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ABSTRACT 
RENEWING A CATHOLIC THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE THROUGH 
 A COMMON WAY OF LIFE: CONSONANCE WITH  
VOWED RELIGIOUS LIFE-IN-COMMUNITY 
 
 
Kent Lasnoski 
 
Marquette University, 2011 
 
 
Beginning with Vatican II‘s call for constant renewal, in light of the council‘s 
universal call to holiness, I analyze and critique modern theologies of Christian marriage, 
especially those identifying marriage as a relationship or as practice. Herein, need 
emerges for a new, ecclesial, trinitarian, and christological paradigm to identify purposes, 
ends, and goods of Christian marriage. The dissertation‘s body develops the foundation 
and framework of this new paradigm: a Common Way in Christ. I find this paradigm by 
putting marriage in dialogue with an ecclesial practice already the subject of rich 
trinitarian, christological, ecclesial theological development: consecrated religious life. 
 
Chapter one outlines two paradigms for marriage (relationship and practice), 
noting their strengths and weaknesses, particularly their need for ecclesial, trinitarian, and 
Christological grounding. Chapter two treats contemporary scholarship relating 
consecrated and conjugal life, finding therein an adversarial narrative and 
dichotomization of the two states. Chapter three counteracts and complicates the 
adversarial narrative by recovering an Augustinian approach to shared ecclesio-nuptial 
goods of virginal and matrimonial life. Chapter four encompasses scriptural consideration 
of Christian life as domestic, as householding with God; it studies principles of Christian 
householding in a variety of Christian householding forms. Chapter five develops the 
theological loci missing from the principles of Christian householding, namely the 
evangelical counsels, the Trinity, and Christology. The final chapter constructs a 
framework for the paradigm of marriage as Common Way in Christ by integrating 
previous chapters‘ insights that present marriage along with consecrated life as a practice, 
as ecclesial, as Christian householding, as trinitarian, and as lived according to a regula 
in Christ‘s own virtues of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The chapter provides 
examples for practicing these virtues and suggests a heuristic for marriage-preparation as 
novitiate. 
 
Major interlocutors are Augustine, Vatican II, John Paul II, Margaret Hogan, 
Bernard Lonergan, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Michael Lawler, Julie Hanlon Rubio, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, David Matzko McCarthy, Jana M. Bennett, Thomas Breidenthal, Francis 
Moloney, Sandra Schneiders, Hans urs von Balthasar, and Marc Cardinal Oullet. Future 
directions would develop the paradigm with focus on ―domestic church‖ and ―parenthood 
as a church‖ in light of emerging householding forms. 
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Christ summons the Church to continual reformation as she sojourns here on earth.
  
—Vatican Council II1 
 
  
INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT, PROBLEM, METHOD, AND ARGUMENT 
 
PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT 
 
 
The Second Vatican Council issued a resounding call to continual renewal and 
reform of theology and practice in the Catholic Church.
2
 In particular, moral and 
systematic theology have undergone tremendous efforts at renewal. Scripture and ―the 
mystery of Christ‖ have taken up a more central place in Catholic theology, and 
theologians have turned to the data of ―experience,‖ the importance of the conscience, 
and the human person as subject as additional theological sources.
3
 
                                                          
1
 The Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio, 6. Unless otherwise noted, all papal and conciliar 
documents are cited from the Vatican website, www.vatican.va. See also, Optatum totius, 16, where the 
Council asks that ―other theological disciplines be renewed through a more living contact with the mystery 
of Christ and the history of salvation. Special care must be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its 
scientific exposition, nourished more on the teaching of the Bible, should shed light on the loftiness of the 
calling of the faithful in Christ and the obligation that is theirs of bearing fruit in charity for the life of the 
world.‖ 
2
 Throughout, I will use ―Church‖ to refer to the Roman Catholic Church; whereas I will use ―church‖ to 
refer to the entire people of God, the entire Church of Christ which subsistit in the Catholic Church (Lumen 
Gentium, 8 [hereafter, LG]). 
3
 Analyses of the trends in moral theology since Vatican II abound. Some have been more critical of the 
distance put between objective moral order and human actions. See Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord 
Jesus, Vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 12–18; Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2007), 1–23 and 36–51; and 
Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P., 3
rd
 ed. 
(Washington: Catholic University of America, 1995). Others provide a narrative more critical of a 
magisterial intransigence and a trend among some theologians toward a seeming unwillingness to leave 
behind ―classical‖ approaches to natural law and intrinsic evil. See Richard Gula, Reason Informed by 
Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality (New York: Paulist, 1989); Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender, and 
Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University, 1996); and Charles Curran, Catholic Moral Theology 
in the United States (Washington: Georgetown University, 2008). 
2 
 
One major focus of attention in this reform and renewal process has been 
marriage and the family.
4
 From the 1930s until the Second Vatican Council, theologians 
and magisterial documents moved away from contractual, institutional language in their 
reflections on marriage, slowly turning toward and eventually favoring covenantal, 
relational, affective language (e.g. conjugal love) to describe marriage and the family.
5
 
Theologies of marriage shifted focus more generally as well: from investigating the 
nature and ends of marriage (ontological interests—linked with Thomism), to describing 
the meanings of marriage and conjugal love (existential, phenomenological interests 
linked with personalist philosophy). Since the Council, which was seen as supporting 
these theological shifts, scholars have sought to build on these developments and address 
continuing problems in the theology of marriage and family in the spirit of authentic 
reform and renewal that is faithful to Christ in Scripture, tradition, and the lived 
experience of the faithful. This dissertation contributes to that renewal through analysis 
of current theological paradigms for understanding marriage and a constructive proposal 
for a new paradigm based in the patristic tradition, Christology, and the Trinity. I will 
                                                          
4
 Definitions of ―family‖ abound. I find Donald A. Miller‘s ―descriptive definition‖ of ―family‖ culled from 
magisterial documents and with attention to the experience of the faithful to be a comprehensive 
representative of those offered. "The family is that secular community of interacting persons united by 
marriage, blood, or adoption which: (1) arises from the social nature of humankind; (2) finds its root in the 
marital covenant (natural or sacramental); (3) relates with society (civil or ecclesial) through a direct and 
reciprocal relationship; (4) forms civil society as its fundamental and foundational unit (and the ecclesial 
community as the domestic church) through the education and socialization of its members; and (5) images 
God's internal relations as Trinity through the internal relations of its members, and God's external relation 
to creation through its external relations to others in terms of civil service (and ecclesial ministry)‖ 
(Concepts of Family Life in Modern Catholic Theology: From Vatican II to ―Christifideles Laici‖ [San 
Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, 1996], 176). Nonetheless, this definition is not entirely adequate for my 
purposes. Even Miller‘s definition presents problems. Miller‘s definition seems too easily to distinguish 
secular, natural characteristics of ―family‖ from ecclesial and Christian characteristics of ―family.‖ I will 
not be relying on the ―family‖ throughout the dissertation. I will instead be referring to terms such as 
―domestic‖ and ―household.‖ These better capture the kind of common life studied and proposed. A 
household can include family but is not limited to family. I am moving beyond what Christian family life is 
like and into questions of how marriage can be lived as a practice of Christian householding. 
5
  E.g., Pius XI, Casti connubii, 23–26, 37, 38; Herbert. Doms, The Meaning of Marriage (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1939); and Dietrich von Hildebrand, Marriage (London: Longmans, 1942). 
3 
 
identify this paradigm as a Common Way in Christ essential to the life of the entire 
Church but shared uniquely by the married and consecrated religious states of life. This 
common way will be an ecclesial, christomorphic practice lived according to principles 
of Christian householding, among them the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and 
obedience integrated by a regula vitae. 
In this introduction, I will set the context for this dissertation‘s investigations by 
providing, first, an overview of certain sociological dynamics of marriage since the 
Second Vatican Council and, second, a presentation of narratives for the marriage crisis 
and its attendant solution. A summary and critique of these narratives will follow with a 
sketch of the dissertation‘s argument as it will proceed through six chapters.  
 
Sex, Love, and Marriage in the U.S.: 1965–2010 
 
Since the Second Vatican Council‘s end, the world has seen radical changes in the 
practice and theory of sexuality and divorce at the cultural, religious, and political levels. 
These shifts have had as many unforeseen as foreseen effects on persons and institutions.
6
 
Marriage itself, as an institution to be entered, is on the decline in the United States.
7
 
                                                          
6
Judith Wallerstein, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25 Year Landmark Study (New York: Hyperion, 
2000). 
7
 See Bradford Wilcox, ed., The State of Our Unions, Marriage in America 2010: When Marriage 
Disappears: The New Middle America, The National Marriage Project (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia, 2010), 62–68, accessed on January 13, 2011, www.stateofourunions.org. The number of 
marriages per 1000 women (ages 15 and older) dropped from 73.5 in 1960 to 36 in 2009. The recent 
economic depression (indicated by rise in unemployment) has decreased divorce, since couples can less 
afford to split their assets, and has also contributed to a relative increase in the declining marriage rate. 
Another explanation for recent trends could be that couples are now more likely to see their marriages as 
economic rather than merely affective partnerships. Interestingly, the link between business cycle and 
marriage rate has decreased since 1865, due in large part to the shift from economic, production-based 
marriages to companionate, consumption-based marriages of two economically independent individuals 
(see Alex Roberts, ―Marriage and the Great Recession,‖ The State of Our Unions 2009: Money and 
4 
 
Unmarried cohabitation and childrearing have dramatically increased over the last 50 
years. According to the authors of the 2010 study out of the National Marriage Project: 
Between 1960 and 2009…the number of cohabitating couples in the United States 
increased more than fifteenfold. About one quarter of unmarried woman age 25 to 
39 are currently living with a partner, and an additional quarter have lived with a 
partner at some time in the past. More than 60 percent of first marriages are now 
preceded by living together, compared to virtually none 50 years ago. For many, 
cohabitation is a prelude to marriage. For others, it is simply better than living 
alone. For a small but growing number, it is considered an alternative to 
marriage.
8
 
 
As evidence suggesting that cohabitation is being increasingly considered an alternative 
to marriage, we see that in 2009, 39 percent of cohabiting-couple households contained 
children.
9
 Not only are fewer adults marrying, but children‘s‘ exposure to marriage has 
dropped as well. In the United States (2009) only 66.7 percent of children lived with two 
married parents,
10
 and despite recent decline in divorce rate, approximately one out of 
two couples who do marry will divorce.
11
 Scholarly and popular opinions across the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Marriage, The National Marriage Project [Piscataway, N.J.: Rutgers University, 2009], 31–48, available at 
www.stateofourunions.org, accessed January 13, 2011). 
8
 Wilcox, et al., State of Our Unions 2010, 75–76; Wilcox, ―When Marriage Disappears: The Retreat from 
Marriage in Middle America,‖ in The State of Our Unions 2010, 13–61; and Wilcox et al., The State of Our 
Unions 2009, 83–85. 
9
 State of Our Unions 2010, 75, 92. This percentage is just down from 2008, when it was over 40% (State 
of Our Unions 2009, 83–85). 
10
State of Our Unions 2010, 90.  
11
 The percentages of marriage ending in divorce is a contested statistic. There are multiple ways to 
calculate the divorce rate. One method compares the number of divorces per annum to the number of 
marriages per annum. The weakness of this method is principally that the marriages ended are not the ones 
begun. In a sense the comparison is between apples and oranges. A second method looks at the total 
number of people who have been married as a group and counts the number who have divorced. The 
strength of this method is that it allows for comparisons among years. For example, in the year 2001 people 
between the age of 50 and 59 had the highest probability of being divorced (41 % of men and 39 % of 
women).Another strength of this method is that it allows for meaningful comparisons over years. For 
example, people marrying after 1975 had a better chance of reaching their 10
th
 and 15
th
 anniversary than 
people marrying before that year. Finally, this method allows for distinctions between groups based on 
education, ethnicity, and age entering marriage. For example, since the 1980s, the percentage of college 
graduates reporting a divorce has declined (16% of these ended in divorce before 10 years); whereas 
divorce percentage for those without college has remained steady (36% of these marriages end in divorce 
before 10 years). Given that 60% of divorces happen with in the first ten years of marriage, this would 
mean that, among the population marrying between 1990 and 1994, 60% of marriages among those without 
undergraduate degrees end in divorce, and only 25% of marriages among those with undergraduate degrees 
will eventually end in divorce. See Steven Martin, ―Women‘s Changing Attitudes Toward Divorce, 1974–
5 
 
political and theological spectrum generally agree that these demographic changes are 
harmful to persons and society in general; it is generally agreed that marriage needs 
reform and renewal.
12
 
Within this context, social institutions of all kinds have made an effort to renew 
and support the theory and practice of marriage and family.
13
 Among those working from 
explicitly religious institutions, theologies of marriage have seen many and varied 
attempts at authentic reform in theory and practice: from Rome‘s Pontifical Council for 
the Family, to the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops‘ National Pastoral 
Initiative on Marriage,
14
 to secular institutes and associations of lay faithful (Schoenstaat, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2002: Evidence for an Educational Crossover,‖ Journal of Marriage and Family 68.1 (2006): 29–40; and 
Dan Hurley, ―Divorce Rate: It‘s Not as High as You Think,‖ New York Times, April 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.divorcereform.org/nyt05.html, accessed on November 17, 2009. 
12
 See, for example, Lawrence Stone, ―The Family Crisis Today,‖ in Christopher Wolfe, ed., The Family, 
Civil Society, and the State (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 17–21; Allan Carlson, ―The 
State‘s Assault on the Family,‖ in Wolfe, The Family, Civil Society, and the State, 39–51;  David Popenoe, 
Life Without Father: Compelling New Evidence that Fatherhood and Marriage are Indispensable for the 
Good of Children and Society (New York: Martin Kessler, 1996); and National Commission on Children, 
Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and Families (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1991). There are ―classic‖ texts on the crisis of family in the United States, e.g., 
Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New York: Basic Books, 1977); 
and Carnegie Council, ed. Kenneth Keniston, All Our Children: American Families Under Pressure (New 
York: Harcourt, 1977). 
13
 There are numerous non-religious efforts to defend and save marriage. The United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, through its Administration for Children and Families has its own ―Healthy 
Marriage Initiative,‖ accessed on January 13, 2011, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/index.html. Its 
mission is ―To help couples, who have chosen marriage for themselves, gain greater access to marriage 
education services, on a voluntary basis, where they can acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to form 
and sustain a healthy marriage.‖ With their $150 million budget, they fund programs such as the ―National 
Healthy Marriage Resource Center‖ (www.healthymarriageinfo.org). Some type of marital education, 
preparation, and restoration program is available in nearly every state. A program named ―Think Marriage‖ 
(www.thinkmarriage.org) has a list of websites of local efforts to renew marriage in almost every state. The 
typical language used by explicitly non-religious effort to talk about their mission is the term ―healthy 
relationships.‖ These non-religious programs are goal-oriented: reduce divorce, reduce non-married 
cohabitation (for non-religious reasons), increase the wellbeing of children and married persons, and give 
dating people techniques for finding a good mate. They also typically provide facts about marriage and 
resources for counselors (e.g., how to put together a good marketing strategy to educate couples of different 
cultural backgrounds). These deserve their own study, but I can only give them brief mention here as I 
focus on those efforts coming explicitly from a religious, Christian context. 
14
 The USCCB, for example, has created a number of pastoral initiatives not only for marriage preparation 
(e.g., use of the FOCCUS and mandatory marriage-prep classes) but also for marital formation (e.g., the 
―For Your Marriage‖ website [www.foryourmarriage.com]). In the 1992, the USCCB put out a family-
centered catechesis campaign called ―Children and Families First,‖ which attempted to introduce families 
6 
 
Opus Dei, Community of the Beatitudes, etc.), to diocesan centers for marriage and 
family (e.g. Milwaukee‘s John Paul II Center), to the programs of each local parish, to 
marriage and family centers at various Catholic universities, and finally to the efforts of 
individual theologians.
15
  
Though each of these efforts merits its own study, in my analysis, I will focus 
chiefly on the efforts of contemporary theologians, who have identified developments in 
Catholic theology of marriage as well as problems preventing reform and renewal in 
magisterial, Catholic theologies of marriage.  
 
Beginning with a Narrative 
 
Stanley Hauerwas states that there can be no single story of how family has 
changed over the past century and that perhaps ―nothing is more problematic than claims 
about how the family has changed.‖16 In part, this attempt presents such a challenge 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to the notion of ―domestic church‖ and help families in the task of being the first religious educators of 
their children. 
15
 I cannot list here all the attempts at theologies of marriage since the Second Vatican Council, but I can 
distinguish among kinds of work by Catholics on marriage since the council: feminist (e.g., Susan Ross, 
Christina Traina, and Rosemary Radford Ruether); personalist (John Paul II, Angelo Cardinal Scola, and 
Vincent J. Genovesi); neo-Augustinian (Jana M. Bennett and John Cavadini); neo-thomist (Germain Grisez, 
Robert P. George, and Janet Smith), covenant-based (John F. Kippley, Walter Kasper), virtue-based 
(Patrick G. Riley, Elizabeth Anscombe), social-ethics based (Lisa Sowle Cahill and Julie Hanlon Rubio), 
trinitarian (Marc Cardinal Oullet), pastoral (from the bishops‘ national conferences); and magisterial (papal 
writings from Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI). Some of the effective lay ministry efforts at 
preparing, forming, and renewing Catholic marriage through the twentieth century have been the Cana 
Conference, the  Worldwide Marriage Encounter program, Retrouvaille, Alexander House, the Christian 
Family Movement,  and more. For a substantial list, see the National Association of Catholic Family Life 
Ministers website, accessed on January 13, 2011, 
http://www.nacflm.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=27.  
16
 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1981), chap. 8, at 158. For Hauerwas‘ other work on marriage, 
which is largely reiterative, see ―Family Grace: The Christian Family and the Difference It Can Make for 
the American Family,‖ in Grace upon Grace: Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Langford, ed. Robert K. 
Johnston, L. Gregory Jones, Jonathan R. Wilson (Nashville: Abingdon, 1999); ―Sex in Public: How 
Adventurous Christians are Doing it (1978),‖ in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael 
7 
 
because the world has always contained a plurality of family forms. Nonetheless, 
multiple narratives of how the family has changed have been put forward, usually in 
conjunction with various analyses of what marriage is and what we are doing in marriage.  
Here, I analyze narratives of marriage offered by Stanley Hauerwas, Lisa Sowle 
Cahill, David Matzko McCarthy, Julie Hanlon Rubio, and Jana M. Bennett. These follow 
chronologically as well as logically from one another. All owe a debt to Hauerwas, who 
began the conversation with its particular focus in Christian social ethics and its ecclesio-
centrism. The rest of the authors carry forward, add a distinctively Catholic attitude 
toward, or diverge from his insights. Hauerwas opened the floodgates by sounding the 
alarm that we are building a society of ―individuals‖ for which marital breakdown is a 
natural corollary, the kind of society that radically voluntarizes all interpersonal 
relationships along the lines of contractual logic. Cahill has drawn attention to the 
contribution of poverty and feminism to the challenges of marital life. McCarthy speaks 
in terms of married life as reproductive, that is, it reproduces not only persons with 
certain virtues and vices but also an economy, a way of ordering and transacting 
ourselves and our resources publicly. Rubio‘s narrative highlights the philosophical shifts 
that have accompanied changes in marital practices. Finally, Bennett tells the story of a 
social, political, and theological march toward ever-rising expectations for marriage and 
the family to save society. In ways commensurate to their narrative of the marriage crisis, 
each author will suggest a refocus on the relationship between the church and the family.            
In 1981, Hauerwas bemoaned the standard, ―boring‖ account of the ―crisis‖ of 
marriage and family: Marriage and the family are seen as per se good, something without 
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which the human person cannot become a socialized moral being, but then statistics on 
divorce, child delinquency, domestic violence, the demands of women‘s liberation, rising 
sexual immorality, and hedonistic flight from responsibility are supposed to demonstrate 
that family is in a crisis. Finally, the story continues, a solution is offered: the state should 
support and encourage a return to so-called traditional family values.
17
 Parents need 
―experts‖ to fill the gaps of their own relational and educational inadequacies. They 
cannot manage their marriages or educate their children without professional 
intervention.
18
 Rejecting this narrative, Hauerwas claims that ―we lack the moral and 
linguistic skills to express adequately what has happened to us and what we do in 
families.‖19 For Hauerwas, the problem is that we are telling ourselves the wrong story.  
In light of what were then new studies by Christopher Lasch and Kenneth 
Keniston,
20
 Hauerwas offers a now common socio-political narrative of changes in the 
family: (1) the large, extended patriarchal family has been replaced by the small, nuclear 
family; (2) the small democratic family has lost three of the family‘s former social 
functions—economic, protective, and educational; (3) the family has taken on what is 
claimed to be the new, ―more profound and rewarding purpose‖ of specializing in 
emotions; and (4) this relatively new nuclear family is the natural correlative to the 
industrial revolution—it is ―not characterized by how many people live under the same 
roof, but by the privileged emotional climate that must be protected from outside 
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intrusion.‖21 This last point is where Hauerwas‘s insight breaks through. We tell 
ourselves that marriage and family are disappearing, that they need to be saved so that 
they can save society, yet our very approach to marriage as a society (as a place of 
voluntary, emotional commitments intended (ironically) to prepare persons for an 
eventual disconnection and autonomy from those commitments) is the problem. The 
problem of marital breakdown is not rooted in moral turpitude. Rather, marital 
breakdown flows necessarily from the very moral convictions linked to modern history—
autonomy and atomism (even within marriage) and the desire to create dichotomies 
between family and individual, work and leisure, public and private life in the interest of 
true equity and justice.
22
 The narrative of changes in marriage has been, for Hauerwas, a 
flight from non-voluntary relationships, from the fact of biological relatedness.
23
 In our 
zeal to create a family founded in the name of intimacy, we have become the kind of 
people incapable of the commitment and intimacy an enduring marriage and family 
require.
24
 With Robert Nisbet, Hauerwas states that politically, family membership has 
become superfluous, since the unit relating to the state is the individual and not the family.  
In quotidian and cultural roles the family has also lost its central role. According 
to Hauerwas‘s story, the family is a practical, economical hindrance to the individual‘s 
success and is merely an accidental quality of the worker as far as the employer is 
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concerned. This fact will be significant for my consideration of poverty as a virtue and 
state necessary for Christian householding in marriage. In terms of tradition, the family is 
no longer its bearer, since parents delusionally think they are making their children free 
by allowing them to ―choose their own‖ beliefs and traditions.25 The irony of this 
historical trend is that despite the bombast from the pulpit and senate about the 
indispensability of the family, it has actually been rendered socially dispensable on 
purpose—so that it might be a center of emotionalism, companionship, and affect. The 
social roles and importance of the family have not been slain by radical immorality and 
hedonism, but they have been sacrificed on the altar of an individualistic economic and 
political order.
26
  
Hauerwas‘s solution is simple yet complex: the state cannot save marriage and the 
family, nor will a mythical return to morality. Marriage and the family need not be 
―saved.‖ They must be held accountable. Hauerwas suggests replacing the political 
rhetoric of ―support‖ with the challenge of ―accountability‖ and demands that families 
understand their primary realm of belonging to be not the state or civil society but the 
church. For Catholic Christians, then, the Church has the task of standing over against 
what Hauerwas calls the ―demonic‖ tendencies of family in modern society, calling 
spouses to recognize the non-voluntary relationships and realities of their life and to live 
married life as a radical Christian practice, a practice of welcoming the stranger and 
loving the enemy—especially when that stranger is the child given by God, and the 
enemy is the person with whom one shares a bed.
27
 For the rest of his career, Hauerwas‘s 
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work on marriage and family has echoed and continued this theme.
28
 He has persistently 
called for a renewed understanding of why we get married and have children at all: as an 
act of eschatological hope, an acknowledgement of the fact that, although the world is not 
safe for children, we receive them anyway, as a stranger, as Christ among us. As a key to 
Christian social ethics, and the ethics of marriage and family, Hauerwas continually 
emphasizes the uniquely Christian virtue of hospitality. A true Christian ―‗separateness‘,‖ 
he writes, ―may involve nothing more nor less than the Christian community‘s 
willingness to provide hospitality for the stranger—particularly when that stranger so 
often comes in the form of our own children.‖29 Hauerwas, thus, warns us that the more 
we focus on making safe for children the world, that is, the more we attempt to ensure the 
material and public conditions conducive to children‘s material wellbeing, the less effort 
we tend to expend preparing social conditions conducive to children‘s personal wellbeing, 
that is, the less we tend to become the kinds of persons who welcome children as an act 
of Christian hope and hospitality. 
Since Hauerwas‘s intervention, and with it the beginning of theological 
approaches to marriage and family from a renewed perspective of the common good, 
Christian social ethics, and virtue, ever more narratives have been offered to fill the gap 
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in our linguistic inability to make sense of what is happening to the family and what we 
are doing in marriage and the family. Lisa Sowle Cahill, for her part, has written two 
works touching the subject: the first, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, was a product of 
the Religion, Culture, and Family Project run by Don Browning out of the University of 
Chicago; and the second, Family: A Christian Social Perspective, is a result of the 
commission set up by Cahill (then president of the CTSA) in 1993 at the request of 
Cardinal Bernardin, who was at that time the head of the USCCB‘s committee on 
marriage and family. I will focus here on the narrative provided by the second of the two 
works.
30
  
For Cahill, the story of the ―family in crisis‖ is really two stories. Both follow 
upon Hauerwas‘s account of the family‘s move away from non-voluntary relationships 
and toward a strict voluntarization of marital and family life. On the one hand, rising 
consumerism, individualism, and moral permissiveness have led to a breakdown in the 
durability of the marital institution. This is true on two levels. First, for the middle and 
upper class, marriage is increasingly weak due to the pressures of having and buying 
more and more. This fact, along with the ideal that marriage will be a place of exclusive 
emotional closeness and personal fulfillment, leads people to leave the institution when it 
no longer serves them. Second, for the working class and the poor, on the other hand, 
marriage in many cases appears to be a non-option, as many of the poor are practically 
locked into life situations inimicable to good marriage—marriage, for example, may 
simply not be viable given the crushing hours of work required just to get by at a menial 
salary, accompanied by the relative absence of marriageable (i.e., employed) men among 
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the impoverished.
31
 In other words, the typical story of the ―conservative‖ ―family values‖ 
ideal of marriage and family is only possible for the middle class, is actually destructive 
to the middle class, and propagates further disruption of marriage and family among the 
poor and working class. In a phrase that sounds eerily Hauerwasian, Cahill states that 
―family belonging is potentially idolatrous, a socially acceptable form of arrogance and 
greed.‖32 This notion could well be compared to what Hauerwas called the ―demonic 
tendencies‖ of the marriage and the modern nuclear family. 
At the same time, Cahill notes a second narrative. Marriage has been challenged 
by the liberating force of feminism, which has diversified gender roles within the family 
and wider society. Unfortunately, while the force of feminism has broken down 
oppressive structures, it has yet to offer better ―ideals of kin-derived spousal and parental 
relationships or of how families serve the common good of society and are served by 
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it.‖33 Thus, what is left is the tendency to accept any family structure on account of the 
values of compassion, love, and inclusion. For Cahill, the feminist freedom from 
oppressive structures and into voluntary choice of family form runs the risk of forgetting 
the importance of ―body,‖ of ―kinship,‖ the non-voluntary nature of marriage and family. 
For Cahill, marriage incorporates some of these non-voluntary elements, for it is ―a 
consensual and contractual manner of uniting kin groups, especially for the purposes of 
reproduction, and for the perpetuation of the kinship structures through which social and 
economic resources are managed.‖34      
 In light of her definition of marriage above, Cahill proposes a solution to the 
destruction of marriage and family that includes an end and a method. First, she calls for 
a reimagination of marriage as the formation of a community that is fundamentally 
concerned with the common good rather than its own, private good. Second, the means 
for reordering marriage toward the common good is to reduce the gap between the family 
and the church. As she argues, ―identification of the Christian family with the church is 
one way of transforming an important formative institution of civil society—family—to 
represent better and to educate for Christian values and practices."
35
 Cahill is nonetheless 
careful to note that, although the family may be truly a symbol of God‘s reign and may be 
conformed to the shape of his church, there always remains the threat that patriarchal 
structures and power struggles will be re-imported from the Church‘s hierarchy into the 
family, or from the family‘s structure back into the Church.36 ―The Christian family,‖ she 
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reminds readers, ―is not the nuclear family focused inward on the welfare of its own 
members but the socially transformative family that seeks to make the Christian moral 
ideal of love of neighbor part of the common good.‖37 Cahill sees the family as an 
institution of civil society, working alongside the Church, ―which must realize its social 
importance and is to embody discipleship in all the concrete ways and in all the particular 
relationships that make up their daily existence, with all its complicated ties to others 
near and far.‖38 
The distinctions here between Hauerwas‘s solution and Cahill‘s solution are both 
pronounced and subtle. In the dialogue between church and family there is always the 
question of who has the controlling interest in the shared task of Christian life. The 
differences between Hauerwas and Cahill deal with this question. While Hauerwas sees 
that marriage is only intelligible within the church, Cahill finds marriage and family best 
understood alongside the church, or even as church. Hauerwas calls the church to hold 
marriage and the family accountable while Cahill calls families to do the work of the 
church and hold the church accountable to the gospel of Jesus. Second, between Cahill 
and Hauerwas there is a distinction of emphasis. For Cahill, the direction of effect is 
primarily from the authentic Christian family to the Church—that is, Christian marriage 
forms a social institution that must enliven and do the authentic work of the Church. 
Hauerwas emphasizes the opposite directionality. For Hauerwas, each person is first 
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Christian and second married. The church gives marriage its shape and asks the spouses 
in their conjugal life to be church by participating in the story of the church. The church 
has the dominant place in the dialogue between church and family. The church issues an 
invitation to Christians to live as Christians in a particular, spousal way. For Cahill, on 
the other hand, the family is ―an institution of civil society,‖ just as the church is ―one of 
the more local forms‖ of civil society.39 The family analogically becomes church 
whenever it does the work of the church. For Hauerwas, this would not be the case. The 
church is not placed alongside marriage and family as just another institution of civil 
society mediating between the individual and the state. The ecclesial community is the 
human person‘s primary location of belonging, and the family‘s primary location is 
within the church. Neither exists in some middle ground between the individual and the 
state. Rather the church exists in a certain sense as community competing with the state 
for primary social context in which each person will participate making and living a 
given narrative of life. 
McCarthy enters this discussion with a narrative that uses a different kind of 
grammar, although he also describes the shift in the shape of the family along the 
trajectory of the flight from non-voluntary (kinship, local community) to strictly 
voluntary (contractual-individualist) relationships, even within the home. McCarthy 
offers a reproductive narrative; he calls his own work ―an attempt to renarrate the home 
and the domestication of love and sex as the venture of a rich social life.‖40 His suggests 
that marriage and family, as reproductive institutions, naturally reproduce not only 
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human persons with certain virtues, vices, and desires, but an economy, that is, a way of 
ordering and transacting ourselves and our resources. The story of marriage and family in 
crisis, is (as it was with Hauerwas) not a question of whether ―the family‖ would 
disappear, but a question of what kind of family, church, and civil society we want to 
have. McCarthy argues that a dominant cause of the problem with marriage is economic, 
but not in the sense that Cahill points out. Cahill attends to the economic impact of 
poverty while McCarthy emphasizes the economic impact of middle-class life. The 
Western world, he argues, operates on a market economy of desire wherein the principal 
participant is the autonomous individual and the central form of relationship is the 
contract—despite the glut of market and political rhetoric stating that the family is the 
source of society. Ever since this form of economy has emerged, marriage as an 
institution has struck a deal of sorts with the state: (1) the state imposes a financial bond 
between the wage-earning parents and their dependents and supports the family with tax 
benefits; (2) the state provides aid and training in productive civic life through public 
education; (3) the state alleviates the burdens of childrearing through public education so 
that both parents can be more involved with the market economy; (4) and in return, the 
family cooperates in the reproduction of the current contractual, individual-based social 
order. As he concludes, ―the family is steward to the state, and it will perform its function 
well if familial relations serve the dominant market economy. Children enter the public 
sphere primarily as consumers who dispose of their parents' income."
41
 The current social 
order requires that marriage and family remain the central ―emotional unit‖ but not a 
productive unit. Being spouses and being family must be more an endeavor of what we 
consume together in the pursuit of making emotional connection in leisure than what we 
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produce together in the pursuit of making substantive connections
42
 in shared pursuit of a 
common good. 
Therein lies McCarthy‘s proposed solution—right within the problem. The 
problem is that marriage and family are reproducing the wrong kind of economic, social 
order. They are acting as the stewards for the wrong institution. They are looking to 
reproduce the basic unit of the wrong kind of society. For McCarthy, to end the crisis of 
marriage and family, we must ―set ourselves to cultivating a social landscape that 
reproduces love and passion of a different kind.‖43 The church bears the story of God 
from generation to generation, in mission, worship, and pedagogy, reproducing Christ‘s 
presence in the world again and again. The family, which traditions first the qualities and 
characteristics of human flourishing to the next generation, shares in the way of the 
church. To love with the love of God, we are called to live as community, as an embodied 
interpretation, through time, within a different oikos—of the world as the household of 
God. McCarthy proposes replacing the contractual individualism and market economy of 
desire with reciprocal interdependence and a household economy of common endeavor. 
In opposition to the ―closed,‖ nuclear family turned in upon itself, McCarthy proposes an 
―open‖ household that is essentially turned outward to participate in the common good of 
the immediate community. In this regard, his solution sounds similar to Cahill‘s. In 
reality, though, the solutions are distinct. For Cahill, the family must be turned outward 
because only then can it fully realize the potential that lies within it—that is, to 
                                                          
42
 ―Substantive connections‖ are those that dispose persons to act for each other‘s good apart from one‘s 
own immediate satisfaction. Substantive connections are formed by the goods that persons share, that is, 
common goods. Persons will be connected substantially inasmuch as they have worked for the achievement 
of the good together. A substantive connection might be a virtue, a child, a home, etc.  
43
 Ibid., 64. McCarthy‘s link to Hauerwas, though not explicitly stated, is clear. McCarthy proposes that 
marriage be ecclesially reproductive: the steward of Christ in the church rather than the steward of the state 
in civil society. Marriage must participate primarily in the economy of salvation, living out the story of 
Christ‘s own life, death, and resurrection.  
19 
 
participate in the life of the church by radically taking up Christ‘s concern for the poor 
and the neighbor. For McCarthy, the family must turn outward because it requires 
substantial aid beyond what can be found in the I-thou spousal relationship.
44
 The kind of 
external support accepted will determine the kind of society that is reproduced.  
At this point McCarthy develops his strong sacramental theology of marriage. 
Marriage, as a sacrament of the Church, ―has a basic structure that precedes them [the 
spouses] and they accept that they will have to bend to it.‖ Their marriage as a sacrament 
is ―framed in the church by its place as a sign of God‘s grace and the journey of 
discipleship.‖45 Marriage, if it is to reproduce an economy of reciprocal interdependence, 
and self-giving relationships of love, must be located within the church. As a sacrament, 
marriage is ―a set of practices not in isolation but open to transformation by God‘s 
gracious communion as routinized in the social body of the church.‖46 Sex and the other 
practices of marriage will fail if they are seen as wrapped in a private realm of the family 
home. The life of marriage and ―sex in the church is public, but not in the sense that it is 
openly visible, but in the sense that it is sustained institutionally by practices supporting 
goods not particular to marriage.‖47    
 Behind the kinds of narratives told by Hauerwas, Cahill, and McCarthy lies a 
complex web of philosophical assumptions. Julie Hanlon Rubio, in her book A Christian 
Theology of Marriage and Family, attempts to tell the story of the marital crisis in terms 
of those philosophical assumptions. The challenge to marriage and the family, for Rubio, 
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has arrived along with and related to the philosophical shift from modernism to 
postmodernism.
48
  
On the cultural level she describes the shift in the normative force from ―family‖ 
to ―families.‖49 According to Rubio, the modernist way of thinking, linked with the 
scientific revolution, empirical realism, and an epistemological trust in human ability to 
know objective reality, attempts to discover a definition of ―the family.‖50 In this 
―modernist‖ camp, Rubio places the Catholic Magisterium, along with political and 
Christian ―conservatives,‖ who she claims imagine a traditional family structure, the 
return to which will save marriage and family in crisis. The thought is that there is one 
normative definition of ―the family,‖ which can direct couples in their lives. According to 
Rubio, the Magisterium works on a respectable, though too rigid idealism for ―the family,‖ 
which ultimately blinds it to and makes it irrelevant to the existential realities of actual 
families.
51
 According to political conservatives, liberal social policies have worn away 
public support for ―the family‖52 as foundation of civil society, and according to religious 
                                                          
48
 See Michael Welker, ―Modernity,‖ Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel Vrede van 
Huyssteen, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2003), 579–82; David Ingram, ―Postmodernism,‖ 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Donald Borchert, vol. 7, second ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 
2006), 729–31.  
49
 Julie Hanlon Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), 3–
18. 
50
 For a similar approach based on philosophical shifts, see Edward C. Vacek, ―The Meaning of Marriage: 
Of Two Minds,‖ Perspectives on Marriage: A Reader, ed. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren, third edition 
(New York: Oxford University, 2007), 134–46. 
51
 Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 18–22. This position is not unique to Rubio, but is the typical 
critique of John Paul II‘s theology of marriage and sexuality. See, for example, Susan Ross in ―The 
Bridegroom and the Bride,‖ 39–59, e.g., at 41; Cristina Traina, ―Papal Ideals, Marital Realities,‖ in ibid., 
269–288. See also, Jon Nilson, ―The Church and Homosexuality: A Lonerganian Approach,‖ in Sexual 
Diversity and Catholicism, 60–76, at 69–72. Nilson‘s is a similar approach. He marshals Lonerganian 
language to accuse the Catholic magisterium of operating with a blind spot, a scotosis that has become kind 
of bias. 
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 Rubio, Christian Theology, 9. For Rubio, these political ―conservatives‖ see ―the family‖ in terms of 
heterosexual union, lifelong fidelity, certain authority of parents over children, and gendered division of 
labor in the home. The political ―liberals,‖ on the other hand, see the state as necessary for a family to 
properly raise children and reject the idea of one, traditional family. 
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―conservatives,‖ moral turpitude and impiety have led people away from ―the family‖ as 
revealed in Scripture.  
Rubio places herself, along with Michael Lawler, in the postmodern camp, among 
those who believe that the crisis of marriage and the family is actually just an honest 
recognition that, ―because of our diverse experiences of family life, we have begun to 
visualize different family models. No single model seems adequate.‖53 For Rubio, the 
story is not that family structure has been radically destabilized by a growing moral 
permissiveness and the rise of feminism, rather, the story has been one of a coming to 
know that there never has been any single ―family‖ with normative power in civil society. 
Interestingly, Rubio comes to this insight through a methodological irony: her coming-to-
know takes place in a postmodern turn toward epistemological skepticism, a doubting 
about our very ability to know at all.
54
  
The key to understanding Rubio‘s narrative for marriage and family is twofold: (1) 
attention to experience over against abstract ideals; and (2) the contribution of sociology, 
which has found that there has always been ―families‖ and the notion of ―the family‖ has 
                                                          
53
 See Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 3. 
54
 Rubio is not alone in postulating a philosophical connection to changes in the shape of and definition of 
―family.‖ There are those who trace the shift from ―family‖ to ―families‖ all the way back to medieval 
nominalism. Such is the proposal of Stratford M. Caldecott in his presentation at the Twenty-Second 
Annual Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. ―For if, as the nominalists taught, only 
individual things exist, not universals, then what the ancient and medieval world understood as metaphysics 
is dead in the water. Philosophy moves rapidly through dualism to positivism, until it finally dissolves into 
the language games played by the analytic school on one side of the English Channel and the 
postmodernists on the other…At the social level, to those living in the long shadows of nominalism, the 
word ‗society‘ itself can mean little more than an aggregate of individuals, bonding through self-interest 
and joined together by contract…Stripped down to this atomic level, even the ‗nuclear family of children 
and parents is quickly split into its elemental particles, and we are told that most marriages begun in the late 
twentieth century will end in divorce‖ (―The Drama of the Home: Marriage, the Common Good, and Public 
Policy,‖ in Marriage and the Common Good, ed. Kenneth D. Whitehead [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine‘s 
Press, 2001], 1–26, at 18–19). 
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always been mythical.
55
 For Rubio the very plurality of families negates the possibility of 
any single version of marriage and family that is normative. Our criteria for judging what 
marriage and family does can now only be function not form. The link between the two, 
on Rubio‘s account, is severed.  
Rubio‘s solution is to say that regardless of a family‘s form, Christian families 
should focus on their function. In other words, Christian spouses and parents should 
rediscover their dual vocation: as a communion of disciples in the private life of the home, 
and as public witnesses to Christ and workers in the sanctification of the world in the 
public life of work.
56
 Furthermore, the family must focus on its Christian calling as 
domestic church to participate in service to the poor. Rubio provides examples of sitting 
on one‘s front porch, having a family meal, using preferential option for the poor in 
making buying decisions, and working in a job that explicitly contributes to the common 
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 Rubio writes, ―Liberals (postmodernists) and conservatives (modernists) approach family issues in very 
different ways. Liberals are concerned with showing that families have been and continue to be diverse. 
The ethical imperative for them is valuing, supporting, and uplifting families as they are. Conservatives, on 
the other hand, are concerned with showing that family structure has been fairly consistently lived out by 
people across time and culture and affirmed in religious traditions,‖ Christian Theology of Marriage, 18. 
Rubio relies on Michael Lawler, whose book  Family: American and Christian (Chicago: Loyola 
University, 1998) puts forth this claim. See also, Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American 
Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and Coontz, Marriage, A History: From 
Obedience to Intimacy, or how Love Conquered Marriage (New York: Basic Books, 2005). Coontz shows 
that plurality of family forms is not novel. The plurality of family forms has been and continues to be a 
complex mix of necessity and choice, of cultural formation and economic situation. At the descriptive level, 
then, ―family‖ requires a pluralistic definition. Even at the normative level, there is a plurality to family 
forms, as each authoritative, formative social body has its own set of acceptable family forms. This 
dissertation concerns itself explicitly with those who situate themselves within the authoritative, formative 
social body of the Church. In other words, at the descriptive and normative level, the Church has a plurality 
of family forms, but a very limited plurality. The criteria for determining the normative family forms will 
be explicitly Catholic for those families formed in the Church. This dissertation, though, is less concerned 
with ―family‖ understood as a group of persons bonded by legal kinship or biological relation, and more 
concerned with households, or persons engaged in stable domestic practices together. In particular the 
dissertation looks at Christian households, that is, those groups of persons (some married, some not) 
engaged in stable domestic life according to explicitly Christian principles. This dissertation studies and 
argues for the normative principles (e.g., poverty, chastity, and obedience) that ground the descriptive 
plurality Christian householding forms (e.g., conjugal living and consecrated religious life).   
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 Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 189, 199; Rubio, ―The Dual Vocation of Christian Parents,‖ 
Theological Studies 63 (2002): 786–812. 
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good.
57
 As for the role of the Church in the solution, Rubio finds the Church at its best 
when it finds ways to affirm, by attention to the experience of families in all their forms, 
and call those families to share in the sanctification of the home and the world beyond its 
walls. She gives examples of these affirmations from the writings of the U.S. bishops as 
contrasts to the papal writings on marriage and ―the family.‖58  
 While Rubio‘s narrative identifies a shift from modern to postmodern 
philosophical tendencies, McCarthy lays blame on a movement toward the ―romantic 
ideal‖ of marriage begun in 19th century and propagated by personalist philosophy and its 
corresponding theologies of marriage and sexuality. Within Catholicism, his critique falls 
on what he calls a ―transcendental sexuality,‖ which tries to out-romantic the ―romantic 
ideal‖ of marriage as complete, passionate union of persons that is disconnected from 
productive, economic concerns. These theologies—among them the work of Andrew 
Greeley, Mary Greeley Durkin, and John Paul II—find in marriage a relationship in 
which each spouse is turned toward the other, locked in an I-thou stare wherein they find 
themselves, by giving themselves completely to and for the other. McCarthy is wary of 
such an approach, for ―the unique face-to-face love brings us outside ourselves, but it has 
no clear connection to the side-by-side nature of quotidian endeavors.‖59 The threat of 
this kind of theology is that it takes the joy out of everyday activities, always pushing the 
true identity of marriage into somewhere beyond, some liminal moment of total 
abandon.
60
 This kind of theology, says McCarthy, asks too much of the spousal 
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 Ibid., 186, 189, 192, 194. 
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 Ibid., 20. Specifically, she refers to the 1994 document Follow the Way of Love, available at 
http://www.usccb.org/laity/follow.shtml, accessed on February 11, 2011. 
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 McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home, 64. 
60
 At the extreme, this tendency to focus on the I-Thou relational aspect of marriage can lead to what 
Anthony Giddens has called the ―pure relationship,‖ that operates on what Nick Luhmnan calls ―love as 
passion‖ (quoted in McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home, 209). When combined, these principles result in 
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relationship in marriage and asks too much of the spouses, and hopes too much for the 
completeness of their conjugal relationship. 
 It is this insight that Jana M. Bennett picks up, names, and develops in her 2008 
monograph, Water is Thicker than Blood: An Augustinian Spirituality of Marriage and 
Singleness. Bennett tells the story of a social, political, and theological march toward ever 
rising expectation for marriage and the family.
61
 Sharing much with those we have heard 
before, her narrative sees the expectations for marriage and family rise as the emotive, 
―relational‖ aspects of marriage have taken controlling interest in the discussion and 
practice of marriage and family. Bennett‘s story ends in what she calls a false 
eschatology of the family. She begins by rejecting the narrative emerging from Don 
Browning‘s Religion, Culture, and Family project. ―The path the Religion, Culture, and 
Family Project sets is a falsely eschatological one,‖ she argues. ―Browning, among others, 
has made these [largely feminist] concerns ultimate precisely by suggesting that the 
savior of the world, or at least of our broken American society, must be a good, 
functioning family.‖62 Ironically, this project starts with the family as ―problem,‖ and 
ends with more ―family‖ as the solution.63 The Religion, Culture, and Family project 
                                                                                                                                                                             
―a situation where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person 
from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only insofar as it is thought by both 
parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual party to stay with it‖ (Anthony Giddens, The 
Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies [Stanford: Stanford 
University, 1992], 58). This situation occurs because the contractual market logic has invaded and taken 
over the workings of even the ―romantic ideal‖ of marriage. Adrian Thatcher has also pointed out the 
dangers of the ―pure relationship‖ in his book Marriage after Modernity: Christian Marriage in 
Postmodern Times, Studies in Theology and Sexuality 3 (Sheffield, U.K.: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 47–
52. 
61
 Jana M. Bennett, Water Is Thicker than Blood: An Augustinian Spirituality of Marriage and Singleness 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 2008). 
62
 Ibid., 8, 155. 
63
 Ibid., 15. For example of the Browning‘s work see Marriage and Modernization: How Globalization 
Threatens Marriage and What to Do about It, ed. Don Browning and David Clairmont (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2003). See also Browning‘s website for the Religion, Culture, and Family Project. For Bennett, 
marriage and family requires a rich participation in the sacramental, eschatological mystery of Christ. If not, 
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wants to offer religious resources to the social and cultural attempts to fix the family. The 
rise of mobile, individualist culture in a consumption-first market economy has created 
marriages that produce the kind of people ever more disconnected from and alien to 
family, neighbor, and church. According to this narrative, the savior of society will be 
better, stronger marriages and families, but the construction of functioning families 
requires informational input from the ―religious resources‖ of theology and the church.64  
If the good functioning of society rests on having good marriage and families, as 
several of the theologians discussed in chapter 1 seem to argue, it is not because 
good marriages and families necessarily lead to the best of the well-ordered, 
happy society. This way of thinking leads toward falsely eschatological ideals. 
Rather, good marriage and families, but even more so, good households, in the 
thicker sense of the word and in the sense of being directed toward Christ, are 
sacramental and direct all of humanity toward its ultimate end in God. This is 
political and this is development of good citizenship, but not the citizenship we 
might first have imagined.
65
  
 
According to the narrative Bennett here resists, marriage is an institution of civil society, 
existing primarily alongside other institutions, such as the Church, and the claim is made 
that the church has particular ways of thinking and living an ethic of love that can help 
marriage and the family flourish as perhaps greatest of all institutions of civil society. 
 Bennett rejects this narrative on the grounds that it is ecclesiologically wrong-
headed. Marriage and family are not first civil institutions standing alongside the church. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
they ―merely become institutions that are part of the world, while baptized Christians that make up these 
institutions become the sole locus of the members making up Christ‘s body. That is, all the baptized, and 
especially the laity, have the task of remedying ‗the customs  and conditions of the world, if they are an 
inducement to sin, so that they all may be conformed to the norms of justice and may favor the practice of 
virtue rather than hinder it.‘ Marriage and family merely become one of those secular institutions needing 
such remedies; they become a matter of natural law that has no need of the name ‗church‘,‖ Water is 
Thicker than Blood, 15. 
64
 From the Religion, Culture, and Family Project‘s website explaining the project‘s purpose, this claim is 
made explicit: ―The Religion, Culture, and Family Project claims that religious traditions have valuable 
theological, ethical, and institutional resources to help revitalize North American family culture and 
families. It brings together over a hundred leading Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other religious scholars 
of both liberal and conservative convictions to produce a major series of books on religion and the family 
together with conferences, articles, and media projects,‖ ―Project Overview: Rationale of Project,‖ 
http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/research/rcfp/projrationale.htm (accessed January 22, 2010). 
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 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 155. 
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Instead, they are institutional realities given identity, shape, and accountability primarily 
by the church, and secondarily in civil society and the state. Bennett writes:  
My contention is that the church is named the Household of God inseparably from 
the various households in which Christians find themselves because of the ways 
that worship and politics (and, hence, ethics) tie the two together…current 
theologies of marriage…have too often been made to connect to state politics and 
vague social programs while all but ignoring the Christological and 
ecclesiological concerns that are present for Christians.
66
  
 
Furthermore, rejecting the ―false eschatology‖ that sees the salvation of human society in 
the human family based on biological kinship, Bennett argues that human society needs 
bonds thicker than blood, namely, the bonds created by the waters of baptism.
67
 The 
problem, then, is not a lack of concern for the family. On the contrary, we have spent 
entirely too much thought, energy, and hopes on the family as primary locus of human 
belonging and capital hope for the creation of a better world.
68
 
Bennett is skeptical, therefore, of theologies of the family. She finds, too often, 
that marriage is seen as the church for and in the world, whereas the chaste life is more 
eschatological in character. If this is the case, that is, if marriage is primarily (or only) for 
this world and has no eschatological character, then the term domestic church can hardly 
be appropriately given to the family.
69
 In fact, such use of ―church‖ to describe family 
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 Ironically, Bennett finds that John Paul II‘s ―theology of the body‖ does not give marriage enough 
eschatological importance. Interpreting him primarily through the work of Angelo Cardinal Scola, The 
Nuptial Mystery, trans. Michelle K. Borras (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), Bennett finds that John 
Paul II‘s approach to marriage locates it on the mundane pole of the continuum between the world now and 
the eschaton. While marriage is for the here and now, celibacy is on the eschatological end of the 
continuum—it is an image of and already an anticipatory participation in the eschatological wedding feast 
of the lamb. Bennett finds in this theology an unfortunate dichotomy rather than a complementarity (Water 
is Thicker than Blood, 16–19).    
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 Ibid., 14–15. Here Bennett faults Familiaris consortio (hereafter, FC), though without citing it, for 
setting up a dichotomy between marriage and singleness, where marriage is for the world alone, and 
singleness is an eschatological foretaste and participation in heaven. Perhaps Bennett is critical of the kind 
of language John Paul II uses here: ―It is for this reason that the Church, throughout her history, has always 
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would denude ―church‖ of its full meaning. After all, the church is both for and in the 
world (church militant) and for and in the eschaton (church victorious).
70
 Furthermore, 
―domestic church‖ is so focused on the family as a private, affective, interpersonal, and 
non-political reality that it leaves out important political and civil, public notions of what 
it means to be church.
71
 Finally, Bennett finds notions of domestic Church offered by 
Cathleen McGinnis (Parenting for Peace and Justice Network) and Lisa Sowle Cahill to 
risk losing what is distinctively Christian. Current proposals for domestic church are 
heavily sociological, often lacking a liturgical, theological richness: 
It is not the case that Christian tradition becomes ritualized within the household; 
such would make the household exactly the ‗domestic church‘ that contemporary 
theologians have posited…Instead, the household becomes ritualized within the 
church so that the church may be ritualized in the household.
72
  
 
In Bennett‘s thinking, some of the domestic church activities that Cahill and McGinnis 
advocate lack a strong, essential connection to or location within ecclesial life as Bennett 
understands it. It is not enough to work for peace and justice, the Christian household 
must do so liturgically and sacramentally:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
defended the superiority of this charism to that of marriage, by reason of the wholly singular link which it 
has with the kingdom of God‖ Familiaris consortio, 16.  
70
 As Bennett has it, ―the name ‗church‘ is cheapened if, in fact, marriages and families do not also bear 
eschatological weight. There is no need to name marriages and families as somehow ‗domestic church‘ if 
there is a limited relationship present,‖ Water is Thicker than Blood, 15. For a development of this 
ecclesiology see Henri de Lubac Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1988). 
71
 Bennett makes reference to the well-known debate during the Second Vatican Council, wherein bishop 
Fiorelli‘s suggestion (with John Chrysostom) of the term ―ecclesia miniscula,‖ ―small church‖ or ―church 
in miniature,‖ became ―domestica ecclesia‖ in Lumen gentium, 11. For a description of the term ―domestic 
church‖ at the Second Vatican Council see Michael Fahey, ―The Christian Family as Domestic Church at 
Vatican II,‖ in The Family, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill and Dietmar Mieth (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995). 
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 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 146. She goes on to fill out the claim with an exposition of 
Augustine‘s City of God (ibid., 146–53). Bennett considers Cahill‘s and McGinnis‘ thoughts on domestic 
church to be focused on this-worldly justice and peace at the expense of eschatological beatitude, justice, 
and peace. Without the eschatological pole, which is essential to the church‘s identity, it would be 
inappropriate to call the family ―domestic church.‖ If the family is a this-worldly institution that is relevant 
to justice now but not beatitutde forever, then it cannot be called ―domestic church.‖ Bennett thinks 
families (and even more so households) have both the worldly and eschatological character of the church. 
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The sacramental image of households, as well as the eschatological image of 
households, is a vision of Christians united in a completely reconfigured and 
unified household in Christ. This vision of Christian household operates partly 
now, because we see glimpses of this reconfigured household, but it is also a 
future vision of the Parousia, when God will be all-in-all. The Household of God 
and its constituent, small households are concerned with the entirety of that reality; 
there is no part of the old life, theologically speaking, that can remain if the new 
life is to take hold.
73
 
 
For Bennett, marriage is a participation in the mystery of Christ and the church rather 
than the other way around. In place of a theology of marriage and family, Bennett offers a 
theology of households.
74
 The household of God holds primacy of place in the life of the 
Christian, and the household of spouses ought to be worked out as part of this larger 
household. The power of Bennett‘s proposal is that by using the term household, she can 
better integrate married, single non-vowed, and consecrated religious life as 
complementary ways of being ―household,‖ each of which participates in one ecclesial 
reality seeking the goal of holiness, namely, life in the household of God.  
 
Summary and Critique  
 
 Neither sociology, nor history, nor theology can offer a single definitive narrative 
of how and why marriage and family have found themselves in crisis. In this first section 
I have analyzed the narratives offered by Stanley Hauerwas, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Julie 
Hanlon Rubio, David Matzko McCarthy, and Jana M. Bennett. Each of the narrated 
problems and solutions offered is distinct, yet together they accomplish a certain 
                                                          
73
 Ibid., 135. 
74
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Christian Households: The Sanctification of Nearness (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004), 2. 
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consensus. First, marriage and family are in crisis—even it if is unclear whether the 
problem is too little or too much attention to the family. Second, the ―nuclear-family‖ 
model of man and woman and children seeking their own private goods is seen as 
destructive to human society, personal wellbeing, and the common good. Third, there has 
been a move from marriage and family as a web involving a great many long-term, non-
voluntary relationships and duties, to marriage and family as a web involving a great 
many voluntary relationships that are easily severed—even if opinions vary on the 
benefits and costs of this change. In other words, marriage as fulfilling, elective 
relationship has taken a controlling stake in the discussion of marriage and family. Fourth, 
the church has a role in healthy function of marriage and the family—even if there is 
disagreement about whether the family is best understood within the church or alongside 
the church. Finally, Christian marriage and family must have a robust social, and 
distinctly Christian role; it must tell with its very way of life the story of Jesus‘ and the 
church‘s love for God and neighbor as expressed in radical hospitality and an active 
participation in the seeking of justice in the world. 
In spite of these points of consensus, the narratives offered by the five authors 
studied also demonstrate significant divergences and problematic dichotomies. Let us 
first examine two unhelpful and often intertwined dichotomies that continue to be 
presumed by some of the authors. These dichotomies are between (1) public (outside the 
home) / private (domestic) and (2) secular / religious. First, the divide between public 
(outside the home) and private (domestic) can be overdrawn.
75
 Rubio suggests that ―the 
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 Bennett devotes an entire chapter (chapter 6) of her book Water is Thicker Than Blood to this false 
dichotomy between public and private, though her critique of this dichotomy comes from a slightly 
different direction. She is more concerned with the false notion that church and religion are private, non-
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self-sacrificial paradigm that privileges openness to children and parental sacrifice for 
children over the public vocations of men and women must be brought into question.‖76 
Further, she makes the strong claim that ―one cannot, I would argue, fully realize the 
demands of discipleship to Jesus of Nazareth unless one also has a public vocation.‖77 By 
public Rubio means not domestic. Thus, raising, caring for the basic needs of, and 
educating children do not qualify. Why? Because much of the task occurs physically in 
the home, because the parent is not directly paid monetarily, and because the 
relationships involved are not primarily contractual.  
This way of speaking artificially dichotomizes the public from the private, as if 
the domestic life were not essentially a public endeavor, one ordained to the common 
good (and here I mean a sense of shared good that includes one supernatural destiny).
78
 
Rubio‘s way of speaking about the divide between ―public‖ and ―private‖ falls prey to 
John Milbank‘s critique of Greek notions of virtue. According to Milbank, the Greeks 
separated the polis from the oikos. Those inhabiting the oikos, children and women, had 
no access to true virtue, which could only be performed in the polis.
79
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
political matters. I agree with Bennett when she states that ―John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas 
have taken to task the false assumption that the church is a private affair, unengaged in the public political 
lives of people who consider themselves to be, first and foremost citizens of a nation-state, as secondarily 
as Christians,‖ 138–39. Bennett also marshals evidence from William Cavanaugh (Theopolitical 
Imagination), John Milbank (Theology and Social Theory) and Pope Leo XIII (Rerum novarum) to argue 
for the political, public nature of the Church.  
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 See Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard 
and Sister Elizabeth Englund, O.C.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988 [Paris: Cerf, 1947]). De Lubac‘s 
ressourcement here toward a renewed understanding of the unity of all Christians in the one body of Christ, 
who came to redeem all of humanity for one shared salvation in Christ himself. Whether or not given 
persons meet on this earth, because they are one in Christ, they contribute to or detract from the 
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 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason  (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1990), 364–
69. 
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Of course, if this dichotomy is taken as a fact, a given, then the center of the 
gospel ought to be the overturning of this situation. This is not the case, though. The 
oikos is already the polis. The ―public‖ is not some space outside the home that is 
affected by a uniquely ―public‖ vocation such as car repairman. The ―public‖ is the 
orientation of the ―private‖ family. The Christian family cannot be raised in isolation. 
The ―domestic‖ vocation of all members of the family is a call to create a community of 
love that overflows biological-kinship into the surrounding community, especially toward 
perceived aliens or enemies. In other words, the ―domestic‖ vocation of the family is to 
nurture relationships and develop habits (virtues) that are public in orientation, that is, 
they are extroverted and reach out beyond themselves to the common good.
80
 Realization 
of this vocation requires public prayer, public presence in a community—especially the 
community of the sacraments—public witness to the love in one‘s own relationships, 
accountability to a community, and public action on behalf of the poor. 
At the same time, this dichotomy between ―public‖ and ―private‖ unjustifiably 
prioritizes ―public vocation‖ over against ―domestic‖ vocation. Rubio states that ―public‖ 
vocation is requisite for complete discipleship, implying that ―domestic‖ vocation is 
neither requisite nor sufficient. In Rubio‘s thought, neither single non-consecrated or as 
                                                          
80
 See Patrick Riley, Civilizing Sex: Chastity and the Common Good (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000). Riley 
argues that first among these domestically developed and publicly ordered virtues is chastity. As Riley 
explains it, chastity was historically a politically important virtue, that is, a virtue central for the good of 
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national survival,‖ (ibid., 7). For the Christian society, the church, chastity contributes to the common good 
of order within the church as a people whose desires are rightly ordered proportionately to the appropriate 
objects, ultimately tending toward the person‘s ultimate end in union with God in the beatific vision (ibid., 
23). 
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consecrated Christians have access to the ―domestic‖ vocation. Thus the ―domestic‖ is of 
secondary moment to the ―public.‖ At the same time, however, ―public‖ is constrained to 
a particular social space—the space of secular society. The following question arises with 
respect to the religious contemplative: Is the contemplative refusing complete 
discipleship? The answer will be yes, unless ―public‖ is conceived as an orientation 
toward the common good (shared common destiny) rather than as a space of economic 
and political relations with people outside one‘s blood- or marriage-kin. The cloistered 
monk or nun‘s vocation is, after all, every bit as ―public‖ as the coal miner‘s. The 
religious‘ prayer is as public as anyone‘s, and their goals are as oriented to the common 
good (our shared destiny) as anyone‘s.  
In prioritizing the ―public‖ vocation over the ―private,‖ or ―domestic‖ life, Rubio 
also makes the mistaken assumption that all ―public‖ work somehow contributes to the 
common good and satisfies the spouses‘ needs to have an identity other than ―mother‖ or 
―father.‖81 First, Rubio would be hard-pressed to agree that all ―public‖ work is as 
beneficial to the common good as ―domestic‖ work. Second, not all ―public‖ work 
satisfies the workers need for an identity. For many, ―public‖ work is an isolating, even 
psychologically degrading experience. Alone in a cubicle writing code, trapped in an 
office reading books, deep in a mine operating a machine, standing on an assembly line 
cutting chicken carcasses, or walking the halls of a university library as a custodian who 
works among yet is strangely alien to the patrons and research staff, the worker is not 
always fulfilled by a ―public‖ vocation. Unfortunately, feminist authors like Rubio often 
imagine only upper middle-class jobs when they speak of ―public‖ ―meaningful‖ work, 
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 See Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 121–23. She is depending here on Bonnie Miller-McLemore, 
Also a Mother: Work and Family as Theological Dilemma. 
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and thus have romanticized ―public‖ work in much the same way some ―traditionalists‖ 
romanticize ―domestic‖ work of the mother, nurturing and educating her children in the 
ways of personal piety, self-sacrifice, and liberal arts in the home. The romantic, early 
feminist notion of being ―free‖ or ―liberated‖ to work in the ―public‖ sphere is at best 
ambivalent. The middle-class and the poor are ironically the ones finding themselves 
―liberated‖ from patriarchal family structures.82 ―Liberation‖ here is an ambivalent term, 
since the situation of poverty creates a kind of slavery that necessarily ―liberates‖ the 
poor from the shackles of the nuclear family and its model of one domestic worker and 
another ―public‖ worker. Unfortunately, for many working-poor and lower-middle class 
families, Rubio‘s ―public vocation‖ is, in the face of grinding poverty, more a damnable 
necessity than a fulfilling endeavor. Ironically, a patriarchal, nuclear family structure has 
become a luxury for the upper-middle class and the rich.  
A second dichotomy that creeps into the discussion is the thick line drawn 
between the ―secular‖ and the ―religious‖ aspects of marriage. For Rubio the history of 
marriage is the story of an institution‘s slow transition from occupying a strictly secular 
location, to an ecclesiastical one. As Rubio states, ―marriage as a secular reality only 
gradually, and with difficulty, came to be seen as a sacred part of Christian life.‖83 This 
history is problematic, as it assumes a time when marriage and weddings were strictly 
secular, and it does not account for the changes in marriage theology and practice that 
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 See Judith Stacey, Brave New Families: Stories of Domestic Upheaval in Late-twentieth-century America, 
rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), 3–40; and Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 10–
12. 
83
 Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 73–75, at 73. See Edward Schillebeeckx, Marriage: Human 
Reality, Saving Mystery, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966).  Schillebeeckx‘s 
monograph was influential in creating the narrative that sees marriage as a secular, civil institution that 
slowly (and in his mind for the worse) became ever more tightly regulated by the church. He makes a case 
that it is important from an Old Testament and New Testament perspective that Christians maintain the 
civil, secular character of marriage. 
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accompanied and arose from the Reformation.
84
 In particular, Cahill and Witte point out 
the Lutheran theological push of marriage out of the ecclesial realm and into the realm of 
the ―secular authority.‖85 Milbank has argued, I think convincingly, that ―once, there was 
no secular.‖86 For those who narrate the history as a march of marriage from the secular 
contract to sacred covenant, the ―secular‖ is seen as a social fact, a given space where a 
certain type of thinking or world-vision operates free from religious influence. The 
existence of this social ―fact‖ is taken for granted rather than taken as a recent human, 
even religiously motivated, creation.
87
 For Rubio, the institution becomes religious once 
another religious institution (the Church) holds regulatory power over its form and 
practice.
88
  
Other authors further the dichotomy by overdrawing the distinction between 
religious and secular marriage. Lawler (Family: American and Christian) analyzes civil 
aspects of marriage, the Christian aspects of marriage, and the way those two have 
occupied the same social spaces in American history.
89
 Elsewhere, Lawler argues for the 
Church to recognize civil marriage as a legitimate union among Christians, which can be 
solemnized on a later date through a rite wherein the union becomes actualized as a 
sacrament. This proposal would largely contribute to solving the problem of annulments, 
argues Lawler, because it would recognize that the marriage between baptized non-
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 See John Witte Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997). Witte‘s narrative of development in thought on 
marriage begins with the religious and moves toward the secular, the reverse of Rubio‘s, Lawler‘s, and 
Cahill‘s narrative, which begins with the secular and moves toward the religious.  
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 Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective, 63. 
86
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 9. These words begin the first chapter. He makes the case that 
relatively recently we have attempted to create a secular space from a religious motivation. 
87
 Ibid., 110. 
88
 Rubio, Christian Theology of Marriage, 75, ―So at Trent, the church defined marriage as a sacrament, 
claimed the right to regulate it, declared that the presence of a priest and two witnesses was necessary for a 
valid marriage, and claimed that a validly contracted marriage could not be dissolved for any reason.‖  
89
 Michael G. Lawler, Family: American and Christian (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1998). 
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believers is a civil, non-sacramental reality rather than an indissoluble sacrament. 
Lawler‘s argument hinges on his claim that the 1917 Code of Canon Law inappropriately 
settled an open theological question: whether there is an identity between the marital 
contract and the marital sacrament.
90
 Since 1917, the Code of Canon Law has described 
an identity between the two. Popes at the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 
twentieth century were at pains to maintain the unity of marriage as necessarily both a 
contract and sacrament, that is, a reality of the world that signifies and makes present the 
supernatural reality it represents.
91
 The current Code states as much: ―A valid 
matrimonial contract cannot exist between the baptized without it being by that fact a 
sacrament.‖92 When Christians are involved, we can speak of marriage as contract and 
marriage as covenant, but we can never disconnect the one from the other.  
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 Michael Lawler, Marriage in the Catholic Church: Disputed Questions (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 2002), 43–65. Susan K. Wood, S.C.L. writes in support of the opposing position in ―The Marriage of 
Baptized Non-believers: Faith, Contract, and Sacrament,‖ Theological Studies 48 (1987): 279–301. 
91
 See Leo XIII, Arcanum divinae sapientiae 17, 18, 23 (1880); and Pius XI, Casti Connubii, 31 (1930) 
(hereafter, CC). Leo XIII writes: Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction which some civil jurists 
have so strongly insisted upon—the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they sever the matrimonial 
contract from the sacrament, with intent to hand over the contract to the power and will of the rulers of the 
State, while reserving questions concerning the sacrament of the Church. A distinction, or rather severance, 
of this kind cannot be approved; for certain it is that in Christian marriage the contract is inseparable from 
the sacrament, and that, for this reason, the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a 
sacrament as well. For Christ our Lord added to marriage the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the 
contract itself, whenever that contract is lawfully concluded‖ (Arcanum divinae sapientiae, 23). 
92
 Codex Iuris Canonici 1983, 1055.2 (hereafter, CIC). This position (that the valid marriage contract of 
two baptized Christians is also a sacrament) has developed over time. From Scripture, Mark‘s and 
Matthew‘s gospel accounts of Jesus‘ teaching on marriage, the Pauline Ephesians 5:21–32 and 1 Cor 7 
have been central, as well as Old Testament sources relying on marriage to understand the term ―covenant‖ 
are primary sources. Within the tradition, Augustine‘s De bono coniugali is the source for the three goods 
of marriage as articulated until they were no longer used at the Second Vatican Council. Key arguments for 
the current teaching were developed in the scholastic period in the thought of Peter Lombard and Thomas 
Aquinas. Aquinas gives special attention to whether baptized non-believers receive the sacrament. See 
Summa theologiae, supplementum, q. 80, a. 3, and In 4 Sent., d. 39, q.1, a.1, ad 5; and ibid., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, 
sol. 1; and ibid., d. 3, q. 68, a. 8. The Decree for the Armenians from the Council of Florence, as well as the 
profession of faith prescribed to the Waldensians include matrimony among the seven sacraments. The 
Council of Trent, Session 24, worked toward the unity of sacrament and contract by placing an impediment 
of form upon clandestine marriages between baptized persons. If their marriage contract was to be valid, it 
would also be a sacrament. 
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Among the costs of speaking about Christian marriage in a way that disassociates 
the marital contract from the marital sacrament is the fact that it can erroneously suggest 
that there is a distinction between what couples do as married and what couples do as 
Christian. This is an ecclesiological implication. ―Christian‖ becomes something added to 
marriage. The implication is that Christians could have a non-Christian marriage. The 
sacrament becomes a Christian rite added to a secular reality assumed to be disconnected 
from supernatural ends in itself. Rather than being the central context for all marriages 
between baptized persons, the Church comes into view as an institution that can 
contribute to good marriages between Christians, if those Christians desire such help. 
Married couples will not be aided if the Church only offers extra ―programs‖ to 
supplement what spouses are really doing as secular communities of individuals. I am 
suggesting that Christian couples will need to redefine their practice of marriage as 
principally an ecclesial one: one that is pushes the hearths onto front porches and 
reconfigures living rooms into chapels. 
 
TOWARD AUTHENTIC RENEWAL: METHOD AND ARGUMENT 
 
 The narratives offered above have been instructive to set the context for the crisis 
of marriage, but in order to move from this context toward a renewal of Catholic 
marriage theology, I must identify and assess the central paradigms for discourse on the 
nature and ends of marriage that emerge from within these narratives. Such is the task of 
the first chapter. I will find two paradigms at work in attempts to renew Catholic theology 
of marriage since the Second Vatican Council: marriage as relationship, and marriage as 
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practice. Both of these ways of speaking about marriage make positive contributions to 
Christian marriage, but both are inadequate. However, I also argue that both are open to a 
possible direction for development. Both can be further pushed in the direction of making 
the primary context of belonging for the Christian marriage, especially as domestic 
church, as ecclesial.
93
 The relational approach pays attention to the personal aspect of 
marriage but lacks a strong ecclesiology and influence from Christology.  The marriage-
as-practice approach, on the other hand, centrally locates marriage within the Church but 
lacks solid theological grounding in Christ and the Trinity. A third approach, therefore, 
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 The Second Vatican Council‘s statement from Apostolicam Actuositatem 11, which was echoed 
throughout the Church, (e.g., Familiaris consortio, 42), is frequently quoted or referenced in the following 
way: The family ―is the first and vital cell of society‖ (AA, 11). Authors use the phrase to mean that the 
first context of the family is civil society, that realm of social belonging including voluntary associations 
and other institutions mediating between the individual and the state. Among the voluntary associations, in 
many tellings, is the Church, in which the members of the family might participate or belong. See (See 
Stratford Caldecott, ―The Drama of the Home: Marriage, the Common Good, and Public Policy,‖ in 
Kenneth D. Whitehead, ed., Marriage and the Common Good: Proceedings from the Twenty-Second 
Annual Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, September 24–26, 1999 (South Bend, IN: St. 
Augustine‘s Press, 2001), 1–26; Jean Bethke Elshtain, ―Families and Civic Goods,‖ Marriage and the 
Common Good, 105–118; and Riley, Civilizing Sex). This conclusion, though, is only possible by removing 
the phrase in AA 11 from its context, and by an oversight of other related documents on the social context 
of marriage (e.g., the 1995 document, Preparation for the Sacrament of Marriage, by the Pontifical 
Council for the Family, accessed on January 13, 2011, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc_ 
13051996_preparation-for-marriage_en.html). Read in context, the passage suggests that the Church is the 
first home of Christian marriage, and that its role in civil society is an apostolate, a mission given by God. 
The primary role of the family in society, moreover, is to demonstrate the family‘s ecclesial, sacramental 
nature. I will allow the Council to speak for itself: ―It has always been the duty of Christians married 
partners but today it is the greatest part of their apostolate to manifest and prove by their own way of life 
the indissolubility and sacredness of the marriage bond, strenuously to affirm the right and duty of parents 
and guardians to educate children in a Christian manner, and to defend the dignity and lawful autonomy of 
the family…This mission—to be the first and vital cell of society—the family has received from God. It 
will fulfill this mission if it appears as the domestic sanctuary of the Church by reason of the mutual 
affection of its members and the prayer that they offer to God in common, if the whole family makes itself 
a part of the liturgical worship of the church, and if it provides active hospitality and promotes justice and 
other good works for the service of all the brethren in need‖ (Apostolicam actuositatem, 11). Christifideles 
laici, 40 says family is the basic cell of society but does not prioritize this fact. Family has a duty to society, 
but because of its supernatural, ecclesial character. In Evangelii nuntiandi 41, Paul VI says that the 
Christian home is a veritable cell of the Church. In his Letter to Families, John Paul II speaks of the family 
as the ―fundamental ‗cell‘ of society.‖ This cell, though, is not on its own and is not part of society without 
a prior and primary context. ―But Christ—the ‗vine‘ from which the ‗branches‘ draw nourishment—is 
needed so that this cell will not be exposed to the threat of a kind of cultural uprooting which can come 
both from within and from without‖ (Gravissimam sane, 13). In his thought, the family is the primary cell 
of society conceived of as a civilization of love, a civilization not possible apart from ecclesial belonging, 
that is, belonging in Christ the vine. 
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must be offered, an approach to marriage that attends to persons, sees marriage as a part 
of a wider, ecclesial practice, and is grounded in Christ and the Trinity. What is required 
is a language to speak about the identity and practice of marriage and the family that 
comes from within the life of the Church.
94
 This third paradigm is to see marriage as a 
Common Way in Christ, a way Christ offers to all those (whether married or religious) 
who participate in the common practice of being church, that is ―householding with God,‖ 
a way of imaging and witnessing to the Trinity‘s love, and a way that fulfills the 
universal call to Christian perfection through a ―regular‖ life ordained to Christoformity 
by growth in the evangelical virtues of poverty, chastity, and obedience.    
A major contribution from contemporary theologies of marriage has been to open 
up an avenue for speaking of marriage in terms of a Common Way in Christ‘s 
evangelical virtues. This avenue has opened with the introduction of three ideas for 
development:
 95
 (1) both married and vowed religious life participate in the common 
practice of being church, that is, as examples of ―householding with God,‖ by their 
ecclesial, baptismal ligation;
96
 (2) married life and vowed religious life have each been 
reflected upon as images of and witnesses to the Trinity and its love; and (3) both married 
and vowed religious life answer Vatican II‘s universal call to Christian perfection through 
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 See Dolores Leckey, The Ordinary Way: A Family Spirituality (New York: Crossroad, 1989), who starts 
her monograph with the same claim: ―People looking for a lay spirituality need some kind of structure, one 
that is strong and yet elastic. Such a structure is part of the Catholic Christian tradition,‖ the monastic 
tradition (Ordinary Way, 6). 
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 John Paul II in Vita consecrata (hereafter, VC) explores the way that vowed religious life is trinitarian, 
and Marc Cardinal Oullet, in Divine Likeness: Toward a trinitarian Anthropology of the Family, trans. 
Philip Milligan and Linda M. Cicone (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006) argues for just what the title 
says. Jana M. Bennett, in her Water is Thicker than Blood, has proposed that the consecrated and married 
lives are part of the same larger project of living a baptismal life in the household of God. None of these 
authors, however, has proposed to take these thoughts to the next step, which is to apply the language and 
models of vowed religious life in community to the development of a theology of marriage. 
96
 While both are examples of ―householding with God,‖ marriage uniquely becomes truly a church in 
miniature, or (in the language of the Second Vatican Council) a ―domestic church‖ (LG, 11) through the 
sacrament of matrimony. 
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a ―common‖ or ―regular‖ life ordained to Christoformity through growth in evangelical 
virtue.
97
 Vowed religious life-in-community refers us to a vocabulary that helps us 
develop existing theologies of marriage as relationship and practice. This vocabulary, 
which theologies of consecrated life center around, does not concern some sole 
possession of the religious life, but rather it concerns a common way Christ invites all 
Christians to live, a way of living in the household of God according to his own virtues of 
poverty, chastity, and obedience. As Orthodox theologian Paul Evdokimov has written, 
―the best, and perhaps the only, method to fathom the value proper to matrimony is by 
comprehending the greatness of the meaning of monasticism.‖98 
 In order to advance this paradigm, a deep theological consonance between 
conjugal and consecrated life will need to be established and developed.
99
 This paradigm 
can be constructed from sources in Scripture and the Catholic tradition. At the level of 
ecclesial practice, both states in life can be construed as sharing in the one household of 
God and all the domestic activity therein. At a theological level, both states of life 
disclose and share in the same basic anthropological, Christological, and trinitarian bases. 
Through both states in life, God teaches us who we are, who we are invited to be, and 
into whose life and narrative we are taken up. This theological connection between the 
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 LG, 32: ―Therefore, the chosen People of God is one: ‗one Lord, one faith, one baptism‘; sharing a 
common dignity as members from their regeneration in Christ, having the same filial grace and the same 
vocation to perfection; possessing in common one salvation, one hope and one undivided charity.‖ Some 
authors have treated the evangelical counsels as ―evangelical imperatives.‖ See Francis Moloney, S.D.B. (A 
Life of Promise: Poverty, Chastity, Obedience [Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1984]).  
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 Paul Evdokimov, The Sacrament of Love: The Nuptial Mystery in the Light of the Orthodox Tradition, 
trans. Anthony P. Gythiel and Victoria Steadman (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir‘s Seminary, 1985), 73. 
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 For the purpose of this dissertation, I will synonymously use ―consecrated life‖ and ―vowed religious life.‖  
All of these terms will refer to the same reality, namely, the communion and practice of life among persons 
having professed vows of religion and been incorporated thereby into membership in a religious institute in 
the Roman Catholic Church according to canon law. According to CIC, 607.2, ―A religious institute is a 
society in which members, according to proper law, pronounce public vows, either perpetual or temporary 
which are to be renewed, however, when the period of time has elapsed, and lead a life of brothers or sisters 
in common.‖ 
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states of life sets the stage for dissertation‘s constructive proposal regarding three sets of 
practices in the life of married Christians (poverty, chastity, and obedience).
100
 
The central task of this dissertation, then, is to rediscover the profound 
relationship between marriage and religious life throughout the tradition.
101
 Some 
theologians have produced studies of the relationship between marriage and monasticism. 
Indeed a relationship exists, but unfortunately, the most common narrative characterizes 
this relationship through history as principally antagonistic and only recently replaced by 
an egalitarian perspective (chapter 2). I reject this narrative and seek to replace it with 
one that sees a much more complicated relationship between conjugal and consecrated 
life in the tradition. In Chapter 3 I begin with Augustine and the early desert fathers, for 
whom the distinction in holiness between any particular married person or virgin was 
muddy. In fact they saw the two states of life in cooperation and dialogue, as two aspects 
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 This consonance works both ways. Conjugal life‘s participation in a common way can inform 
consecrated life as well. This dissertation focuses on the ways this consonance helps us think more 
theologically about marriage, but of course this paradigm also promises to help us rethinking consecrated 
life. Developing the latter is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but hopefully I outline a framework here 
for taking a next step in the research.  
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religious life and conjugal life; marriage is one of the seven sacraments of the Church whereas consecrated 
religious life is not. This distinction, though is not problematic. The goal of the dissertation is not to find 
surface-level similarities between the two states in life, but a deep theological share in common ecclesial 
goods and virtues that could potentially play out in common practices of Christian householding. Were 
both sacraments of the Church, that fact would indicate a certain kind of theological relationship, but as it 
happens this is not the kind of relationship conjugal and consecrated life have. That they are not both 
among the seven sacraments does not hinder their possessing a theological consonance of any kind. 
Furthermore, while both are not among the seven sacraments, part of my argument is that both do share in 
the church‘s identity as primordial sacrament of Christ. Baptismally integrated into Christ‘s body, 
consecrated religious and married Christians each participate in the sacrament of being church. Marriage 
has a unique participation in this primordial sacrament as domestic church or ―church in miniature,‖ but 
consecrated religious life is also church ―domestically.‖ Not in the way marriage creates an instantiation of 
church, but inasmuch as the religious community‘s (or any Christian household‘s) domestic activities 
(quotidian aspects of life together) must be part of their task of being church, the sacrament of Christ. 
Finally, maintaining distinctions between the two states is crucial for the entire project, otherwise the claim 
for consonance would be a claim for tonal identity, a tautology. The dissertation does not focus on these 
distinctions, though, because the project is to find a common ground underlying these states that can enrich 
both. Much has been done to distinguish the two states, to the detriment of both, and to the frustrated 
attempts at ―authentic lay spiritualities.‖ Less has been done to see what the two states authentically share 
and how they can cooperate in being the one household of God, the one sacrament of Christ. 
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of being church. This historical precedent is further developed (chapter 4) by the 
Johannine ecclesiology of ―householding with God,‖ which allows us to see a 
consonance between the married and religious states inasmuch as both are inherently 
domestic practices developing the virtues of life in the household of God. In chapter 5, I 
present a theological grounding behind the historical developments that have come in 
previous chapters. The consonance between conjugal and consecrated states of life comes 
most deeply from the share both have in the life of the Trinity and the life of Christ‘s 
evangelical virtues. Both states of life reveal the anthropological principle of complete 
self-donation, whether this is understood principally nuptial terms (and thus a matter of 
celibacy or exclusive sexuality) or whether this is understood principally in obediential 
terms (and thus most centrally a matter of the will).
102
 Furthermore, both states of life are 
present in the one life, death, and resurrection of Christ, a life that becomes our own in 
baptism and is modeled in the evangelical virtues. Finally, both states of life are disclosed 
by and image the Trinity inasmuch as both share a trinitarian genealogy as communiones 
personarum. Found throughout the tradition, all of these points of contact amount to a 
profound consonance between these states of life (while respecting the canonical, 
theological, and practical distinctions between the two). This consonance makes way for 
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 ―Nuptial‖ cannot be understood univocally throughout the dissertation. When the term ―nuptial‖ appears 
in the context of consecrated celibacy and the context of the marriage between a man and a woman, it will 
operate at different levels of discourse. It always means ―of or having to do with marriage,‖ but whether 
literally, allegorically, anagogically, or metaphorically will not always be the same. This is important 
because the church does not have conjugal relations with Christ understood as an act of genital intimacy. 
Nor does the consecrated religious person experience conjugal relation with any other person in the 
community or with Christ in any kind of genital way. Consecrated religious do give their bodies over to 
Christ and to the community just as spouses give their bodies over to each other. The difference is in the 
appropriate and symbolic use of those bodies within the relationship. Marriage ought not be reduced to a 
genital union, though. Therefore similarities between the Church‘s marriage to Christ, spouses‘s marriage 
to each other, and a consecrated religious person‘s marriage to Christ is more than strictly metaphorical or 
allegorical. The married life as ―a partnership of life and love‖ is in a real way experienced by all those 
incorporated into the Church, Christ‘s bride. Where confusion would arise I will clarify the level of 
discourse at which nuptial words and images are used.  
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my final, constructive proposal for practices of poverty, chastity, and obedience 
according to a couple‘s own regula matrimonii (chapter 6).  
 The hope of this work is not to bolster or ―fix‖ marriage per se, but to contribute 
to the building up of the body of Christ, the bride of Christ, God‘s holy people, the 
household of God (Eph 2:19). The goal is to develop a language to help scholars, pastoral 
ministers, and spouses themselves understand the matrimonial sacrament as a Common 
Way in Christ, a particular way of living in the one household of God according to 
Christ‘s own evangelical virtues.103 
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 This Common Way in Christ is domestic, but not in the sense that it follows the shape and concerns of 
the nuclear family. Christian conjugal life as a Common Way in Christ is domestic inasmuch as the spouses 
manifest a particular way of living in the one household of God, a household that includes married and 
single people who both share domestic concerns and activities, who might even share a home, living a 
common way of missionary and liturgical life, seeking one common good as members of one holy, catholic, 
and apostolic church. Understanding how the family participates as domestic church in the mystery of 
Christ in the church requires both analogy (understanding divine reality from the bottom up) as well as a 
katalogical method (understanding the reality of the family from the top down, e.g., by means of 
understanding the life of the Trinity). See Oullett, Divine Likeness, 14–16; and Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
Theologik II: Wahrheit Gottes (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1985), 159–200. 
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CHAPTER 1: POST VATICAN II THEOLOGIES OF MARRIAGE— 
 TWO PARADIGMS 
 
 As the introduction showed, narratives offer signposts and markers to help locate 
authors in a complex theological landscape. A second, equally helpful way to create a 
landscape of the Catholic scholarship on marriage and family is to study the very 
definitions or accounts of marriage that emerge from the more general narratives. A study 
of Catholic authors writing in the last twenty years finds two paradigmatic frameworks: 
(1) marriage as a relationship; and (2) marriage as a practice. This chapter analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of the paradigms and suggests a third paradigm, which will fill 
gaps in these other paradigms at three theological loci: ecclesiology, Christology, and 
Trinity. In order to illustrate the contours of these paradigms, I will examine the thought 
of two sets of authors: Margaret Monahan Hogan, Lisa Cahill, and Michael Lawler 
(marriage as relationship), and David Matzko McCarthy, Jana Bennett, and Alasdair 
MacIntyre (marriage as practice). 
 
 
MARRIAGE AS RELATIONSHIP 
 
 I begin with the work of Margaret Monahan Hogan, whose book Marriage as 
Relationship: Real and Rational (2002) was published as a second edition of her Finality 
and Marriage (1993). Hogan approaches ―marriage‖ historically and systematically. Her 
goal is to revisit the twentieth century‘s doctrinal development in the area of sexuality 
and marriage (from Casti connubii through Donum vitae) to find therein a movement 
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from a ―traditional position‖ toward an ―emerging position‖ on (1) ―the essential nature 
of marriage, (2) the several finalities to be accomplished within marriage, (3) the role of 
conjugal intercourse, and (4) the governance of the reproductive finality within 
marriage.‖1 The result of her study is the following definition of marriage: ―a special kind 
of human relationship. It is an intimate personal union which is to supply the matrix of 
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, for procreation, and for the perfection of the 
partners.‖2 For Hogan this definition amounts to a ―higher viewpoint,‖ an ―Aufhebung, 
under which opposing viewpoints may be seen as partial viewpoints and within which 
meaningful conversation may begin among the well intentioned and scholarly people on 
all sides of the issue.‖3 To trace this movement, I will begin with Hogan‘s account of the 
traditional position, followed by an account of the emerging tradition of marriage as 
―relationship‖ in the thought of Hogan and Michael Lawler. 
 
The Traditional Position 
 
Hogan explicitly positions her constructive account ―not as a disagreement with 
the tradition but rather a development of the tradition.‖4 But it is clear that she disagrees 
with what she sees as intransigence in the Catholic magisterium. This intransigence she 
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 Hogan, Marriage as Relationship: Real and Rational (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2002), 9, 15, 
and 16. 
2
 Ibid. 9–10. She goes on here to say that ―marriage has three ends: (1) personal union — intrinsic 
necessary end; (2) procreation — intrinsic contingent end; and (3) personalist — intrinsic contingent end. 
These ends press for actualization on three distinct interrelated levels: horizontal, vertical, and 
transcendental. Governance of the reproductive finality is directed from within the marital matrix,‖ ibid., 10. 
3
 Ibid. Throughout, Hogan shows her dependence on the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. In this 
particular instance, her use of the term ―higher viewpoint‖ refers to the term as Lonergan would use it in 
Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 37–43, 258–59. A series of insights leads to the emergence of a 
higher viewpoint, from which series of data seeming to be only accidentally connected are systematically 
intelligible. Reaching a higher viewpoint is a manifestation of the term ―vertical finality,‖ which will 
become important later in the analysis of Hogan‘s use of Lonergan. 
4
 Ibid., 19. 
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identifies as a willingness to understand the ends and nature of marriage and sexuality in 
relational terms, yet an unwillingness to allow those relational terms primacy of place in 
the moral evaluation of the proper use of intercourse, contraception, and artificial 
insemination and fertilization within marriage.
5
  
 For Hogan, the ―traditional position‖ sees marriage as primarily a procreative 
institution, the structure and practice of which is determined by God in revelation and 
natural law, and the controlling factor of behavior in marriage is the biological aspect of 
sexuality. At the same time, however, Hogan sees in the ―traditional position‖ a robust 
theory of the secondary purposes of marriage: the mutual aid of the spouses and their 
Christian perfection.
6
 Drawing from Casti connubii, Hogan defines ―essential nature‖ of 
marriage in the ―traditional position‖ as follows: (1) marriage is a divine institution given 
ends, laws, and blessings from God. The nature of this institution is divinely, not 
humanly, made. Men and women enter this institution rather than make it; (2) marriage is 
a sacrament, that is, marriage is a natural institution that the Lord has raised to a higher 
dignity as a sign and instrument of grace—the effect of which is indissolubility and 
sanctification; and (3) marriage is an intimate union, a union of persons not merely 
                                                          
5
 Hogan repeats this critique multiple times. See, for example, ibid., 99 (against Evangelium vitae), and 123 
(against modern Catholic scholars defending the magisterial position). For her description of the proper 
regulation of the fertility finality, see ibid., 139. 
6
 The documents expounding the ―traditional position,‖ according to Hogan, are Pius XI‘s Casti Connubii, 
and the earlier of Pius XII‘s papal allocutions. Ibid., 23, 28. Here she notes Pius XI‘s hypothesis in Casti 
connubii, 24, that ―This mutual interior formation of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect 
each other, can in a very real sense, and the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the primary cause and 
reason of matrimony, provided matrimony be considered not in the restricted sense as the institution 
designed for the procreation and education of the child, but in the wider sense as a complete and intimate 
life partnership and association.‖ The Roman Catechism referred to here is the Catechism of the Council of 
Trent. 
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bodies.
7
 In this third aspect of marriage‘s nature Hogan finds the seed of what would 
become the keystone for understanding marriage‘s nature as ―relationship.‖  
 As for the ―several finalities to be accomplished by marriage,‖ Hogan identifies 
two in the ―traditional position.‖ First and primary is procreation and education of 
children. The second is the mutual aid of the partners in their earthly life and pursuit of 
holiness, as well as the remediation of concupiscence. For Hogan‘s purposes, what is 
important about these ends for the ―traditional position,‖ is the way Pius XII develops 
them in his papal allocutions to medical professionals. They are both ―objective ends,‖ 
both finis operis (not merely ends of the agents) and that they are arranged hierarchically. 
Procreation and education are considered primary because they determine the nature and 
essence of marriage. ―Marriage is one and indivisible, a unique institution of nature 
distinct from every other human association.‖8 Therefore, ―marriage must have a finis 
operis that is one and indivisible. Where there are several ends, one must be prime, by 
reason of its formal cause, in which the other ends are contained or to which the other 
ends are added to help achieve the primary. In matrimony the finis operis primary is 
procreation and education.‖9 It follows, then, that ―we might go on to say that there are 
other ends of marriage that are primary as in most important or excellent. We can say that 
the other ends are subordinate in a certain way, that is, they depend on this one for their 
actualization.‖ Furthermore, the ends are not ―of equal value or independent of‖ the 
                                                          
7
 Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 25. Here she is referring to Pius XI, Casti connubii, 1, and 9. An 
essential component of marriage's nature and what makes fidelity of chastity possible. Marriage not 
dissoluble, even for sterility or absence of "compatibility of temperament" Casti connubii, 70. 
8
 Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 38–39. 
9
 Pope Pius XII, Sentence of the Holy Roman Rota, Acta Apostolicae Sedis (Vaticanis: Typis Polyglottis, 
1944), 179–200, at 185. See Hogan, Marriage as a Relationship, 38–39.  
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primary end.
10
 Even in the ―traditional position,‖ then, the secondary ends of mutual aid 
in sanctification and daily life, and remediation of concupiscence are, in Thomistic 
fashion,
11
 less essential, yet more excellent than the primary end of the procreation and 
education of children. The good of mutual aid and sanctification is more excellent than 
the good of procreation and education because the first is a supernatural good while the 
second is proper to man‘s own nature.  
 In the third area of her analyses (the role of conjugal intercourse in marriage), the 
―traditional position‘s‖ potential orientation toward the notion of ―marriage as 
relationship‖ is again visible. In ―the traditional position,‖ specifically as expressed by 
Pope Pius XI in Casti connubii, the role of intercourse in marriage is constituted by the 
following: (1) the consummation, in canonical terms, of the marital sacrament (1917 
Code of Canon Law, 1013); (2) the reproduction of children; (3) the remediation of 
concupiscence; and (4) a contribution to the love of the spouses.
12
 With this last 
statement, writes Hogan, Pius XI goes beyond Aquinas‘, and certainly Augustine‘s, 
position on the role of conjugal intercourse.
13
 Finally, Pius XI considers that, in the union 
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 Pius XII, Address to the Midwives, Acta Apostolicae Sedis (Vaticanis: Typis Polyglottis, 1951), 835–54, 
at 845. See Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 39. 
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 See Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 35-36, where she connects the approach of Pius XI and Pius XII 
to Aquinas‘ natural law theory in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 91, a. 2; q. 94, a.2; and Aquinas‘s own 
application of the goods of marriage in the Supplementum q. 49, a. 3; and q. 65, a.1). 
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 CC, 90. 
13
 I would argue that Pius XI is not adding as much to Aquinas as Hogan claims. Hogan could have 
mentioned here Aquinas‘s position on ―adultery‖ within marriage. In Summa theologiae II-II, q. 154, a. 8, 
reply 2 (hereafter ST) Aquinas states that one might be called too ardent a lover of his own wife, and 
therefore commit a break in the marriage fidelity even though he has not done so with another woman. The 
husband ―may in a sense be called an adulterer.‖ One may conclude that for Aquinas, the role of conjugal 
intercourse in marriage was related to love, a properly ordered love. Therefore when the spouse is 
motivated by too ardent a love or when making use of marriage indecently, conjugal intercourse acts 
against the proper ordering of spousal love. Additionally, I reject Hogan‘s claim regarding the ability of 
conjugal intercourse to express love in the thought of Augustine. Augustine stated that conjugal intercourse 
could express love, especially when one knowingly pays the marriage debt intending to aid the spouse‘s 
sanctification (Sermon 51, 30–36; Sermon 162C,  Sermon 354A, 323–31; and Sermon 392 to Married 
Couples, 422–24). Unless otherwise noted, all English citations of Augustine will give the title of the work 
and page number from the The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21
st
 Century, ed. John E. 
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of spouses, the souls of the spouses are knit and joined more intimately and directly than 
their bodies.
14
 In this respect, one ought not to overstate the role of conjugal intercourse 
in supporting the union and love of the couple in the mind of Pius XI. Hogan is right to 
find here only a seed of what was to come. Pius XI does not speak as if conjugal 
intercourse creates the love and union of the spouses; instead he sees the union of the 
spouses and their growth in holiness together where spouses come together in free, firm, 
deliberate acts of the will, where there is growth in virtue— the excellence accomplished 
through the practice of appropriately similar acts throughout a lifetime.
15
 
On the fourth aspect of Hogan‘s analysis, the governance of the reproductive 
finality, the move toward a ―relational‖ understanding of marriage gathers still more 
steam, yet ironically comes to a dead stop as far as she is concerned. Moral analysis shifts 
from what is in her opinion strictly biologistic natural law to include a wider notion of 
human involvement in natural law and a notion of the good of the human person as a 
whole, but the controlling factor remains the notion of marriage as procreative institution 
and the body as physical unity. The ―marriage itself,‖ as the subject of moral thought, 
does not yet enter the discussion. There are two aspects to consider in the governance of 
the reproductive finality: (1) the avoidance of conception, and (2) the accomplishment of 
conception. Interestingly, it was Pope Pius XII‘s interventions on the debate over 
artificial insemination (rather than contraception) that provided the milieu for his 
development of this relational approach.
16
 In allocutions between 1951 and 1954, Pius 
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 CC, 7.  
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 CC, 10.  
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 In a 1951 allocution (Address to the Midwives, 846), Pius XII affirmed the use of the infertile time as a 
means to avoid conception. He encouraged scientists to further develop the means to make this method 
workable for married couples. Such use of periodic continence might even be necessary ―throughout the 
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XII rejects artificial insemination on the grounds that it is ―a violation of the personalist, 
relational, unitive, giving aspects of marriage.‖17 Furthermore: 
The Church has likewise rejected the opposite attitude which would pretend to 
separate, in generation, the biological activity in the personal relation of the 
married couple. The child is the fruit of the conjugal union when that union finds 
full expression by bringing into play the organic functions, the associated sensible 
emotions, and the spirited and disinterested love which animates the union. It is in 
the unity of the human act that we should consider the biological conditions of 
generation. Never is it permitted to separate these various aspects to the positive 
exclusion either of the procreative intention or of the conjugal relationship.
18
 
 
Pius XII has provided a way of speaking that regulates conjugal intercourse by locating it 
within the marriage as a whole, as a relationship over time.
19
 Because conception must 
take place within marriage, there can be no artificial insemination and/or fertilization 
with gametes from a person outside the marriage. Because conception must take place as 
a direct result of the natural shape of the conjugal act (namely, that which brings two 
persons together physically and emotionally and ends with internal insemination), there 
can be no artificial insemination and/or fertilization with gametes of the spouses. To do 
                                                                                                                                                                             
entire course of the marriage.‖ Because of statements like this one, Hogan concludes, with Pius XII, that 
―procreation begins to be viewed within the context of the marriage rather than within the context of each 
and every conjugal act,‖ Marriage as Relationship, 41.  
17
 Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 41. 
18
 Pius XII, Address to the Second World Congress on Fertility and Sterility, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 48 
(Vatican: Typis Polyglottis, 1956), 467–74, at 470). The pope continues: ―The relationship which unites the 
father and the mother to their child finds its root in the organic fact and still more in the deliberate conduct 
of the spouses who give themselves to each other and whose will to give themselves blossoms forth and 
finds its true attainment in the being which they bring into the world.‖ 
19
 Nonetheless, she faults Pius XII, and later Paul VI for not allowing their position on contraception to be 
directed according to the same notion of the marriage as a whole, realized over time. She laments that even 
though a shift toward understanding marriage as ―relationship‖ took place, the determining factor in the 
regulation of sexuality (on the contraception front) remained a strict biologistic natural law principle (Pius 
XI and Pius XII) followed by Paul VI‘s claim that it necessarily follows that there is an indissoluble link 
between the unitive and procreative aspect of any given act of conjugal intercourse.  
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so would be to attempt the procreative aspect of conjugal sexuality without the unitive 
aspect (unitive in physical and emotional terms).
20
   
 As Hogan lays it out, the ―traditional position‖ on marriage, finding its expression 
in the thought of Pope Pius XI and Pius XII can be summarized in this way: (1) marriage 
is a procreative institution created by God as a natural institution and a sacrament of the 
new law instituted by Christ; (2) it has two central goods (procreation and education of 
children, and the mutual aid and remediation of concupiscence), but its essence is 
determined by the good unique to it as an institution, namely the primary good of 
procreation and education of children. The secondary good is acknowledged to be more 
excellent, though not determinative of the essence of marriage. (3) The role of conjugal 
intercourse is the consummation, in canonical terms, of the marital sacrament (1917 Code 
of Canon Law, 1013), the reproduction of children, the remediation of concupiscence, 
and a contribution to the love of the spouses. (4) The governance of the reproductive 
finality in marriage remains primarily influenced by the understanding of marriage as 
procreative union, that is, despite Pius XI and Pius XII‘s development of the unitive, 
personalist aspects of conjugal intercourse, they do not allow these aspects controlling 
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 Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 42–49. In terms of the avoidance of conception, Hogan finds in the 
―traditional position‖ a refusal to assess the morality of acts based on the relational language that had been 
developed in the thinking about the achievement of conception. For example, despite having made the 
claim for the importance of both the unitive and procreative qualities of the conjugal act, and despite his 
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Questions of totality in a moral unity refer to the actions performed by the members constituting the unity 
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S.J., in ―Pope Pius XII and the Principle of Totality,‖ Theological Studies 16 (1955): 373–96. 
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influence beyond the biologistic notions of natural law and thomistic moral analysis of 
object, intention, and circumstance. 
 
The Emerging Position 
 
 Authors identifying an ―emerging tradition‖ of marriage as relationship typically 
recognize the Second Vatican council and its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World (Gaudium et spes) as a touchstone. Two authors who have seen Gaudium 
et spes as such are Michael Lawler and Margaret Hogan. In his 2002 monograph 
Marriage and the Catholic Church: Disputed Questions, Michael Lawler identifies two 
―Catholic models of marriage‖ and argues for the Church‘s model of ―marriage as 
interpersonal union‖ that developed out of the Second Vatican Council and the work that 
led immediately up to it.
21
 Susan Ross also finds ―relationship‖ at the center of the 
Church‘s emerging position since the Second Vatican Council, but Hogan‘s thicker 
theological account of ―relationship‖ will receive more attention. Ross identifies the way 
John Paul II has used ―relationship‖ to establish roles within marriages and the Church.22 
In Gaudium et spes, the Council calls marriage a divine institution, an intimate 
union, and a sacrament. The notion of divine institution is carried over from the thought 
of Pius XI‘s Casti connubii. As intimate union, marriage is a particular kind of 
                                                          
21
 Lawler, Marriage and the Catholic Church, 33–39. He notes the importance of Herbert Doms and 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, whose initially silenced work eventually became influential in official Catholic 
teaching. 
22
 Susan A. Ross, ―The Bridegroom and the Bride: The Theological Anthropology of John  
Paul II and Its Relation to the Bible and Homosexuality.‖ In Sexual Diversity and Catholicism: Toward the 
Development of Moral Theology. Ed. Patricia Beattie Jung, with Joseph Andrew Coray (Collegeville, MN: 
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relationship: an ―intimate partnership of married life and love.‖23 In it, the ―spouses 
mutually bestow and accept each other‖ in a relationship that is so close as to be 
characterized by a vinculum sacrum.
24
 The union is seen with greater emphasis on the 
love that resides at its center. It develops as ―a man and a woman, by their compact of 
conjugal love ‗are no longer two, but one flesh‘ (Matt 19:6).‖25 The focus on canonical 
consummation is also backgrounded, as ―the actualization of the unity, the relationship 
itself…is accomplished only in time.‖26 Further, the ends of marriage take a place beside 
one another, no longer hierarchically arranged. 
The essence of marriage is a relationship of a particular kind rather than primarily 
an institution defined by an essential end. As Hogan puts it, ―because the marital union 
supplies the matrix of conditions both for the nurturing of already existing children and 
for the possibility of additional children, the continuation of the union itself is 
essential.‖27 This union is, moreover, a union of equals. Lisa Cahill, for her part, applauds 
what she sees as attempts by John Paul II since Vatican II to promote equal dignity within 
marriage (though not without concern).
28
 John Paul II has continually attempted to raise 
the dignity of the marriage relationship itself, arguing that marriage forms a ―communion 
of persons.‖ In fact, he identified the first task of families as precisely this: forming a 
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 Cahill, Family, 90–92. She question‘s John Paul II‘s conclusion that the Church‘s institutional practices 
are in line with equality and make sense in terms of complementarity, especially those whereby women 
―are not allowed access to contraception, abortion, or divorce under any circumstances; they are not to be 
ordained priests‖ (ibid., 92). She goes on to say, ―his notion that women are by nature maternal; that, even 
when not literally mother, their ‗special genius‘ consists in nurturing, maternal behavior in all other 
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undermine what seems to be John Paul II‘s sincerity about gender equality in family and society.   
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communion of persons.
29
 These unions, or communions, therefore, are to be sought as the 
primary, essential, necessary good, a good contributing to the perfection of the spouses, 
and existing as the matrix for the nurturing and procreation of children. As a sacrament, 
the marriage confers the grace necessary to perform the duties of marriage and has an 
indissoluble character. What is interesting here, though, is that the relationship has taken 
primacy of place over procreation in regard to one of the effects of the sacrament. 
Whereas for Pius XI and XII, the indissolubility conferred in the sacrament is required 
for the good of the offspring and the ability to educate and nurture them, for the Second 
Vatican Council indissolubility is required for the purposes of the intimate union in 
which the perfection of the partners will be realized.
30
  
The role of conjugal intercourse in the life of the marriage is treated explicitly by 
the Council: ―Where the intimacy of marriage life is broken off, its faithfulness can 
sometimes be imperiled and its quality of fruitfulness ruined, for then the upbringing of 
the children and the courage to accept new ones are both endangered.‖31 For Hogan this 
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 Hogan (Marriage as a Relationship, 60) writes, ―Fidelity and indissolubility appear as requirements and 
characteristics of marriage considered as an intimate union in which the perfection of the partners is to be 
realized, rather than as a requirement of marriage as a procreative union. Understood in this latter sense, 
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an autonomous, individual who will primarily operate and belong in a world of contractual relationship 
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indissolubility follow. If the task of parenthood is conceived of as raising members of a common household 
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more reasonable. The relation of parent and child is indissoluble just as the relation of spousalhood is 
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 GS, 51. In the previous sentence, the Council states that during times when the size of a family should 
not be increased, ―the faithful exercise of love and the full intimacy of their lives is hard to maintain.‖ The 
Vatican website translates ―intimacy‖ for ―consuetudo.‖ ―Consuetudo‖ could also be translated as 
―practice,‖ or ―habit.‖ Intimacy captures the central concern of the passage, but that concern would not be 
lost by translating with the wider term of ―practice.‖ In fact, the term ―practice‖ would here capture the 
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is a clear development on the ―traditional position,‖ since it recognizes the direct link 
between, and even necessity of conjugal intercourse for the maintenance of the marital 
relationship. Further, the role of conjugal intercourse is wrapped up in the Council‘s 
description of fully human marital love:  
It is directed from one person to another through an affection of the will; it 
involves the good of the whole person, and therefore can enrich the expression of 
the body and the mind with a unique dignity, ennobling these deepest expressions 
as special ingredients and signs of the friendship distinctive of marriage.
32
 
 
Hogan and Lawler emphasize the Council‘s introduction of the terms ―reasonable‖ and 
―responsible‖ into the discussion of the regulation of the procreative finality. As she sees 
it, the Council does not make determinative the natural law foundation for regulating 
marriage‘s reproductive finality, but rather focuses on the essence or nature of the person, 
a rational being, as the determinant. The marriage partners must balance the essential 
directedness of their married love toward procreation and education of children with the 
necessity to accomplish that procreation and education as rational, responsible beings in 
such a way that the marital relationship will be sustained as the matrix for continued 
growth in holiness and further procreation and education. As Lawler puts it, ―the 
difference the interpersonal union model of marriage makes is that it places the 
procreation of the relationship of the spouses, their marital life and love, on an equal 
footing with the procreation of children.‖33 
Lawler and Hogan find that the role of conjugal intercourse in this prudential 
balancing of the good of procreation and the good of sustaining the marriage as 
―relationship‖ has not been given reign to develop as a controlling criterion for the 
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governance of the procreative finality in marriage. In the midst of the Council, Paul VI 
reserved the particular question of appropriate means for regulating births to a special 
study group of lay and religious, married and single contributors.
34
 Ultimately, the 
Council adverts to ―objective criteria‖ and cite the work of Pius XI and XII, which follow 
a Thomistic moral analysis wherein any act of contraception is intrinsically evil, as it is 
always defective on one of the three criteria of judgment (in this case object) for a moral 
act.
35
 Hogan follows this line of thought through Paul VI‘s Humanae vitae and John Paul 
II‘s Donum vitae, finding the same deficiencies therein, and adding one more: the so-
called indissoluble link between the procreative and unitive character of the conjugal act. 
In sum, Hogan finds the emerging position in Catholic teaching on marriage to 
have been a development on the following movements: (1) from procreative institution to 
procreative union; (2) from primary and secondary ends to two co-equal ends; (3) from 
the body as criteria of judgment to the person ―integrally and adequately considered‖ as 
the criteria of judgment; and (4) from an emphasis on ―procreation and education‖ to the 
term ―responsible parenthood.‖36 On the other hand, she criticizes the following aspects 
of the emerging position: (l) despite the rhetorical shift from procreative institution, and 
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from the body as criteria, those categories seem to remain the determining factors in 
questions regarding the regulation of the reproductive finality in marriage; (2) despite 
embracing the unitive quality of conjugal intercourse along with its procreative quality, 
she considers the argument for an indissoluble link between the two in each act of 
conjugal intercourse flawed on a philosophical basis. After all, ―inasmuch as conception 
is distant in time and place from the unitive reality of marital intercourse, interventions, 
whether to avoid or to accomplish conception, which are distant in time and place, are 
appropriate.‖37 ―The tradition's understanding of the essential nature of marriage is 
incomplete, but the heuristic structures are in place to guide to a more complete 
understanding of marriage's nature and from there the role of conjugal intercourse in it 
and the way to go about ordering the ends of marriage.‖38 
As a way of completing this notion of marriage emerging from the tradition, 
Hogan proposes a vision of marriage as relationship that offers a postmodern attention to 
data of experience, yet does not drown in a sea of epistemological uncertainty and 
vagueness. At the same time she maintains the objective reality of marriage‘s ―nature.‖ 
Hogan begins by asserting that her position is not a departure from but a development of 
the Catholic natural law tradition. Hogan affirms that the idea of marriage as a 
―relationship‖ has foundation in Scripture,39 Aristotle,40 and Aquinas,41 and is further 
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notions that marriage and the household are prior to the polis. Furthermore, ―the natural biological 
relationship under the command of the rational may be conducive to the generation of a moral relationship, 
that is, the kind of friendship based on virtue,‖ (Hogan, Marriage as Relationship, 115).   
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 Hogan sees Aquinas defending Peter Lombard‘s position that the marital relationship is a natural 
relationship, ―a tie between the man and a definite woman,‖ and furthermore, a ―union of man and woman 
57 
 
explicated by twentieth-century theologians before and after Vatican II.
42
 She asserts, 
with Aquinas, that ―there is order in the created world; (2) the order in the created world 
derives from eternal law; (3) the order in the created world is accessible to human reason; 
hence (4) there is an objective moral order accessible to human reason.‖43 Explicating 
Bernard Lonergan, Hogan affirms: 
The explication of any nature in the created world is accomplished, albeit never 
completely, in an empirical process directed by ‗the immanent and recurrently 
operative structure‘ of human intelligence and results in the progressively 
cumulative set of judgments of concrete fact.
44
 
 
A nature, then, is an abstraction from concrete observations. It is a recurring set of 
tendencies and inclinations concretely manifested.
45
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
involving their living together in individual partnership.‖ Seeing him go beyond Lombard, she identifies in 
Aquinas further characteristics of this union—a unity of purpose and a unity of being. It is the greatest of 
all joinings, since it is of the soul and the body, wherefore, it is called a conjugal union. She explains his 
refusal to make ―union‖ the controlling aspect of marriage‘s moral concerns on two accounts: (1) residual 
effects of Stoicism and Augustinian Manichaeism endure in Aquinas; and (2) Aquinas still harbors 
discomfort over the marital act because its pleasure is powerful enough to impair reason. See Hogan, 
Marriage as Relationship, 117. Unfortunately, Hogan has mischaracterized Aquinas‘ thought on the marital 
act here. Aquinas places the argument about the overpowering pleasure of the marital act in an objection 
that he refutes. See Summa theologiae, suppl., q. 41, a. 3, obj. 6, and reply to. obj. 6.  
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What, then, is the nature of marriage for Hogan? For Hogan, ―marriage has an 
essential nature as a particular type of human relationship…It is an intimate community 
of marital life and love.‖ Further, ―marriage is, in its essential nature, an intimate union of 
persons.‖46 Just as human nature is physical, appetitive, rational, and spiritual, so too is 
the human, marital relationship physical, appetitive, rational, and spiritual.
47
 Marriage is a 
―covenanted, lifelong, heterosexual, sacramental union begun by a consent (intention and 
antecedent capacity) to bring to reality this union.‖48 ―The union is promised, that is, it is 
ratified in an act of consent. The Consent is signified, that is, initially and physically 
consummated…in a particular type of act, the marriage act. The intimate relationship, as 
a singularity in being, a singularity in consciousness, and a singularity in conscience, is 
brought to completion, that is, more fully consummated, over a lifetime.‖49   
Hogan must render the term ―relationship‖ with precision, though, if it is to have 
explanatory power. Following canon law, Hogan calls the relationship that is marriage ―a 
being in itself,‖ a ―juridical person.‖ At the moment of consent, the ―becoming of 
marriage‖ exists (matrimonium in fieri). From that point on, the ―union itself‖ 
(matrimonium in facto esse) ―begins to emerge as a new being.‖50 From a more Thomistic, 
Aristotelian vantage, Hogan claims that ―as a reality in the objective order, marriage is an 
entity constituted in the real relation of subject to subject. The relationship, a union, is 
established as a nexus or connection between two persons who are, in their nature, 
mutually ordered to each other. The spouses, as the principles of the relationship, are 
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those whose ‗to be‘ precisely as spouses is to be ordered to each other.‖51 According to 
this definition, the relationship is real, rather than logical. It is a relation linked 
intrinsically to the nature of the principle constituents of the relationship. Therefore, it is 
a real relation existing in each spouse.
52
 In other words, to be ―spouse‖ is to be ordered, 
or related to another person in a particular, spousal way. In becoming a spouse a person 
forever possesses a real relation of ―spousalhood‖ with respect to their husband or wife.53  
 Hogan‘s next move is to determine marriage‘s specific difference from all other 
human relationships. In one sense, this is just another definition of marriage. Marriage 
has three distinctions from any other human relationship. ―(1) This relationship is the 
actual personal union
54
 of the partners, each of whom represents a partial manifestation of 
humanity to form a new being, the marriage; (2) within this union, the procreation and 
education of children are to be accomplished; and (3) within this union, the flourishing of 
the individual partners, as individuals, is to be accomplished as each helps and satisfies 
the other.‖55 This distinction carries a heavy workload for Hogan: (1) it describes the 
nature of marriage; (2) it defines the ends of marriage (the union itself, the children, and 
the flourishing of the individual partners); (3) it identifies the marriage itself as an 
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objective reality and moral subject; and (4) it differentiates discrete identities for the 
subjects constituting the marriage (each person has three identities relevant to each of the 
three ends of marriage—spouse, parent, and individual). Thus, in marriage Hogan finds 
three kinds of ends and three corresponding identities, according to which those ends are 
actualized: (1) unitive—spouses; (2) procreative—parents; and (3) personalist—
individuals. Herein lies her attempt at a language, or grammar, for discussing what we are 
doing in marriage. 
 As a response to her critique of the tradition, Hogan gives controlling status to the 
unitive end and the spousal identity of marriage over the procreative end and identity. 
Her reason is three-fold: (1) she understands the tradition to be moving in this direction 
but finds that it remains somehow unwilling to take the final step; (2) she proposes a kind 
of Liguorian understanding of intrinsic-essential ends and intrinsic-accidental ends in 
marriage that allows for a separation of the procreative ends from the unitive ends; and (2) 
she attempts to apply Bernard Lonergan‘s theory of finality and his theology of marriage. 
First, as the section above on the traditional position and the emerging position has 
shown, Hogan consistently finds theologians and magisterial documents relying 
increasingly on relational terminology, yet seemingly allowing biologistic concerns to 
take controlling status in moral determinations within marriage. Second, reading John 
Noonan‘s Contraception,56 Hogan finds an analysis of St. Alphonsus Liguori‘s thought 
sympathetic to her own position on the separability of marriage‘s ends. Hogan identifies 
the union itself as the ―intrinsic-necessary‖ end of marriage. On the other hand, she calls 
                                                          
56
 John Noonan, Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists, rev. 
ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1986), 328. 
61 
 
the procreative and personalist ―intrinsic-contingent‖ ends.57 In other words, the marriage 
relationship is first concerned with its own endurance. This position results in a sort of 
tautological statement: in order for the marriage to be a marriage, the marriage must 
endure. On the other hand, the marriage remains a marriage even if the partners, as 
―individuals,‖ do not flourish and even if the partners never procreate and educate 
children. The personalist and procreative ends belong to marriage by nature, but need not 
be actualized for the marriage to remain extant. The intrinsic-contingent ends, then, serve 
the preservation of the union, the marriage itself. The ―relationship‖ takes on a sort of life 
of its own as a unity created by the consent of the spouses. The union of marriage 
―supplies the matrix of conditions for children‖ and personal flourishing, whether or not 
those ends ever occur.
58
 
 Finally, Hogan applies Lonergan‘s notion of finality to her discussion of the 
marital relationship. As Hogan reads Lonergan, ―finality, or final causality, is the 
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operation of causation as directed to an end as good, that is, perfective of the being.‖59 
Hogan identifies three ends of marriage in Lonergan‘s thought: essential goods, excellent 
goods, and absolute goods. She then associates these goods with the corresponding 
finality found in Lonergan‘s article on marriage, ―Finality, Love, Marriage‖: (1) 
horizontal, (2) vertical, and (3) absolute.
60
 Her application of finality in marriage follows: 
there are three kinds of ends (or goods) in marriage—unitive, procreative, and personalist; 
each of those species of good has an essential good, a more excellent good, and an 
absolute good; the essential good is a result of marriage‘s horizontal finality; the more 
excellent good results from marriage‘s vertical finality; and the absolute good is the result 
of marriage‘s absolute finality. Take, for example, the unitive end of marriage. First, 
marriage has a unitive end. The unitive end has a horizontal finality in an essential good, 
that is, by nature marriage is ordered to continue itself as an organistic union. By 
appetition males and females are attracted to each other and respond to one another. 
Second, marriage‘s unitive end has a vertical finality in a more excellent good, that is, to 
be a union of friendship—a unity of body, consciousness, and conscience. Human reason 
integrates and orders animal appetition and passion and ―forms the set of conditions 
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which incline toward the emergence of unity of consciousness and unity of conscience.‖61 
Finally, as Hogan describes it, the unitive end of marriage has an absolute finality in an 
absolute good, that is, union with God.
62
 The triple unity of body, consciousness, and 
conscience supplies the matrix wherein the spouses fulfill their role as parents, and 
wherein the marital union is receptive to the transforming power of grace, whereby they 
are brought to the possibility of attaining the absolute good of union with God. Hogan 
continues with this same kind of analysis on the other two specific ends of marriage: the 
procreative and the personalist ends. 
 
Critique 
 
This description of marriage as relationship, especially Hogan‘s account of the 
nature of marriage, the role of sexual intercourse, and the manner of regulating the 
actualization of the various finalities in marriage obviously contains theological richness, 
an engagement with the tradition, and a creative development. Her developments are 
helpful for addressing some of the problems confronting theologies of marriage. As an 
answer for Hauerwas‘s concern about our linguistic inability to talk about what we are 
doing in marriage, Hogan provides a language to speak intelligibly and thoroughly about 
what partners are doing in marriage by organizing the three identities, the three ends, and 
the goods within those ends. Second, as an answer to Rubio‘s philosophical problematic 
of modernism and postmodernism, (ideal family over-against the ―real‖ families) Hogan 
provides a way to bring the ideals for marriage proposed by the magisterial writings of 
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the Church into discussion with spousal experience. As an answer to those who find 
inadequate the notion of marriage as procreative union, her development is to complete 
the trend she identifies within the Catholic tradition of the last century toward a focus on 
the marriage itself, the relationship itself, as the primary end or object of the acts that take 
place in the married life and also the primary moral subject of those acts. The other goods 
of marriage serve the marriage, the relationship itself.  
Another advantage the ―marriage as relationship‖ paradigm presents for the 21st-
century theological debate is that it seems to attract a variety of scholars. As part of the 
theological debate on marriage in the twenty-first century, Hogan‘s hypothesis has much 
to recommend it: (1) its focus on the ―nature and ends‖ of marriage attracts perhaps more 
traditionalist scholars;
63
 (2) its integration of marriage as a relationship that provides the 
matrix for the actualization of certain ends attracts those theologians of a more revisionist 
stance. These latter scholars have a more ostensible postmodern epistemological 
skepticism about marriage, especially with respect to its status as indissoluble, as 
sacrament, and the regulation of sexuality therein.
64
 Bringing these two kinds of 
theologians into charitable dialogue presents a challenge, one to which Hogan has made 
strides. Rather than seeing marriage as already an indissoluble communion of persons 
serving life, transforming society, and participating in the mystery of Christ in the church, 
Hogan‘s vision is a marital relationship that sets up the conditions for those tasks to be 
accomplished over time to a greater or lesser extent.
65
 From a feminist perspective, 
Hogan‘s rich notion of the marital friendship and the personalist end of marriage strongly 
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rejects patriarchal marital forms. From an ecumenical standpoint, as well as from the 
position of dialogue with civil society and the state, her vision of marriage as human 
relationship is accessible. It does not depend on sacramental language, and her 
development from natural, to reasonable, to transcendental or absolute levels of 
relationship is intelligible to policy-makers, because the transcendental or absolute level 
of the relationship can be prescinded from. Finally, Hogan‘s robust characterization of 
the marriage‘s objective reality as a moral agent allows her to argue for a less restrictive 
method of conception regulation (both achievement and avoidance) than is currently 
approved by the Church.
66
 
This characterization of marriage as relationship is not, however, without cost. 
Two problems are evident at the general level. First, Hogan‘s account is so focused on 
natural law and philosophy that it lacks relationship to Christology, and makes no 
mention of the Trinity. The model of Christ‘s spousal love for the Church is all but 
entirely absent from this account. Second, Hogan‘s account of marriage as relationship 
does not place the relationship of marriage deep enough in the life of the Church. The 
connection between marriage as natural, human relationship and as Christian sacrament 
was overly voluntarized. For Christians, the ecclesial character of matrimony is not added 
on top of the natural character, but the natural character is altered because the couple 
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marries in the church as part of Christ‘s body. Hogan‘s account does not do enough to 
capture this inherently sacramental aspect of the Christian marriage relationship. The 
christological and trinitarian, and the ecclesial characteristics of marriage are theological 
loci addressed by the paradigm I will be developing (marriage as Common Way in Christ) 
throughout the dissertation, especially in light of another state of life that has better 
developed these theological loci: vowed religious life in community. 
At a more nuanced level, Hogan‘s account of marriage as relationship has other 
costs. First, her distinction of the marital relationship from all other human relationships 
is overdrawn. Uniqueness belongs to marriage among all human relations because 
―within this union, the flourishing of the individual partners, as individuals, is to be 
accomplished as each helps and satisfies the other.‖67 I find this claim unsupportable. 
Marriage is not the only union within which ―the flourishing of the individual partners, as 
individuals, is to be accomplished as each helps and satisfies the other.‖ The 
distinctiveness of marriage is not the desire for fully human (and thus supernatural) 
flourishing, nor the help with daily tasks, nor even the satisfaction of one another. Human 
flourishing is sought in all partnerships, e.g., vowed religious life-in-community. 
Doubtless, any persons abiding in intentional Christian community, whether vowed 
religious, non-vowed lay single life, or married life, seek each other‘s flourishing and 
help each other while satisfying each other. The goal of church as the people of God, as 
the household of God, is to be the kind of community that seeks full flourishing for all the 
members of Christ‘s own body. The Church, and each institution within it, whether lay 
apostolic movements, marriage, or vowed religious life-in-community, is the community 
wherein help is found for remedy of concupiscence through prayer and the sacraments, 
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especially penance and Eucharist. Married people as constituents of a household, help 
each other avoid sin and flourish inasmuch as they are ―church,‖ that is, inasmuch as they 
share in the mystery of Christ—not inasmuch as they are ―family‖ in the modern western 
sense. Finally, not even ―satisfaction of one another‖ distinguishes marriage, generally 
speaking. Satisfaction can only be the distinguishing factor for the marital relationship if 
more precision is given that term. If the term is reduced to sexual satisfaction, or 
expanded by the addition of sexual satisfaction to other kinds of satisfaction, then it 
distinguishes the conjugal relationship from any other human relationship. Regardless of 
how the term is defined, Hogan seems to be asking too much of marriage on this front.
68
 
Second, Hogan‘s notion of marriage as a relationship suffers from what David 
Matzko McCarthy calls a transcendental romanticism that characterizes such approaches 
to marriage as Vincent Genovesi‘s, Mary Greeley Durkin, and John Paul II‘s.69 In her 
discussion of the relationship between the unitive and procreative ends of marriage, 
Hogan states that ―marriage is always a union. The conjugal act is always unitive.‖70 
Because she does not merely mean physically, this characterization seems reductive of 
and inattentive to experience. As Matzko McCarthy has put it, according to this kind of 
transcendental sexuality, ―sex ‗just because,‘ which is one of the great opportunities of 
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marriage, will never measure up.‖71 Certainly the conjugal act is always physically 
unitive, but can be doubtless more or less an authentic witness to its nature as 
psychologically, affectively, and spiritually unitive.  
Third, Hogan misreads Lonergan‘s understanding of vertical and absolute finality 
and their role in human, married life. Her mistake results in the creation of and separation 
between ―natural‖ (secular) and ―supernatural‖ (religious, graced) spaces in married life 
and human life in general. This consequence will become clear once I have laid out her 
reading of Lonergan in more detail. Hogan sees in Lonergan‘s thought on marriage three 
finalities: horizontal, vertical, and transcendental. Each of these has its own distinct 
general end and specific end. In reference to the unitive end of marriage and the spousal 
identity of the partners these three finalities play out thus: On the level of horizontal 
finality (the tendency of a thing toward the end commensurate of its nature), the marriage 
as relationship tends toward the organistic union of a man and a woman. On the level of 
vertical finality (the potency of a concrete plurality of events to form more complex 
schemes of recurrence, or the potency of a concrete plurality of things to reach a good 
more excellent than is commensurate to their nature) the marriage as relationship is the 
matrix wherein the organistic union of more than one person may be integrated by reason 
into a union of friendship based in virtue. At the level of absolute, transcendental finality 
(the potency of a thing for its absolute good) the marriage as relationship is the set of 
conditions ―receptive to the transforming power of grace.‖ In other words, when it comes 
to marriage as relationship, as unitive, that is as spousal, the horizontal finality is at the 
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animal level of passion; the vertical finality is at the rational level of friendship; and only 
the absolute or ―transcendental‖ finality is at the level of ―total love‖ or union with God.72  
At first this explication of Lonergan sounds attractive. It describes what appears 
to be an integrative understanding of biological (animal), personal (human, rational), and 
graced aspects of life in marriage, while avoiding a pelagian notion that humans might by 
themselves work their way up from passion to friendship to total love and union with 
each other and God. So where is the mistake?  
The mistake is to think that ―absolute‖ or what Hogan calls ―transcendental‖ 
finality operates chronologically or developmentally as a sort of third step in human 
flourishing that takes place after horizontal and vertical finality have reach their limit. For 
Lonergan, absolute finality is not happening on top of horizontal and vertical finality. 
Rather, it is behind and in a sense prior to horizontal and vertical finality.
73
 Absolute 
finality sits within both horizontal and vertical finality: (1) horizontal finality is any 
being‘s particular mode of appetition for its absolute good. A being‘s essence limits its 
modes of appetition and the terms of its various processes, but these modes of appetition 
and terms of processes are proportionate participations in the absolute good of the being. 
Therefore, it is on account of any existent‘s ordination to the absolute good that it has any 
commensurate terms and processes associated with its essence at all. For example, at the 
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universe as a series of horizontal strata; on each level reality responds to God as absolute motive and tends 
to Him as absolute term; but on each level it does so differently‖ (―Finality, Love, Marriage,‖ 480).  ―One 
finality is affirmed, besides the absolute reference of all things to God and the horizontal reference of each 
thing to its commensurate motives and ends, a vertical up-thrust from lower levels of appetition and process; 
thus are provided the empty categories for the ultimate solution, since horizontal ends are shown to be more 
essential and vertical more excellent,‖ (Lonergan, ―Finality, Love, Marriage,‖ 478).    
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level of horizontal finality, infused virtue (sanctifying grace) has a horizontal finality in 
the sanctification of the person. Again, at the level of horizontal finality, a human person 
has modes of appetition and terms of processes that contribute to that person‘s continued 
existence as person—hunger is a mode of appetition that leads to the identification of 
edible resources through sensory input and habits of thought, the consumption of food, 
the maintenance of the human body, and through that scheme of recurrence the continued 
existence of the human person. (2) The notion of vertical finality also presupposes and 
requires a notion of absolute finality. Vertical finality is an immanent dynamism toward 
greater being, a higher viewpoint, a more complex scheme of recurrence. It is the 
reference of a thing to higher levels of appetition and process than are commensurate to it 
by nature. In that sense, it requires a plurality of beings, events, or insights from which 
emerges the higher form of being, the more complex scheme of recurrence, or the higher 
viewpoint.
74
 It would be impossible to call these new realities ―higher‖ unless there were 
stipulated a highest or absolute being, scheme of recurrence, or viewpoint in which they 
proportionately participate. Absolute finality is not a level of finality happening extrinsic 
to the vertical, but rather it makes the vertical possible.  
Therefore, Hogan‘s equation of the term ―absolute finality‖ with ―transcendental 
finality‖ represents a misreading of Lonergan on finality. Vertical finality is already 
transcendental, and absolute finality does not exist to prevent a pelagian turn. Vertical 
finality is the potency of pluralities of beings or events that are non-systematic, that is, 
without statistically recurring regularity, to become systematic as a new scheme of 
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recurrence or a new kind of being.
75
 Vertical finality is the immanent, dynamic upthrust, 
a potency of any being or scheme of events to reach an end beyond those commensurate 
to it.
76
 It is the dynamism by which a plurality of atoms collides per accidens until the 
product of those collisions exists in a form stable enough to have its own systematically 
intelligible way of existing (per se) in the world—that is, until the atoms become a 
molecule. Thus, the notion of vertical finality already contains transcendence.
77
 To call 
only absolute finality ―transcendental‖ is to conflate absolute and vertical finality, or to 
be mistaken about what vertical finality is.  
 Instead of renaming Lonergan‘s absolute finality with the term ―transcendental 
finality,‖ a sort of supernatural operator on the world, raising it to holiness, Hogan ought 
to have recovered more richly Lonergan‘s notion of vertical finality as ―obediential 
potency.‖ A concrete plurality of rational beings has the obediential potency to receive 
communication of God. This obediential manifestation of finality is found, for example, 
three ways: (1) the mystical body of Christ with its head, (2) with the indwelling of the 
Spirit in the person by grace, (3) or the union of the body and soul in the beatific vision.
 78
 
Like all other manifestations of vertical finality, the obediential finality is plural.
79
 Unlike 
any other manifestation of finality, the obediential finality is social. It involves conscious 
plurality of persons seeking the good together. The ―term‖ of obediential potency is 
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God‘s self, and the manner of termination is by rational, interpersonal relationships 
among people infused by grace. Human persons have a capacity to receive God‘s self, but 
socially, as part of Christ‘s own body. The marriage of baptized Christians is one such 
conscious plurality of persons. Inasmuch as they participate in Christ‘s mystical body, 
and inasmuch as they have been infused by baptismal grace, spouses exist in a 
relationship of obediential potency for growth in holiness according to a conjugal way of 
life in the church. Therefore, marriage, in as much as it is ecclesial, that is, wherever it 
participates in the mystery of Christ and his church, manifests vertical finality (as 
obediential potency).  
While Hogan attempts a synthesis of the human as animal, rational, and 
supernatural, she unwittingly ends up with a version of finality that leads to a vision of 
marriage that would have to primarily occupy the supposed free space of civil society.
80
 
From there, marriage, the state or some institution of civil society (such as the Church) 
bolster and support marriage. Religion, then, can offer counsel, direction, and means of 
grace if the couple is interested in pursuing a life of holiness, but the ecclesial institution 
is not necessarily the central institution. Marriage becomes an extra-ecclesial affair to 
which the Church can contribute its blessing, and even a sacrament, but the sacrament is 
merely icing on the wedding cake, the transcendental, absolute finality of the marriage 
that is proceeding according to the order of reason, or its vertical finality.  
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MARRIAGE AS PRACTICE 
  
 Readings of the tradition always vary, and theologians are ever attempting to 
understand the tradition authentically in their own context. Differences of emphasis, then, 
will always occur, even when theologians read the same text. For example, I begin this 
discussion of marriage as practice by comparing two alternate readings of Gaudium et 
spes on the question of marriage as relationship or practice:  
Marriage to be sure is not intended solely for procreation; rather, its very nature as 
an unbreakable compact between persons, and the welfare of children, both 
demand that mutual love of the spouses be embodied in a rightly ordered manner 
[recto ordine], that it grow and ripen. Therefore marriage persists as a whole 
manner and communion of life [ut totius vitae consuetudo et communio], and 
maintains its value and indissolubility, even when, despite the often intense desire 
of the couple, offspring are lacking.
81
 
 
This passage can serve to demonstrate the central place for the ontological reality of the 
marital relationship among the nature and ends of marriage. The other goods are at the 
relationship‘s service because the relationship is the matrix of conditions in which the 
other goods (procreative and personalist) may develop.
82
 The role of marital intercourse 
is first to serve the relationship, which is why retrievals of ―relationship‖ as gravitational 
center of marriage, as the very definition of marriage, is good as far as it goes, but 
unfortunately, they do not take us as far as we need. 
 On the other hand, this same passage from Gaudium et spes could be read from a 
different vantage: the vantage of ―practice.‖ I believe such an approach to marriage can 
work with the relational paradigm to create constructive possibilities for how to renew 
and re-imagine marriage in the Church. In fact, Hogan‘s own reading of this passage begs 
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for completion by a ―practice‖ approach to the theology of marriage: ―The actualization 
of the complete unity, the relationship itself, that ‗intimate unity of persons and actions‘ 
[GS 48] is accomplished only in time.‖83 Marriage is a relationship, yes, a matrix of 
conditions, but in that sense it is a potency that must be fulfilled in act, by order, practices, 
and habits.  
Reading the same passage wherein we saw the centrality of the relationship, let 
me briefly point out the degree to which the language of practice enters the thought of the 
Council. Marriage is identified in the passage quoted above from Gaudium et spes 50 as a 
―totius vitae consuetudo et communio‖ a practice or habitual manner and communion of 
the whole of life.
84
 Now this practice of the whole of life, on account of the ―unbreakable 
compact‖ and the ―welfare of the children,‖ must be a habitual manner of a particular 
kind. What kind? Gaudium et spes 50 suggests one in which the ―spouses‘ mutual love be 
made present in right ordering [recto ordine].‖ Marriage does have an ontological unity 
through the gift of the sacrament, but at the same time it has a unity of order, as it is 
constituted by the right ordering of spousal love.
85
 By what criteria is this ―right ordering‖ 
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determined, though? Notice that the two goods demanding this particular way of life, and 
thus owning a controlling stake in its shape, are chiefly theological and ecclesial: (1) the 
―unbreakable compact‖ is made as a Christian in virtue of baptism and guaranteed by the 
gift of grace. It is only possible ecclesially, that is, from within the Church. A marriage 
between a Christian and the unbaptized is not a sacrament, not an unbreakable compact. 
(2) The welfare of the children too is finally theological; they belong in the household of 
God, the Church. Marriage, then, must be a particular, ecclesial, sacramental way of 
ordering a practice, manner, and communion of the whole of life—a life that is both 
temporal and eschatological. It is the Church, the household of God, the body of Christ 
that will offer to Christians the shape and character of this practice of the entirety of life. 
Marriage, as a communion and practice of the entirety of life, is necessarily a communion 
and practice for the kingdom of God, which is after all the consummation of the entirety 
of life. The life of the Church, then, from the richness of its liturgical, transformational, 
and communal character and tradition offers the resources for reimagining the way we 
enter marriage and what we are doing as married Christians. 
The following section will take steps to just that end. I will examine the work of 
three scholars (Alasdair MacIntyre, David Matzko McCarthy, and Jana M. Bennett) 
whose work contributes to the development of an approach to marriage as practice, 
specifically a practice within the Church. Because MacIntyre‘s studies on ―virtue‖ and 
―practice‖ precede and prepare for McCarthy‘s and Bennett‘s work, I will begin by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
three goods of marriage. Here Aquinas considers the sacrament to be both most essential and most worthy. 
This is the case because there is no marriage without indissolubility (the fruit of the sacrament), but there 
may be marriage without the actualization of the potency for faithfulness or procreation and education of 
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sacrament the most excellent good of marriage. See Lonergan, ―Finality, Love, Marriage,‖ 477–510.  
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exploring how Alasdair MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice‖ can be applied to marriage 
as a practice of the Church. Analyses of McCarthy‘s and Bennett‘s work will follow as a 
further theological development of calling marriage a practice. McCarthy‘s efforts will 
focus on the virtue of reciprocity in reproducing a different kind of domestic economy. 
Bennett‘s exploration hopes to shift focus from the practices of ―family‖ and onto 
practices shared by the household of God. A critique and description of the way forward 
will end the chapter. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre 
 
 A first inroad to the paradigm of marriage as practice comes from the work of 
Alasdair MacIntyre, whose definition of ―practice‖ can be well applied to Christian 
marriage. MacIntyre defines ―practice‖ in the following way:  
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers 
to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.
86
 
 
MacIntyre himself thinks ―the range of practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in 
the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life, all fall under the 
                                                          
86
 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. Internal goods are those goods that cannot be achieved except through 
the practice itself. For example, fame and fortune are external goods of the practice of portrait painting. 
There are two kinds of internal goods: the excellent product or act of producing, and the good of a certain 
kind of life. For example, the excellent painting is a good internal to painting, and living out one‘s life as a 
painter is the second kind of good internal to painting (ibid., 189–90). External goods, moreover, are 
limited, and scarce. Internal goods, though are diffusive of a practice. The more excellent the practice and 
the more widely practiced it is, the more these goods abound. The achievement of internal goods benefits 
the whole community who participate in the practice (ibid., 190–91). 
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concept.‖87 To establish the thesis beyond MacIntyre‘s assertion, though, I will treat the 
relevant criteria MacIntyre sets forth.  
 First, a practice must be a ―coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity.‖ Does Christian marriage fit this bill? Descriptively, perhaps 
not. One might make the case that while marriage is complex it is increasingly incoherent. 
As Rubio and others rightly point out, marriage has always produced a plurality of family 
forms. In the twenty-first century that plurality exists to a greater degree and in different 
kind. Take, for example, the case of new family situations formed by remarriages. When 
marriages were more likely to end because of early death, a plurality of mixed family 
forms abounded. Since marriages now are more likely to end because of divorce than 
they were in pre-industrial times, the plurality of new family forms issuing from 
remarriages is more complex, because for each marriage ended, it is possible for two new 
marriages to happen. While remarriage on account of death results in one step-parent, 
remarriage because of divorce potentially yields two step-parents if both former spouses 
remarry. Furthermore, no-fault marriage laws contribute to the incoherence of marriage at 
the descriptive level. The marriage contract is one of the few contracts that can be 
terminated without any wrongdoing, negligence, or malfeasance of the other contracting 
party. As a society, we have set up marriage as an incoherent, complex, socially 
established human activity.  
 MacIntyre, though, seems to have more normative considerations of ―coherent,‖ 
in mind when he defines ―practice.‖ For example: 
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A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the 
achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those 
standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to 
subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences, and tastes to the standards which 
currently and partially define the practice.
88
 
 
MacIntyre‘s proposal fits well with McCarthy‘s stress on the non-voluntary aspects of 
marital practice. McCarthy reminds us that couples entering marriage are not choosing to 
make something new, as much as they are consenting to enter a set of roles and 
expectations that precede them. It is these standards of excellence and rules that must be 
coherent for a practice to exist. The fact of family plurality (descriptive incoherence), 
though, does not hinder the argument that marriage is a practice with standards. Christian 
marriage does not demand a monolithic family form; in fact, if the conclusions I will 
make about the domestic character of all the Church‘s life are correct, then there are 
many ways married persons and their children might choose to organize living 
arrangements, with single non-vowed persons, with elders, with vowed religious, etc. The 
common domestic project of the entire church suggests as much (as chapters 3 and 4 will 
describe in more detail).  
Christian marriage does, however, require certain moral forms (e.g., chaste 
fidelity, responsible procreation and education without contraception, mutual love, and 
just distribution of work inside and outside the home). If the Christian standards of 
marital excellence are not met, the practitioner merely does the practice poorly. As a 
result the spouses will achieve fewer of the goods internal to the practice and acquire 
fewer of the virtues that make the excellent performance easier. For Christians, the social 
institution of the Church invites those wishing to marry into coherent, complex standards 
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of excellence for their cooperative activity in conjugal life begun in and with ecclesial 
witness. For example, the Church initiates couples into the complex, coherent demands of 
the marital vows: to freely give oneself unconditionally to another, to receive, love, and 
honor the other as spouse for better, for worse, forever, and to receive and educate 
children lovingly from God and for God according to the law of Christ.
89
 One of the most 
central socially established standards is indissolubility, though this standard has reached a 
point of scandal in the Church with the number of annulments so high.
90
 This standard is 
set by the social reality that is the union between Christ and the Church, a union that is 
indissoluble—for Christ will never revoke his love that caused him to be bound to the 
Church like a bridegroom to his bride. Another standard of excellence is chaste married 
sexuality and responsible parenthood, which the Church proposes should be expressed in 
forms of natural family planning. This standard too faces the specter of scandal, as a vast 
majority of spouses practice artificial birth control with the tacit approval of the rest of 
the ecclesial community.  
While marriage fits MacIntyre‘s demand for normative skills (e.g., 
communication, fidelity, natural means of responsible parenthood, and Christian 
education of children) a practice ―is never just a set of technical skills, even when 
directed towards some unified purpose and even if the exercise of those skills can on 
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occasion be valued or enjoyed for their own sake.‖91 For marriage to count as a practice, 
it must be also an activity ―through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity.‖ First, goods internal to a 
practice are those which can only be specified in terms of the practice or by means of 
examples from some other similar practice. Second, internal goods can only be identified 
and recognized by the experience of participation in the practice in question.‖92 Finally, 
internal goods are of two kinds: first, the excellent product and the excellent performance 
of the practice; and second the entire form of life generated by the practice. For example, 
goods internal to the practice of painting are at least these: painting well, the excellent 
portrait, and living as a painter.
93
 
 In what follows, I will illustrate examples wherein marriage contains internal 
goods of the kinds specified by MacIntyre. First, Christian marriage achieves the internal 
good of interpersonal communion, a unique kind of communion unattained in any other 
partnership. Any two persons can achieve interpersonal communion, even a deep 
friendship and sharing of life, but spouses achieve a communion of the whole persons 
and the whole of their life. Marriage achieves a consortium vitae et amoris coniugalis (a 
communion of life and love, an interpersonal relationship that is specifically conjugal). 
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―Matrimonial consent is directed primarily and radically towards this relationship.‖94 The 
conjugal aspect of this common life is what specifies it unique to marriage. No other 
communion of persons has as its object the unity of whole persons expressed in domestic 
intimacy and sexual intimacy.  
This good of the consortium vitae is at once the excellent product, the excellent 
performance, and the form of life. As the excellent product, it is that union initiated by 
the validly spoken vows and authentically consummated in the conjugal act, and 
developed in the well-ordered, prayerful domestic life. It is a product that requires grace 
for its completion. As a sacrament, couples trust that in this practice, God works his grace 
in and with them to create their consortium vitae. As the excellent performance it is that 
generous sharing of life and love consented to in the wedding vows and lived out on a 
quotidian basis with cohabitation, co-ownership, co-parenting, common prayer, and co-
responsibility for domestic and personal affairs. Again, as a sacrament, couples trust that 
this excellent performance is inspired and ennobled by grace, despite their failings. 
Finally, this communion comes more into being as a form of life inasmuch as couples 
share ever more of their lives together with common property, shared education and care 
of children, shared work toward domestic maintenance and development, shared 
relaxation, shared sufferings, and shared joys.
95
 The form of life and communion is 
initiated by the verbally spoken wedding vows and regular bodily consummation and 
restatement of those vows in the conjugal act. The good resulting from their marriage 
becomes their very living as married people.  
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 A second internal good of Christian marriage is the child, or the good of the child. 
This suggestion may give pause, since it would seem the child is not a good available 
only from the marital practice. Strictly speaking, the child would seem to be an external 
good relative to marriage. The child can be conceived, born, and raised outside the 
marital communion. This is true, of course, but the important fact is that the activities and 
skills required in achieving the good of the child are subject to the standards of 
excellence set by the ecclesial community; for Christians these actions and goods do not 
have meaning outside of that ecclesial context. According to the authoritative community 
in question (the ecclesia), the actions that bring about a child (e.g., sexual intercourse and 
maintenance of a pregnancy, and parental education) are regulated and belong within the 
context of the marital practice. Apart from that context they are less intelligible. For 
example, in chess, a player achieves the internal good of checkmate by trapping and 
knocking down the opponent‘s king. Outside the game of chess, taking a white chess 
piece, knocking over the black king, and declaring ―checkmate‖ is meaningless. The 
good of ―checkmate‖ has not really been achieved. Yes, the king is defeated, but only by 
ill performance of an activity that belongs properly to the practice of chess and is subject 
to the rules and standards of excellence socially established for that practice. In the same 
way, any two non-married Christian men and women could conceive a child without their 
being married, but they cannot do so without engaging in activities properly belonging to 
the practice of Christian marriage and subject to the rules and standards of excellence 
ecclesially established for that practice. Yes, a child can be born outside of marriage, but 
only by poor performance of what is properly a Christian marital practice, that is, 
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activities socially situated within the practice of Christian marriage as determined by the 
primary authoritative community for this practice—the Church. 
The final aspect of MacIntyre‘s definition that must apply to Christian marriage is 
related to the manner by which the goods of the practice and the capacity to achieve those 
goods are extended. A practice has ―the result that human powers to achieve excellence, 
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.‖ In 
other words, practices generate and extend virtues, and virtues generate and extend the 
goods internal to a practice. Without virtues, writes MacIntyre, ―the goods internal to 
practices are barred to us, but not just barred to us generally, barred in a very particular 
way.‖96 Furthermore, ―the possession of virtues—and not only of their semblance and 
simulacra—is necessary to achieve the latter [internal goods]; yet the possession of the 
virtues may perfectly well hinder us in achieving external goods.‖97 Finally, ―every 
practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it. Now 
the virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, we define our 
relationships to those other people with whom we share the kind of purposes and 
standards which inform practices.‖98  
Marriage demonstrates well this relationship between virtue and the extension of 
internal goods, as well as the relationship between virtue and the kind of relationship 
required between the practitioners. Here I will briefly consider the virtues of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience. Chapter 5 argues that these virtues are at the center of both 
conjugal and consecrated religious life, as they are at the center of Christ‘s life. In 
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marriage, the internal good of totius vitae consuetudo et communio demands two 
habitually actualized potencies: the ability to share all that one has as if it were not one‘s 
own, and the ability to put oneself in a position of real, vulnerable reliance on another for 
something necessary to life. In other words, sharing the whole of life demands the virtue 
of poverty, and bids us to place ourselves in a state of poverty with respect to the spouse 
and even perhaps our neighbors. To lack this virtue is to reserve some area of life for and 
to oneself, or to maintain a certain independence or safety net in case the relationship 
were to fall apart. This kind of reservation explicitly excludes the central, excellent 
product of the marriage practice, namely, the interpersonal relationship as a totius vitae 
consuetudo et communio. 
 Second, chastity, the virtue of sexual self-possession and integration, goes hand-
in-hand with another internal good of marriage: the child. This good is not only the 
responsible openness to children but also the child‘s education and formation, and the 
child herself. Unchastity can lead to the irresponsible increase in family size; a couple 
might decide to continue being open to children because they do not want to or cannot 
abstain during a fertile period of the woman‘s cycle, for example. This lack of virtue does 
not bar them from the good that is the child, but bars them from the fuller sense of the 
good of the child, which would include provision for their adequate material needs, their 
education, and their formation in the life of Christian discipleship. Furthermore, 
unchastity so unchecked that it leads to an extramarital affair hardly needs mention here. 
Such actions threaten to destroy the entire practice by breaking the trust of the 
practitioners in community. Finally, chastity is a capital virtue for living the internal good 
of married life‘s form, which involves sexual intercourse as an expression of conjugal 
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love. Unless each partner fully possesses himself or herself, he or she will struggle to 
make conjugal intercourse a gift of self to the other in the fullest sense. 
Obedience as a virtue represents the couple‘s realized capacity to give themselves 
over to the standards, common goods, and activities that constitute the practice of 
marriage as situated with the Church. By this virtue, a couple puts themselves in just 
relationship to the practicing community to learn from the community and contribute to 
the further development of the standards of excellence and goods of the practice. 
―Standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be 
initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so 
far.‖99 ―For not to accept these‖ standards of excellence and virtues of a practice, says 
MacIntyre, ―so far bars us from achieving the standards of excellence or the goods 
internal to the practice that it renders the practice pointless except as a device for 
achieving external goods.‖100 For example, one of the standards for the practice of 
marriage in the Church is that the conception of a child must result from the conjugal act. 
In obedience to this standard, certain infertile couples may never achieve this good, 
namely the child itself. By disobedience to this standard, a couple can achieve this good, 
but they would do so by stepping out of the practice. To do so would be to break faith and 
honesty with the other practitioners. In terms of the game of chess, for example, it would 
be like cheating, where the good of winning is now external to the practice because it is 
reached by disallowed moves. The good of ―the child‖ would be external to their practice 
of marriage, a break with the practice and a rupture with the community of practitioners. 
In a certain sense, the achievement of the good this way also presents a rupture in the 
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relationship between the couple and the child, who has been conceived by activities 
external to the marriage practice. So, while a good is achieved, the achievement of this 
good by means excluded from the practice puts the rest of the internal goods of the 
practice in peril and alters the relationship between this couple and the rest of the 
practicing community for the worse. Conception apart from conjugal intercourse, for 
example, jeopardizes the foundational character of the internal good of the interpersonal 
union. The good of the child is separated from this interpersonal union, not originating 
from it directly as it would if the child were conceived naturally.  
On all the levels of MacIntyre‘s definition, then, marriage is aptly understood as a 
practice. First, it is a complex, coherent (normatively) set of cooperative human activity 
that is socially established. Second, it has certain internal goods (interpersonal union, the 
good of the child) and standards of excellence and virtue (poverty, chastity, and 
obedience) partially definitive of the practice. Finally, the virtues required for the practice 
extend the internal goods and the standards of excellence.  
 
David Matzko McCarthy 
 
In his book, Sex and Love in the Home, David Matzko McCarthy offers a 
definition of marriage as practice located primarily in the Church. He attempts ―to make 
sense of marriage as a sacrament, that is, marriage as a set of practices that do not stand 
in isolation, but are open to be transformed by God‘s gracious communion as it is 
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routinized in the social body of the church.‖101 McCarthy makes ―a decisive break‖ with 
the contemporary theology that makes ―relationship‖ the center of gravity:  
Marriage is not the foundation of family or the household…I do not suggest that 
conjugal union establishes and sustains a communion. On the contrary, I propose 
that marriage does not set a couple apart in order to begin a family, but puts a 
husband and wife in the middle of a larger network of preferential loves. In the 
household (in contrast to the market), sexual practices have a grammar of 
belonging.
102
 
 
Rooted in ecclesial identity, marriage must be understood in terms of the task shared by 
all Christians. For McCarthy, ―the common task of all Christians is to accept God‘s 
invitation to share Christ‘s body in the Eucharist, which means to have our bodies be 
formed by our call to discipleship and by our place in the one body of the church. God‘s 
invitation is our call to live out God‘s hospitality as members of the body of Christ.‖103 In 
direct opposition to ―relational paradigm‘s conclusion that the unity chiefly sought in 
marriage is the conjugal union itself, McCarthy asserts that ―indifference to private 
unions is not possible in the church, for the unity of Christ‘s body is always the central 
concern…Marriage and family conform to wider institutional practices and are called 
upon to support goods that are not particular to marriage or private family life.‖104 
McCarthy continues, relativizing the uniqueness and centrality of the marital relationship. 
The conjugal relationship is sacramentally set within the context of Christ‘s relationship 
to the church. Furthermore, the relationship characterizes and contains a call ―to live out 
practices of love and care that are definable apart from marriage (like fraternal correction 
and forgiveness). Marriage is only a particular instantiation of common practices of the 
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Christian life.‖105 Also countermanding the relationship paradigm, McCarthy argues ―that 
that standard conception of interpersonal union offers an inadequate context for sexual 
practices.‖106 
As mentioned in the introduction, McCarthy offers a reproductive narrative, so his 
concern is with what kind of social reproduction results from marital practices. Marriage 
can reproduce the current market economy of unlimited growth and desire with its 
corollary individual, autonomous politics that relegates the Church among the ranks of 
other voluntary institutions of civil society, or it can reproduce an order of love sought 
and found in shared endeavor for our common good, our shared life in Christ as members 
of the Church, the household of God. 
What kind of common practices does McCarthy refer to, and how do these 
practices avoid a dangerous turn toward self-sufficiency in Christian life?
107
 For 
McCarthy, at stake are chiefly the virtues of reciprocity, self-control, obedience, 
hospitality, and faithfulness.
108
 These virtues are cultivated in familial roles that ―precede 
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us. They are passed on to us, and like apprentices to a craft, we are trained in the skills of 
their performance.‖109 Family members are apprenticed in sexual, economic, and 
parenting practices given shape in an order of love as they contribute to a common good 
that is, as emphasized above, beyond the closed, nuclear family.
110
 These practices are 
rooted in the virtue of reciprocity, which McCarthy sees as chief among the virtues of the 
household. Reciprocity ―is a disposition to do the good in terms of what and how we 
receive,‖ especially the ability to receive the unrequested gift or a gift given as to one in a 
position of need.
111
 The theological grounding for virtue in the family, then, becomes 
clear here in its relationship to non-voluntary gift-giving and receiving. The connection to 
the non-voluntary aspects of life constitutes, for McCarthy, a defense against the thought 
that ―practice‖ itself makes a Christian marriage or makes a person a Christian.  
We did not choose our savior. We needed one who would choose to save the sorry 
lot that we are. Ultimately, there is nothing a person can give to God that does not already 
belong to God. Our relationship to God is necessarily one that begins and ends in receipt. 
The gift of life in Christ, the grace of rebirth in baptism ―is what it means to be poor and 
why it is vitally important in the Christian life to receive the poor as the agents of Christ.‖ 
                                                                                                                                                                             
irreplaceable in relation to one another…isolated sexual acts have variable significance…a critical problem 
with romantic views is that sex is expected to carry meaning that transcends its particular place and time. In 
contrast…as sex takes on the course of time, a husband and wife communicate the ebb of [sic] flow of their 
common life and ‗live into‘ a complexity of bodily presence…this enduring bodily presence brings 
involvement in an intricate social network‖ (237). As parents, our ―agency of bodily care [diapering, 
washing, feeding, etc.] has set us within a network of relationships (mother–son, brother–sister) that 
exceeds voluntary association‖ (238).   
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―In receiving grace,‖ he continues, ―we do not return something to God that God 
needs…Rather, the very meaning of grace is God‘s giving to us the capacity to respond to 
God and to share in divine life. In friendship with God, we will the good that God is, be it 
the good of our neighbor, our spouse, or enemy.‖112 ―The meaning of the family,‖ then, 
―is larger than us, particularly as it plays a part in the life of the church.‖113 After all, ―we 
have not chosen our parents, our siblings, our neighbors, our co-workers, and our fellow 
Christians; yet, whether we like them or not, we do not hesitate to call them our own.‖114 
There is even much we do not know, and thus could not have chosen, about our own 
spouse.
115
 Reciprocity, the virtue of community, is grounded, at the deepest level of 
reality, the life of the Trinity, which pours out in God‘s gracious gift of his own life to the 
world through his Son Jesus in the Holy Spirit.
116
 
McCarthy‘s vision stands in stark contrast to that of marriage as ―relationship.‖ 
He offers a vision of marriage grounded in the virtue of reciprocity, a disposition to 
receive and give generously and asymmetrically,
117
 a disposition rooted in the Christian 
experience of receiving grace liturgically, sacramentally, and in the household setting. In 
the household, gift-receiving and giving takes shape when persons find love and 
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friendship most richly in productivity and common endeavors rather than in escape and 
idle pleasures.
118
 It is not somehow being lost in one-another ecstatically, romantically, 
that spouses encounter themselves and form their deepest connections. Rather, for 
McCarthy: 
If I understand goods of life in terms only of the market economy and contractual 
individualism, my feelings will have no practical home. My love is limited to 
ephemeral moments of romance, and my feelings will always be impractical and 
unsuited to what I conceive of as work. If, on the other hand, I locate my identity 
in the productive goods of the household and in the vocation of family, I will see 
the attractiveness of qualities that suit the roles of mother and father, brother and 
sister, neighbor and friend.
119
   
 
Seeing marriage as a practice allows McCarthy to reorder the way a person chooses the 
kind of partner they desire for entering this kind of life and the way they vivify their 
marital life together. 
 
Jana M. Bennett 
 
McCarthy is not alone in his practice-oriented approach to marriage.
120
 Following 
this trajectory, Jana M. Bennett develops her own notion of marriage as practice, which I 
will address here. Bennett explicitly works with MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice.‖ 
After citing MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice,‖ she attempts to give the term additional, 
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theological depth. She nests the practice of marriage within (what is common 
Hauerwasian parlance) the practice of ―being church.‖121 ―The body of Christ, the church 
becomes the important referent for all Christian households because it is both virgin and 
married; as the household of God, in which the sacraments are celebrated, the church 
becomes a stage for moral activity in its ritual practice  and even in daily household 
rituals.‖122 Thus for Bennett, the practices determinative of the married Christian‘s life 
are those determinative for any Christian‘s life, namely, liturgy.123 Marriage as practice 
begins with the practice of worshipping together as one household of God.  
Out of our shared, baptismal belonging in this one household, married and single 
(vowed and non-vowed alike) both participate in the nuptial and virginal meaning of the 
church. As Augustine has it, ―The Church is the mother of Christ‘s members spiritually, 
as she is also the virgin of Christ spiritually‖124 Bennett recovers a particularly 
Augustinian, salvation-history approach to the question of Christian householding. 
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Bennett cues in on Augustine‘s situating marital and virginal goods ecclesially, as 
training and belonging in a different kind of community, the city of God rather than the 
city of man. Bennett suggests that in the ecclesial city married Christians and non-
married Christians not only should work together, but need each other. Furthermore, 
Bennett turns an eschatological focus on Christian marriage, saying that it too points us 
toward the end times. Both participate in the practice of being church, of Christian 
householding, a practice that will continue eternally though in different ways. Thus, in a 
heuristic way, Bennett suggests the Benedictine, monastic practice of hospitality and 
formation in liturgical life as a relevant model for Christian marriage. Her hope is to spur 
discussion of ―married monks‖ and a new, ecclesial understanding of ―single parents,‖ 
that is, single Christians seeing themselves as spiritual Christian parents in the church.
125
 
Further, she suggests that the liturgical practices of the Church and even vowed religious 
life in community might, given their alternative view of what it means to live as a 
household, spill over into the daily life and practice of married Christians and single non-
vowed Christians so that they might aid in the development of virtue therein. Finally, 
again in a heuristic way, Bennett suggests the theological development of practices to 
help people prepare for Christian marriages given shape and rooted first in the church as 
household of God. To this end, Bennett suggests, ―perhaps it is time, as some scholars 
have suggested, to resurrect a sustained, church-guided period of engagement, or perhaps 
betrothal ceremonies.‖126 This hypothesis is taken up in chapter six, where I offer ways 
forward for the possibility of a marriage novitiate. 
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Critique 
 
 Of course, the notion of marriage as practice carries its own costs. First, its 
resistance to the notion of marriage as ―relationship‖ would seem to open the way for an 
assault on the indissolubility of marriage. If marriage is a practice, then it would seem 
that if the practice fails, then the marriage itself disappears. The marriage-as-relationship 
paradigm answers this problem by postulating an ontological and indestructible bond 
between the spouses created as their sacramental marriage begins. A potential answer to 
such a critique from the perspective of practice would be to say that marriage is a 
cruciform practice of being placed on the cross by one‘s own spouse.127 Were there no 
crosses to bear, no sin begging for forgiveness, there would be nothing Christian about 
the marriage. Marriage is a particular practice of telling the story of Christ‘s life, death, 
and resurrection. As such, it is a practice of requiring resources external to the spousal 
pair, especially the supernatural help of grace found explicitly in the sacraments of 
Eucharist and reconciliation. In other words, if spouses stop living with each other and 
begin cohabiting with other people, their marriage is not gone; they are merely being 
unfaithful to its practice. In the absence of their doing the practice, the practice still exists, 
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because they do not define it themselves. The practice pre-dates the couple and is situated 
socially, ecclesially. The practice endures even if the couple breaks faith with the virtues, 
activities, and goods internal to the practice. 
Second, in suggesting a comparison between the practices of marriage and the 
practices of other ways to be church (e.g., monastic life), this paradigm risks confusing 
Christian states of life or collapsing the various states of life into one another. Chapter 2 
explores this critique in detail. The tradition of the Church has been to assert a unique 
character to a life modeled on the vows of the evangelical counsels, but viewing this way 
of life as of a kind with married and non-vowed single life may further deteriorate the 
already waning interest in and honor for a life dedicated to Christ through the evangelical 
counsels. 
 In other words, in Bennett‘s vision of shared ecclesial practice in Christian 
householding, and McCarthy‘s emphasis on marriage‘s pursuit of ends particular to the 
Church rather than the nuclear family, the possibility exists for the distinction between 
the consecrated and the conjugal life to be lost in the shuffle. If these ways of life are so 
similar—as domestic, ecclesial practices—then how do they differ? If both of these states 
in life are eschatologically meaningful, what is different about their symbolic, prophetic 
character? A responsible account of the consonance between the consecrated and 
conjugal states will necessarily retain the distinction between the two. 
 Finally, one might argue that all this practice language lacks a theological 
foundation in the Church, Christ, and the Trinity. We can say that marriage is a practice 
of the Church, but how do we justify using ecclesial language? To begin, MacIntyre‘s 
definition of ―practice‖ lacks any explicit connection to theology at all, let alone the 
96 
 
Church, Christ, and the Trinity. McCarthy‘s account of marital practice was rooted in the 
theological principle of God‘s gratuitous love in creation and redemption, but he does not 
flesh out the full Christological implications of this principle, and the inner communion 
of the Trinity only briefly factors into his account of the order of love. For her part, 
Bennett‘s account of marriage as a practice has a stronger connection to the church. She 
prioritizes baptismal ligation between Christians over kinship and conjugal bonds. She 
even begins to look in the life of the Church for examples of Christian householding, 
suggesting that married and single people can participate in the same ecclesial goods. 
However, she does not go far enough in providing a rich theological account of these 
goods and how the lives of all who are in Christ can share in the one practice of Christian 
householding. The marriage-as-practice paradigm has not done enough to identify exactly 
what it is that the lives of the married and the consecrated religious share as their 
common practice. There has been work on principles of these two states of life as forms 
of Christian householding, but these practices remain ungrounded in Christology and the 
Trinity.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to provide a landscape on which to locate authors in the 
vast field of theology of marriage and family. To accomplish the task I have taken two 
steps: (1) to offer two paradigms (―relationship‖ and ―practice‖) into which most moral 
and systematic theologies of marriage can be fit; and (2) to critique each paradigm. As a 
preparation for what follows, I have shown authors who assert that the life of the Church 
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is the primary location and the liturgy the architectural model of married Christian life; 
therefore, resources for talking about how we understand and live marriage must be 
mined from the riches thereof. 
The rest of this dissertation, therefore, will be taking steps in answering the 
critiques of marriage-as-practice. To do so I will continue the project of the marriage-as-
practice paradigm but develop it toward a third paradigm: marriage as Common Way in 
Christ. I will be bringing the marriage-as-practice paradigm deeper into the life of the 
Church by rooting it in the life of Christ, son of man and Second Person of the Trinity. To 
do this, I will look to the tradition at another form of life in Christ that has been 
theologically developed and christologically grounded throughout the tradition: the 
vowed religious state. What I find is that both the vowed religious state and the married 
states share a common way of life in Christ. This common way of life is a practice of 
Christian householding according to the evangelical virtues of poverty, chastity, and 
obedience lived according to one‘s state.  
In chapter two I will explore modern attempts to put vowed religious life directly 
in dialogue with married life. As we will see, these have suffered from unfortunate 
narrative of the historical relationship between the two, as well as incomplete attempts to 
go beyond antagonistic construals of the relationship between consecrated and conjugal 
life. Understanding these construals prepares the way for our reconsideration of patristic 
tradition on this relationship in chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 2: POST-VATICAN II ATTEMPTS AT DIALOGUE  
BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND CONSECRATED LIFE 
 
UNIVERSAL VOCATION AS HEURISTIC 
 
Chapter 1 investigated two common paradigms for understanding the nature, ends, 
meaning, and task of marriage and the family, the result of which was to conclude that 
the existing paradigms are fruitful but insufficient and require a new way of proceeding 
that brings to bear on the discussion a language specifically from within the life of the 
Church. Christian marriage requires an ecclesial grammar because Christian marriage 
belongs first in and to the Church. Christian marriage needs this ecclesial grammar not 
because there is a prior natural reality of marriage necessitating the Church‘s spiritual, 
supernatural resources to make itself, society, and the state better.
1
 The conjugal, 
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particularly when the term ―society‖ is meant to refer to a public, secular space of belonging and interaction 
that is supposedly limited to material existence and is ordered and governed in isolation from theological 
language, or reason informed by faith. I also reject the notion that the family is a natural reality that 
requires the secular intervention of the state and the supernatural intervention of the Church. I affirm that 
the family is a natural reality, but only when the term ―natural‖ is properly understood as a term with 
theological content. ―Nature‖ is the entire cosmos as created and ordered by God; as fallen from God‘s 
ordering; as redeemed in Christ and called to return to God‘s right ordering in loving, filial obedience; and 
finally as eschatologically restored and renewed to right order under Christ for all eternity. With John 
Milbank and William Cavanaugh, I reject the need for and possibility of a ―secular‖ space that is entirely 
disconnected from religious claims. In the Catholic tradition, there has been a distinction between marriage 
as an institution of nature and marriage as a sacrament. This distinction may be understood as in complete 
agreement with what I have said above. Marriage is an ―institution of nature‖ that is nonetheless a divine 
institution whose order and character are divinely given and make sense only in the context of salvation 
history: (1) initially existing as a participation in God‘s ordering; (2) suffering a fall into sin; (3) enjoying 
though embattled in the current age of redemption and the return to God in obedience; and (4) awaiting the 
final consummation of the world subject to Christ in all things. Many statements in Catholic tradition 
noting a distinction between ―natural‖ and Christian marriage exist, as well as many statements that seem to 
suggest that good marriages are important because they are good for society and the state. Such statements 
can be true only if ―society‖ is understood first in a theological sense, as the communion of saints, the city 
of God, or the church. According to St. Augustine, in De bono coniugali 1.1 (Marriage and Virginity: The 
Excellence of Marriage, Holy Virginity, The Excellence of Widowhood, Adulterous Marriages, Continence, 
trans. Ray Kearney, ed., David G. Hunter, The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21
st
 Century, 
vol. 1/9, electronic edition, 3
rd
 Release [Hyde Park, NY: New City, 1991–]), 33:  ―Human nature is a social 
entity, and has naturally the great benefit and power of friendship. For this reason God wished to produce 
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biological kinship relationships of the family formed by the grace of the marital 
sacrament are subject to and directed by the prior and overarching spiritual kinship 
relationships created by the grace of baptism. It is in the life of the Church, then, that we 
must find resources to enliven and understand Christian marriage. From among the many 
aspects of the Church‘s life, I have proposed to investigate vowed religious life-in-
community.  
 But why choose vowed religious life-in-community? Is there a rich theological 
connection between the consecrated religious life and the sacramental married life? 
                                                                                                                                                                             
all persons out of one, so that they would be held together in their social relationships not only by similarity 
of race, but also by the bond of kinship. The first natural bond of human society, therefore, is that of 
husband and wife. God did not create them as separate individuals and bring them together as persons of a 
different race, but he created one from the other, making the side, from which the woman was taken and 
formed, a sign of the strength of their union. For those who walk together, and look ahead together to 
where they are walking, do so at each other‘s side. The result is the bonding of society in its children.‖  In 
what became the first of the Catholic social encyclicals, Pope Leo XIII‘s Rerum novarum speaks of man‘s 
―natural and original right of marriage…Hence we have the family, the ‗society‘ of a man‘s house – a 
society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, and one older than any State. 
Consequently, it has rights and duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State‖ (RN, 12). 
In 1930, Pius XI wrote Casti Connubii, which speaks in the words of his predecessor Pius VI of ―natural 
marriage‖: ―‘Hence it is clear that marriage even in the state of nature, and certainly long before it was 
raised to the dignity of a sacrament was divinely instituted in such a way that it should carry with it a 
perpetual and indissoluble bond which cannot therefore be dissolved by any civil law. Therefore although 
the sacramental element may be absent from a marriage…inasmuch as it is a true marriage there must 
remain and indeed there does remain that perpetual bond which by divine right is so bound up with 
matrimony from its first institution that it is not subject to any civil power,‖ (CC, 34). Pius XI continues, 
stating, ―Where this order of things [the indissoluble marriage] obtains, the happiness and wellbeing of the 
nation is safely guarded; what the families and individuals are, so also is the State, for the body is 
determined by its parts‖ (CC, 37). At the Second Vatican Council, the authors continue the Augustinian 
tradition: ―‘Since the Creator of all things has established conjugal society as the beginning and basis of 
human society and, by His grace, has made it a great mystery in Christ and the Church (cf. Eph. 5:32), the 
apostolate of married persons and families is of unique importance for the Church and civil society‖ 
(Apostolicam actuositatem, 10). More recently, Pope Paul VI in Humanae vitae wrote to legislators: ―The 
family is the primary unity in the state; do not tolerate any legislation which would introduce into the 
family those practices which are opposed to the natural law of God‖ (Humanae vitae, 23). John Paul II, in 
Familiaris consortio, filled out the relationship between the family and ―society.‖ He called the family ―the 
first and vital cell of society‖ (FC, 42). By this he does not mean that the family is a private unit that 
prepares children for a life ―out there‖ in society. Rather, the family already is the basic unit of society. 
Participation in society does not require leaving the family. Thus the theological character of the family as 
first school in faith, and as domestic church, cannot be isolated from how the family participates in society 
in general. ―The very experience of communion and sharing that should characterize the family‘s daily life 
represents its first and fundamental contribution to society‖ (FC, 43). In other words, the family‘s 
contribution to society is not chiefly this or that ministry, but rather to become what it is, (FC, 17) a 
―communion of persons‖ (FC, 18). In a document from 2009 (Love and Life in the Divine Plan), the 
USCCB organized the entire content around the distinction between marriage as ―natural institution‖ in 
―the Order of Creation‖ (part 1) and marriage as ―sacrament‖ in ―the order of the new creation‖ (part 2).          
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Perhaps the most obvious connection is the common destiny and vocation of all the 
baptized to a life of Christian perfection
2
 or holiness as expressed in the documents of the 
Second Vatican Council.
3
 In Lumen gentium the Council states, ―The chosen People of 
God is one: ‗one Lord, one faith, one baptism‘ [Eph 4:5]; sharing a common dignity as 
members from their regeneration in Christ, having the same filial grace and the same 
vocation to perfection; possessing in common one salvation, one hope, and one undivided 
charity.‖4 Beginning chapter five, on the Universal Call to Holiness, the Council affirms 
that each Christian, ―whether belonging to the hierarchy, or being cared for by it, is called 
to holiness.‖ 5 Christ, they continue:  
the divine Teacher and Model of all perfection, preached holiness of life to each 
and every one of His disciples of every condition. He Himself stands as the author 
and consummator of this holiness of life: ―Be you therefore perfect, even as your 
heavenly Father is perfect [Mt 5:48].‖ By the power of baptism, the faithful ―truly 
become sons of God and sharers in the divine nature…Then too, by God‘s gift, 
they must hold on to and complete in their lives this holiness they have received. 
 
                                                          
2
 ―Perfection‖ is a term that always requires an object. In other words, ―perfection‖ never stands alone. 
There must always be something being perfected. Perfection is the complete fulfillment of a capacity; it is 
the complete enactment of a potency. Therefore, even if the term ―perfection‖ appears alone, it should be 
read as ―perfection of ____.‖ Therefore, the Council often pairs ―perfection‖ with some other word. For 
example, the Council speaks of the ―perfection of holiness‖ (LG, 11) the ―perfection of charity‖ (LG, 39, 
40). ―Perfection‖ must be continually tied to what is being perfected lest the term take on a life and 
meaning of its own. Unmoored from a specific object, ―perfection‖ is a dangerous term to employ this side 
of the eschaton. Thus, even when we see the religious life referred to in the tradition as the life of 
―perfection,‖ we should bear in mind what one is setting out to perfect—namely Christ‘s own virtues of 
poverty, chastity, and obedience.  
3
 While the Second Vatican Council explicitly stated the universal call to Christian perfection or holiness, 
this teaching was not entirely new. In 1954, Pius XII stated, in the encyclical Sacra virginitas that virginity 
is not necessary for Christian perfection. ―Holiness of life can really be attained, even without a chastity 
that is consecrated to God. Witness to this are the many holy men and women, who are publicly honored by 
the Church, and who were faithful spouses and stood out as an example of excellent fathers and mothers; 
indeed it is not rare to find married people who are very earnest in their efforts for Christian perfection‖ 
(SV, 46). Dolores Leckey, in her popular monograph The Ordinary Way: A Family Spirituality (New York: 
Crossroad, 1989), 1–2, also begins her work looking for practical insights for married people in monastic 
life with the call of the Second Vatican Council. She also invokes John Paul II‘s 1980 Synod on the Family 
(Ordinary Way, 5–6). 
4
 LG, 32. This first appearance of ―perfection‖ is set in the context of rejecting racial, ethnic, or any other 
kind of prejudice.    
5
 Ibid., 39. Here the Council begins by noting how Christ makes the entire Church perfect as his one bride 
by the power of the Holy Spirit. Within this one Church which will be finally perfected, each Christian is 
called to personal perfection in the imitation of Christ, who ―is believed to be indefectibly holy.‖  
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―Thus it is evident to everyone,‖ states Lumen gentium: 
 
that all the faithful of Christ of whatever rank or status, are called to the fullness 
of the Christian life and to the perfection of charity...In order that the faithful may 
reach this perfection, they must use their strength accordingly as they have 
received it, as a gift from Christ. They must follow in His footsteps and conform 
themselves to His image seeking the will of the Father in all things.
6
  
 
As the Council has it, the call to complete, perfect holiness that is an imitation of Christ is 
not limited to some upper-crust of Christians (it never truly was) but is the vocation of all; 
―Fortified by so many and such helpful means of salvation, all the faithful, whatever their 
condition or state, are called by the Lord, each in his own way, to that [perfection of 
holiness] whereby the Father Himself is perfect.‖7 This statement is particularly 
important for its location within the dogmatic constitution. This sentence serves as its 
own paragraph and as a conclusion to the first section on the universal priesthood of the 
people of God. It immediately follows a paragraph treating the power of the sacraments 
in the life of the Christian, and it specifically links the pursuit of holiness to marriage and 
religious life. The paragraph preceding this sentence contains the momentous 
identification of the family as the ―domestic church,‖8 wherein the parents are the first 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., 39–40 (emphasis mine). To follow in Christ‘s footsteps would mean sharing his virtues of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience. In VC, 30, John Paul II explicitly states that the poverty, chastity, and obedience 
are in a certain sense evangelical imperatives: ―In fact, all those reborn in Christ are called to live out with 
the strength which is the Spirit‘s gift the chastity appropriate to their state of life, obedience to God and to 
the Church, and a reasonable detachment from material possessions.‖ 
7
 LG, 11: ―Tot ac tantis salutaribus mediis munitis, christifideles omnes, cuiusvis conditionis ac status, ad 
perfectionem sanctitatis qua Pater ipse perfectus est sua quisque via, a Domino vocantur.‖ I have altered the 
translation here to emphasize what is being perfected. 
8
 The interesting history of the term ―domestic church‖ at the Second Vatican council has been well 
documented by Michael Fahey, ―The Christian Family as Domestic Church at Vatican II,‖ in The Family, 
ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill and Dietmar Mieth (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995), 85–92. Bishop Pietro 
Fiordelli‘s intervention at the 34th general congregation (December 5, 1962) was to argue that the 
Constitution on the Church required a substantial section on marriage. He argued that the smallest division 
of the Church was not the diocese but the Christian family. His evidence was patristic; John Chrysostom, in 
his commentary on Ephesians, had called families minisculae ecclesiae. Augustine referred to the father of 
a home in terms of a bishop. See John Chrysostom, ―Homily 20 on Ephesians 5:22–33,‖ in John 
Chrysostom, Marriage and Family Life, trans. Catherine P. Roth and David Anderson (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir‘s Press, 1986), 43–64; and Chrysostom, ―Homily 26 on Acts 12:1–2,‖; where Chrysostom 
encourages families to let their homes be little churches (available at 
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preachers of the faith and first to encourage their children toward their own proper 
vocation, with special attention to the religious vocation. 
Post-Vatican II theology has made much of the insight that all are called to 
Christian perfection, but few have taken their egalitarian sentiment to its logical telos.
9
 
Rather than being seen as an invitation to the rest of the laity to take up the greatest 
commandment and the evangelical counsels according to their own state of life, it has 
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/210126.htm, accessed on 1 December, 2010). See Augustine, ―Sermon 
94‖ in The Works of Saint Augustine: Sermons, (51–94) on the Old Testament, vol. 3.3, 3rd release (Hyde 
Park, NY: New City, 1991), 478. In this sermon, Augustine chastises visiting bishops for their slothfulness 
in works of charity and defense of doctrine. He then exhorts any head of a household to ―do my job in your 
home,‖ namely, leading to salvation by right teaching, working for the poor, and protection against heresy. 
For both of these authors, the family shares in the evangelical, charitable, and educational ministries of the 
church, but not the ministry of the sacraments.   
9
 Authors vigorously take up the universal call to holiness, but in the call they hear confirmation and 
sacralization of current practices of marrying and householding. Understood less as a call to alternative 
ways of living marriage and family life, it is heard too frequently as a mere blessing and renaming of 
practices that already exist. Florence Caffrey Bourg (Where Two or Three Are Gathered: Christian 
Families as Domestic Churches [Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame, 2004]) claims that it is only 
after the Second Vatican Council that the family is rediscovered as a context for living out the general 
Christian vocation. Bourg notes two  types of reference to the domestic church: symbolic and juridical. She 
is wary of the juridical approach to family as domestic church, that is, as smallest unity of the ecclesial 
hierarchy, because she thinks it too easily opens a way to exclusionary, structure-based notions of which 
families count as domestic church and which families do not count as domestic church. Families without 
the correct, observable features will not be valid domestic churches, leading to their discouragement and 
continued loss of contact to the larger church. Instead she prefers the symbolic notion of domestic church, 
where the most essential feature of domestic church is ―the way members see and interpret the world and 
their lives‖ (Where Two or Three are Gathered, 28). Moreover, Bourg identifies the crux of the problems 
surrounding theologies of ―domestic church‖ after the Second Vatican Council: does the family model 
itself on the Church or does the church model itself on the family? Unfortunately, answers to this question 
of directionality, as Bourg points out, have become embroiled in the same turfwars typically seen between 
―progressive‖ and ―conservative‖ camps—where ―progressives‖ see diverse families as informing and 
changing the nature of what it means to be church, and ―conservatives‖ restricting and repressing the move 
in this direction. Bourg‘s own tendency is to emphasize the family as a source for understanding what it 
means to be church. Christina Traina (―Papal Ideals, Marital Realities: One View from the Ground,‖ in 
Sexual Diversity and Catholicism: Toward the Development of Moral Theology, ed. Patricia Beattie Jung, 
with Joseph Andrew Coray [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2001], 269–88) makes the argument that married 
people need to be sources of data and participants in the development of moral theological principals and 
conclusions as they relate to marriage and the family.  Adrian Thatcher is among Anglican scholars who 
point to their own church moving in this direction in the Anglican Church‘s document Marriage and the 
Church‘s Task: The Report of the General Synod Marriage Commission  (London, CIO Publishing, 1978). 
Adrian Thatcher chastises the Catholic Church for a continual failure of ―loyalty to experience.‖ In other 
words, Catholic theology of marriage and sexuality must listen to the voices of those who have relevant but 
excluded experience (Marriage After Modernity: Christian Marriage in Postmodern Times, Studies in 
Theology and Sexuality 3 [Sheffield, U.K.: Sheffield Academic, 1999], 19-20.  
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meant a virtual rejection of the evangelical counsels, especially celibacy, as helpful for 
Christian perfection.
10
  
In contrast to this tendency, the Council encourages the universality of the life of 
the evangelical counsels, a Christoform life. Below, the Council states that the holiness 
manifested by those who live the evangelical counsels is the one holiness of the church, 
the sanctitas Ecclesiae. This one holiness is not individual but universal: 
This holiness of the Church is unceasingly manifested…it is expressed in many 
ways in individuals, who in their walk of life, tend toward the perfection of 
charity, thus causing the edification of others; in a very special way this [holiness] 
appears in the practice of the counsels, customarily called ‗evangelical.‘ This 
practice of the counsels, under the impulsion of the Holy Spirit, undertaken by 
many Christians, either privately or in a Church-approved condition or state of 
life, gives and must give in the world an outstanding witness and example of this 
same holiness.
11
 
 
The authors continue, briefly noting how each state in life can manifest the one holiness 
of the Church by living out in particular the general call to Christian perfection of charity:  
Married couples and Christian parents should follow their own proper path [to 
holiness] by faithful love. They should sustain one another in grace throughout the 
entire length of their lives. They should imbue their offspring, lovingly welcomed 
as God‘s gift, with Christian doctrine and the evangelical virtues.12 
                                                          
10
 At the demographic level, the number of men and women religious has dropped significantly since the 
Second Vatican Council, see Kenneth Jones, Index of Leading Catholic Indicators: The Church Since 
Vatican II (St. Louis, Mo.: Oriens, 2003). Patricia Wittberg, in The Rise and Fall of Catholic Religious 
Orders (Albany: State University of New York, 1994), treats the relationship between celibacy and the 
decline in religious life after the Second Vatican Council. She links the decline to a collapse of the reigning 
ideology of celibacy.   
11
 LG, 39: ―Haec autem Ecclesiae sanctitas in gratiae fructibus quo Spiritus in fidelibus poducit, incessanter 
manifestatur et manifestari debet; multiformiter exprimitur apud singulos, qui in suo vitae ordine ad 
perfectionem caritatis, aedificantes alios, tendunt; proprio quodam modo apparet in praxi consiliorum, quae 
evangelica appellari consueverunt. Quae consiliorum praxis, Spiritu Sancto impellente, a multis christianis 
assumpta, sive privatim sive in conditione vel statu in Ecclesia sancitis, praeclarum in mundo fert, et ferre 
oportet, eiusdem sanctitatis testimonium et exemplum.‖   
12
 LG, 41. I must note that ―to holiness‖ is not in the Latin text, but the context clearly suggests its inclusion 
in the English. The English renders ―totius vitae decursu‖ as ―throughout the entire length of their lives,‖ 
but ―totius vitae‖ also carries the meaning of the entire content of life. ―Decursu‖ should not limit the 
meaning to the duration of the fidelity. A total fidelity in all parts of life for the entire duration of life is 
intended. The desire to invite all Christians to the quest for Christian perfection of holiness as a response to 
God‘s grace is necessarily tied to the doctrine that there is one common origin and one common destiny of 
man. The universal call to holiness is also emphasized an expression of John Paul II‘s attempt to renew the 
moral theological method according to the doctrine of common dignity and common destiny. See Veritatis 
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The Council even goes as far as to suggest that all Christians are obliged to strive for a 
life of the counsels: 
The holiness of the Church is fostered in a special way by the observance of the 
counsels proposed in the Gospel by Our Lord to His disciples. An eminent 
position among these is held by virginity…a particular source of spiritual 
fecundity in the world…There are some who, in their freedom as sons of God, 
renounce their own wills and take upon themselves the state of poverty. Still 
further, some become subject of their own accord to another man, in the matter of 
perfection for love of God. This is beyond the measure of the commandments, but 
is done in order to become more fully like the obedient Christ. 
Therefore, all the faithful of Christ are invited [and held to pursuing] the holiness 
and perfection of their own proper state. Indeed they have an obligation to so 
strive…Let neither the use of the things of this world nor attachment to riches, 
which is against the spirit of evangelical poverty, hinder them in their quest for 
perfect love.
13
 
 
These exhortations to a life in the image of Christ and suffused with grace toward 
evangelical virtues come directly before the section on vowed religious life. They suggest 
that all the laity should strive toward the virtues (chastity, poverty, and obedience) 
expressed in the life of those who explicitly vow a life in the pattern of poverty, chastity, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Splendor, where John Paul II does away with the dichotomy between spirituality and morality, between 
ascetical and mystical theology, the division between intention and action, counsel and command. For John 
Paul II, the question of moral theology is not ―what is permitted and what is forbidden? But ―what is the 
good life, that is, what is the fullness of life?‖ Jesus‘ command in Matthew 5:48 is to be perfect as the 
heavenly father is perfect. This command is not reserved for the spiritual elite, but available to all 
Christians. When Christ responds to the rich young ruler‘s question ―What is the fullness of life?‖ there is 
no break between the two responses. They possess a continuity of charity. Christ refers to stages of 
movement in holiness rather than to two independent states of life. This seemingly impossible call to 
holiness is a moment of grace. Quoting Augustine, John Paul II finds that ―The law was given so that we 
might ask for grace; grace was given so that we might fulfill the law.‖ See Servais Pinckaers, ―An 
Encyclical for the Future: Veritatis Splendor,‖ in J. A., Di Noia, O. P., and Romanus P. Cessario, O. P., eds., 
Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology: Studies by Ten Outstanding Scholars (Princeton, 
N.J.: Scepter, 1999), 35. 
13
 LG 41, 42. The English translation on the Vatican website omits ―et tenentur‖ from the translation. I have 
placed it back into the translation. Second, the English translation from the Vatican website renders 
―Omnes igitur christifideles ad sanctitatem et proprii status perfectionem prosequendam invitantur et 
tenentur‖ as ―Therefore all of the Christian faithful are called to strive for the holiness and perfection of 
their own state of life.‖ One might as easily translate render this passage, ―Therefore all of the Christian 
faithful are called and held to pursuing holiness and perfection of one‘s proper state of life.‖ Note that this 
translation does not add the definite article ―the‖ before ―holiness and perfection.‖ This second translation 
is to be preferred since it is more flexible, allowing for a distinction between ―holiness‖ and ―perfection of 
one‘s proper state of life‖ or a conjunction of the two.  
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and obedience. If a theology of marriage and family is to take seriously the universal call 
to holiness in Christian perfection, then it ought to investigate manners and practices of 
how married couples can strive toward that Christian perfection as an act of receiving 
God‘s grace worked out in a life of evangelical virtue. If we take the words of the 
Council to heart, then, we at least have reason to begin this study, to ask whether there is 
a further theological bond between the vowed religious and married ways of life. 
 
RELATING MARRIAGE AND CONSECRATED LIFE AS  
WAYS OF HOLINESS IN RECENT SCHOLARSHIP: 
A STANDARD NARRATIVE 
 
 
The question of a consonance between vowed religious life and married life is not 
entirely untrodden ground. Some contemporary scholars have considered the relationship 
between the two ways of life. In this section I will analyze and critique attempts by 
Frederick Parrella, Kenneth Russell, and Peter Phan. I identify one typical ―level-playing-
field‖ approach to married and consecrated life, which tries to put the two states of life 
beside one another (purportedly to free marriage from a ―normative‖ monastic 
spirituality). Parrella wants a family spirituality that is authentically its own, that is, 
distinct from monastic spirituality. It must be trinitarian and sacramental.
14
 Russell 
proposes a contemplative marital spirituality based on spiritual friendship (via the 
thought of Aelred of Rievaulx) and a spousal love that does not conflict with a love of 
God.
15
 Phan argues for a vision of marriage and monastic life on parallel spiritual tracks, 
                                                          
14
 Frederick J. Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ Communio 9 (1982): 128-41. 
15
 Kenneth Russell, ―Marriage and the Contemplative Life,‖ Spiritual Life 24.7 (1978): 48–57; and ―Loves 
in Conflict: Maritain on Marriage and Contemplation,‖ Eglise et Théologie 7.3 (1976): 333–340. 
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separate but equal ways of attempting to love God with one‘s whole heart, mind, body, 
and soul.
16
 These modern attempts are laudable, but I will critique them on four counts: 
(1) these modern spiritualities tend to maintain a dichotomy between the two states of life 
rather than seeing them as sharing in the same task; (2) these modern spiritualities 
perpetuate a competitive relationship between married and vowed religious life (albeit 
defanged); (3) the modern spiritualities of marriage (particularly Parrella‘s) inadvertently 
privilege married life as an expression of God‘s life as Trinity; and (4) the modern 
complication of the ascetical hierarchy of merit is not new, and, therefore, spiritualities 
assuming the novelty of complicating this hierarchy lack important material from the 
tradition. I will develop some of this crucial material from the tradition in chapter 3. The 
most important missing link, though, in these accounts of the relationship between 
marriage and consecrated life is their Christology—they lack a recognition of Christ, son 
of man and Second Person of the Trinity, as the true nexus of religious and conjugal life. 
As will be argued in chapter five, it is Christ the poor, chaste, and obedient Son of the 
Father and brother to humanity who draws these two states of life together into one body, 
household, and task. It is this Christological and trinitarian nexus that I will develop more 
fully in chapter five. But prior to developing this Christological-trinitarian account of the 
nexus of consecrated and conjugal life we must first explore the standard, adversarial 
narrative embedded in even the attempts to find consonance between the two states of life.  
The alternative proposed in this dissertation emerges from the thought of 
Augustine. It proposes that both married and consecrated life share in the common task of 
being church and in the common membership in two shared bodies (the bride‘s and the 
                                                          
16
 Peter C. Phan, ―Possibility of a Lay Spirituality: A Re-Examination of Some Theological 
Presuppositions,‖ Communio 10 (1983-Winter): 378-395. 
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bridegroom‘s).17 The dual mystery of the church, at once the bride of Christ and Christ‘s 
own body, is constituted by both the married and the celibate. This bride is purified and 
finally made whole eschatologically. As St. Paul writes, Christ gives himself up for the 
Church ―to sanctify her, having cleansed her by the washing of water with the word, that 
he might present the church to himself in splendor, without spot or wrinkle or any such 
thing, that she might be holy and without blemish‖ (Eph 5:26–27). The notion of 
common task and corporate belonging that undergirds the mystery of the Church‘s 
identity as bride of Christ also founds the consonance between married and religious life 
and frees our discussion from the adversarial structure that has dominated the scholarship, 
popular reflection, and the historical narrative offered therein.
18
 
                                                          
17
 I will speak about Christ as bridegroom in chapter 5, but for now, it should be noted that Scriptural 
sources come from an allegorical reading of Psalm 45, wherein the church is being married to Christ. For 
example, see Augustine‘s interpretation of the passage. Ennarrationes in Psalmos 44. 3 (CSEL 38, 495). In 
the wedding procession, after the bride of Christ, the virgins follow into the wedding banquet. ―To what 
extent do virgins now seek favor with the King? How are they moved to do so? Because the Church has 
preceded them. ‗Behind her the virgins shall be brought to the King, her companions shall follow her.‘‖ 
Ennarrationes in Psalmos 44, 30 (CSEL 38, 515). See Hunter, ―The Virgin, the Bride, and the Church,‖ 
298–99. Ephesians 5:21–32 is a source for analogy between Christ and Church and bridegroom and bride in 
general, but the passage does not state that Christ is literally bridegroom. At the same time, Christ refers 
allegorically to himself as bridegroom in many parables. He is not explicit that the bride, though, is the 
church, which is inferred. See Mt 9:14–17, and Mk 2:19–20, and Lk 5:34–36 (the impossibility of fasting 
when the bridegroom is present); Mt 25:1–13 (the wise and foolish virgins waiting for the bridegroom; Jn 
3:29 (John the Baptist‘s reference to Christ as bridegroom). Christ is also seen as bridegroom through early 
Christian allegorical readings of the Song of Songs. See Mark W. Elliott, The Song of Songs and 
Christology in the Early Church 381–451 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).   
18
 My project is in part suggested by Jana M. Bennett in Water is Thicker than Blood: An Augustinian 
Spirituality of Marriage and Singleness (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008). Her hope is that the book will 
―provide direction for discussion about same-sex marriage and a conception of ‗married monks,‘ while 
allowing single people to see themselves as Christian parents‖ (Water is Thicker than Blood, chap. 7). My 
project, I hope, is a fulfillment of her own hope, though I do not take up in this dissertation the issue of 
same-sex marriages. Bennett‘s thesis is that through salvation history, the virtues of married life and 
singleness have both been required for obedience (in the garden) and for returning to God through life in 
the Church (the complementarity of marriage and singleness after the Incarnation). In her final chapter she 
suggests a further investigation of what the consequences of the deep ecclesial relationship between 
marriage and singleness for how we live together in domestic, ecclesial situations. My development of 
consonance between marriage and celibacy in Augustine complements Bennett‘s, which focuses on the 
way that both marriage and celibacy reveal a semi-realized eschatology. Bennett develops Augustine‘s 
insight that ―neither marriage and sex nor virginity are standard for what it means to be domestic church. 
This is because on Augustine‘s insight, every state of life, every life of virtue, is surrounded by domestic 
cares and troubles‖ (Water is Thicker than Blood, chap. 7). My recovery of Augustine‘s thought in chapter 
three will turn on his ―middle way‖ for addressing the competitive spiritualities of his day and develops an 
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The common method for putting married life in direct conversation with vowed 
religious life-in-community has been to begin with a narrative. The now-standard 
narrative follows this pattern: the historical Jesus radically resisted the idolatry of Greco-
Roman and Jewish 1
st
-century householding:
19
 its patriarchy and its tendency to close off 
the outsider. Jesus himself lived a celibate life and called disciples to a kind of life that 
may have required a conflicted departure from the household;
20
 his practice and theory 
amounted to the support for what could be called a right to remain unmarried, a 
relativization of the earthly household in favor of the spiritual household of believers. 
Saint Paul, in his eschatological fervor, his desire to open Christians to broader love of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Augustinian notion of what the marital sacrament does to integrate the goods shared by the virtuous lives of 
married and celibate persons.    
19
 John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Angus Noster, second ed., (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1994), chap. 9. He considers the writers of Colossians, Ephesians, and 1 Peter to have called 
married people to ―revolutionary subordination‖ that is more or less in continuity with Jesus‘ own insights 
on the participation in the family. The goal of the gospel is not to use righteous violence to change 
idolatrous social structures, but to witness to the fact that Christ has already overcome and defeated them. 
They fall away while Christ‘s kingdom remains and is fulfilled. Yoder‘s exegesis, which I support, rejects 
the commonly held ―evangelical inadequacy‖ interpretation of Martin Dibelieus, who states that 
Christianity did not initially need to organize itself at a domestic, social level, but once the need arose 
Christian leaders looked to Hellenistic and Jewish philosophy because Jesus did not provide them resources 
for social organization. Lisa Sowle Cahill (in Family: A Christian Social Perspective [Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2000], 39–42) sees in Jesus an initial insight that is eventually lost. This insight is the radical 
rejection of married kinship and patronage structures of his social milieu in favor of a new ―fictive kinship‖ 
that expands who counts as ―family.‖ Despite this initial insight, the church, in her telling, (which depends 
on Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and an ―accomodationist‖ approach) soon lost the practice of this radical 
equality in favor of familial structures that were less threatening to the status quo of Roman household 
organization. 
20
 Jesus‘ demand ―Whoever comes to me and does not hate his father and mother and wife and children, 
brothers and sisters, even his own life, cannot be my disciple‖ (Lk 14:26) might be seen by Cahill, John 
Dominic Crossan, Gerhard Theissen, and others as an example of Jesus rejecting the patriarchal Jewish 
family. Wolfgang Stegemann (―The Contextual Ethics of Jesus,‖ in The Social Setting of Jesus and the 
Gospels, ed. Wolfgang Stegemann, Bruce J. Malina, and Gerd Theissen [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002], 45–
61, at 55–59) reads passages where Jesus distances himself and his disciples from current domestic 
practices in the context of the command to love one‘s neighbor and enemy, that is, in the context of social 
attachment and reciprocity. Stegemann finds no evidence for a direct rejection of the patriarchal kinship 
model per se in any of the commonly cited passages. Instead, passages such as these reflect Jesus‘ claim 
that belonging with Jesus is prior to and in a sense involves ―the dissolution of attachment to one‘s family.‖ 
Following Jesus then, has a large social cost. It is a rejection of the priority of extending reciprocal relations 
of mutual service to those in one‘s kin group (however patriarchal or egalitarian it may be). At the same 
time it is a requirement to extend reciprocal relations to social enemies, that is, to give without the hope of 
getting anything in return. 
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neighbor, or his philosophical tendencies, preferred celibacy to marriage.
21
 Some chose 
the path of celibacy and austerity as an attempt to follow Christ more closely, prepare for 
martyrdom, live a life of penance, or master their sin and do battle with the devil. Early 
treatises on chastity and virginity focus on the perfection of virtue and the offering of 
one‘s complete self, body and soul, exclusively to God, rather than imitation of Jesus.22 
The silent majority of Christians, though, married.
23
 The early church recognized the 
good of marriage, but (as this narrative goes) troublesome philosophical tendencies (e.g., 
stoicism, a Platonic dualism, and gnostic dualism) invaded Christian thinking and 
resulted in a dubious, skeptical, even fearful stance toward sexuality and therefore 
marriage.
24
 In the confusion, Augustine‘s theological preference for the virginal life, 
especially when lived in community, and his skeptical stance toward right use of 
sexuality in marriage take center stage through the medieval tradition, and up through the 
Council of Trent. During this time ecclesiastical institutions develop in light of the 
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 Francis J. Moloney (Life of Promise, 98–102) largely reduces Paul‘s preference for the unmarried life to 
his expectation of an imminent end to the world. He argues further that Paul changed his theology in the 
light of discovering that such an end was not imminent. Richard B. Hays, in The Moral Vision of the New 
Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 
1996),  reduces Paul‘s counsel to remain unmarried to a perception of the eschaton‘s imminence. 
―Presumably, Paul‘s belief in the imminent eschaton made him relatively indifferent to the raising of 
families‖ (51). Furthermore, ―Marriage inevitably brings with it a concern for ‗the affairs of the world‘ and 
thereby hinders total devotion to the mission of the church at the turn of the ages (7:32–35). That mission is 
‗the present necessity‘ that leads Paul to opine that singleness if preferable to marriage‖ (52). This analysis 
prescinds from questions of moral psychology in Paul. Others reduce Paul‘s apparent disregard for the 
goodness of sexuality to stoic or cynic philosophical influences. See Will Demming‘s comprehensive 
treatment of the philosophical sources Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 
Corinthians 7, second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 1-46.  
22
 See, for example, St. Methodius of Olympus Symposium: A Treatise on Chastity, trans. Herbert 
Musurillo (New York: Newman, 1958). 
23
 See Carol Harrison, ―Silent Majority: The Family in Patristic Thought,‖ in Family in Theological 
Perspective (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996), 87–105. 
24
 See Kim Power, Veiled Desire: Augustine on Women (New York: Continuum, 1996); and John Mahoney, 
The Making of Moral Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) for two typical analyses of Augustine‘s 
thought on sexuality as negative, overly determined by his philosophical commitments, his own sexual 
obsession, and a latent Manichaeism. For a more historically accurate and complete understanding of 
Augustine‘s position on sexuality and the context within which Augustine addressed the issue see David 
Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity: The Jovinianist Controversy (New York: 
Oxford University, 2007). 
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Augustinian doctrine, and the pinnacle of Christian life continues to be seen as a 
renunciation of marriage.
25
 Married Christians can attain holiness too, but only in the 
following ways: (1) in spite of their marital sexuality; (2) after one spouse dies, allowing 
the other to take up monastic life; or (3) by renouncing what is essential to marriage—if 
both spouses take on a celibate life of poverty and prayer, that is, a monastic life. The 
only way for married people to grow, it would seem, is to import the consecrated 
religious spirituality.
26
 At the same time, monastic spirituality apparently owes but a 
pittance to married life for contributions to the vowed religious pursuit of holiness.
27
 
                                                          
25
 Jana Bennett‘s work too follows the first part of this common narrative: ―Throughout Christian history 
the tendency has been to sharply define and separate marriage and celibacy from each other in ways that 
have not allowed the church to draw on the gifts and opportunities of each state of life‖ (―Mark 8: Support 
for Celibate Singles Alongside Monogamous Married Couples and Their Children,‖ Schools of Conversion: 
12 Marks of a New Monasticism [Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2005], 112–123, at 117). 
26
 The tendency to think this is not without cause. Augustine does suggest that the holier a couple is, the 
sooner they will begin abstaining from conjugal intercourse. See De Bono Coniugali, 3 (CSEL 41:190-91); 
The Excellence of Marriage, 35: ―the better persons they are, the earlier they begin by mutual consent to 
abstain from carnal union.‖  Also see De Genesi adversus manichaeos, 2.19.29 (CSEL 91), where 
Augustine interprets the punishment of Adam and Eve spiritually: ―there is no restraint from carnal desire 
which does not have pain in the beginning, until habit has been bent toward the better part.‖  Even in 
marriage, the proper use of sexuality can be bent toward what is better, the gift of continence.  For 
Augustine, even chaste marriage would have included what would be unimaginable amounts of abstinence 
from intercourse by modern ―sexually liberated‖ standards.  He expected chaste married couples to abstain 
during pregnancy, menstruation, and after menopause entirely. All abstinence is off, however, if one spouse 
is on the brink of committing adultery or some other sexual sin.  For evidence from his later writings, see 
De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia 1.12 (CSEL 42, 242); Marriage and Desire, 35–36, where he states that 
spouses grow closer companions as they are not bound by the bond that requires use of concupiscence. ―In 
fact, it [the marital bond] will be stronger to the extent that they have entered more deeply into those 
agreements with each other, which have to be observed in greater love and harmony, not by pleasureful 
embraces of their bodies, but by willing affections of their hears.‖ Augustine does not take the position 
because sexuality must be rejected and that married people must become monks. Rather he understands the 
virtue of continence to be one all persons should seek, whether married or unmarried. The incontinent who 
are married should seek continence. This may lead to abstaining from conjugal intercourse at times, but it 
need not in all cases. 
27
 As Parrella has it, ―a spirituality of the family, one that included the meaning of marriage and the raising 
of children, subsequently developed in a subordinate relationship to the spirituality of monasticism and a 
theology of virginity. The family was always understood in the context of a higher ideal, namely the 
monastic life. This inevitably led to a hierarchy of holiness within the Church. In a standard work on the 
laity in the Church, Yves Congar (Lay People in the Church [Westminster, MD: Newman, 1965), 12) cites 
a Bull of Pope Urban II from 1092 which stated, ―From the beginning the Church has offered two kinds of 
life to her children: one to help the insufficiency of the weak, the other to perfect the goodness of the 
strong.‖ In reality, this one-way directionality is a false characterization. As will be shown in the 
subsequent chapter, the life of religious orders has relied on domestic language of the family to make sense 
of and order their own project. 
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Furthermore, because of the ―dark‖ Augustinian doctrine on sexuality—that it 
must be excused by various goods (as the means of procreation, or as a remedy for 
concupiscence, or as an act of mercy)—married people remain second class Christians 
until the Second Vatican Council. Finally, we hear, the Church has officially declared 
two major points: (1) the universal call to holiness and Christian perfection; and (2) the 
goodness of sexuality in and of itself and the notion that sexuality in marriage is part of 
how the married couple achieves holiness in and through their marriage. In the marital act 
the couples give themselves to each other as an expression of a human love that is taken 
up into a divine love.
28
 The marital act is the consummation of the marriage, seen by 
many as the pinnacle and clearest expression of sacramental love of the spouses.
29
 No 
longer to be excused, the conjugal act must be celebrated. The sexual desire (which is in 
part subject to concupiscentia carnis, one of many expressions of the basic 
concupiscence [concupiscentia]
30
 resulting from the fall) was formerly viewed 
suspiciously for its idolatrous tendencies, but is now celebrated as each person‘s natural 
                                                          
28
 According to GS, 48 and 51: ―Authentic married love is caught up into divine love,‖ and married couples 
―preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the context of true love,‖ when they 
consummate their marriage.  
29
 John Paul II‘s Wednesday audiences, published as Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the 
Body, Trans., intro., Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline, 2006), develop this personalist approach, which 
has been popularized by Christopher West in the United States (e.g., Theology of the Body for Beginners 
[West Chester, PA: Ascension, 2004]). For another personalist approach, see Vincent Genovesi, In Pursuit 
of Love: Catholic Morality and Human Sexuality (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1987). 
30
 For an accurate description of the relationship between concupiscentia and sexuality in Augustine, see 
John C. Cavadini, ―Feeling Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual Desire,‖ Augustinian Studies 36 
(2005): 195–217; David G. Hunter, ―Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine‘s Teaching on 
Sex, Marriage, and Celibacy,‖ Augustinian Studies 25 (1994): 153–77. Cavadini‘s contribution is to 
reconsider whether Augustine might be right about just how ambivalent are our sexual desire and our 
feelings regarding sexual pleasure. Cavadini argues that modern thought is not as unanimously positive 
about sexual pleasure as one might assume. 
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desire to be given entirely to another and receive the other entirely as gift.
31
 With this 
development, the door had been opened for a supposed authentic spirituality of the laity. 
As the story goes, it was only recently that marriage came back into view as a 
path to holiness on its own terms. Frederick J. Parrella, in a 1982 article in Communio, 
―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ applauds the early church for the demand that 
even spouses had to be perfect (Clement of Alexandria), but he finds this insight to have 
been rather quickly lost and only recently recovered in any substantial way. He rejects, 
moreover, what he calls a context for thinking about marriage that ―subsequently 
developed in a subordinate relationship to the spirituality of monasticism and a theology 
of virginity.‖32 Among the problematic constructs of this context Parrella lists the strict 
hierarchy of holiness, a notion of ―duo genera Christianorum,‖ and the idea that a virginal 
life was a sort of this-worldly ―vita angelica.‖ As clear evidence of this kind of 
adversarial stratification Parrella finds Pope Urban II (1092) stating that ―From the 
beginning the Church has offered two kinds of life to her children: one to help the 
insufficiency of the weak, the other to perfect the goodness of the strong.‖33 In light of 
this stratified relationship, Parrella laments that, throughout history, when spouses 
―aspired to deeper levels of holiness, however, their model of spirituality was primarily 
derived from monastic life, not from their immediate roles as husband, wife, lover, 
                                                          
31
 See, for example, Innocent Ecstasy: How Christianity Gave America an Ethic of Sexual Pleasure, 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1985); and Christine Gudorf, Body, Sex, and Pleasure: Reconstructing 
Christian Sexual Ethics (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1994).   
32
 Frederick J. Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ Communio 9 (1982): 128-41, at 131. 
Despite the early insight of Clement of Alexandria, who wrote, ―we must be holy in the whole manner of 
our lives…the obligation to be perfect is incumbent on all, lay and religious alike,‖ spirituality of marriage 
developed as subordinate and with nothing to contribute to the spirituality of the celibate life. ―By the end 
of the fourth century, a strong dualism solidified in Christian spirituality so that duo genera Christianorum 
existed: the monk, the cleric, the virgin on the one hand and those left to life in the secular world on the 
other,‖ (Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ 131). 
33
 Ibid., 131. 
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childbearer, craftsman, homemaker. Growth in the spirit did not take place directly 
through the procreative relation of the family.‖34 As he tells the story, throughout history, 
married spirituality was either (1) impossible; (2) accomplished only in spite of the 
realities of marriage, that is, not in an through those realities; or (3) accomplished only if 
one excised what was essential to married life qua marriage. 
The narrative I have outlined generally makes three moves: First, it attempts to 
villainize a former hierarchical stratification of the religious and lay states while praising 
a supposedly modern, level-playing-field approach to these ways of life assumed to be 
novel. Authors in the second-half of the twentieth century write as if the Second Vatican 
Council finally introduced this kind of discourse into Catholic theology‘s mainstream, but 
in fact this method of argumentation was by no means a product of the Second Vatican 
Council or even the first half of the twentieth century. The attempt to equalize married 
and religious states is an ancient argumentative strategy, nearly as old as Antony of the 
Desert.
35
 Second, the narrative attempts to move beyond a supposed dichotomization of 
the married life and the celibate life that paved the way for the hierarchical assessment of 
the states. Finally, the narrative has assumed a historical one-way street, seeing a 
unidirectional spiritual invasion from monastic life into marriage but little to no 
dependence on non-vowed life to inform the monastic spirituality.  
My contention in this chapter will be that the late twentieth-century equalization 
of married and religious life does not escape the dualism and competitive spirit it seeks to 
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 Ibid., 131. 
35
 In late fourth-century Rome, for example, Jovinian attempted to propose that marriage and virginity were 
of equal merit. The content of Jovinian‘s argument known from the condemnations text of Pope Siricius, a 
letter from Ambrose to Siricius (Epistola. 42, Rescriptum ad Siricium papam 4) concerning Ambrose‘s 
condemnation of Jovinian through a council in Milan, Jerome‘s first response (Adversus Iovinianum, 1.3; 
PL, 23, col. 206–338) and a letter he sent when that response met with lack of enthusiasm (Epistola. 49, 
CSEL 54; and Epistola. 52). 
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avoid; and that this way of putting marriage and vowed religious life in dialogue is not to 
be preferred, because a better narrative and a better alternative for relating the two ways 
of life can be offered from within the tradition. A renarration complicates the simple 
prioritization of monastic life over married life by seeing them share in the same goods 
and the same domestic project of being church. In the chapter that follows, I will allow 
the desert fathers and Augustine to begin this renarration with the alternative they offer 
for their own time, a non-adversarial, complementary vision of the married life and the 
consecrated life. 
 
MARRIAGE AND VIRGINITY, EQUALS AT LAST?  
THREE SCHOLARS’ PROPOSALS 
 
Parrella’s Lay Spirituality—Inadvertently Inverting a Hierarchy of Holiness 
 
With the door opened for an authentic lay spirituality, how have recent scholars 
walked through it? The first step has been apophatic and the second is positive, though 
heuristic. In the apophatic step, the project has been to reject past attempts at a 
spirituality of marriage and the family and to clear the deck of false theological 
presuppositions that prevent the development of an authentic spirituality of marriage. The 
second, heuristic step has been to lay out principles or hypotheses for how an authentic 
lay spirituality might be developed. Most authors perform both the apophatic and the 
heuristic tasks at the same time, so I will treat the two together in my analysis of the 
works of Frederick J. Parrella, Peter Phan, and Kenneth Russell. I make this decision in 
part because the principles the authors reject determines to a certain extent the kind of 
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principles the author positively proposes.  I begin with Frederick J. Parrella. His article, 
―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ offers three theological presuppositions (one 
negative and two positive) required for a family spirituality: (1) marriage is not 
subordinate to virginity; (2) Family is an expression of God‘s triune life; and (3) the 
family is a sacramental, incarnational locus of grace in history.  
Parrella‘s critique of subordinating married spirituality to religious spirituality is 
based in a rejection of ―dualism‖ in Christian life that sees a hierarchy or difference in 
holiness between marriage and virginity. His account of the dualism between 
monasticism and marriage in history follows the narrative presented above. Parrella 
wants to end the debate on ascetic hierarchy by enfolding each into the one seamless 
garment of the Church. For Parrella, Vatican II‘s statement on the universal call to 
holiness ―offers the Church a new vision of herself as the one and whole bride of Christ 
and the seamless robe that covers his Body.‖36 The question of personal holiness should 
be tabled because of this ―new‖ vision. Because we are one, it would seem, the question 
of personal holiness vanishes. Invoking universal vocation is enough for Parrella to allow 
the question to disappear. This vision of Vatican II, however, is not novel (as we will see 
chapter 3), and does not utterly destroy questions of personal merit.
37
 Since married 
holiness is no longer subordinate to monastic, Parrella can develop a theology of ―the 
family as a unique locus of transcendence and embodiment of divine grace.‖38  
                                                          
36
 Ibid., 132. 
37
 This debate raged in the fourth and fifth century. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine, Jovinian, 
and Julian of Aeclanum were embroiled in arguments about a hierarchy of merit within the church and the 
preference for a virgin life over married life. The most complete treatment is by David Hunter, Marriage, 
Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity. For a history of the question in the early Church, see Peter 
Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University, 1988).  
38
 Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ 132. 
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Parrella‘s second principle, that the family is an expression of the Trinity, is a rich 
and at the same time dangerous source of reflection. Marc Cardinal Oullett has taken up 
the same question in Divine Likeness: Toward a trinitarian Anthropology of the Family.
39
 
The richness of this principle lies in the fact that ―In speaking of God as Person and as 
Trinity, we enter into the central mystery of theology, which, when properly considered, 
includes all other mysteries within itself.‖40 Parrella finds in the family a privileged 
location where the Trinity is revealed as radical relatedness ad alium: ―No other 
commitment is as absolute in its intensity nor as eternal in its duration as marriage…In 
uttering Thou, he [sic] stands in relation, existing ad alium with his whole being. In this 
process he becomes himself, in se, a person. Sexuality in marriage is the unique language 
that expresses the all-encompassing power of the relationship.‖41  
Parrella‘s third proposal, that the family is a sacramental, incarnational locus of 
grace in history, stands on solid ground; Catholic scholarly consensus leans toward this 
position already.
42
 Christ is the perfect sacrament of God; he makes the father visible in 
                                                          
39
 Marc Cardinal Oullet does well to operate with this caution, which originates as early as Augustine‘s De 
Trinitate. To his credit, Oullett notes that he will use analogical approaches, but only in dialogue with and 
corrected by what von Balthasar calls the katalogical or ―top-down‖ approach. 
40
 Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ 133. For Parrella, the danger of the trinitarian approach 
is to objectify and reduce the Trinity ―to an abstract question of three persons in one divine nature, isolated 
from history and human experience,‖ (133). Parrella has been influenced by Karl Rahner‘s declaration that 
―The ‗economic‘ Trinity is the ‗immanent‘ Trinity and the ‗immanent‘ Trinity is the ‗economic Trinity‖ 
(Rahner, The Trinity [New York: Herder & Herder, 1970], 22, italics original). Behind Parrella‘s thought is 
the work of Catherine LaCugna, God For Us (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), who attempts to 
renew trinitarian theology by arguing that the God is per se relational. His essence is to be related ad alium. 
41
 Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ 137. 
42
 Parrella relies on AA, 11;  as well as LG, 1, 9, and 48; Sacrosanctum concilium, 5; and GS, 47–52; the 
1980 World Synod of Bishops, ―A Message to Christian Families in the Modern World,‖ Origins 10, no. 21 
(6 November, 1980). This question of how the family is a sacrament of Christ is distinct from the question 
of how marriage is one of the seven sacraments instituted by Christ. See Matthias Scheeben, in the classic 
Mysteries of Christianity, trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. (St. Louis: Herder, 1946), 600;  Michael Lawler, 
Marriage and Sacrament: A Theology of Christian Marriage (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1993; 
Theodore Mackin, The Marital Sacrament (New York: Paulist Press, 1989); Walter Kasper, Theology of 
Christian Marriage (New York: Seabury, 1980), chap. 2; Marc Cardinal Oullet, Divine Likeness: Toward a 
Trinitarian Anthropology of the Family, 50–55; Bernard Lonergan, ―Finality, Love, Marriage,‖ 477–510; 
Thomas Norris, ―Why the Marriage of Christians is One of the Seven Sacraments,‖ Irish Theological 
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the very paradox that threatens to make God invisible: the cross. Both nadir and pinnacle 
of Christ‘s revelation (when taken as one with the resurrection), the church‘s 
sacramentality requires this bipolar form. The same is true for the sacramentality of the 
nuclear family. By pointing to the sacramental character of the family, Parrella 
emphasizes the real experience of the family, as ―at once both the image of divine life 
and of human estrangement and sin; at once both the community where salvation is 
present and the community in which salvation seems difficult if not impossible to 
attain.‖43 The brokenness and vulnerability of our family experience is the ground from 
which its reality as sacrament emerges. The family is a sacrament of Christ analogously 
to the way the church is a sacrament of Christ—―it embodies grace in concrete form 
while pointing to a grace that is absolute and eschatological.‖44 The Christian family is 
―the domestic sanctuary of the Church,‖ where each member shares in the common 
priesthood, prophecy, and kingship of Christ through the sacraments of initiation.
45
 
 Following upon this overview, Parrella identifies three additional ways to 
envision the family as sacrament of grace. Though he does not explicitly cite the 
document, Parrella seems informed by Familiaris consortio for each of these three 
sacramental views of the family.
 46
 First, for Parrella, ―each family member is a 
sacrament to other members of the family, not just by virtue of his or her individual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Quarterly 51.1 (1985): 37–51. While scholars agree that marriage is a sacrament, there is diversity of 
scholarly opinion as to what the sacrament is and what character it confers (if any). The Church‘s official 
position is that that the grace of the sacrament confers indissolubility to the marriage bond, which is ratified 
in the liturgy and consummated at first conjugal intercourse. Other graces of the sacrament are the taking 
up of the human, spousal love into a divine love, as well as the helps toward the fidelity, perseverance, self-
discipline, and the other virtues required for a Christian marriage. See GS, 48–52; and CIC, 1055–1057, 
1134.  
43
 Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ 138. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 The 1980 World Synod of Bishops, ―A Message to Christian Families in the Modern World,‖ art. 6, in 
Origins 10, no. 21 (6 November 1980), quoted in Parrella, ―Towards a Spirituality of the Family,‖ 138. 
46
 FC 17–21, 28–41, 42–48, 49–64. 
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baptism into Christ, but first and essentially by simply being a member of that particular 
family community.‖47 With this first notion, Parrella parallels John Paul II‘s phrase 
―communion of persons,‖ the end of which is to be ―at the service of life.‖ Both of these 
principles are central to John Paul II‘s understanding of the family‘s role in the Church. 
Second, the family must also be a sacrament ad extra. Because Christian family 
members ―seek first God‘s kingdom and his righteousness…loving relationships and 
strong family ties grow from this openness to a world beyond the confines of their intra-
familial circle.‖48 This second aspect of family sacramentality aligns with John Paul II‘s 
call for the family to full ―participation in the development of society‖ and ―participation 
in the mission of the church.‖ The family is a sacrament of Christ when it brings his 
mercy and justice to life in places of oppression and injustice. 
Third, ―the family is a sacramental expression of the import of the personal sphere 
to contemporary culture…It embodies the powerful truth that the person and personal 
relations, whether between individuals or nations, are the ultimate meaning and destiny of 
life.‖49 This third principle is a kind of restatement of John Paul II‘s emphasis on the term 
―communion of persons.‖ It is a strong rejection of the idea that the family provides an 
affective escape from the harsh world ―out there.‖  
These three principles are an important contribution to the development of a 
spirituality of the family. I also echo Parrella‘s assertion that ―a spirituality of the family 
must be rooted in the triune God, in Christ incarnate, and in grace sacramental.‖50 
Parrella‘s principles do provide spouses with a certain language to understand how they 
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might seek holiness in and through married life. Unfortunately, Parrella never overcomes 
the dualism that he so wants to reject. The constructive proposal he offers for a 
spirituality of the family is in many ways compelling, but his married spirituality remains 
one that envisions itself over against consecrated religious life. The only thing that has 
changed about a competitive relationship between these two ways of life is the identity of 
the winner. He speaks of the church as a seamless garment, but then goes on to outline a 
unique spirituality of family that privileges the nuclear family‘s ability to image God. 
This seems to be the opposite of his intention. His high praise for family has come at a 
price: the implicit diminution of monastic spirituality as a means to fully realize human 
personhood as being related in love ad alium. I imagine Parrella does not intend such a 
marginalization of monastic spirituality.  Nor does he likely intend to re-order the 
hierarchy of merit with marriage on top as most perfect image of the Trinity and celibate 
life beneath it as only partially imaging the Trinity. The danger I see in Parrella‘s 
approach, especially his trinitarian angle to understanding the family, is the failure to 
acknowledge the radical contingency and provisional nature of any bottom-up approach 
to understanding what the Trinity is. For now, it is enough to say that the family‘s ability 
to reveal the nature of the Trinity must always be interrogated. It is the Trinity that 
reveals definitively to each person and to the family what he, she, or they are to be. 
Parrella‘s claim for marriage as a privileged place of trinitarian revelation unfortunately 
results in a stunted theology of religious life and a continuing adversarial construal of the 
relationship between the two. I must leave off this trinitarian avenue, though, until 
chapter 5, where I can deal with Parrella and other authors as part of a larger theological 
context and argument. Parrella‘s attention to the Trinity is essential, but unfortunately, he 
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puts too much effort into finding the ―unique‖ quality of the nuclear family‘s spirituality. 
The result of Parrella‘s spirituality is that he cannot achieve the goal he so desires, 
namely to work with the family spirituality as part of the Church ―vision of herself as the 
one and whole bride of Christ and the seamless robe that covers his Body.‖ This is, in 
part, why I am not arguing for a spirituality of the family here but a theology of marriage 
as a common way of life in Christ. In chapters 4 and 5, my use of principles that belong 
to the Church (Christian householding, evangelical counsels), rather than to the nuclear 
family, to understand the consonance between consecrated religious life and marriage 
better accomplishes the task Parrella has set for himself.    
 
Kenneth Russell and the Loss of a Distinction 
 
 A second scaffolding for working on marriage and consecrated life is offered by 
Kenneth Russell, who proposes the following two principles: (1) love of spouse poses no 
conflict to love of God, and in fact, the love of spouse is a mediation of the love of God;
51
 
and (2) a contemplative spirituality of marriage requires a model, but none has been 
developed. He proposes that such a model could be developed from Aelred of Rievaulx‘s 
work Spiritual Friendship but does not undertake that development himself. 
Kenneth Russell lays out four typical arguments against the possibility of a 
contemplative married life. First, according to St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 7, he notes, it 
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would seem that married life presents a distraction from completely undivided concern or 
care for the things of God. Second, whereas a contemplative life seems to require a life of 
detachment, the married life necessitates involvement. Third, whereas contemplative life 
involves a general expression of charity, married life involves a particular, incarnate love, 
with sexual pleasure. Finally, whereas the contemplative‘s heart is centered completely 
on the love of God, the husband‘s or wife‘s love is centered on his or her spouse. 
In answering the four arguments, Russell is honest about the ambiguity of 
sexuality, even within marriage. The sexual act, he writes, ―is not rightly ordered just by 
the fact that it is in marriage.‖52 He concedes even more ground to St. Paul when he 
suggests that marriage too is ambiguous, especially in its economic and child-rearing 
aspects. It is meant to draw us together in love, but spouses often splinter in opposite 
directions. Worse, the two ―egos‖ can pool and become one larger married ―ego,‖ which 
acts for its own self-centered good.
53
 Russell, though, dismisses Paul‘s argument by 
stating that he was not speaking against marriage per se, but against an over-asceticism 
regarding sexuality within marriage. For Russell, the danger Paul identifies ―is not in the 
service of the other in a bond of love nor in the need to care for the family but in the risk 
that the proper hierarchy of values may be threatened by absorption in ‗the cares of the 
world.‘‖54 Finally, Russell claims that holiness is not found in avoidance of social 
belonging (e.g., marriage), but in a right ordering of that belonging. Just as holiness in 
marriage is not in avoiding the involvements of daily life and sexual contact, so too for 
the monk holiness is not avoiding love of brethren and the material concerns of the 
monastery.  
                                                          
52
 Russell, ―Marriage and the Contemplative Life,‖ 53. 
53
 Ibid., 54.  
54
 Ibid. 
122 
 
So how does Russell hope to ground this right ordering and harmony of 
marriage‘s daily round with the concerns of contemplative life? Russell makes two 
suggestions: (1) ―the work of the family for the Church and society could primarily be 
contemplative prayer‖; and (2) ―it is the task of theologians to make this intuition 
intelligible and to provide the married contemplative with a model of the spiritual life 
which respects his dual vocation. I suggest Aelred of Rievaulx‘s sound understanding of 
friendship and its bearing on our progress toward God provides the ground for a theology 
of contemplative style of life within marriage.‖55 Aelred‘s vision of friendship allows for 
intimacy between a man and wife to function as an aid rather than a barrier to union with 
God inasmuch as the spouses would make space and time for each other to practice 
contemplative prayer.
56
 His final and perhaps most powerful insight linking 
contemplative and familial life is to suggest that the ―work‖ of the family for the Church 
and society could be a form of contemplative prayer.
57
 This is the kind of re-imagination 
of the married couple‘s and the family‘s task that is required to contextualize marriage 
again as an ecclesial reality which takes as its primary social role a participation in the 
building up of the body of Christ, the Civitas Dei rather than the civitas terrena. 
While I admire Russell‘s call for ―a model of the contemplative life which will 
integrate the sexual and spiritual intimacy of the married couple‖ I contest Russell‘s easy 
claim for this model‘s function. By such a model, he purports, spouses ―will be able to 
                                                          
55
 Ibid., 56. For a description of Aelred of Rievaulx on marriage, see Marie Anne Mayeski, ―‗Like a Boat is 
Marriage‘: Aelred on Marriage as a Christian Way of Life,‖ Theological Studies 70 (2009): 92–108. Aelred 
characterizes marriage as a boat that will get spouses to their goal of God‘s kingdom, but they will need to 
continually bail out their vessel, which suffers from more leaks than the boat of vowed religious life. 
56
 Ibid., 49–52. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Life Together, trans., John W. Doberstein [New York: Harper & Row, 
1954], 87) argues that each person in the Christian community has the right to demand time for 
contemplative prayer and devotional Scripture reading. ―We have a right to this time, even prior to the 
claims of other people, and we may insist upon having it as a completely undisturbed quiet time despite all 
external difficulties.‖   
57
 Russell, ―Marriage and the Contemplative Life,‖ 55. 
123 
 
reconcile on an intellectual level the harmony between marriage and contemplation they 
know experientially.‖58 Unfortunately, this ―they‖ is a small lot, and given the tradition of 
married saints who have chosen celibacy within marriage, I wonder just how obvious the 
harmony between conjugal intercourse and contemplation is experientially—even for 
those attracted to the contemplative life.
59
 Further, a model of married spirituality is 
needed not principally to justify the life of those already experiencing a ―harmony 
between marriage and contemplation.‖ Theology is not a justification of their practices. 
Instead, a model that finds consonance between contemplative and married life is 
required principally for those married or engaged couples who want to see their marriage 
as a pilgrimage toward the City of God, but find themselves besieged and battered by 
what seems disharmonious and distracting in their daily lives. 
One important point at stake in Russell‘s attempt to level the playing field 
between consecrated and conjugal life is the question of the way God is the object of love 
and the kind of love occurring in consecrated and conjugal life. He argues that spousal 
love mediates the love of God in the same way that the consecrated religious person‘s 
love of every neighbor mediates the love of God. Jacques and Raissa Maritain‘s writings 
on the amour fou divin and amour fou humain serves as the touchpoint for this hypothesis. 
Maritain believes that the human heart has room for one of these loves. A marriage may 
exist with either but not both of these loves.
60
 As opposed to Maritain, Russell argues 
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―that for married people the best preparation for contemplation is the vigorous living out 
of the daily reality of the state to which they have been called.‖61 Maritain believes that 
sexuality and the completely consuming gift of love a spouse might give the other, a love 
that makes the spouse the center of gravity for the life of love, prevents the spouse from 
making God the gravitational center of one‘s life. There is only room for one total love in 
the person. Russell rejects this position on the grounds of De Lubac‘s and Rahner‘s 
efforts to maintain the distinction but not the complete separation between the ―natural‖ 
and ―supernatural.‖ ―In fact,‖ Russell states, ―the neat dichotomy of nature and grace is 
challenged by marriage‘s status as a sacrament in which two people are called to be 
completely given over to each other in oneness. It follows from this that no aspect of the 
union—neither the sexual nor the deep interpersonal attachment—can be seen as a barrier 
to union with God.‖62 
Although Russell thinks the point of contention with Maritain is whether love of 
God and love of a person conflict in marriage, in fact a more basic distinction lies at the 
discussion‘s base. Russell and Maritain, it seems, disagree about the nature of the love 
that is essential for marriage. In line with the thought of John Paul II, Russell sees the 
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love essential to marriage as a complete self-gift, a love that makes the other spouse the 
gravitational center of life: ―To married people who take the commitment to one another 
as persons seriously any advance toward God which would take them away from their 
sacramental call to be totally for the other, body and soul, can only be regarded as a 
deviation.‖63 Maritain, though, does not see this kind of love as the love essential to 
marriage. Instead, he sees only a love of friendship as essential to marriage:  
In the unique and sacred friendship of which I have just spoken, together with 
(when it is there) the love, the bel amour, equally unique and sacred, which is 
joined to it or should normally be joined to it, consists the essence of conjugal 
love...Mad, boundless love arises in this case as a surplus.
64
 
 
Spouses may have a mad, boundless love for one another (amour fou humain), but this 
love in Maritain‘s thought is not essential to marriage and would necessarily inhibit the 
spouses ability to have mad, boundless love for God. ―Maritain sees a radical and 
irreconcilable opposition between the perfection of human love which is sometimes 
attained in marriage (amour fou humain) and the perfect love (amour fou divin) which the 
contemplative must, he maintains, give exclusively to God.‖65 Because in Maritain‘s 
thought, the only legitimate object of amour fou divin is God in Himself, either the 
spouse gives complete, passionate love to God or to their spouse, but not to both. Russell, 
though, cannot accept such an assertion. ―The neighbor is not an obstacle to God but the 
personal intersection where God himself is loved…in the intimacy of marriage the love 
that goes out to the beloved does not need to be redirected toward God—there is no need 
to lift either the physical or spiritual eyes from the spouse toward the heavenly realms.‖66  
                                                          
63
 Ibid., 339–40. 
64
 Jacques Maritain, Notebooks, 244. 
65
 Ibid., 333–34. 
66
 Ibid., 338. 
126 
 
At one level, Russell agrees with Maritain that there is only one ultimate love (amour fou 
divin), but Russell does not think (as Maritain does) that it is given either to God or to the 
spouse. Russell‘s solution is to say that the religious give amour fou divin to God through 
the neighbor in general, and the spouse gives that love to God through a specific neighbor.  
Perhaps, though, Russell‘s answer is too neat. Russell would not have had to go 
this direction if he had seen his deeper disagreement with Maritain was actually about the 
kind of love necessary to make a marriage contract and covenant. The loves are not in 
conflict, because the one leads to the other. Spousal love (bel amour, and sometimes 
amour fou humain) disposes a couple to develop amour fou divin in and through their 
relationship. Russell, like so many authors, is overly anxious to equalize and level out the 
consecrated and conjugal life. There is no need to give either state of life a self-esteem 
boost or a piece of humble pie. Rather, we can see them, as I will propose in the next 
chapter, as two parts of the same task of being church, living in the household of God.   
 
Separate but Equal: Peter Phan on Marriage and Consecrated life 
 
Russell and Parrella are not alone in the attempt to level the spiritual playing field. 
Peter Phan has taken up the task in his attempt to set the groundwork for an authentic 
spirituality of the laity. Phan, too, takes the initial, apophatic step toward a lay spirituality 
(saying what it is not) in his article, ―The Possibility of a Lay Spirituality.‖ He overturns 
and qualifies three theological principles that says have obstructed a lay spirituality: (1) 
virginity is superior to married life; (2) monastic spirituality is normative for the laity; 
and (3) those not living consecrated religious life only love the Lord with a divided heart. 
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Like Parrella, Phan wants to excise lay spirituality from ―monasticization,‖ that is, from 
the normative context of monastic or vowed religious spirituality.
67
 Interestingly, he 
wants to overturn and yet affirm the three theological principles given above. ―A 
misunderstanding of the statement regarding the normativity of monasticism for the laity,‖ 
he writes, ―has produced a stunted, jejune spirituality with dwarfed monastic practices 
intended to transform the laypersons into monks in the world… a misunderstanding of 
the statement regarding the divided heart of the laity has prevented the development of a 
theology in which marriage is seen as the way to perfection.‖68 
Phan attempts a both/and approach, seeking to hold both hierarchy and 
egalitarianism in one hand. Phan makes the case for a qualified superiority of marriage 
and a qualified superiority of the state of the counsels. The problem Phan sees in arguing 
for equal spiritual worth of the married and vowed religious life comes in the form of the 
traditional and contemporary magisterial teaching that the life of the counsels is 
objectively superior.
69
 The life of the evangelical counsels, writes Phan, ―considered as a 
renunciation and a practicing of the passion of Christ himself, is the more evident, visible, 
graspable mode of the objectivation and manifestation of the mystery of Christ and the 
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Church in its transcendent and eschatological dimension.‖70 Therefore he can, in a way, 
affirm the superiority of consecrated life in a precise context—as a way to manifest and 
objectify the transcendental and eschatological dimension of the mystery of Christ and 
the Church. On the other hand, Phan asserts the objective superiority of married life as 
well: ―Marriage objectively and absolutely speaking is a ‗better means‘ than virginity 
insofar as it is the more evident, visible, graspable objectivation and manifestation of the 
immanent, intramundane dimensions of the mystery of Christ and the Church.‖71 Phan 
can make this claim because he limits the context of the comparison. Marriage is in the 
context of the world; consecrated life is in the context of the eschaton. Marriage is a 
better means to manifest and objectify the dimensions of the mystery of Christ and the 
Church in the world.  
Despite his rejection of ―monasticizing‖ marital spirituality, Phan does attempt to 
articulate the evangelical counsels as normative in a unique way for married persons. ―A 
radical transcendence over the world and its structures is an essential characteristic of 
Christianity and, therefore, every Christian, including the laity, must realize that 
dimension in his or her life. It is in this context that the affirmation that monastic 
spirituality is normative also for the laity takes on a definitive and valid meaning.‖72 
Monasticism, then, is essentially a renunciation of earthly values in preference for a 
greater good found outside the world. Because all Christians are destined for an end 
beyond the world, they must practice some measure of renunciation. For Phan the 
evangelical counsels are normative for married Christians, but only if their application 
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qualitatively differs from monastic application.
73
 For the laity, they cannot be a 
renunciation of earthly values. Monastic spirituality, after all, is not ―the only way to 
reach the one holiness to which all Christians, lay or clerical, are called.‖74 Below I 
briefly treat his description of each of the three counsels in both states of life.  
For Phan, the religious renounces certain values of the world to find God outside 
the world, whereas the lay person renounces the world in that she relativizes the world, 
that is, she relates everything to Christ as the center and heart of all things.
75
 The non-
vowed apply poverty as a sober use of the material world and an avoidance of luxury and 
self-indulgence, as well as the practice of almsgiving in various forms.
76
 For Phan the 
non-vowed apply chastity as ―a total transformation and integration of human sexuality 
into a creative and integrative force in one‘s life with a required dose of asceticism and 
self-discipline leading to fidelity and love.‖77 Finally, for Phan the non-vowed apply 
obedience as docility to the divine call and invitation in every situation…going out of 
oneself and advancing towards perfection.‖78  
Phan‘s attempt to understand the difficult teaching of Trent regarding the 
comparison between marriage and celibacy deserves praise, but unfortunately his effort 
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amounts to a comparison of apples and oranges. He can assert that each state is ―better‖ 
than the other only by giving each its own unique end, further driving a wedge between 
them. In other words, marriage is better than the life of the counsels at accomplishing 
what marriage is supposed to accomplish (sanctification of life in the world). Likewise, 
the life of the counsels is better at accomplishing what the life of the counsels is naturally 
ordered toward (sanctification of life apart from the world). In other words, an apple 
makes a better apple pie than an orange does. Unfortunately, Phan‘s assertions of 
superiority amount to little more than tautologies. The ways of life are equally worthy 
because they are each the best at doing what they do.
79
 
Again we have a view of married and vowed religious life that maintains an 
unfortunate dichotomy between the two. The task common to both falls into the 
background. When language of the counsels or communal contemplative life arises in 
married spirituality, it is seen as a ―monasticization,‖ a monastic invasion into the 
properly married realm of spirituality.
80
 A more fruitful path, I argue, is to propose that 
the language typically found in religious life (that of evangelical counsels and 
contemplative prayer) is fundamental to and common to both states of life rather than the 
purview of either. So when married people take up the counsels or the apostolate of 
prayer they are not becoming ―monks-lite,‖ with all the flavor but half the calories, but 
rather they are embracing an evangelical spirituality shared in common by the entire 
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ecclesia, the entire body of Christ and people of God though manifest uniquely depending 
on state of life. The evangelical counsels are not somehow first the property of the 
monastics, which must be adapted by non-vowed people. Rather, the evangelical counsels 
are the virtues of Christ and thus properly belong to anyone incorporated into Christ‘s 
own body—each Christian and the entire Church.81 It is precisely this shared language of 
vows that I will take up and develop in chapter 5. 
Second, Phan‘s goal of avoiding a monasticization of marriage or ―lay adaptation‖ 
of monasticism in marriage is laudable; in fact it is a goal we share. Unfortunately, I do 
not believe his attempt fully hits the mark. I find that Phan does not succeed in offering 
an application of the evangelical counsels for married people that is qualitatively different 
from the religious applications. What he actually describes is more a difference of degree 
than a difference of kind in the application of the evangelical counsels. Take, for example, 
his treatment of poverty. In Phan‘s description, the vow of poverty taken in vowed 
religious life seems but a further specification and intensification of this practice rather 
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as common ―life in Christ,‖ an incorporation into his cross and participation in his resurrection. Therefore 
the Christian necessarily lives the virtues of Christ. Moloney argues that when Paul speaks of life ―in 
Christ,‖ he is referring to the Christian entering into a ―new situation.‖ ―The ‗new situation‘ is not a new 
frame of mind or a change of attitude. Paul seems to claim that by becoming a Christian, the ex-Pagan or 
Jew has moved into a new ‗place.‘ In the passage from Galatians Paul describes this new situation as a 
place where all constitute ‗one man,‘ while in Colossians Paul goes further and explicitly says that ‗the new 
man‘ is a place where (Greek: hopou) there cannot be such divisions‖ (36). Moloney‘s book is devoted to 
discovering in the biblical record of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus the exemplary virtues of 
poverty, chastity, and obedience as three evangelical imperatives for all Christians. He rereads the classical 
loci for each of the evangelical counsels. He finds these loci to offer imperatives for all Christians rather 
than counsels for a set of elite Christians. ―All Christians are called to live all the Gospel…It is probably a 
helpful thing that none of these so-called ‗proof texts‘ are available for an immediate solution to the 
question of obedience, because, more than any of the vows, this is the one which is most biblical. This is 
the case because behind the call for obedience in the Christian life stands the call to follow the life-style of 
Jesus of Nazareth. We have already spent a great deal of time and space tracing the poverty and chastity of 
Jesus in an attempt to find the prime model of Christian and Religious poverty and chastity. However, both 
of these aspects of Jesus‘ life pale into insignificance before the grandeur of his obedience‖ (121).  
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than a qualitatively different understanding of the vow.
82
 Even the most austere 
renunciation of property must relativize, reorder, and soberly use the material world. A 
complete renunciation of the material world would not be Christian at all. Again, with 
chastity, Phan seems to be working with a difference of degree. For example, when Phan 
says chastity for the married is ―not total abstinence,‖ it seems that chastity for the 
religious would be ―total abstinence.‖ No theology of religious chastity reduces the vow 
to total abstinence. In fact, though, theological descriptions of the vow sound similar to 
Phan‘s unique definition of the vow for married Christians.83 The vow of chastity 
requires a successful integration of the person‘s whole sexuality expressed not only in 
genital acts, but by the very nature of a person as sexed. One can abstain from genital 
intercourse and sexual pleasure, but one cannot abstain from sexuality, the fact of being 
biologically and culturally sexed and gendered. Chastity requires a mastery of sexuality 
so that it may be rightly ordered and completely given as gift.
84
 The vow of chastity ends 
                                                          
82
 In terms of canon law, ―The fundamental manifestation of this vow [poverty] is to be found in the 
dependence, promised to God or before God, on legitimate superiors, who are to be the distributors of 
whatever is useful or necessary,‖ (A. Delchard, S.J., ―Religious Poverty in Canon Law,‖ in Poverty, trans. 
Lancelot C. Sheppard, Religious Life 4 [Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1954], 126–39, at 138).  
83
 Various definitions of the evangelical counsel of ―chastity‖ understand the term as a radical gift of the 
entire self, a gift that necessitates a fully integrated sexuality. The difference between married and religious 
chastity is the manner of expressing that integrated sexuality. See VC, 14, 15, 21, 32, and 36, where John 
Paul II casts the entire vowed religious life, and especially chastity, in terms of the transfiguration, a giving 
over of the entire person to God out of a yearning that is not satisfied by any finite love. See Francis J. 
Moloney, A Life of Promise, 74–118, where he describes ―chastity‖ as the virtue of being entirely given 
over to the presence of the kingdom within and around that one‘s actions are completely given over to that 
kingdom . For married people, this kingdom is the ―kingdom of love‖ between the spouses. The spouses 
can do no other than to vow a life of chaste living within it. For religiously chaste persons, e.g., Jesus, the 
kingdom of God is so urgently present to them that they can do nothing else but pursue it through 
dedication to an evangelical apostolate. Marriage never comes to their mind. Moloney too tries to find as 
much similarity as possible in the chastity of the married and the chastity of the vowed religious. The vow 
of chastity is, for Moloney, not the most central of vows; obedience is. Sandra Schneiders, Selling All, 
defines ―consecrated celibacy‖ as the distinguishing, unique aspect of religious life: ―Consecrated celibacy 
is the freely chosen response to a personally discerned vocation to charismatically grounded, religiously 
motivated, sexually abstinent, lifelong commitment to Christ that is externally symbolized by remaining 
unmarried‖ (117). 
84
 Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), nos. 2339, 2346: 
―Chastity includes an apprenticeship in self-mastery which is a training in human freedom. The alternative 
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in the same result as the marital vow of fidelity. The consecrated religious person gives 
his or her entire person, including his or her sexuality, over in freedom to God (mediated 
by the authority of another person).
85
 Thus the religious vow of chastity expresses the 
same complete and necessarily sexual self-gift that is visible in marriage of two 
Christians.
86
 
 Again, the definition of ―obedience‖ offered by a vowed religious community 
would certainly include what Phan identifies as a uniquely lay application.
87
 To define 
obedience as an absolute renunciation of one‘s own will is in a certain sense to ask the 
impossible. For it must always remain one‘s will to submit to the authority of another, 
even when such submission becomes habitual. The religious does not seek ultimately to 
obliterate her will and replace it with God‘s or the abbot‘s or abbess‘s, but rather to 
conform her own will to that of God the Father. Phan‘s explications of the counsels in the 
life of a married or non-vowed person leave us with a version of the counsels that are 
subsumed in the way they would be lived by a consecrated religious person, or as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
is clear: either man governs his passions and finds peace, or he lets himself be dominated by them and 
becomes unhappy.‖ Further, ―Self-mastery is ordered to the gift of self. Chastity leads him who practices it 
to become a witness to his neighbor of God‘s fidelity and loving kindness,‖ available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM#fonte, accessed on February 7, 2011. All 
quotations from the catechism are from the Vatican website unless otherwise noted. 
85
 See Aquinas, The Religious State, The Episcopate, and The Priestly Office: A Translation of the Minor 
Work of the Saint on The Perfection for the Spiritual Life, ed. F. J. Procter (Westminster, MD: Newman 
Press, 1950), 51–52; and Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 186, articles 7 and 8. 
86
 See David Crawford, ―Christian Community and the States of Life,‖ 337-365. The notion that the 
evangelical counsels disclose the fundamental nature of the human person and thus the fundamental nature 
of human community will be taken up later to support the claim of a deep consonance between vowed 
religious life and married life. 
87
 Moloney (Life of Promise, 144) sees obedience as a disposition to be available for the future God has in 
store, a future that will not be the one we have planned for our self. ―The Christian is called to know Christ 
Jesus, and to move further and further away from our own securities into God‘s future, cost what it may.‖ 
See also, Obedience: Being the English version of L‘Obéissance et la religieuse d‘aujourd‘hui 
(Westminster, MD: Newman, 1953), 5–13  where obedience is first and primarily introduced as the 
person‘s response, as sinner in need of redemption, to the call issued by Christ to return to the will of God. 
Adam, hiding in the garden after the fall, hears God‘s call and is afraid, for he is no longer walking with but 
disobeying God. Jesus‘ perfect obedience to the will of the Father makes possible and resounds for us the 
call to renounce ―who we are,‖ that is, our own will.  
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scaled back application of the vow as understood by the consecrated religious. 
Unfortunately, Phan cannot escape the kind of ―monasticization‖ or ―lay adaptation‖ or 
―heart of a monastic‖ characterizations of lay spirituality he wishes to avoid.  
As we have seen, Parrella‘s, Russell‘s and Phan‘s attempts to liberate lay, non-
vowed spirituality from monastic spirituality have yielded similar results. First, whenever 
they deal with the notion of ―monastic spirituality‖ these authors risk treating the term as 
if it were monolithic. The fact is that there are myriad spiritualities of consecrated 
religious life (e.g., monastic orders, societies of apostolic life, secular institutes). Ignatius 
of Loyola, who suggested that the Jesuit ―find God in all things,‖ would not agree with an 
over-simple characterization of vowed religious life as seeking sanctification ―apart from 
the world.‖ While there is a certain unity of ―monastic spirituality,‖ the varied ways of 
expressing and living that theology throughout history resist reduction to simple 
formula.
88
 As another example, religious orders differ amongst themselves as to the 
content of the vows (e.g., some have stability as a vow) and the kind of vows (simple or 
solemn). In addition, religious life can be monastic and cloistered (set apart physically 
from the rest of the world) or apostolic and secular (existing physically within the rest of 
                                                          
88
 For example, the way of living the evangelical counsel of poverty has varied dramatically over two 
millennia. The vow was not part of the religious profession explicitly until the twelfth century. Additionally, 
there is a distinction in the practice of poverty between individual poverty, and communal or institutional 
poverty (wherein a religious community cannot own any property). The tension between these two 
throughout history has been the focus of much theological reform, debate, and even scandal. Another 
distinction that has caused a varied practice of the evangelical counsels has been the distinction between 
simple and solemn vows. A simple vow of poverty, for example, does not render a person juridically 
incapable of owning or acquiring property, but a solemn vow of poverty does so render a person. See CIC, 
668; and John D. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green, eds., New Commentary on the Code of 
Canon Law, Commissioned by the Canon Law Society of America (New York: Paulist, 1999), 1416–1420. 
For a sense of the variety of religious spiritualities and manners of living the vows, see the four-volume 
series Religious Life studying the vows historically, doctrinally, psychologically, and practically. In 
particular see Obedience; and Poverty, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1954). 
See also the series by Sandra M. Schneiders, Finding the Treasure: Locating Catholic Religious Life in a 
New Ecclesial and Cultural Context, Religious Life in a new Milennium, vol. 1 (New York: Paulist, 2000); 
and Schneiders, Selling All: Commitment, Consecrated Celibacy, and Community in Catholic Religious 
Life, Religious Life in a New Milennium, vol. 2 (New York: Paulist, 2001). 
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the population. These differences affect how the communities live their vows and hold 
house together.
89
  
Second, in an attempt to create a level playing field, the authors do not relieve the 
oppositional tension between the ways of life. Parrella, for his part, implicitly privileges 
married life over religious life as an image of the Trinity. Russell and Phan end up with a 
zero-sum game in the comparison between the two states of life, which maintains a 
competitive tension between the two rather than finding a complementarity. Thus the 
authors dichotomize the states of life so that their common end and common task of 
being church blurs and falls from the field of vision. We find ourselves with apples and 
oranges that cannot be compared using the same criteria because they are different paths 
seeking different ends. Or we find that they are separate but equally effective means of 
achieving the one holiness sought by all Christians. Third, while these authors are all 
interested in seeing the evangelical counsels in married and religious life, they cannot 
avoid applying them as if the counsels are somehow on loan from the vowed religious; in 
fact they belong properly to Christ and, by virtue of baptism, to each Christian and the 
entire Church that composes at once Christ‘s own body and Christ‘s pure and holy bride. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter set out to accomplish three tasks. First, it proposed initially that the 
universal call to Christian perfection issued by the Second Vatican Council was sufficient 
                                                          
89
 Consider the difference between religious institutes that are apostolic and thus organize their common 
life around mission and those institutes that are monastic and organize their common life around 
geographical stability. There is a distinction here, but at the same time, we might note that the cloistered 
monastery or convent is still organized around ―mission.‖ It is their mission to become holy in this place 
with these people, and reach those beyond their walls spiritually. 
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reason to begin looking for a deeper connection between the consecrated and religious 
ways of life.
90
 Second, it identified and explored the historical narrative offered by 
scholars seeking to understand the relationship between vowed religious life and married 
life in the Church. And third, it argued that current attempts to put these two states of life 
in dialogue according to the standard narrative do not overcome competitive posturing 
and have resulted in a further isolation of the vowed religious life from married life. 
Furthermore, they miss the deepest nexus of the religious and married states of life, 
namely, the Son of God, the Second Person of the Trinity. It is toward this Christological, 
trinitarian focus that the rest of this dissertation will be moving. The subsequent chapter, 
though, follows closely on the second part of this chapter, where I explicated a common 
scholarly narrative for envisioning the connection between vowed religious and married 
life. The third chapter complicates this narrative with patristic evidence and advocates for 
an alternative account from the thought of Augustine.  
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 LG, 32: ―Therefore, the chosen People of God is one: ‗one Lord, one faith, one baptism‘; sharing a 
common dignity as members from their regeneration in Christ, having the same filial grace and the same 
vocation to perfection; possessing in common one salvation, one hope and one undivided charity‖ 
(emphasis mine). Throughout the dissertation I will want to keep ―perfection‖ moored to qualities or virtues 
such as ―holiness‖ and ―charity.‖  
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CHAPTER 3: COMPLICATING A STANDARD NARRATIVE AND DISCOVERING  
AN ALTERNATIVE IN PATRISTIC SOURCES 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined a narrative advocated by some contemporary 
scholars attempting to understand the relationship between marriage and religious life. By 
means of this narrative, modern scholars such as Kenneth Russell, Frederick J. Parrella, 
and Peter Phan have developed spiritualities of the laity that amount to a kind of zero-
sum game for married life and vowed religious life. As became clear, in the process these 
authors further dichotomize the two states of life and implicitly maintain the antagonism 
and the kind of monasticization of marriage they hoped to avoid. This happens because, 
in order to put conjugal and consecrated life on the same level next to each other, the 
authors must first isolate the states from each other. I contend that these authors have 
been asking the wrong question. In their effort to make arguments about the equal 
holiness and dignity of married and consecrated life, the authors have (ironically) had to 
focus their attention on making distinctions between the two states. Instead of asking 
―what are the hard distinctions between vowed religious life and married life?‖ we could 
be asking, ―what do these two ways of life in the church share?‖  
In this chapter I argue that attention to primary evidence from the first centuries of 
the desert fathers and the beginnings of cenobitic life show the insufficiency of the 
narrative proposed by the modern scholars looking for a unique, married spirituality that 
is equal to monastic spirituality. To this end, I show that two central claims of the 
common narrative about the relationship between religious and matrimonial life do not 
hold. In fact, it is the thesis of this chapter that their opposites are true: (1) the resistance 
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to a facile ascetic hierarchy is ancient; and (2) there has been a bi-directional flow of 
influence from married life into the monastic, and vice versa. In the process of 
demonstrating these claims I argue for an alternative to the commonly used narrative, the 
shape of which stems from Augustine‘s thought on the meaning of marriage and 
consecrated life in Christian community as revealed in salvation history.  
My argument will proceed as follows. First, I will show that Eastern monastic 
fathers had a more complicated view of personal holiness than was given credit by 
scholars treated in the previous chapter. Second, I will show in the theology of Augustine, 
who enters the battles over ascetical hierarchy, an alternative to both the competitive 
spirit and its egalitarian challenge. He recognizes distinction in personal merit, but 
emphasizes its elusiveness and moves beyond the question through a development of our 
common and primarily ecclesial identity as Christians, which he develops with spousal 
language that relates to both the consecrated and the married life. Over the course of his 
life he develops three ―nuptial goods,‖ (proles, fides, and sacramentum) shared by both 
consecrated virgins and married persons. These ―nuptial goods‖ are properly and 
primarily ecclesial goods that are differentially shared by all those baptized into Christ. 
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PATRISTIC EVIDENCE TO COMPLICATE THE NARRATIVE OF A SIMPLE 
ASCETICAL HIERARCHY IN EASTERN DESERT TRADITION 
 
 
 According to the narrative of theological development given in the last chapter, a 
dichotomization and hierarchy of religious and married life began early in the Church and 
persisted until the second half of the twentieth century, when the Church and many 
theologians finally rejected the preference of the consecrated life over married life. While 
Parrella, Russell, and Phan may be correct to note that a tide seems swelling against the 
claim that the life of vowed religious life is objectively better than marriage, it is 
important to note that the pot of popular and theological fervor on this question has been 
boiled and bubbled, toiled and troubled throughout history. 
First, there is evidence from the Eastern monastic fathers to suggest a 
complication of the simple hierarchy of merit assumed by the common narrative. Kalistos 
Ware‘s study ―The Monk and the Married Christian: Some Comparisons in Early 
Monastic Sources‖ offers telling examples of monks finding themselves inferior to 
married men and women.
1
 Some might argue that examples of monks comparing 
themselves negatively to married persons are the exceptions that prove the rule of a 
simple ascetic hierarchy. After all, there would be little rhetorical power to the 
comparisons if they did not in some way surprise the reader. Such an argument might be 
convincing if the examples really constituted a miniscule sample. In fact, it appears that 
the debate was more evenly split. St. Isaac the Syrian and St. Theodore the Studite 
                                                          
1
 Kalistos Ware, ―The Monk and the Married Christian: Some Comparisons in Early Monastic Sources,‖ 
Eastern Churches Review 6.1 (1974): 72–83. 
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doubted that the grace of contemplation and vision of God could be given to the married.
2
 
On the other hand, St. Gregory the Great thought the lumen contemplationis was 
available to all.
 3
 Furthermore, Ware finds that ―St. Maximus the Confessor, embodied 
some of his deepest teaching about theosis and union with God in his Second Letter, 
addressed to a layman, a civil servant; St. Gregory Palamas considered that continual 
prayer is for lay people as well as monks, and that full purity of heart can be attained by 
the married Christian, ‗although with the greatest difficulty.‘‖4 
A second kind of evidence suggesting that holiness could be achieved in marriage 
comes from a genre of literature popular in the Byzantine empire, the vitae of the saints, 
or hagiographical literature. These vitae were the popular media of the day, and every bit 
as exciting for the audience. The earliest versions of some of these vitae, e.g. those of St. 
Symeon the Stylite and Melania emphasize the monastic aversion to marriage and the 
superlative value of physical virginity. The lives of some married saints are related, but 
they either do not consummate the marriage, or they eventually lead a life of celibacy. 
Take Melania the Younger, for example. The earliest versions of her vita claim that 
―After the death of her two sons she felt an aversion to marriage (misos tou gamon) and 
told her husband that she would stay with him ‗as her lord and master‘ only if he agreed 
to lead a life of chastity; if not, she would give him all her belongings and ‗liberate her 
body.‘ In the later Vita of Melania, the sharpness of this anti-marital tendency was 
                                                          
2
 Mystic Treatises by Isaac of Nineveh, trans. A. J. Wensinck (Amsterdam, 1923), 102; and  Theodore the 
Studite, Epistle ii 43 (PG, xcix, col. 1245AB), cited in Ware, ―The Monk and the Married Christian,‖ 74. 
3
 St. Gregory the Great, Homilies in Ezekiel 2, 5, 19 (PL, lxxvi, col. 996A), cited in Ware, ―The Monk and 
the Married Christian,‖ 74.  
4
 Ware, ―The Monk and the Married Christian,‖ 74. Ware cites St. Maximus the Confessor from the PG, xci, 
col. 391–408; Ware cites St. Gregory Palamas from Encomium S. Gregorii Thessalonicensis (PG, cli, col. 
573a–574a), and De passionibus et virtutibus (PG, cl, col. 1056A). 
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reduced, the ‗aversion‘ disappeared, and only the call for chastity (agneia) remained.‖5 
For example, revised versions of Melania‘s and Symeon‘s vitae include the praise of 
marriage as ‗honorable‘ and the aversion to marriage is muted. From this trend, 
Alexander Kazhdan has made the following observation that over three centuries ―the 
concept was developed that sanctity could be achieved not only in the desert or in the 
monastery but in family life. Maria the Younger and Thomais of Lesbos…were married 
women who deserved the reward of holiness; Nicholas Kataskepenos, in the Vita of Cyril 
Phileotes, conjured up the image of a saint who, after the birth of his child, limited his 
sexual intercourse with his wife but did not accept consistent celibacy.‖6 Even more 
surprising, Eustathios of Thessalonike judges the lay saint of greater honor than lonely 
anchorites living in isolation.
7
 
A third kind of evidence for a more nuanced view of the ascetical hierarchy 
comes from a genre of literature known as Streitnovellen or ―stories of rivalry‖ found in 
the Apophthegmata Patrum. In each of these stories, a monk is told in a dream or by and 
angel about a person (man or woman) whose holiness exceeds his own. The monk 
investigates and discovers his own weakness, which is usually pride or a lack of charity. 
When the married person is judged holier than the monk, it is on one of four grounds: (1) 
on account of holy, ascetic practices, (2) on account of virtuous deeds; (3) on account of 
holy disposition, such as the virtue of humility or simplicity; and (4) on account of an 
intention to live a life of renunciation even if such a life is impossible. In the first case, a 
                                                          
5
 Alexander Kazhdan, ―Byzantine Hagiography and Sex in the Fifth to Twelfth Centuries,‖ Dumbarton 
Oaks Papers, vol. 44 (1990): 131–43, at 133.  
6
 Ibid., 133. 
7
 Ibid. For more on the development of a positive theology of marriage in comparison to monasticism in 
Byzantine tradition see Alexander Kazhdan, ―Hermitic, Cenobitic, and Secular Ideals in Byzantine 
Hagiography of the Ninth [to Twelfth] Centuries,‖ Greek Orthodox Theological Review 30 (1985): 484–87. 
142 
 
villager named Eucharistus is holier than a certain monk. This shepherd and married man 
divides his money in thirds, giving one third to the poor, one third for hospitality, and one 
third for his own needs. He lives an ascetic life, is married, and practices celibacy within 
his marriage. In this story, it is Eucharistus‘ ascetic practices that impress. There is a 
suggestion that his life conforms to the monastic already since he practices celibacy. 
Regarding the second case, a monk is told he is not as holy as a local flute player and 
known sinner. This flute player, though, saved a woman in distress on two occasions, and 
for this is counted holier than the ascetic monk. The emphasis here is on his deeds of 
compassion. In the third case, a monk is compared to Emperor Theodosius. Here 
Theodosius‘ superiority to the monk is not his asceticism nor his charitable deeds but his 
true humility, simplicity of heart, and detachment from the world, the chief expression of 
which is his ability to copy religious manuscripts while in attendance at the hippodrome.
8
 
It is of special interest that the author does not suggest Theodosius would be holier as a 
monk whereas in the first two models becoming a monk would perfect the holiness of the 
non-vowed persons.  
Finally, Macarius of Egypt is compared to two women. These women married 
brothers and had children by them. The two couples live together, but despite their wives‘ 
request the husbands have refused to live in celibacy. These two women, out of a desire 
for holiness, vow to never speak a word of quarrel or conflict between them. Seeing the 
holy intention of these two women and ―marveling at their ability to live so long together 
without quarrelling, Macarius exclaims: ‗In truth there is neither virgin nor married, 
neither monk nor secular, but God gives his Holy Spirit to all, according to the intention 
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 Ware, ―The Monk and the Married Christian,‖ 75–76. He relies on Patrologia Orientalis viii, ed. F. Nau 
(1912), 171–74. 
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of each.‖9 Here the emphasis falls on the strong intention to a life of renunciation despite 
the fact that it could not be realized in full.  
In the final analysis, these ―rivalry stories‖ are ill-named. Any reader is 
confronted with the fact that the very desire and attempt to rank oneself with respect to 
another person is already a symptom of pride, and already betrays an incomplete 
renunciation of and detachment from the world and its temptations toward renown. Ware 
concludes that, in the world imagined by these anecdotes:  
Inward purity is always possible, whatever the outward circumstances. The true 
flight is not geographical but spiritual; the real desert lies within the heart…The 
Christian in the city, by virtue of his very involvement in worldly things, can 
attain a distinctive type of sanctity—of detachment, humility and inner 
simplicity—not accessible to the monk in the desert. Even if the idea is not 
developed, there exists here in embryo a theology of the layman‘s vocation. The 
Emperor enthroned in the hippodrome, hearing the acclamations of the crowd yet 
never lifting his eyes from his manuscript; the greengrocer sitting in his room at 
night hearing the songs of the drunkards yet thinking only of their salvation—
these are two of the most striking figures in the Apophthegmata. It is not easy to 
forget them.
10
 
 
 
 
AUGUSTINE AND EQUALITY OF MERIT IN MARRIAGE AND VIRGINITY: A 
RADICAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ZERO-SUM GAME 
 
The debates and hortatory literature relating the personal holiness of the vowed 
religious and the married Christian were not limited by any means to the Eastern tradition. 
Augustine and his contemporaries hotly disputed the same questions, though their 
audiences and genres differed. In this section, I argue this basic thesis: the common 
imagining of Augustine‘s position on marriage and celibacy as a ―middle way‖ requires a 
nuanced reconsideration. Augustine does offer a ―middle way‖—he says so himself in De 
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 Ibid.,‖ 79. 
10
 Ibid.,‖ 82–83. 
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sancta virginitate. His way is the ―medium veritatis,‖ ―the middle way of truth.‖ 11 As I 
will argue, the nuance here is that he offers us a ―middle path‖ rather than just a ―middle 
conclusion.‖ In other words, Augustine offers an alternative manner of proceeding, not 
simply a conclusion that falls between the ―excesses‖ of Jovinian (equality of married 
and virginal life) and Jerome (hierarchy of merit). Augustine makes a unique proposal 
that moves beyond concern for individual merit and picks up a social, ecclesial, co-
participative understanding of the ―bonum nuptiarum.‖ The bonum nuptiarum, in other 
words, is principally bonum ecclesiae that people of different states share.  
First I will present the context for Augustine‘s involvement in three ecclesial 
controversies as they relate to marriage (manicheism, Jovinianism, and Pelagianism). I 
will also address their relationship to the modern construals of the problems and solutions 
to the ―crisis‖ of marriage, as well as their relationship to the modern zero-sum 
understanding of the relationship between consecrated and conjugal life. The second part 
attempts to reconstruct Augustine‘s ―middle way‖ and explore the three major 
accomplishments of his constructive task: prioritizing ecclesial belonging over individual 
merit; complicating but not rejecting differentiation of merit; and creating a three-fold, 
bonum nuptiarum. These accomplishments ground and shape the Augustinian 
counternarrative I use to understand the relationship between marriage and celibate life in 
juxtaposition to the one offered by scholars in the previous chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 De sancta virginitate 19 (CSEL 41,252–53). Ironically, this passage is not cited when authors describe 
Augustine as staking a middle ground on marriage. 
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Augustine’s Context 
 
Just as the Eastern fathers experienced and reflected on the tension between 
married and religious life, especially with respect to how persons might locate themselves 
on a hierarchy of holiness, so too did the Western fathers. At the end of the fourth and the 
beginning of the fifth century, Augustine himself was embroiled in debates over the 
relative merit of virginity over against married life. Whereas the Eastern fathers offered 
anecdotal stories to challenge individual monastics in their own life with Christ, 
Augustine dealt with three major controversies and opponents in his thinking on marriage: 
the manichaeans, the Jovinian controversy, and the Pelagians. Augustine‘s genius in his 
defense of marriage and virginity, a genius that makes him relevant to my claim for 
consonance between the two, is Augustine‘s ―making them both magnificently social.‖12 
As social, they must constitute part of a larger association; this larger association is first 
and foremost the ecclesia, the mystical body of Christ. Augustine understands this 
mystical body to be one with and composed of Christ‘s bride the Church. Christ is head 
of his body, which is also his own bride in realistic and analogical ways.
13
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 See Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity 
(New York: Columbia University, 1988), 402. 
13
 See Stanislaus J. Grabowski, The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of Saint Augustine (St. Louis: 
B. Herder Book Company, 1957). Augustine‘s ecclesiology is chiefly that of the mystical body. The church 
is the body of Christ. Augsutine nonetheless includes Church as bride and Christ as bridegroom. We see 
this in two ways. First explicitly, for example see Ennarrationes in Psalmos 44. 3 (CSEL 38, 495, 515) 
where Augustine refers to Christ as the bridegroom in this wedding feast of the King and the Church as the 
virgin to be wed. Second, whenever Christ refers to the Church as the mystical body of Christ, the church 
as bride is also included therein implicitly on account of scriptural warrant (e.g., Eph 5:23–32). As Pius 
Schelkens argues, "Christus, caput et sponsus, et Ecclesia, corpus et sponsa, in unam personam et in unam 
carnem copulantur, itaque mysticam unionem matrimonialem verificant secundum verba Apostoli. Cum 
autem duo sint in carne una, erunt pariter duo in voce una, et in passione una" (Pius Schelkens, ―De 
Ecclesia Sponsa Christi,‖ Augustiniana 3 [1953]: 145–64). Schelkens‘ position lends support to the claim 
that Augustine holds to more than merely metaphorical understanding of the bond between Christ and his 
Church as bridegroom and bride. Schelkens is arguing for a bond wherein the bride becomes one body with 
Christ analogously (though not sexually) to the way husband and wife are one body. Likewise, Tarsisius 
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Before I tackle Augustine‘s constructive task itself, I must fill in the polemical 
background of the two theologies Augustine takes on in De bono coniugali (Manichaeism 
and Jovinianism) and the final heresy that will dominate the late portion of his career 
(Pelagianism, as propounded by Julian of Aeclanum). A Manichaean for ten years 
himself,
14
 Augustine vigorously fought against Manichaean teachings after his 
conversion to Christianity, especially regarding marriage. In works predating De bono 
coniugali against Manicheans, Augustine resists Manichean arguments against 
marriage,
15
 and he does not leave that polemic behind in De bono coniugali, especially 
given that he is still trying to complete his literal commentary on Genesis (a crucial peg 
in an argument against Manicheans).
16
 Manicheans often ridiculed Christian reading of 
the Old Testament; Augustine had to find a way to read Genesis in light of the 
Manichaean arguments against the text. The Manicheans taught that the material world 
was evil, having been created by a god who rivals the true god. In this material world the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
van Bavel has argued that when Augustine speaks of the mystical body of Christ, it is more a matter of 
realism than symbolism. ―En general, il est plus juste de parler de realism—meme exagéré parfois!—que 
de symbolisme‖ (Tarsisius van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. L‘humain et le 
divin dans le Christ d‘apres saint Augustin [Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1954], 79–85, at 83). For 
more on Augustinian ecclesiology see; Denis Faul, ―Ecclesia, Sponsa Christi: Origenes y Augustín ante la 
exegesis de Eph. 5, 27,‖ Augustinus 15 (1970): 263–80; Charles Journet, L‘Eglise du Verbe Incarne, vol. II 
(Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1951), 116–18; and Emilien, Lamirande, Un siècle et demi d‘etudes sur 
l‘ecclesiologie de saint Augustin: Essai Bibliographique (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1962). 
14
 See Augustine, Confessions, book 4. The classic biography is Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A 
Biography, second ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), 35–49; a newer biography that challenges 
Brown‘s for comprehensiveness is Serge Lancel, Augustine, trans. Antonia Nevill (London: SCM, 2002), 
37–42. 
15
 Augustine wrote many works against the Manichaeans, among them De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et 
de moribus Manicheorum, Acta contra Fortunatum Manicheum, De Genesi ad litteram liber unus 
imperfectus, Contra Faustum Manicheum, De Genesi adversus manichaeos 1.19, as well as a work in 
progress when he wrote De bono coniugali, namely De Genesi ad litteram (his third and final attempt at a 
commentary on Genesis). For a wider treatment of Augustine and the Manicheans, see Kam-Lun Lee, 
Augustine, Manichaeism, and the Good, Patristic Studies 2 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999). 
16
 See Retractationes 1.10, on De Genesi ad litteram (extracted in, On Genesis, 36–37). A ―literal‖ 
interpretation of Genesis is important because the Manicheans rejected the goodness of procreation, which 
keeps the ―light‖ trapped in matter. In Confessions, 5.23–24 (chap. 13) (CCL 27:70–71) Augustine reports 
that learning to read Scripture spiritually had a great deal to do with his ability to read the Old Testament in 
the face of Manichean criticism. Ambrose was certainly a large part of this new way of approaching 
Scripture for Augustine. 
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rival god has trapped pieces of the true god. Human souls are these trapped pieces. The 
goal of life, then, is to escape material reality, a process completed by certain dietary and 
ascetical practices, accompanied by gaining secret knowledge. Their teachings on 
marriage follow logically from their understanding of the origin and purpose of the 
material world, that is, the origin and nature of evil. As procreation traps more spirit in 
the prison of matter, the Manicheans naturally treat procreation with abhorrence. 
Therefore they conclude that marriage is the invention of the rival to the true god of spirit. 
Those who are truly holy must be celibate on account of the evil, material world. While 
sexual intercourse is allowed for those outside the Manichaean inner circle (as Augustine 
was), contraception was mandated.
17
 Augustine pulled no rhetorical punches when 
attacking this position:  
You think that taking a wife is not for the sake of procreating children but for the 
sake of satisfying lust. But marriage, as the very laws of marriage cry out, unites a 
man and a woman for the sake of procreating children. Whoever, then, says that 
to beget children is a more serious sin than to have intercourse certainly forbids 
marriage and makes the woman no longer a wife but a prostitute, who in return 
for certain compensation is given to the man to satisfy his lust. After all, as she is 
a wife, it is matrimony. But it is not matrimony when the effort is made that she 
not become a mother.
18
    
 
The translation to English unfortunately loses Augustine‘s rhetorical skill. He links the 
word ―mater‖ to ―matrimonium‖ in this sentence, claiming that there is no ―matrimonio‖ 
absent the intent to become ―mater." 
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 Augustine provides information regarding the above beliefs and practices in De Moribus Ecclesiae 
Catholicae et de Moribus Manicheorum. In his later writings, especially those against Julian of Eclanum, 
Augustine vehemently resists any sexual instrumentalism of the spouses.  Marriage is entered for the 
mutual, honorable purpose of liberorum procreandorum causa, not for the sake of satisfying lust (Sermon 
51.22; Sermons [51–94], 33–34). 
18
 See in particular De moribus 2.65 (CSEL 90: 147): ―Si enim uxor est, matrimonium est. Non autem 
matrimonium est ubi datur opera ne sit mater.‖ See The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of 
Life, 98. 
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As a second point of attack, the Manicheans assailed the moral character of the 
Old Testament patriarchs. For one, these men had multiple wives, an obvious 
contradiction to Christian practice. In De bono coniugali Augustine defends the 
patriarchs by seeing in their multiplicity of wives a certain sign or prophetic character, as 
well as the expression of the virtue of obedience:  
Just as the multiple wives of the fathers of old signified us the future churches, 
from all peoples subject to one man Christ, so our bishop, a man of one wife, 
signifies the unity, from all peoples, subject to one man, Christ. 
 
In truth, in those times, when the mystery of our salvation was veiled by the 
sacred signs in the prophecies, even those who were [continent] before marriage 
united in marriage for the obligation of begetting children, not as a victory from 
sexual desire but as having been led by piety; for if such an option were given 
them, as is given in the New Testament when the Lord says, ―Whosoever can take 
this, take it,‖ one does not doubt that they would accept it [celibacy], even with 
joy.
19
 
 
According to this account, the patriarchs, then, are not only morally sound, but they are 
more virtuous than the vast majority of married people today, even though they had 
multiple wives. 
While the Manichaean issue perhaps most closely affected his own life, Augustine 
also had to deal with polemics brought his way by concerned Christian friends; among 
these we find the Jovinianist controversy. In his Retractationes Augustine writes that the 
two works De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate respond to the heresy 
propounded by Jovinian.
20
 Jovinian taught four contentious doctrines: ―(1) Virgins, 
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 Augustine, De bono coniugali, 15 (my translation). See The Excellence of Marriage, 44–45. 
20
 The content of Jovinian‘s argument known from the condemnations text of Pope Siricius, a letter from 
Ambrose to Siricius (Epistola. 42, Rescriptum ad Siricium papam 4) concerning Ambrose‘s condemnation 
of Jovinian through a council in Milan, Jerome‘s first response (Adversus Iovinianum, 1.3; PL, 23, col. 
206–338) and a letter he sent when that response met with lack of enthusiasm (Epistola. 49, CSEL 54; and 
Epistola. 52). In Adv. Iovinianum Jerome lays out four Jovinian theses. Ambrose gives a fifth in his 
polemical work. Another battle entirely is over the interpretation of Song of Songs at this time as it relates 
to the Church and the Christian, particularly the celibate woman. This is a debate that Augustine did not 
enter with Jovinian. See David G. Hunter, ―The Virgin, the Bride, and the Church: Reading Psalm 45 with 
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widows, and spouses, having been washed once in Christ, if they do not differ in other 
works, are commended as of the same merit; (2) whoever in full faith is born again in 
baptism cannot be overthrown by the devil; (3) there is no distinction between abstinence 
from food and receiving it with acts of thanksgiving; (4) for all who will preserve their 
baptism, there is one reward in the kingdom of heaven.‖21 Pope Siricius had condemned 
Jovinian in Rome as had Bishop Ambrose in Milan. He was sentenced to exile and 
flogging. At the theological level, Jerome attempted a vitriolic rebuttal of Jovinian‘s 
teachings, which only further fanned the flames.
22
 This heresy continued to grow despite 
efforts to stop it, and Jovinian had even inveigled some consecrated virgins to precipitate 
marriage.  
Most importantly, Augustine had to answer the charge that Jovinian could only be 
refuted by denigrating marriage, that is, by taking a Manichaean position. Augustine, 
therefore, sets out to prove that a praise of marriage is possible that refutes Jovinian‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine,‖ Church History 69 (2000): 281–303. He discusses the role of the virgin 
bride in each of these thinkers as it related to the ascetic debate, but unfortunately he ends up making the 
fundamental character of each authors work about power relations, that is, how to deal with a crisis of 
rising female ascetic power. He closes by trying to put Augustine into the debate about whether power in 
the Church is through ascetic practice or Episcopal authority. Hunter thinks Augustine sides with Episcopal 
authority (302). 
21
 As reported in Jerome‘s Adversus Iovinianum 1, lines 41–50, the four positions of Jovinian are these: 
―Virgines, viduas, et maritatas, quae semel in christo lotae sunt, si non discrepant caeteris operibus, 
eiusdem esse meriti…approbare eos, qui plena fide in baptismate renati sunt, a diabolo non posse 
subuerti…inter abstinentiam ciborum et cum gratiarum actione perceptionem eorum, nullam esse 
distantiam…esse omnium qui suum baptisma servaverint, unam in regno coelerum remunerationem.‖ 
CLCLT electronic version published electronically through Brepols, available at 
http://clt.brepolis.net/clt/start. (translation mine). 
22
 Jerome‘s friends in Rome were not receptive to his rebuttal of Jovinian. Jerome‘s efforts help soften his 
language somewhat, and his letter 48 to Pammachius, thanking him for pulling the Adversus Iovinianum 
from the public sphere, is endearing and humble. But ultimately, even Jerome‘s pièce justificatif (Letter 49) 
leaves unanswered exactly what good the married couple is doing. It is all well for Jerome to say he is 
between the Manicheans and Jovinian, but he has not been specific enough about what that small good of 
marriage is. Defining this good of marriage, is the unique, creative task of Augustine.   
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heresy.
23
 The challenge was to succeed where Jerome and Ambrose had failed. Jerome 
had refuted Jovinian but at what seemed to be the cost of marriage‘s inherent good. 
Augustine‘s challenge, then, in refuting Jovinian, was not merely to construct a positive 
account of marriage. Jovinian could easily do as much. What Augustine needed was to 
offer an optimistic theology of marriage while maintaining the basic doctrine that persons 
can differ in virtue and that difference in virtue has eternal consequence. Augustine 
would have to argue that, despite their both being Christian, the married Christian can 
contrast in merit from the celibate Christian, and the difference will be rewarded 
differently in the kingdom of God. Augustine‘s answer measures merit based more upon 
the virtues operative in the person than on his or her state in life. 
David Hunter, in a series of articles that culminate in his recent book Marriage, 
Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity: The Jovinianist Controversy,
24
 has 
significantly expanded our understanding of what is at stake in the polemical context of 
De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate. He sees the debate occurring on three fronts: 
(1) the concern among all the authors (Jovinian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine) to 
fight Manichaean tendencies in any theology of marriage; (2) the competition among 
theologians to garner favor and to proliferate their theological positions among the 
                                                          
23
 See Retractationes 2.22, CCSL 57, 107–08: ―Sed etiam occultis venenos repentibus facultate quam 
donabat Dominus occurrendum fuit, maxime quoniam iactabatur Ioviniano responderi non potuisse sed 
cum vituperatione nuptiarum. Propter hoc librum edidi cuius inscription est De bono coniugali."   
24
 See David Hunter, ―Resistance to the Virginal Ideal in Late-Fourth-Century Rome: The Case of Jovinian,‖ 
Theological Studies 48 (1987): 45–64; Hunter, ―Clerical Celibacy and the Veiling of Virgins: New 
Boundaries in Late Ancient Christianity,‖ in Limits of Ancient Christianity (An Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1999), 139–152; Hunter, ―The Virgin, the Bride, and the Church: Reading Psalm 45 in Ambrose, 
Jerome, and Augustine,‖ Church History 69.2 (2000): 281–303; Hunter,  ―Augustine, Sermon 354A: Its 
Place in His Thought on Marriage and Sexuality,‖ Augustinian Studies 33.1 (2002): 40–44; Hunter, 
―Reclaiming Biblical Morality‖; Hunter, ―Rereading the Jovinianist Controversy: Asceticism and Clerical 
Authority in Late Ancient Christianity,‖ Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 33 (2003): 453–70; 
and Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity: The Jovinianist Controversy, Oxford 
Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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Roman, aristocratic elite; and (3) the clerical and lay resistance to or embrace of an 
ascetic hierarchy in the late fourth and early fifth century.  
As to the first point, Hunter has successfully demonstrated that Jovinian was 
genuinely as anti-manichaean as Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Siricius, or any other of 
the less-controversial authors involved in this debate. Jovinian cannot simply be labeled a 
heretic and brushed aside. His authentic concern about Manichaean tendencies in 
Christian asceticism demand attention.
25
 It is not difficult to see how Jerome‘s rebuttal 
smacked of Manichean theology and drove more Romans into Jovinian‘s camp:  
When you [Paul] come to marriage, you do not say it is good to marry, because 
you cannot then add ‗than to burn;‘ but you say, ‗It is better to marry than to burn.‘ 
If marriage in itself be good, do not compare it with fire, but simply say ‗It is 
good to marry.‘ I suspect the goodness of that thing which is forced into the 
position of being only the lesser of two evils. What I want is not the smaller evil, 
but a thing absolutely good.
26
 
  
Hunter has pointed out how much of Jerome‘s letters 48, 49, and 50 are dedicated to a 
defense against accusations of Manichaeism, which his overly strong rhetoric opened him 
up to.
27
 Further, with Pierre-Marie Hombert, Hunter supports a later date for De bono 
coniugali and De sancta virginitate (both in 403–4 instead of 397 or 401)28, which puts 
                                                          
25
 Hunter writes, ―Jovinian deserves to be reexamined for historical and theological reasons.‖ He continues, 
―Jovinian is best understood not as an opponent of Christian virginity or asceticism per se, but rather as an 
opponent of Manicheism and what he saw as Manichean tendencies among Christian ascetics at Rome,‖  
(―Resistance to the Virginal Ideal,‖ 45–46). 
26
 Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum, 1.9: ―Ubi ad nuptias venis, non dicis, bonum est nubere, quia non potes 
iungere, quam uri; sed dicis: melius est nubere quam uri. Si per se nuptiae sunt bonae, noli illas incendio 
comparare: sed dic simplicte, bonum est nubere. Suspecta est mihi bonitas eius rei, quam magnitude 
alterius mali malum esse cogit inferius. Ego autem non levius malum, sed simplex per se bonum volo‖ 
(available at Library of Latin Texts – Series A [http://clt.brepolis.net/llta/pages/Toc.aspx], accessed on 5 
Oct, 2010). See Jerome, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2
nd
 series, vol. 6, trans. W.H. Fermantle, et al. 
(Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature, 1893), available at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/30091.htm 
(accessed on 5 Oct, 2010). 
27
 See Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity, 29–30, 244, 246–47, 257, 275–7. 
28
  Hunter makes a strong case for this dating in ―Augustine, Sermon 354A,‖ 40–44. In his 2001 critical 
edition and translation of De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate, P.G. Walsh notes the traditional 
date of AD 401 (H. I Marrou and A. M. La Bonnardiére, Saint Augustin et l‘augustinisme,[Paris: Éditiones 
Sueil, 1955], 183) and the earlier date proposed by M. –F. Berrouard, Augustinus Lexicon, vol. 1 (Basel: 
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these texts in the same couple of years that Augustine preached a host of sermons on 
marriage, engaged in vigorous debate with Manichaeans in Africa, and argued with 
Jerome over exegesis of Scripture relevant to marriage.
29
 Hunter has also shown the 
relationship between this first point of the debate and the second: courting favor among 
Roman Christian aristocrats.
30
  
As to the third point, Hunter actually aligns Augustine with Jovinian against 
Jerome‘s and Ambrose‘s strong embrace of a clearly and easily defined ascetical 
hierarchy in the Latin West. Hunter titles a section of chapter 6 in his Marriage, Celibacy, 
and Heresy in Ancient Christianity ―Subverting the Ascetic Hierarchy: Augustine of 
Hippo.‖31 In a concluding paragraph of that section, Hunter writes, ―Augustine 
undermined the ascetic hierarchy in a form that mirrored the intentions, if not all the 
arguments, of Jovinian.‖32  
Hunter has expanded the polemical context and squarely located Augustine‘s 
position as a ―middle way‖ that retains some of Jovinian‘s, Ambrose‘s, and Jerome‘s 
conclusions, but where Hunter leaves off is on the question of Augustine‘s particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Schwabe, 1992), 658–66). Strangely, Walsh seems unaware of Pierre-Marie Hombert‘s later dating of De 
bono coniugali and sermon 354A based on La Bonnardière‘s methodology (see Hombert, Nouvelles 
recherches de chronologie augustinienne [Paris: Institut d‘etudes Augustiniennes, 2000]). Hombert‘s book 
was published in the year preceding Walsh‘s critical translation, which may have given Walsh little time to 
consider the evidence. By 2002, though, David Hunter had written an article in favor of Hombert‘s dating 
(Hunter, ―Augustine, Sermon 354A‖). 
29
  See Hunter, ―Between Jovinian and Jerome: Augustine and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7,‖ Studia 
Patristica 43 (2006): 131–136. During these years Augustine gave Sermons 354A, 51, 162C and gave 
sermons on psalms 99, 103, and 44. Interestingly, all of these sermons deal with marriage, even when the 
Scripture does not directly treat marriage.  What‘s more, Augustine‘s letters 28 and 82 to Jerome, his 
debates with the Manichaeans in Carthage, and the thoughts that are carried through from the 397 Contra 
Faustum seem to indicate that Augustine‘s De bono coniugali was written as much with an anti-
manichaean tone as it was with an eye toward preventing the rise of Jovinian or Jeromian theology of 
marriage in North Africa. 
30
 See David Hunter, ―Resistance to the Virginal Ideal in Late-Fourth-Century Rome,‖ 45–64. Hunter 
conducts a detailed exploration of the situation in Rome in Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy, 15–86.  
31
 Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy, 269–84.  
32
 Ibid., 284. 
153 
 
constructive project for marriage. Can we identify what Augustine calls the ―middle way 
of truth‖ (medium veritatis)? What are its payoffs in this debate? It is here, then, that I 
must pick up. If Hunter has demonstrated what Augustine did to deconstruct and subvert 
ascetical hierarchy and the Manichaean tendencies of certain Christians (e.g. Jerome), I 
hope to show in the next section that which Augustine built up in its place. For now, 
though, I must finish contextualizing Augustine‘s theological soundings as they relate to 
marriage with the third, most taxing debate of Augustine‘s late life—Pelagianism.  
As the fifth century went on, battles were waged in Rome for influence over 
wealthy young women and men, as well as wealthy widows. Priests and ascetical 
spiritual masters gathered followings around themselves. Peter Brown has argued that at 
this point in Roman Empire (early fifth century), the wealthy elite were rediscovering 
ascetic Christianity as a way to stand out in society, to make a name for oneself in society 
and the government. In Brown‘s mind, the stability of the empire and the standard of a 
modest Christianity among the elite led to a centrifugal force among some of this class, 
which encouraged a sort religious competitiveness. The pressure to stand out may have 
encouraged young, power-seeking Roman elite to find in Christianity again a religion of 
strong discontinuity from pre-conversion life.
33
 Thus when Pelagius and Julian of 
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 See Peter Brown, ―Pelagius and His Supporters: Environment and Aims,‖ in Journal of Theological 
Studies 19 (1968): 93–123. Just as Augustine has a context, so too does Brown. Brown, writing in the late 
sixties, is applying a social-scientific model to the Pelagian and Jovinian controversies. He views the 
Pelagian controversy as a social movement. This movement begins due to a need for ―stand-outs‖ in a 
socially secure environment that produces a socially centrifugal force; the movement ends with the fall of 
Rome because the need for social cohesion in an overturned society creates a ―centripetal force‖ that 
reduces the need for Christians to use their religion as a means to stand out. Rather, the cultural elite will 
find ways to stand together. Other scholars have rejected this reading of the controversy as a ―social 
movement.‖ See Josef Loessl, ―Augustine, Pelagianism, Julian of Aeclanum, and Modern Scholarship,‖ 
Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum 11.1 (2007): 129–50, who argues that the Pelagian controversy was not 
a social movement, as some have claimed, but was and is a theological tendency. For Loessl, at base stands 
the history of Paulusrezeption and battles over proper Pauline exegesis. Ultimately, ―the Pelagian 
controversy became the paradigm for Pauline reception in the West and in a certain sense it has remained 
so until today,‖ (Lössl, ―Augustine,‖ 130–33). Lössl is quick to point out that ―Julian was never condemned 
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Aeclanum enter the scene, these Christian masters find a population ready for their 
emphasis on a postbaptismal clean-slate that demands and allows for rigorous asceticism 
in any who would claim to be a true Christian.  
There were a host of fundamental theological points at stake in Augustine‘s 
debates with the Pelagians, especially Julian of Aeclanum (perhaps Augustine‘s most 
worthy opponent). Among the most important points was the doctrine of one holiness, 
and all ―Integri Christiani‖ (authentic Christians, as Pelagius called them) must live it.34 
In other words, Christianity demanded one, rigorous moral standard for inclusion in the 
community. Only those meeting this rigorous standard counted as authentic Christians. 
The tendency toward forming a ―church within the Church‖ had sprung up before in the 
heresies of Montanism
35
 and Donatism,
36
 and here again it was visible in the efforts of 
Pelagius and Julian.
37
 Both Montanism and Donatism required extraordinary witness of 
holiness for ecclesial membership (and certainly for ministry). For the Montanists this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for any of his positions specifically;‖ in fact, he was the one questioning Augustine‘s orthodoxy. The most 
striking of his conclusions is that ―Augustine and Julian are both arguing for, if not equally valid, then at 
any rate equally reasoned, and certainly equally interesting forms of early Christianity‖ (ibid, 147). 
34
 Peter Brown, ―Pelagius and His Supporters,‖ 101. 
35
 In the case of Montanism, which emerged out of a charismatic pietism, ―true Christians‖ were those who 
received gifts of the Spirit to speak in tongues and receive private revelations. The early Latin Father 
Tertullian slowly drifted into this theological camp. See William Tabbernee, Fake Prophecy and Polluted 
Sacraments: Ecclesiastical and Imperial Reactions to Montanism, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 84 
(Boston: Brill, 2007); Christine Trevett, Montanism: Gender, Authority, and the New Prophecy (New York: 
Cambridge University, 1996); Daniel H. Williams, ―The Origins of the Montanist Movement: A 
Sociological Analysis,‖ Religion 19.4 (Oct 1989): 331–51; and John G. Davies, ―Tertullian, De 
Resurrectione Carnis 63: A Note on the Origins of Montanism,‖ Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 6.1 
(Apr, 1955): 90–94. Interestingly, Montanism developed a rigorous teaching on marriage in the works of 
Tertullian, e.g., Ad uxorem. Tertullian and other Montanists did not allow remarriage of widows. 
36
 Peter Iver Kaufman, ―Augustine, Evil, and Donatism: Sin and Sanctity before the Pelagian Controversy,‖ 
Theological Studies 51 (1990): 115–126. Another article that links the Donatist and Pelagian controversies 
is Carol Scheppard, ―The Transmission of Sin in the Seed: A Debate Between Augustine of Hippo and 
Julian of Eclanum,‖ in Doctrinal Diversity: Varieties of Early Christianity, ed. Everett Ferguson (New 
York: Garland, 1999), 233–42. 
37
 A later example of this kind of theological tendency, though in many ways from the opposite approach, 
appears in Jansenism. See Ronald Arbuthnott Knox, Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of Religion, with 
Special Reference to the XVII and XVIII Centuries (New York: Oxford University, 1950); and Nigel 
Abercrombie, The Origins of Jansenism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936). The ―church within the church‖ 
tendency based on moral or liturgical rigorism is still alive and well in the contemporary church. Examples 
abound.  
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took the form of ecstatic prophecy, and for the Donatists heroic faithfulness in the face of 
persecution. Peter I. Kaufman points out that the Donatist claim to be a church of the pure, 
authentic Christians was part of Augustine‘s impetus for developing the doctrines of sin 
and grace that become even more pronounced in his later debates with the Pelagians. 
These understandings of sin and grace have an important role in how Augustine 
conceptualizes the relationship between consecrated and conjugal life (which I will 
explore below).  
These groups were, in a sense, theologically ―conservative.‖ The Montanists 
wanted to hold on to the early tradition of prophecy, and the Donatists the early tradition 
of radical martyros (witness) and ecclesial exclusion of sinners. For the Donatists, the 
Church was the church of the holy, the pure, not a church of sinners.
38
 In a similar way, 
the Pelagians too could be construed as ―conservatives‖ of their day, hoping to preserve 
Christianity as a religion requiring a practice of existing in severe tension with the 
surrounding societal mores. Augustine, on the other hand, could have been cast as a sort 
of ―liberal,‖ allowing luke-warm Christians in the Church with his ―ontological,‖ 
                                                          
38
 This is the distinction at stake and clearly apparent in Augustine‘s debate with the Donatists and later the 
Pelagians. See Kaufman, ―Augustine, Evil, and Donatism,‖ 115, 117–18, 122–23. Kaufman, though, 
hypothesizes that Augustine ―probably made Donatist puritanism seem more perfectionist than it actually 
was‖ (ibid., 122).  For Augustine, baptism cleans the soul of guilt and frees the will, but it does not 
completely repair the wound of original sin (Contra Iulianum, 6.18; Against Julian, 364–66). ―Christian 
baptism gives us perfect newness and perfect health from those evils by which we were guilty, not from 
those evils we must still combat lest we become guilty. These, too, are in us and they are not another‘s, but 
our own.‖ English translations of Contra Iulianum, unless otherwise noted, come from Saint Augustine: 
Against Julian, trans. Matthew A. Schumacher, Fathers of the Church 16 (New York: Fathers of the Church, 
1957). Contra Iulianum is not in the CCL or the CSEL. The best Latin edition is Saint Augustine: Opera 
Omnia CAG. Ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Scwabe, 1995), available at http://0-
library.nlx.com.libus.csd.mu.edu/xtf/view?docId=augustine_la/augustine_la.00.xml;chunk.id=div.augustine
_la.pmpreface.1;toc.depth=1;toc.id=div.augustine_la.pmpreface.1;brand=default&fragment_id=, accessed 
on February 7, 2011. Citations of Contra Iulianum will appear in this way: Contra Iulianum, book.chapter; 
Against Julian, page. 
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supravoluntary understanding of baptism‘s effectiveness and his emphasis on our slow 
limp toward the kingdom.
39
 
Below I will lay out Julian of Aeclanum‘s theological accusations against 
Augustine, as well as his positive theological assertions, which will help us understand 
Augustine‘s response and Augustine‘s counternarrative for the relationship between 
conjugal and consecrated life.
40
 It will become apparent that much of Julian‘s theology 
has survived and even gained popularity in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first 
century.
41
 As for accusations, Julian called Augustine first and foremost a Manichaean, a 
charge not uncommon even to this day.
42
 Second, Julian belittled Augustine‘s grasp of 
                                                          
39
 Augustine makes note of the supravoluntary character of salvation in Contra Iulianum 4.8; Against 
Julian, 204,  when he states that baptism‘s effect is real when undesired and even when contradesired, e.g., 
when an infant resists reception of the sacrament, ―Actually, even while they are being baptized they 
sometimes scream, spit, and struggle against it—yet they receive and find it is opened to them, and they 
enter into the kingdom of God where they have eternal salvation and the knowledge of the truth.‖ 
Furthermore, in Contra Iulianum 6.3; Against Julian, 312, Augustine states, ―we hold that infants believe in 
Christ through the hearts and voices of those who carry them.‖  
40
 Julian‘s of Aeclaunum‘s theology survives in the lengthy quotations by Augustine in his polemical 
responses to Julian. 
41
 The problem preventing a clearer vision of this fact is that there is a general assumption that Augustine 
―won‖ his argument against the Pelagians (especially Julian of Aeclanum). The immediate reception of 
Augustine with respect to this debate was moderate, and theologians (including Cassian) more or less 
loudly disagreed with Augustine until the Council of Orange 529. Josef Lössl, Peter Brown, and B.R. Rees 
have made the argument that the Pelagian theological tendency is a matter deeply rooted in our notions of 
sin and Christian identity vis-à-vis the world, and our interpretations of Paul. Furthermore, the Pelagian 
theological tendency continues to exist (validly) today. See Lössl, ―Augustine, Pelagianism, Julian of 
Aeclanum, and Modern Scholarship,‖ 129–50; and Peter Brown, The Body and Society, pp. 408–27; and B. 
R. Rees, Pelagius: Life and Letters (Rochester, NY: Boydell, 1998). William E. Phipps has claimed, even 
more forcefully, that Augustine not Pelagius is the great heresiarch (―The Heresiarch; Pelagius or 
Augustine?‖ Anglican Theological Review 62.2 [1980]: 124–133). 
42
 See Augustine, Contra Iulianum, book 1, where Augustine explicitly defends himself and all other 
theologians Julian lumps with the Manicheans. Augustine goes on in this first book to demonstrate how 
Julian‘s position ironically supports manicheism. For more of the specific grounds on the accusation, see 
Mathijs Lamberigts, ―Was Augustine a Manichean? The Assessment of Julian of Aeclanum,‖ in Augustine 
in the Latin West, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2002, 113–136. While few actually claim Augustine is overtly 
Manichean, it is more commonly held that Augustine never completely left behind all Manichean 
tendencies in his theology. For example, with Julian, some find Augustine‘s doctrine of sin and evil closely 
tied with the Manichean understanding of evil as substantial, that is, material. Furthermore, his concession 
of a kind of sexual desire or movement in Eden leave him even more open to charges of Manicheism 
(Elizabeth Clark, ―Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels: Augustine‘s Manichean Past,‖ in Ascetic Piety and 
Women‘s Faith: Essays on Ancient Christianity [Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1986]). 
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philosophy as inept and confused.
43
 Third, Julian called Augustine‘s Christology docetic, 
or Apollinarian.
44
 Augustine is also supposed to have taught the following: the devil is 
the creator of man and his marriage is the devil‘s instrument;45 Augustine makes God 
unjust for damning infants;
46
 Augustine denies the forgiveness of all sins in baptism;
47
 
and Augustine says sin is inevitable, which encourages moral laxity and despair.
48
 As for 
his positive assertions, Julian claimed first that only Adam was harmed by original sin.
49
 
As a correlative, Julian taught that people learn sin by imitation not propagation. Only 
personal (not original) sin sends people to hell. Another corollary is that sin cannot be 
passed to the child of baptized spouses, since sin is gone from them.
50
 Furthermore, 
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 Augustine quotes Julian‘s attacks in various places. Julian says that because Augustine is unsophisticated 
in philosophy, he ―will probably assert we should use the testimony of Scripture, not syllogisms, to prove 
that offspring born of the union of bodies must be ascribed to the divine work‖ (Contra Iulianum, 3.10; 
Against Julian, 124). Julian takes Augustine to task on the philosophical impossibility of passing on guilt: 
―That which inheres in a subject cannot exist without the thing which is the subject of its inherence.‖ 
(contra Iulianum 5.14; Against Julian, 291). Furthermore, he uses philosophical categories to de-theologize 
sexual desire by philosophical dissection of its genus, species, mode, excess, and origin (Contra Iulianum 
3.13). 
44
 Ibid., 5.15, where Augustine defends himself against the Apollinarian charge. See also Mathijs 
Lamberigts, ―Was Augustine a Manichean?‖ 113–136, at 130. He is citing Julian‘s letter, Ad Florum IV, 47, 
PL, 45, col. 1365.  
45
 Contra Iulianum., 2.1, 10; 3.18, 24; 5.7; 6.23. 
46
 Ibid., 2.1, 3.5., 19. Julian claims that Augustine makes God unjust for damning innocent infants. 
Augustine agrees with Julian that infants are innocent of personal sin, since that would require will and 
action. Infants, though, are not just because they incur guilt, as it were, by contagion. Augustine 
distinguishes between innocence and justice. Interestingly, for Augustine, ―indeed it would be unjust if he 
who was disobedient to his lord were obeyed by his own slave, that is, his body‖ (De nuptiis et 
concupiscentia 1.7, my translation). 
47
 Contra Iulianum, 2.1; Against Julian, 55–56: ―Surely these are, it would appear, the topics of your 
dreadful arguments by which you terrify the weak and, less than is expedient for you, those versed in 
sacred literature. For you say that we ‗by asserting original sin, say that the Devil is the creator of men who 
are born, condemn marriage, deny that in baptism all sins are forgiven, convict God of the crime of 
injustice, and make men despair of perfection.‘ You contend that all these things follow if we believe that 
infants are born bound by the sin of the first man, and for this reason are subject to the Devil unless they are 
reborn in Christ.‖ 
48
 Ibid., 2.8. On the authority of Ambrose, Cyprian, and Hilary, Augustine claims here that a sinless life is 
possible, but only by a special grace of God. Even holy Christians do not have enough control of their 
hearts and minds to reach such a life alone. A sinless life is only made perfect in the weakness of total 
dependence on the grace of God. 
49
 Ibid., 1.5; 2.9. 
50
 Ibid., 2.9, where Augustine cites Julian‘s positive arguments: if God is just, he cannot condemn in the 
children the sins of the parents since those sins have been forgiven; furthermore, if all sins are forgiven in 
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concupiscence (here limited to the unwilled desire for sex and the non-rational arousal of 
the sexual organs) is a natural, biological force and gift that are only evil when used in 
excess. Their genus is vital fire. Their species is genital action, their mode is the conjugal 
act, and their excess is intemperance of fornication.
51
 Finally, Mary and Joseph did not 
have a true marriage, as they never had conjugal intercourse.
52
  
The stark contrast between Augustine and Julian on these topics has many 
implications for the relationship between consecrated and religious life. If Julian is 
correct, then biological reproduction would be equivalent to ecclesial, spiritual 
reproduction. If children are born just (that is, in right relationship to themselves, the 
community, and God) then they are born in the Church. Procreation is like evangelization. 
Furthermore, if sexual desire is not somehow disordered and, therefore, need not be 
fought against, then it is certainly no more honorable to abstain entirely from sexual 
congress than to make good use of the same. The same virtue is required for both, since 
what is being restrained is a good rather than something broken that we might still put to 
good use anyway. Julian and Jovinian, then, are early representatives of the theologians 
we saw in chapter two. They all attempt to find a way to level out the Christian life, that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
baptism, then those born of the reborn cannot contract original sin; if God creates men, they cannot be born 
with any evil; and if human nature is capable of perfect justice, it cannot have natural faults. 
51
 Ibid., 3.13; and see Elizabeth Clark, ―Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels: Augustine‘s Manichean Past,‖ 
291–349. Clark makes a good analysis of the Manichean roots in the background of Augustine‘s debate 
with Julian and how Augustine‘s thought changed over time. She gives too much credence, though, to the 
distinction between ―biological‖ and ―theological‖ understandings of human sexuality and origins. The 
strictly ―biological‖ understanding she attributes to Julian is not value-free. By calling it ―biological,‖ an 
attempt is made to locate it in the realm of the good, as if the ―theological‖ nature of Augustine‘s account is 
what prevents him from seeing carnal concupiscence as good. For Augustine, ―biology‖ has an explicit 
theological meaning and significance. Julian assumes the theological positive meaning of biology while 
pretending it is theologically neutral. Human physiology and genetics has theological meaning; it is 
ultimately a question of what meaning the theologian attributes to it. Is it broken or properly functioning? If 
it is broken, is that brokenness transmittable materially? 
52
 Contra Iulianum, 5.12; and De nuptiis et concupiscentia, 1.11–1.13; Marriage and Desire, 35–37. 
Augustine defends the reality of Mary and Joseph‘s marriage on the grounds that, more than any other 
marriage, they achieved the three goods of marriage (proles, fides, sacramentum). 
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is, work against easy hierarchical judgments about the holiness available to members of 
certain states of life. The result is an account of conjugal and consecrated life where the 
two states have little to teach each other. If Augustine is correct, though, then there is a 
distinction between consecrated life and conjugal life, and these two states of life will 
have reason to speak to one another. If the process by which biological procreation 
functions is somehow malfunctional as a result of sin, then even the best use of this 
capacity (for the procreation of children to be regenerated in Christ) will be less virtuous 
than the complete abstinence from that capacity (for the sake of the kingdom of God). At 
the same time, as we will see in Augustine‘s thought below, even the most continent, 
temperate consecrated virgin will have much to learn from the conjugal life of an 
obedient, humble, chaste, and faithful spouse. It only makes sense to talk about a 
consonance between conjugal and consecrated life if in fact they are distinct. Augustine 
maintains this distinction, while much of the modern scholarship moves dangerously 
close to losing the distinction on the altar of an egalitarian approach to Christian 
spirituality.   
We have just walked through Augustine‘s polemical context with respect to his 
doctrine on marriage. Let me take a moment now to review the connection between this 
section on Augustine‘s context and a concern of the whole chapter—to demonstrate that 
modern attempts to equalize marriage and monasticism are not new. Julian‘s and 
Jovinian‘s teachings have a certain post-Vatican II sensibility to them, that is, they have 
affinities with theological conclusions of post-conciliar attempts to put consecrated and 
conjugal life in dialogue. Julian‘s theology sounds hopeful in the face of Augustine‘s 
apparent pessimism; it is inviting rather than condemning. In baptism, according to Julian, 
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we are cleansed from all the guilt of our personal sins, and all that is required is for us to 
unlearn our bad habits and replace them with virtue by the Holy Spirit‘s help.53 Julian and 
Jovinian both seem to echo the Second Vatican Council‘s invitation to the one universal 
holiness available to all.
54
 Certainly Jovinian in his forceful claim that there is no 
difference in merit between celibate and married life, per se, would garner popularity 
today. The same is true for Jovinian‘s decidedly social understanding of Christian 
identity as expressed by modern, communion ecclesiology;
55
 he emphasizes the unity of 
the Church as the primary place of belonging over-against a tide of individualistic 
ascetical competitiveness: ―be not proud: you and your married sisters are members of 
the same Church.‖56 This mantra would find many an adherent in contemporary 
theology—and I share it.  
Just as Jovinian‘s theology has remained popular, so Julian‘s theological 
commitments remain throughout history and in current theology as well. Julian‘s doctrine 
that sin is taught anticipates the enlightenment‘s ―noble savage‖ and twentieth-century 
lamentation of structural sin. Most relevant is Julian‘s understanding of concupiscence. 
For Julian, the concupiscence required for the conjugal act is considered chiefly in its 
biological (thus natural, given) character; therefore, it is a ―gift‖ from God. This approach 
to sexual desire as natural and gift seems to resonate well even with magisterial 
                                                          
53
 Julian has a hard time affirming the need for infant baptism. According to Julian, in baptism, what is 
made good by creation ―God makes better by renovation and adoption‖ (Contra Iulianum, 3.3; Against 
Julian, 112).  
54
 See LG, 5, on the universal call to holiness. 
55
 Communion ecclesiology has grown in popularity since the second Vatican Council and is well 
expressed in Henri de Lubac‘s Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, Trans. Lancelot C. 
Sheppard and Elizabeth Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988); as well as the overview Dennis 
Doyle, Communion Ecclesiology: Vision and Versions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2000). 
56
 Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum, 1.5.  
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statements on sexuality from the Second Vatican Council onward,
57
 and has gained place 
in the Catechism of the Catholic Church.
58
  
It is true that there is much beneficial in the thought of Jovinian and Julian, and 
that many of their insights were carried through history as part of authentic development 
of doctrine. My goal here is not to villainize these theologians and holy men,
59
 but to 
point out that their theological tendencies tend toward the same conclusions made by the 
theologians we studied in the previous chapter. Jovinian‘s and Julian‘s attempts to 
valorize married life exemplify the same zero-sum game played by theologians in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. The apparent tension between consecrated and 
married life, as well as the desire to relieve that tension, is (like most ideas and trends) 
both nova et vetera.    
It is this tension that Augustine must cut. He is aware of the issues at stake, and 
the insights of Jovinian and Julian.
60
 His solution incorporates some of those insights, but 
uses them to fashion a counternarrative for the relationship between celibate and conjugal 
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 See, for example, Gaudium et Spes 51: ―The sexual characteristics of man and the human faculty of 
reproduction wonderfully exceed the dispositions of lower forms of life. Hence the acts themselves which 
are proper to conjugal love and which are exercised in accord with genuine human dignity must be honored 
with great reverence.‖ 
58
 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2337: ―Chastity means the successful integration of sexuality 
within the person and thus the inner unity of man in his bodily and spiritual being. Sexuality, in which 
man's belonging to the bodily and biological world is expressed, becomes personal and truly human when it 
is integrated into the relationship of one person to another, in the complete and lifelong mutual gift of a 
man and a woman.  
The virtue of chastity therefore involves the integrity of the person and the integrality of the gift.‖ 
59
 Augustine made note of their particular piety and irreproachability, and treated them cordially (Gerald 
Bonner, ―Pelagianism and Augsutine,‖ in Doctrinal Diversity: Varieties of Early Christianity, ed. and intro. 
Everett Ferguson [New York: Garland, 1999], 198–99). Furthermore, Josef Lössl has argued that 
―Augustine and Julian are both arguing for, if not equally valid, then at any rate equally reasoned, and 
certainly equally interesting forms of early Christianity.‖ As he has it, the modern challenge is not to 
determine the ―right choice‖ between Augustinianism and Pelagianism, but to draw the right conclusions 
from the fact that both phenomena have arrived at the present time together, through an immensely rich and 
complex reception process (Lössl, ―Augustine, Pelagianism, Julian of Aeclanum, and Modern Scholarship,‖ 
Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum 11.1 (2007): 129–50, at 147–50;  
60
 Serge Lancel‘s St. Augustine, 325–46; Bonner‘s ―Pelagianism and Augustine,‖ 191–210; and Bonner‘s 
―Augustine and Pelagianism,‖ 211–232, explore the shifts in the argument between Augustine and the 
Pelagians that show well the high stakes of the debate. 
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life. In the following section I will lay out the Augustinian counternarrative and revision 
of the simple, antagonistic account (whether zero-sum or not) of the consonance between 
consecrated and conjugal life. I intend to show how this saint and theologian met the 
challenge of ranking holiness with a far more creative and liberating alternative than had 
been offered by his contemporaries or by the modern authors treated in the preceding 
chapter. 
 
Augustine’s Accomplishment: The ―medium veritatis‖ 
 
I can now focus on what I consider the three major accomplishments of 
Augustine‘s lifelong constructive project for marriage and family: (1) while leaving intact 
a version of ascetical hierarchy, he rejects any attempt to evaluate the merit of an 
individual in any particular state of life; (2) he prioritizes the social nature of Christian 
life over a more individual approach easily co-opted by competition and pride; and (3) he 
creates an account of the good of marriage and virginity that allows the two a 
participative share in the same goods. The combination of these three outcomes is an 
enduring reformulation of the place of marriage and virginity within Christian life, 
wherein it could neither be said that all people were of equal virtue, or that all virgins are 
of greater virtue than all married persons.  
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Complicating but not Rejecting an Ascetical Hierarchy 
 
In his articles and book on the Jovinian controversy, Hunter highlights how 
―Augustine‘s theology of marriage and celibacy radically destabilized the ascetic 
hierarchy maintained by Jerome.‖61 Further, he states that ―by introducing virtues that 
were superior to sexual continence (e.g. readiness for martyrdom) and by emphasizing 
that it was impossible to know if one possessed such virtues, Augustine had introduced a 
note of radical instability into the discussion of marriage and celibacy. While 
acknowledging a theoretical superiority of celibacy over marriage, Augustine 
simultaneously undermined the practical validity of this hierarchy, since no individual 
celibate could ever claim superiority over any individual married person.‖62 I depend on 
Hunter for these insights, but I take them in a new direction. If the work on this question 
ends on Hunter‘s point, then we never progress past an argument over individual merit: 
who can earn more? Can anyone earn more? Whereas Hunter suggests that Augustine 
denied a certain ―validity‖ of the hierarchy, I argue that Augustine is more concerned to 
positively defend the hierarchy and emphasize its social and mysterious nature. Taking 
Hunter‘s insights in this direction, we can see how Augustine moves beyond the 
argument over individual merit and refocuses on a common yet differentiated sharing in 
the gifts of the virtues in the one body of Christ‘s bride, the Church. 
First, if Augustine‘s constructive project is to leave an ascetic hierarchy in place 
while resisting arguments over personal merit, he must subvert the way people position 
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 Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity, 281. 
62
 Ibid., 283–84. 
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themselves within that hierarchy rather than subvert the hierarchy itself.
63
 The first step to 
combating evaluations of individual merit is to relativize the virtue of continence in the 
conversation by introducing a virtue accessible to all Christians, married or virgin—
obedience. On this account, as Hunter has highlighted, Augustine has much in common 
with Jovinian. But where Hunter sees both Jovinian and Augustine undermining ascetical 
hierarchy itself, I see Augustine replacing arguments over merit gained with questions 
about virtues received. Both Jovinian and Augustine share a theological tendency, 
namely, militating against the vice of pride, and placing the virtues of humility and 
obedience above continence. Both worry more about pride in the virgin than incontinence 
in the married. Jovinian declares to all virgins, ―Be not proud! You belong to the same 
Church as married women.‖64 For his part, Augustine says in De bono coniugali, ―the 
matron who is more obedient is to be preferred to the virgin who is less so.‖65 In De 
sancta virginitate, Augustine continues, ―For we must not only preach virginity…we 
must instruct [admonish] it, so that it does not become puffed up.‖66 As he states in De 
bono coniugali, the one who forgoes the goods of marriage is only holier, ―provided, 
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 It is clear that Augustine intends to leave a hierarchy of merit in place. In De bono coniugali 28 (Walsh, 
On the Good of Marriage, 53) he states, ―So if we compare the issues themselves, we can be in no doubt 
whatever that the chastity of continence is better than the chastity of marriage, though both are a good. But 
when we compare persons, the better of the two is the one who possesses a greater good than the other.‖ 
―Res ergo ipsas si comparemus, nullo modo dubitandum est meliorem esse castitatem continentiae quam 
castitatem nuptialem, cum tamen utrumque sit bonum; hominess vero cum comparamus, ille est melior qui 
bonum amplius quam alius habet‖ (De bono coniugali 28, CSEL 41, 224). In De sancta virginitate, 24; 
Walsh, On Holy Virginity, 95–96, he asks: who would ―maintain that those who with devoted resolve 
remain continent, disciplining their bodies to the point of spurning marriage, castrating themselves not 
physically but at the very root of concupiscence, pondering the life of heaven and of angels in their mortal 
life on earth, are merely equal to the merits of married people?‖ ―et pio proposito continentes, corpus usque 
ad contemptas nuptias castigantes, se ipsos non in corpore, sed in ipsa concupsicentiae radice castrantes, 
caelestem et angelicam vitam in terrene mortalitate meditantes, coniugatorum meritis pares esse 
contendat…?‖ (De sancta virginitate, CSEL 41, 259–60). 
64
 Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum 1.5. 
65
 De bono coniugali 30 (CSEL 41, 225); Walsh, The Good of Marriage, 55: ―Quapropter non solum 
oboediens inoboedienti, sed oboedientior coniugata minus oboedienti virgini praeponenda est.‖  
66
 De sancta virginitate, 1 (CSEL 41, 236); Walsh, On Holy Virginity, 68: ―Non solum ergo praedicanda est 
virginitas ut ametur, verum etiam monenda ne infletur.‖  
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however, that individuals exploit that freedom to ponder, in Scripture‘s words, ‗the things 
of the Lord, how to please God,‘ which means pondering constantly that obedience 
should not take second place to continence.‖67 
The second step in combating the competitive spirit over individual merit is to 
show the near impossibility of proving (outside of revelation) the moral character of any 
individual. Both Jovinian and Augustine fight the tendency to pride by refusing a facile 
insistence on a clear hierarchy of merit in the Church.
68
 They part ways, though, on their 
method. Jovinian and Augustine both say the same words, ―are you [a celibate] better 
than Sara?‖ but they are asking different questions. Jovinian asks as if the assumed 
answer ―no‖ will prove that the married state cannot be per se worse than the celibate 
state. Augustine asks as if the assumed answer ―no‖ simply means that judging our own 
virtue, let alone that of others, is a practical impossibility. Both questions embattle the 
Jeromian and Ambrosian notions of ascetical hierarchy: the former by attempting to 
destroy it entirely, the other by destabilizing the link between a given virtue and one‘s 
state in life.
69
  
To this end, destabilizing the position within the ascetical hierarchy without 
completely rejecting it, Augustine reflects on Jovinian‘s favorite question: ―Are you 
better than Sara, Susana?‖ In De bono coniugali Augustine deals with the complex 
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 De bono coniugali, 32 (CSEL 41, 228); Walsh, The Good of Marriage, 57: ―Si tamen ea vacatione sic 
utantur homines, quomodo scriptum est, ut cogitent quae sunt domini, quomodo placeant deo, id est up 
perpetuo cogitet, continentia ne quid minus habeat oboedientia.‖ 
68
 Both Jovinian and Augustine level the playing field of Christian life, and both see Christian identity in 
terms of belonging to a new social body, yet for Augustine, the married state is and always will be more 
problematic than the celibate life. While the married make good use of an evil (concupiscentia carnis), the 
celibate do without that evil in at least one sector of life, though each Christian must constantly fight 
against this tendency for as long as their pilgrimage on earth continues. So, assuming exactly equal virtue 
in both persons other than their way of life, the celibate is closer to God for their avoidance of that evil 
entirely. The problem is, no people are of equal virtue. The consecrated virgin may be prideful, whereas the 
married wife might be humble. 
69
 See Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity, chap. 6, esp. 281–84. 
166 
 
answer: the virgin could respond ―yes, insofar as I have the practice of continence,‖ but 
―no, inasmuch as I do not possess the virtue any more than Sara did,‖ and ―no, insofar as 
I would not have lived the married life with as much obedience as Sara did.‖70 Augustine 
also offers the case of the apostles John and Peter. Who is more virtuous? John the virgin 
or Peter, married? Jerome argued that even Peter‘s martyrdom could not wash away the 
grime of his married state; thus he was inferior to John.
71
 Augustine, however, insists that 
John‘s equal holiness to Peter comes not primarily from the continence he expressed, but 
the virtue necessary for martyrdom, namely patience, which he possessed ―solely in 
disposition,‖ that is, in habitu. John‘s virtue of patience is comparable to Abraham‘s 
virtue of continence; both were maintained, ―solely in disposition,‖ in habitu, hidden 
from view.
72
 The virtues given to any individual, then, may be hidden or may be 
expressed, and so judgments of merit become exceedingly complicated.
73
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 De bono coniugali, 27 (CSEL 41, 223); Walsh, On the Good of Marriage, 51: ―Sic et femina 
innupta…cum audierit imprudentem illum percunctatorem dicentem ‗Tu ergo melior quam Sarra?‘ 
respondeat ‗Ego melior sum, sed his quae virtute huius continentiae carent, quod de Sarra non credo. Fecit 
ergo illa cum ista virtute quod illi tempori congruebat, a quo ego sum immunis, ut in meo etiam corpore 
appareat quod in illa in animo conservabat.‖ 
71
 Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum 1.26. 
72
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temporum distributione Christo militaverunt; sed continentiam Iohannes et in opere, Abraham vero in solo 
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 It may be argued that Augustine makes judgments of individual merit not only complicated but 
impossible by introducing the possibility of virtues in habitu and also a hierarchy among the virtues 
themselves (e.g. obedience is greater than continence, and readiness for martyrdom is greater than 
continence). One might also argue that Augustine speculates on merit in theory but not when it comes to 
particular persons. Augustine does, nonetheless, offer real comparisons of merit and ways of analyzing 
merit that only work for actual persons rather than in theory. For example, in De bono coniugali 27 (CSEL 
41, 221) (Walsh, On the Good of Marriage, 51) Augustine offers his reader a way of answering the 
question ―are you better than Abraham?‖ that speaks of specific virtues and acknowledges their hierarchy 
as an opportunity for the reader to respond humbly. As Augustine writes: ―So far as this issue of continence 
goes, I am no better than Abraham was. He did not lack it, even if it was not apparent. But I am not the sort 
of person whose actions runs contrary to his dispositions. He can say this frankly, for even if his intention is 
to boast, he will not be stupid since he speaks the truth.‖    
167 
 
Prioritizing Ecclesial Membership over Personal Merit 
 
The second major accomplishment of Augustine‘s constructive task is to prioritize 
membership in the Church through baptism over individual merit. The most important 
piece of evidence supporting this claim is that, for Augustine, the bride of Christ is first 
and foremost the one Church instead of the sole ascetic.
74
 In a recent article, Hunter 
showed that Augustine makes this position clear, in contradistinction to Jerome and 
Ambrose, for whom the virgin bride of Christ was equally the ascetic virgin. Hunter uses 
this point to indicate Augustine‘s support for organizing power within the Church in 
terms of Episcopal hierarchy over against ascetical hierarchy, but I will use the point to 
help fill out how Augustine‘s intervention in this debate was an effort to take focus off of 
arguments about personal merit within the ascetical hierarchy and create an ecclesial, 
social account of the good of marriage.  
So strong is Augustine‘s sense that all Christians (married or celibate) belong first 
to one ecclesial, bridal body, that he is wary to approach Julian as ―an individual.‖  
Augustine's first argumentative strategy against Julian is, in fact, not to defend himself 
but to bring to bear the cloud of witnesses that Julian also of necessity accuses, that is, the 
Church itself.
75
 Augustine does not construe the debate the way Julian does, as some kind 
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of single combat, mind against mind. Augustine makes a social argument. He argues with 
and for the Church. ―God forbid,‖ he writes, ―that I among Catholics should arrogate to 
myself the role you are not ashamed to assume among Pelagians…Before I was born to 
this world and before I was reborn to God, many Catholic teachers had already refuted 
your future errors.‖76 Alone we are lost, but with the Church we are saved and find the 
truth. 
In his sermon on Psalm 45, thought to have been preached on September 2, 403 in 
Hippo, Augustine develops just this sort of social account of Christian life with nuptial 
imagery.
77
 Herein, Augustine refers to the bride of Christ as the Church first; our 
common identity as members of one bride precedes any analogy of the individual virgin 
as bride. ―These invited to the wedding are themselves the bride, for the Church is the 
bride, and Christ the Bridegroom.‖78  
This claim is asserted and argued more deeply in De bono viduitatis. Here 
Augustine countermands those who claim that a person who marries after vowing 
celibacy commits adultery. Augustine‘s argument against this position hinges on his 
social ecclesiology and his resistance to the idea that an individual becomes in any strong 
sense the bride of Christ by taking a vow of celibacy. ―Because those who in Christian 
holiness do not marry are said to choose marriage with Christ, some argue like this: ‗If a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
overcome that great evil of their obstinacy.‖ The list Augustine provides includes Irenaeus of Lyon, Bishop 
Cyprian, Bishop Reticius of Autun, Bishop Olympius from Spain, the Gallic bishop Hilary, and many more.  
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woman marries someone else while her husband is still living, she is an adulteress, as the 
Lord himself declared in the gospel. Therefore, as Christ is alive…if a woman who has 
chosen marriage with him marries some mere man, she is an adulterous. Those who say 
this, indeed, are very sharp, but they fail to notice the absurd consequences of this 
argument.‖ It would mean that the vow of celibacy within marriage would result in 
adultery because ―she becomes his spouse while her husband is alive.‖ The argument also 
bans celibacy in widows, since second marriages are less perfect, and a celibate widow 
would be making Christ their second husband. This claim against the widow is ridiculous, 
Augustine writes, because ―He [Christ] was already their spouse [the now widows], not 
physically but spiritually, before that, when they were faithful and submissive to their 
husbands (1 Pt 3:5–6).‖ Furthermore, ―the whole Church, of which they are members, is 
itself his spouse, because by the integrity of her faith, hope, and love she is a virgin, not 
only in holy virgins but in widows and the married faithful too. The apostle says to the 
whole Church, of which they are all members, I have prepared you to present you to the 
one husband, Christ, as a chaste virgin (2 Cor 11:2).‖79  Augustine also emphasizes this 
richly social nature of Christian life in De bono coniugali, written at the same time or 
during the next year. ―The one city,‖ says Augustine, ―will be composed of many souls 
who have ‗one soul and one heart‘ in God, and after this earthly pilgrimage it will be the 
perfection of our unity…for this reason the sacrament of marriage has in our time been 
reduced to one husband and one wife.‖80 This approach to the meaning of Christian life 
mitigates claims to personal merit, as a consecrated virgin can identify as the bride of 
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Christ primarily in a participative way, that is, as a constitutive part of the one bride that 
is gathered up from the Church.
81
 
Augustine also approaches the priority of ecclesial relatedness to Christ, that is, 
spiritual kinship, by an exegesis of Mt 12:48–50 and Lk 11:27–28 (Jesus asks ―Who is 
my mother! Who are my brothers?‖), which much modern scholarship typically offers, 
ironically, as an example of Christ distancing himself from his biological mother.
82
 When 
Christ says ―Whoever does my Father‘s will, that person is my brother and mother and 
sister,‖ he was teaching the following: 
To value our spiritual family more highly than relationship by birth, and that what 
makes people blessed is not being close to upright and holy persons by blood 
relationship, but being united with them by obeying and imitating their doctrine 
and way of life. It was a greater blessing for Mary, therefore, to receive Christ‘s 
faith than to conceive his flesh…Finally, what advantage was that relationship for 
his brothers and sisters, that is those related to him by birth, who did not believe 
in him? So even the close relationship of being his mother would have been no 
benefit to Mary, if she had not carried Christ in her heart, a greater privilege than 
doing so in her body.
83
 
 
No belonging matters other than the spiritual belonging in Christ‘s family. This 
belonging is entered baptismally and lived by obedience to God‘s will and imitation of 
Christ‘s life. In other words, being related to Christ is only possible ecclesially, no matter 
how continent or ascetic a person might be.  
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Augustine‘s social, ecclesial approach to ―the bride of Christ‖ is significant for its 
divergence from the position of his contemporaries Ambrose and Jerome, as well as for 
its apparent dependence on Jovinian‘s stance. In his treatment of Psalm 45‘s place in 
patristic discussions of ―the virgin bride of Christ,‖ Hunter has noted that for Jerome and 
Ambrose the bride of Christ trope could be applied to the Church but was more often 
applied to the individual consecrated virgin. As Hunter points out, the velatio liturgies in 
use by Ambrose closely resemble many aspects of weddings, and it seems Ambrose used 
these ceremonies to emphasize paternal, Episcopal power structures in the Church.
84
 On 
the other hand, whereas Ambrose only referred to consecrated virgins as brides of Christ, 
Jerome included consecrated virgins and all other celibate women as brides of Christ, 
thus highlighting his preference for ascetical rather than liturgical language.
85
 J. N. D. 
Kelly shows that for Jovinian, the principal bride of Christ is the Church herself over 
above any individual ascetic.
86
  
Ironically though, Augustine and Jovinian move in opposite directions despite 
their common ground on the identity of the virgin bride of Christ. Whereas Jovinian 
destabilizes the ascetical hierarchy because it seems too individualistic and too 
Manichaean
87
, Augustine defends a type of ascetical hierarchy, because although all 
Christians compose one virgin bride of Christ, each receives a unique position of greater 
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or lesser honor in that social body.
88
 To demonstrate this point, Augustine deals with 
what was a controversial text in the debate: the parable of the steward who gave each 
worker one denarius despite their variety of hours worked: 
What else does it [the denarius] stand for except something that everyone will 
have in common, such as eternal life, the kingdom of heaven itself, which will be 
the home of everyone whom God has predestined, called, justified and brought to 
glory? This corruptible nature has to put on incorruptibility, and this mortal 
nature immortality (1 Cor 15:53). This is that denarius, the wages everyone 
receives. At the same time, star differs from star in splendor, and it is like that 
with the resurrection of the dead (1 Cor 15:41–42); these are the different rewards 
earned by the saints. If the denarius stood for the sky, is it not common to all the 
stars that they are in the sky? Yet the splendor of the sun is one thing, the 
splendor of the moon another, and the splendor of the stars another (1 Cor 15:41). 
If that denarius stood for bodily health, is it not the case that when we have our 
capacities in all parts of the body, there is health in all of them, and if it stays that 
way until death, it is present the same and equally in all of them? Yet God 
established the organs of the body in the way he wanted them to be (1 Cor 12:18), 
and so they are not all eyes, nor all for hearing, nor all for smell. Each of these, as 
well as any other, has its own special characteristics, although they all have health 
equally, all receive the equal payment of a denarius; but because in that eternal 
life the brilliance of their merits will shine out differently, in the Father‘s house 
there are many rooms (Jn 14:2). So it will be that with the equal denarius no one 
will live more lavishly than anyone else; but with the many rooms some will be 
honored with greater distinction than others.
89
 
 
What we see here is that, for Augustine, the organic unity of Christians in one body, the 
unity of Christian saints as stars in one sky, the unity of the kingdom as one edifice with 
many rooms preserves the corporate and individual nature of salvation and coheres with 
Paul‘s and Jesus‘ explicit statements about the distinction of reward.  
A weakness of Jovinian‘s emphasis on the unity of the holy people in the one 
bride, and their one shared reward, as well as the inability of the Christian to be lost to the 
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devil, is the risk it runs of subsuming the person into the social whole. These positions 
follow from his robust, social understanding of baptism‘s effects. If we are made one 
body, how can that body be complete if a limb is lost to the devil? If Christ truly brings 
his bride to himself pure and spotless, then we all share the one reward of union with 
Christ and it is impossible for any to be lost. Jovinian‘s theory of the one reward for the 
one bride of Christ leaves little room for individuals within that bride receiving more or 
less honor depending on their individual identity in the whole. Instead, if there is only 
one reward for one bride, then we only receive it as a collective and not in any way as an 
individual. The individual is lost in the common whole, the one bride of Christ. 
Augustine‘s intervention in the debate avoids this problem by affirming the primary 
position of the person as part of a new social body while emphasizing the person‘s 
uniqueness and remaining wholeness within that body.
90
  
On the other hand, Julian‘s conception of sin and sanctification, rather than 
subsuming the individual into the group, has the opposite socio-political consequence, 
over-emphasis on individualism. Carol Scheppard has drawn attention to the way that this 
conception of holiness singles out the individual and puts all the weight of a holy life on 
her shoulders.
91
 Julian‘s conception of sexuality is individual, private, and personal. By 
arguing that sexual generation does not pass on the wound inhering in the parents and 
that only personal sin is damning, he has unmoored sexuality from its social location and 
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from its social repercussions. This is true in the strongest sense if we (with Augustine) 
believe that ecclesial belonging is primary. Julian‘s version of holiness is both populist 
and elitist all at once. These repercussions were not lost on Augustine. Had they been so, 
Augustine might have agreed to disagree with Julian. After all, he was leading people 
toward a rigorous Christian praxis, wasn‘t he? The socio-political problem with Julian, 
from Augustine‘s standpoint, is well addressed in Augustine‘s enarration on Psalm 147. 
Herein Augustine points out the same sort of false eschatology we heard Jana Bennett 
decry in the thought of many who think perfect marriage will solve the world‘s problems. 
Augustine asks: ―When will full peace come to even one single person? The time when 
full peace comes to each is the time when peace in its fullness will have come in all the 
citizens of our Jerusalem.‖92 In other words, either we all have peace or none of us has 
peace. Either we are all at war with our pride and passions, or we are all in harmony with 
truth.  
Augustine saw Julian as wanting to have his cake and eat it too; the individual 
Christian has to fight and deal a knockout blow to concupiscence, even though 
concupiscence is a good, and even though it seems very few are equal to the task. 
Augustine saw in Julian the Donatist problem all over again, the problem of the church 
within the Church, the problem of putting the weight of God‘s righteousness squarely on 
an individual‘s shoulders.93 So Augustine needed the concept of concupiscentia carnis as 
the great leveler; not because he was overly dark and pessimistic, but because he was 
attentive to experience. Augustine‘s account of sin, sexuality, marriage, and virginity 
helps Christians understand their experience of just how hard it is to live the way Jesus 
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did. For Augustine, there is no elitism in the church; instead the church is the community 
of the convalescent limping and being carried home. There is little room for superstars on 
this journey.     
It is these two extremes (over-social, and over-individualistic) that make these 
theologies extraordinarily relevant to the modern crisis of marriage addressed in the first 
chapter. As we saw, some authors saw the family‘s abnegation of its roles and authorities 
to the state as the problem while others saw the family‘s underparticipation in society and 
over individualistic attitude as a root of breakdown. Correspondingly, authors offered 
―social‖ or ―individualistic‖ solutions: better state and social policy, or holier individuals 
can save marriage.  
Augustine‘s conception of all Christian belonging (both consecrated and conjugal) 
in the bride of Christ avoids both of these problems through the way he conceives of 
salvation and virtue. While Jovinian and Julian are arguing about what an individual is 
capable of or not capable of, Augustine proposes the solution that we are saved by 
incorporation into a new body, a new body free from the concupiscentia carnis that limits 
our own ability and freedom. We are incorporated into the corpus Christi itself.
94
 As 
Christ‘s body is free from this concupiscence, so too will we be as Church. While we 
share the benefit and reward of one who is without concupiscence (delivery from death 
and eternal life) we must war against it until we inhabit God‘s kingdom. Each individual 
differs in virtue, their capacity and habit of ordering their actions to God‘s kingdom, but 
their incorporation into the ecclesial body, and therefore their share in the Church‘s end, 
and the Church‘s faith, hope, and love make their own personal virtue true Christian 
virtue. They are at once sharing in the one identity and the one reward of the Church—
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union with Christ—but at the same time developing personal, unique virtues. In the one 
body of the pure bride of Christ, a consecrated virgin may have a more noble position 
than a married woman who shares equally in all other virtues, but that noble position 
would be meaningless if disconnected from the body. For example, even if married 
people are the toe of the bride and the virgin is her eye, an eye severed from the body is 
grotesque in comparison to the toe united with its body. As Augustine puts it, a virgin 
who has continence but not obedience loses what should be common among all 
Christians, namely obedience, which is a command rather than a counsel.
95
 Said boldly, 
for Augustine, virtues are no virtues at all unless they are Christian. ―God forbid,‖ writes 
Augustine, that ―there be true virtues in anyone unless he is just [here this means 
baptized], and God forbid he be truly just unless he lives by faith, for he who is just lives 
by faith.‘‖96  
In Augustine‘s thought, there is no virtue in the non-Christian.97 Therefore, the 
non-Christian marriage, be it ever so chaste, does not possess conjugal chastity. Likewise, 
the celibate virgin, be she ever so humble and modest, has no true modesty.
98
 These lack 
virtue by their disconnection from the body of Christ, because their actions and 
dispositions have not been ordered to a Christian end. ―Whatever good is done by man, 
yet not done for the purpose for which true wisdom commands it be done, may seem 
good from its function, but because the end is not right, it is sin.‖99 It is the fact of our 
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membership in the ecclesial body that makes any holiness whatsoever possible for either 
the virgin or the married. This belonging is prior to anything else they might hope for or 
hold out. It is this belonging that brings these states of life together. 
In his writings on the topic of marriage and virginity, Augustine is at pains to 
bring his ecclesial location and value of these to the forefront of the discussion, especially 
in terms of the shared Christian identity as bride of Christ, but what remains for 
Augustine is to offer an account of the good of marriage (―bonum nuptiarum‖) that brings 
this good into the ecclesial body so that the entire church (celibates and married persons) 
has a share in it. In doing so, Augustine reconfigures the conversation about conjugal and 
consecrated life, taking the focus off of the individual merit gained by either. This 
success is applauded, but in order to avoid an eventual return to Jovinian‘s (and the 
modern scholarship‘s) egalitarian yet unconsciously antagonistic approach (which thus 
far resonate with Augustine‘s position), Augustine must construct a notion of the goods 
of marriage that distinguishes between spousal and celibate participation on those goods. 
All members in Christ‘s pure and holy bride share in the one reward of union with the 
bridegroom, but they share it according to the perfection of the virtues and charisms they 
possess, which in all likelihood vary from one Christian to another.   
 
A Threefold, Integrating, Bonum Nuptiarum, Bonum Ecclesiae 
 
It is to this third accomplishment, Augustine‘s threefold construction of the 
―bonum nuptiarum,‖ that we now turn. In De bono coniugali Augustine identifies two 
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universal goods of marriage (proles, and fides castitatis).
100
 There is a third, integrating 
and particularly Christian good, though ―sacramentum.‖101 First I will treat the way 
ecclesial belonging transforms the meaning of proles (procreation) and fides castitatis 
(chaste faithfulness) to allow both married and virginal participation in their good. Then I 
will treat the most central Christian meaning of marriage in Augustine‘s thought, 
sacramentum. Augustine‘s account of this good of marriage provides the basis and shape 
of the Augustinian counternarrative for the relationship between conjugal and 
consecrated life.  
The spouses‘ membership in the body of Christ dignifies these two (proles and 
fides) universal goods of marriage, giving them Christian significance and allowing both 
married and celibates a share in their practice and meaning. Because the spouses are 
members of the one bride of Christ, these goods contribute to their own sanctification 
inasmuch because they aid the sanctification of the universal bride. A movement toward 
the Christianization of these goods of marriage (proles and fides) takes shape over 
Augustine‘s life as a whole.  
                                                          
100
 De bono coniugali 6: ―The sealing of the marriage compact is so clearly governed by a kind of 
sacrament that it is not made void even by the act of separation‖ (Walsh, The Good of Marriage, 17). In the 
next section, Augustine continues, though: ―However, it is only ‗in the city of our God, upon his holy 
mountain‘ that this situation with a wife applies‖ (Walsh, The Good of Marriage, 19). 
101
 There is a wealth of literature on Augustine‘s understanding of ―sacrament.‖ Four important strains of 
thought to follow are these: (1) the relation between the Latin term ―sacramentum‖ and the Greek term 
―mysterion,‖ (mystery or secret revealed by God); (2) Augustine‘s understanding of ―sacramentum‖ as a 
character of the marriage between two Christians that demands it be monogamous and confers on its bond 
indissolubility; (3) Augustine‘s use of the term ―sacramentum‖ to describe what marriage symbolized 
during different ages of salvation history; and (4) to what extent Augustine had or paved the way for what 
would become a scholastic understanding of the marital sacrament as sign and instrument of grace. Among 
many sources, see Theodore Mackin, The Marital Sacrament (New York: Paulist, 1989), 129, 215–19; 
John Cavadini, ―The Sacramentality of Marriage in the Fathers,‖ paper given for the USCCB Committee on 
Marriage and Family‘s 2006 Theological Colloquium on the Sacramentality of Marriage at Notre Dame, 
available at http://www.usccb.org/laity/marriage/Cavadini.pdf (accessed on July 8, 2009); and Emile 
Schmitt, Le mariage Chrétien dans l‘oeuvre de Saint Augustin: une théologie baptismale de la vie 
conjugale (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1983). 
179 
 
Let us treat first the good of procreation. In the earliest years of the fifth century, 
(ca. 403–04), Augustine had not decided how Adam and Eve would have reproduced in 
the garden, but he believed they would have procreated somehow, as an act of 
obedience.
102
 After the fall, and as part of salvation history, the patriarchs participated in 
the good of proles, again by obedience, so as to prepare for the coming of Christ.
103
 
Finally, after the coming of Christ, the duty to perform this good physically has gone 
away.
104
 It would not be until later, in the anti-pelagian writings, that Augustine will fully 
develop the notion (beyond its incipient form in De bono coniugali) that the good of 
procreation too is only intelligible within the Church. Marriages are honorable, but ―not 
because they produce children.‖ Instead, they are honorable for producing children 
―honorably,‖ ―lawfully,‖ ―chastely,‖ and ―in a social role.‖105 That social role is not 
principally for the world but for the kingdom of God. Rather, what lends value to 
procreation at all (after the incarnation) is that the child may become a member of the 
Church and thus a potential member of God‘s eschatological kingdom. Of Christian 
marriage he writes this:  
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Inasmuch as the goal of its journey is not merely the end to which its own work 
tends [i.e. biological reproduction and natural friendship], the purpose of the will 
presses onward even to this: that it may generate men to be regenerated, and this 
is why modesty in it is true modesty, that is modesty pleasing to God. For without 
faith it is impossible to please God.
106
 
 
Consequently, ―children should be generated…by good use of the evil of lust, with the 
intention of reigning with them in eternity.‖107  
In stark contrast to this praise of procreation in Christian marriage is the shocking 
character Augustine attributes to procreative activity among non-Christians: ―By using 
the good of marriage without faith, unbelievers turn it to evil and to sin; likewise the 
marriage of believers turns the evil of concupiscence to the use of justice.‖108 Procreation 
of spouses in marriage, therefore, is allowable and good (though not required) within the 
ecclesia. Outside the church, however, for those without faith, even procreative use of sex 
cannot put the evil of concupiscence to good use. Outside of the ecclesial context, sex—
even for procreation—is sin. 
For Augustine, procreation is a divine activity, not properly a human one, in 
which spouses participate biologically and celibates spiritually. Of course ―God makes 
man from the parents,‖ writes Augustine; ―not even parents are able to make man.‖109 
Procreation is a good which the couple participates by their posture of receptivity and 
openness to what God is doing. ―You cannot deny that God gave life to the dead womb of 
Sara for the reception of seed, and to the dead body of Abraham for generation in the way 
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in which young men generate.‖110 Procreation is ―the good which marriage possesses in 
the end to which its office tends, even if none [children] be actually born. The man sows 
the seed; the woman receives it; and precisely this much the married are able to 
accomplish by their own activity.‖111 ―That offspring be conceived and born is the divine 
work, not the human, yet it is with this intention and wish that marriage achieves even 
that good which belongs to its own work.‖112 Even the ―biological‖ aspect of procreation 
in marriage is good on account of its Christian, theological meaning, on account of what 
God does in and with it. Christian spouses are not ―making a baby‖ but setting up 
material conditions necessary for the generation of a new child of Adam who may 
become a child of God. 
Far from being speculative or irrelevant to the matter at hand, or linked to some 
deep-seated pessimism or optimism, the conclusions of Julian and Augustine have serious, 
practical implications for the kind of shared, ecclesial identity between consecrated and 
married persons. For example, Augustine‘s teaching on the transmission of the guilt and 
punishment of original sin from parents to children is a result of Augustine‘s consistency 
in his social understanding of sin and reward. Sin and its effects come to persons by two 
means: ownership or contagion.  
In a way, the sins of our parents are said to be another‘s sins, and, in a way, they 
are also our own. They are another‘s by right of ownership of the action; they are 
ours by means of contagion of offspring. If this were false, the heavy yoke upon 
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children of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother‘s womb would 
in no way be just (Ecclesiasticus 40:1).
113
 
In the same way reward comes to us by two means: ownership or proxy. ―How can an 
infant receive good that he may enter into the kingdom of God, if each one receives for 
what he has done, unless what an infant has done, that is, believed through another, 
belongs to him?‖114 Just as Augustine is convinced from Scripture and tradition that 
something supravoluntary garners us the effects of original sin, so too something 
supravoluntary frees us from that effect by entering us into a body, a family we could not 
have joined by our own power. ―All children of this concupiscence of the flesh, no matter 
whence they are born, deservedly come under the heavy yoke of the children of Adam, 
and all the children of spiritual grace, no matter whence they are born, without their own 
merit arrive at the sweet yoke of the children of God.‖ 115  
It is in this anti-pelagian context that we find an important distinction between the 
fertility of the virgin mother and the fertility of the married. Augustine neatly summarizes 
his entire dispute with Julian with this phrase: ―The whole point between us in this 
controversy is whether the thing of which good use is made is good or evil.‖116 Julian of 
Aeclanum identified an equivalence between the reproduction of the virgin and the 
reproduction of the spouses. Both resulted in the birth of a sinless, guiltless, new creation. 
For Julian, concupiscence of the flesh, the non-willed arousal of the sexual organs, works 
as properly now as ever. Therefore, for Julian the distinction between the married and the 
virgin is that the married makes restrained use of a good (concupiscence of the flesh), and 
                                                          
113
 Ibid., 6.10. 
114
 Ibid. 
115
 Ibid., 6.14. 
116
 Ibid., 3.21. 
183 
 
the celibate abstains entirely from that good.
117
 For Augustine, though, married persons 
make use of a broken instrument in their procreation, and thus they cannot but end up 
with a flawed product. No matter how good the musician, the sound is always a bit off 
key. Although the spouses themselves may have been cured from the disease, their 
offspring nevertheless feel the effects of that disease‘s scars; the child is born wounded 
by the guilt and punishment of original sin. Those ―who give birth physically in the 
married state do not give birth to Christ but to Adam, and therefore, because they know 
what they have given birth to, they hasten to have their children made members of Christ 
by being bathed in the sacraments.‖118 This child is born to be reborn in Christ, from 
death to life. The married, in availing themselves of the concupiscence of the flesh, use a 
crooked ruler to draw a straight line. Their intention and end may be noble, but they 
cannot avoid evil, that is, the good that has been distorted or broken, a good that lacks 
something proper to it. In this case, the good is the lost human capacity to perform sexual 
activity by a perfect harmony of mind and body (e.g., the way humans write letters, by 
reasoned and willed manipulation of the hand).
119
 As Augustine puts it, the celibate 
abstains from this evil entirely, but the married person may use this evil virtuously. In 
other words, the virgins ―preserve in their bodies what the whole Church preserves by 
faith, in imitation of the mother of its spouse and Lord!‖120  
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The virgin, focused exclusively on leading people to regeneration in baptismal 
grace of rebirth, participates in God‘s fecundity spiritually. Virgins do not sacrifice 
motherhood by their vow: ―There is no reason, therefore, why God‘s virgins should 
regret that they too cannot be mothers physically while still preserving their virginity.‖ 
With Mary as her model, the virgin mystically participates even in Mary‘s motherhood of 
Christ: ―They too are Christ‘s mothers, along with Mary, if they do the will of his 
Father.‖121 These virgins, mothers like Mary to Christ and the whole church, are worthy 
of special honor because their fertility goes beyond that of the married. They are able to 
procreate without making use of concupiscence of the flesh and, in fact, their procreation 
may be even more fruitful.
122
 The married procreate well by using an evil, but the virgins 
procreate without recourse to an evil. The married preserve the total commitment to God 
as spouse by faith, whereas the virgin maintains total commitment to God as spouse in 
faith and in body: they ―preserve even in their bodies what the whole Church preserves 
by faith, in imitation of the mother of its spouse and Lord!‖123 In their virginal 
motherhood, all the baptized call them mother and they call all the baptized children.
124
  
These distinctions are all well and good, but on what grounds does ecclesial 
belonging allow married and consecrated persons to share in the same ecclesio-nuptial 
good of proles? Augustine‘s thrust is that it is ecclesial belonging that renders value of 
any kind to either the life of the virgin or the married. Marrying and procreating outside 
of Christ, spouses procreate unto and in sin. Living as virgin outside of Christ renders 
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oneself a useless and prideful eunuch for the sake of worldly convenience. On the other 
hand, if both live in Christ, both make up the one Church and share in the great 
procreative good of Mary and the Church as mother of all Christians.  
His [Jesus‘] mother is the whole Church, because through God‘s grace she 
certainly gives birth to his members, his faithful. In addition every devout soul 
that does the will of his Father by the fertile power of charity is Christ‘s mother in 
those to whom it gives birth, until Christ himself is formed in them. In doing 
God‘s will, therefore, physically Mary is only Christ‘s mother, but spiritually she 
is both mother and sister…The Church as a whole, in the saints destined to 
possess God‘s kingdom, is Christ‘s mother spiritually and also Christ‘s virgin 
spiritually, but as a whole she is not these things physically. Rather, in some 
persons she is a virgin of Christ and in others she is a mother, though not Christ‘s 
mother. Both married women of faith and virgins consecrated to God are Christ‘s 
mothers spiritually, because with holy practices and with love they do the will of 
the father with a pure heart and good conscience and a sincere faith (1 Tm 
1:5).
125
 
 
Notice here the way both married and virgins share in the good of procreation. Both are 
spiritually mothers of Christ and both spiritually participate in the Church‘s motherhood 
of all Christians. How? For both married and virgins it is by ―holy practices and with love‖ 
living in obedience to the Father‘s will with a pure heart. All that is unique to the virgin‘s 
participation in this motherhood is her closer, physical approximation to Mary: the 
physical preservation of their virginal state and abstinence from the evil of 
concupiscentia carnis. Herein Augustine has provided a deep consonance between these 
states in life, a consonance linked in the ecclesio-nuptial good of procreation. In other 
words, the good of proles belongs first to the church. It is properly ecclesial and 
secondarily called nuptial. This will come up again in chapter five when I discuss the role 
of the vows and their practice. 
 
The second good of marriage, too, takes on new form when considered as 
primarily a shared ecclesial good. In De bono coniugali, faithfulness of chastity (fides 
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castitatis) becomes the growth in holiness of the spouses, who learn through prayer and 
mutual encouragement to surpass any need for the conjugal act beyond that of 
procreation. ―The better persons they are,‖ Augustine claims, ―the earlier they begin by 
mutual consent to abstain from carnal union.‖126 Seeing married life in terms of mutual 
growth in holiness, Augustine further takes the focus off of a competition for personal 
merit. To this end, Augustine warns, ―While seeking to do something that brings greater 
honor to itself, conjugal love should be careful not to do anything that causes the spouse 
to incur damnation.‖127 Even stronger is Augustine‘s confidence that each spouse 
participates in the salvation of the other inasmuch as their own fides castitatis takes on 
the shape of the cross, ―in ministering, so to say, to each other, to shoulder each other‘s 
weakness.‖128 Finally, as I mentioned above, Augustine finds no virtue, let alone 
Christian chastity, without ecclesial belonging: Christian ―Love is needed so that 
conjugal modesty may also be a beatific good; and that the intention in carnal union is not 
the pleasure of lust but the desire for offspring. If, however, pleasure prevails and extorts 
an act for its own sake and not for the sake of propagating children, this sin will be 
pardonable, because of Christian marriage.‖129 The implication, of course, is that this sin 
is not pardoned apart from the church.  
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The virgin, too, participates in this good of exclusive, faithful, chastity in and for 
Christ, ―as spouse.‖ Permanent celibacy is useless unless it is a manifestation of the gift 
of faith for the kingdom of God:  
Just as no one uses one‘s body impurely unless wickedness first has its beginning 
in the soul, so too no one keeps one‘s body pure unless chastity first takes root in 
the soul. Furthermore, although conjugal chastity is observed in the flesh, it is not 
attributed to the flesh but to the mind, as it is under its control and guidance that 
the flesh itself has union only with its own spouse. If this is so, with how much 
greater justification, and with how much more honor, must celibacy be counted 
among the spiritual goods, when bodily integrity is vowed and consecrated to the 
very Creator of soul and body, and preserved for him!‖130 
 
Again, Augustine is folding together the married and consecrated life to participate in one 
nuptial good while avoiding the problem of reducing one to the other. 
Again, with respect to fides castitatis, we see Augustine taking the focus off of a 
competition for personal merit by involving the married and the celibate in the same good. 
The virgin may already practice the virtue of continence to the degree that holy spouses 
may have taken much struggle to reach. Perhaps only after years do both spouses refrain 
from seeking the marriage debt. At the same time, though, married spouses may be more 
continent than a virgin if the term is understood in the wider sense of resisting any and all 
evil desires.
131
 For Augustine, when it comes to the spiritual virtue of continence, ―the 
first thing to say, and demonstrate, is that continence is a gift from God.‖ He continues: 
In the book of Wisdom we find it written that unless God grants it, no one is able 
to be continent (Wis 8:21). Speaking about the superior and more splendid 
continence, whereby one abstains from marriage, the Lord said, ―Everyone does 
not accept this, but only those to whom it is granted‖ (Mt 19:11). Since even 
conjugal chastity is unable to be preserved without abstaining from illicit sexual 
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union when the apostle was speaking about both ways of life, he proclaimed that 
both are God‘s gift.132 
 
Chastity, then, like the other goods of marriage, finds its source in God and is shared by 
both celibates and married Christians. 
We now move on to the third, integrating good of marriage, the sacramentum. 
Again, as with the proles and fides, the sacramentum is an ecclesial good shared by both 
celibates and married Christians. Nuptial language is used to describe the way these states 
of life can participate in these goods. When using sacramentum here I am referring to 
Augustine‘s use of the term as the signifying character of the marriage at a given point in 
salvation history.
133
 Consecrated religious persons share in this sacramentum inasmuch 
as they are baptized into the church, the bride of Christ, whose own nuptials (at an 
allegorical level) have a signifying, but also a participatory and literal character (though 
spiritually and not physically). With the good of sacramentum in sight, I am now in a 
position to walk through an Augustinian counternarrative for understanding the 
relationship between consecrated and religious life. It is the narrative
134
 offered for 
understanding the meaning of marriage, the symbolic quality of marriage, that is, the 
sacramentum of marriage. Augustine fashions this narrative in terms of salvation history, 
isolating three sections of salvation history to narrate a trajectory of the relationship of 
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marriage and virginity among the people of God: (1) marriage before the fall; (2) 
marriage after the fall but before the Incarnation; and (3) marriage after Christ.  
For Augustine, the nuptial union of man and woman in the garden was intended 
for and required for the perfect obedience to God, joyful rest in God and eternal 
beatitude.
135
 To express their social nature and capacity for friendship, to tend and till the 
garden, to increase and multiply, Adam and Eve needed each other in perfect partnership. 
In Eden, their conjugal union, based, as it was on Eve‘s origin in Adam, their mutual 
friendship (amicitia), and their way of life together (societas), was an image of the unity 
of human society, as well as the integral unity of the human mind in one individual.
136
 
The first couple needed gendered complements not for romantic interests or to satiate an 
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irascible concupiscence of the flesh, but for a complete union of persons, of flesh 
(physical reproduction in the garden of Eden) and of spirit (perfect, mutual obedience to 
God). As their nature is social, they require and have the capacity for friendship, but, in 
Augustine‘s thought if friendship were the greatest reason for creating mankind, then 
God would have created two males: ―How much more agreeably, after all, for 
conviviality and conversation would two male friends live together on equal terms than 
man and wife?‖ The greatest good of humanity is not conviviality and human 
companionship, but obedience to God in the context of human companionship. God‘s 
command was to tend and till the garden, and to fill it. Only a sexually complementary 
humanity could live in the great good of friendship while also fulfilling God‘s command 
to be fruitful and multiply. Furthermore, their acts of procreation would have expressed 
their friendship peacefully. Their procreation would have been a peaceful act of the will 
out of loving obedience to the divine command, and would not have been subject to the 
potentially destructive powers of inordinate desire required to arouse men and women to 
the conjugal act after the fall.
137
 In the fall, humans encounter the freedom of their 
potency for interpersonal union of friendship. It is a potency that, because of its power for 
good, can be equally turned for harm. Physical virginity would have had no place for 
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Adam and Eve before the fall, since procreation was a matter of obedience for filling up 
the number God desired, yet the virtue of continence would have been theirs.
138
 Because 
of the fall, we will see that the sacramentum, or sacred sign and mystery of marriage 
takes on a new meaning, a new, prophetic character. 
What does this scene of the narrative tell us about the relationship between the 
consecrated and conjugal life? Before the fall, there was no place for virginity, since God 
had given the command to be fruitful and multiply, and since he gave the command in the 
context of sexual beings. Virginity would have been disobedient. The kind of friendship 
obtained between members of religious communities, though, has found its source in the 
friendship of Eden. It would be a friendship focused on the obedience of God for the sake 
of eternal life lived in the subjection of one to the other. What Eden tells us about the 
relationship between religious and married life is that the vowed religious can learn from 
the married. The kind of relationships needed for monastic life can be found in the first 
married life. This Augustinian insight countermands contemporary fears of a one-way 
street from monastic life into married life. It is married life, after all, that serves as the 
paradigmatic friendship. The key difference between monastic and married friendship, of 
course, is that their project of obedience to God would not involve the command to be 
fruitful and multiply in a physical way. Let us see, then, how all this changes after the fall.  
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 De Genesi ad Litteram (9, 14, 15); On Genesis, 384: ―For the earth to be filled through just two human 
beings—how could they possibly fulfill this social duty except by having children?‖ ―It was with 
foreknowledge of the completion of this vast multitude in the resurrection of the saints joining the company 
of the angels that the Lord said: In the resurrection they are neither married nor do they take wives; for 
they will not be going to die, but will be equal to the angels of God (Lk 20:36). Here, however, the earth 
still had to be filled with human beings; and since for the sake of a close family relationship, and above all 
for giving the highest commendation to the bond of unity, it was essential to start its being filled from one 
man, for what other reason was a helper like him sought in the female sex, than that a wife by her very 
nature should assist him, like fertile soil, in sowing and planting out the human race?‖  
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For Augustine, the fall requires that marriage become a different kind of sign; 
when humans fell, there was a substantial wound to their relationships: humanity‘s 
relationship to God, the human person‘s relationship to her own body and will, and the 
human relation of friendship between man and woman. Human nature was wounded so 
that persons lost their ability to order their passions in accord with their will. The 
rebellion of the soul from its master and maker, expressed in the rebellion of will and 
action from God‘s will, results in the rebellion of human body from its own master. The 
result is mortality. Additionally, the human will is no longer in the human subject‘s 
complete control. The result is our inability to have properly ordered affection for 
properly ordered goods, and our inability even to choose the goods we may even know to 
be better.
139
 Having been turned in on itself by pride, the human will disobedient to God 
is no longer free to choose the good as it was in Eden. Not only does this inward turning 
of the will derange humanity‘s relationship with God its master and creator, but it 
deranges and makes more difficult a true friendship between man and woman who were 
once equals but now seek to rule one another out of a libido dominandi rather than as an 
expression of the ordo caritatis. The hierarchical relationship that would have obtained 
between the two arbitrarily now exists in the form of a punishment. As Augustine has it, 
―It was God‘s sentence, you see, that gave this position to the man, and it was by her own 
fault that the woman deserved to have her husband as her lord, not by nature.‖ 
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 Thus, while the three goods of marriage are not lost after the fall, they have been deranged. First, 
whereas we would have procreated with a peaceful movement of the will, we must now procreate by 
agitation of lust, which is not always subject to the decision of the will. Furthermore, the offspring we beget 
suffer from the wound of nature inflicted by the prevarication to which the Devil persuaded man. Second, 
whereas our fidelity of chastity would have been an expression of the order of charity, after the fall it 
becomes a remedy for concupiscence. Third, whereas before the fall the bond of marriage represented the 
unity of the human species and the integral unity of the human person, after the fall, the bond represents in 
two persons the difficulty of overcoming the rebellion and division will and body in each of us. 
Additionally the marriage bond represents, until the coming of Christ, the disunity of the people that will 
eventually be gathered together under one husband. 
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Nonetheless, we must not think that men and women cannot reclaim the kind of 
friendship and service to one another indicated by the gospel. After all, ―the apostle 
indeed says, Serving one another through love (Gal 5:13); but he would never have 
dreamed of saying, ‗Lord it over one another.‘ And so married couples can indeed serve 
each other through love.‖140 Their relationship, then, despite the fall, can take on the 
character of service in friendship that it once had, provided they do not attempt to reverse 
the conditions of the punishment.     
As it is, the fall produced a mutation of practice (e.g., polygamy) and meaning 
(e.g., subjection of women) in marriage, but even this modified institution retained a 
prophetic, signifying character. In the mind of Augustine, the marriage of one patriarch to 
multiple wives was a sacramentum or sign of the plurality of peoples that will be brought 
together in the one church in a union of perfect harmony of love.
141
 These marriages, 
Augustine argues, were entered out of obedience as well, and for the sake of bringing 
about the eventual, physical birth of Christ Jesus. ―What this means is that in the earliest 
ages of the human race, especially because of the need to propagate the people of God, 
through whom the Prince and Savior of all peoples would be proclaimed and be born, 
holy persons had a duty to make use of the benefit of marriage that is not desirable for its 
own sake but necessary on account of something else,‖ namely, redemption in Christ.142 
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 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, 11.38; On Genesis, 459.  
141
 Augustine, De bono coniugali 21 (CSEL 41:215); The Excellence of Marriage, 49–50: ―Just as the 
several wives of the ancient fathers were a symbol of our future Churches arising from all nations though 
subject to the one man Christ, so too the fact that our ecclesiastical leader is a man who has had only one 
wife symbolizes the union of all races in submission to the one man Christ…Therefore, just as the 
sacrament (sacramentum) of polygamous marriage of that age was a symbol of the plurality of people who 
would be subject to God in all nations (gentibus) of the earth, so too the sacrament of monogamous 
marriage of our time is a symbol that in the future we shall all be united and subject to God in the one 
heavenly city.‖  
142
 Augustine, De bono coniugali, 9; The Excellence of Marriage, 41. See David Hunter, ―Reclaiming 
Biblical Morality: Sex and Salvation History in Augustine‘s Treatment of the Hebrew Saints,‖ in In Lordly 
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Augustine sees these marriages as preparing what will be revealed and made present in 
Christ‘s wedding to the Church by his life, death, resurrection, and eschatological return.  
Just as in the garden, there is little place for virginity in the age between the fall 
and before the Incarnation. Marriages were entered for the sake of Christ‘s advent, and 
virginity required a special vocation. As noted above, Augustine‘s arguments against 
Jovinian and the Manicheans put him at pains to show that the patriarchs were equally as 
continent as any celibate person. What is more, they were not only continent but obedient 
and humble, for they would have rather chosen celibacy had it been an option. These 
great men and women possessed the virtues of the celibate in habitu (in habit).
143
 In this 
second stage of salvation history, from the first sin to the first noel, virginity remains 
hidden in the lives of those who marry in hope for Christ, out of obedience to the need for 
a nation to be the bearers of God‘s prophecy and the physical progenitors of the Christ. 
Again the direction of influence is turned. The virgins ought to read the Scripture and 
learn from the virtue of Susanna, Abraham, and all the rest of the married Old Testament 
saints who excelled in secret, in their hearts, at the virtues these same virgins struggle to 
imitate.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Eloquence: Essays on Patristic Exegesis in Honor of Robert Louis Wilken, eds. Paul M. Blowers, Angela R. 
Christman, David G. Hunter, and Robin D. Young (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
2002), 317-336.  Also in this same volume, see the work of Joseph T. Lienhard, ―Augustine, Sermon 51: St. 
Joseph in Early Christianity,‖ 336-348. Lienhard explores Augustine‘s thought on why Joseph might have 
taken Mary as wife. 
143
 In De bono coniugali 21 Augustine describes virtues present without being manifested in action. 
―Celibacy, to be sure, is a virtue of the mind, not of the body. Virtues of the mind, however, sometimes 
manifest themselves in deeds, sometimes lie hidden as a habitual disposition‖ (in habitu). He continues, 
―The chastity of John, who did not have the experience of marriage, was not superior to that of Abraham , 
who fathered children. The one‘s celibacy and the other‘s marriage were both practiced in the service of 
Christ in response to the different demands of the times. John, however, also practiced celibacy, whereas 
Abraham had it only as a disposition of mind. At that time, therefore, when subsequent to the period of the 
patriarchs the law still declared that anyone who did not emit seed for Israel was accurse, even those with 
the capacity for celibacy gave no outward evidence of this, but it was there just the same‖ (De bono 
coniugali 21–22, emphasis mine; The Excellence of Marriage, 51–53). 
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In the mind of Augustine, no couple since the fall of man has demonstrated the 
spirituality of marriage better than Mary and Joseph; they are the paradigm of marriage 
and the fulcrum between the sacramentum of marriage before Christ and the 
sacramentum of marriage after Christ. Mary and Joseph offer us the climax of this 
Augustinian narrative relating conjugal and consecrated life. Augustine treats this ideal 
couple most explicitly in his later work Sermon 51 (ca. 418), but the pair also appears in 
Contra Faustus, De bono coniugali, De Genesi ad litteram,  De sancta virginitate, 
Epistle 262, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, and Contra Iulianum.
144
   
 The marriage of Mary and Joseph overflows with spiritual wealth; it exemplifies 
the mutuality and friendship of marriage in paradise, and, more than any other marriage, 
it contributes to the advent of God‘s kingdom.145 It was at once more fecund and more 
continent than any other marriage ever has been or will be. Augustine presents the 
relationship of Mary and Joseph as a model of holiness based on mutuality, friendship, 
and love of God above all else.
146
  Mary and Joseph testify that ―intercourse of the mind 
is more intimate than that of the body.‖147 ―Joseph,‖ Augustine writes, ―was not the less 
his [Jesus‘] father, because he knew not the mother of our Lord, as though concupiscence 
(libido) and not conjugal affection (caritas coniugalis) constitutes the marriage bond.‖  
Furthermore, ―a chaste man and woman are husband and wife ‗because there is no fleshly 
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 Of great help for this section was Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J., ―Augustine, Sermon 51,‖ 336-47. 
145
 According to Augustine in De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.13; Marriage and Desire, 37. Mary and 
Joseph are the paragon of the gift of continence in marriage.  Augustine is adamant, though, that the 
marriage of Mary and Joseph demonstrates all three goods of marriage (proles, fides, sacramentum): 
―Every good of marriage, then, was realized in those parents of Christ: offspring, fidelity, and sacrament. 
We recognize the offspring in the Lord Jesus, fidelity because there was no adultery, and the sacrament 
because there was no divorce‖ (ibid., 37). 
146
 In De Sancta Virginitate, 4 (CSEL, 41:238); Holy Virginity, 70. Augustine states that Mary consecrated 
her virginity to God ―The imitation of heavenly life in a mortal earthly body arose from a vow rather than a 
command, chosen from love rather than imposed by obedience.‖  
147
 Contra Faustus 23.8.  See Elizabeth Clark, ―Adam‘s Only Companion: Augustine and the Early debate 
on Marriage,‖ Recherches Augustiniennes 21 (1986), 139–62.   
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intercourse, but only the union of hearts between them.‖148  In fact, for Augustine, the 
marriage itself was ordered toward procreation, but was made valid by consent, the 
shared will of the spouses in their decision to be married.
149
 All marriages after the fall 
are based on caritas coniugalis, but only Mary and Joseph manifested the material fruit 
of matrimony without recourse to libido or concupiscentia carnis. Not only does Mary‘s 
fleshly offspring fulfill the promise of the kingdom of God prepared for by Patriarch‘s 
children, but Jesus is the fulfillment in himself. Therefore, even in its very materiality, the 
fruit of Mary‘s womb and Joseph‘s son is the greatest spiritual good the world will ever 
know.
150
 The fruit of their marriage is not only a physical good, a child, but it is the 
greatest spiritual good, the salvation of the world.  In this sense, Joseph is Jesus‘ father in 
a more pure way than if had begotten Jesus by intercourse with Mary.
151
 
  Just as Mary remained Joseph‘s wife even though she had vowed virginity, 
Joseph did not seek another wife, even though there was no hope of sexual union with his 
wife.
152
 In that sense, the matrimony of Mary and Joseph is a sort of foil to that of the 
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 ―Quia non sibi carnaliter miscentur sed cordibus connectuntur,‖ in Sermon 51.21, in Pierre-Patrick 
Verbraken, ―Le sermon LI de saint Augustin sur les genealogies du Christ selon Matthieu et selon Luc,‖ 
revue Bénédictine 91 (1981), 20–45, at 36.  The translation I used is in R.G. MacMullen, trans., Saint 
Augustine: Homilies on the Gospels, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 1
st
 series, vol. 6 (reprinted, Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 245–59.  See RB, 91 (1981), 23–45.  
149
 Lienhard, ―Sermon 51,‖ 342, where he characterizes Augustine‘s statement as congruent with roman 
law‘s necessity of consent as the binding factor of a marriage, and against Julian of Eclanum‘s position that 
the physical consummation constitutes the marriage. 
150
Ac per hoc illa una femina non solum spiritu, uerum etiam corpore et mater uirgo. Et mater quidem 
spiritu non capitis nostris, quod est ipse salvator, ex quo magis illa spiritaliter nata est, quia omnes qui in 
eum crediderint,‖ De Sancta Virginitate, 6 (CSEL, 41: 239–240). ―So that woman, and she alone, was both  
mother and a virgin, not only spiritually but also physically. She is not spiritually the mother of our head, as 
that is the Savior himself. On the contrary, she was born spiritually from him, as everyone who believes in 
him‖ (Holy Virginity, 70).   
151
 Augustine‘s scale of fatherhood places adopting parents at the highest end, and parents begetting in 
adultery at the lowest end.  The former is a father only by voluntas, whereas the other is by natura.  
Interesting, especially for those who think Augustine is a slave to natural law, is the fact that Augustine 
ranks the will (voluntas) over nature (natura).  See Lienhard ―Sermon 51,‖ 345. 
152
 Contra Iulianum 5.12; Against Julian, 289: ―When he saw the holy Virgin already fruitful with the 
divine gift, he did not seek another wife, although he would never have sought the Virgin herself if she had 
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Patriarchs. Mary and Joseph embraced virginity in order that God‘s kingdom might be 
fulfilled, while the Patriarchs, out of the same motive, embraced their wives in conjugal 
intercourse. After Jesus is born, procreation is no longer a duty for the married couple, 
although it remains a good of marriage. Mary and Joseph, then, exemplifying the 
obedience of the Patriarchs in their willingness to have offspring, and the virtue of 
continence as they remained virgins in both spirit and body, signal the paradigm-shift in 
the expression of the way marriage contributes to the kingdom‘s advent. With Jesus‘ birth 
into the marriage of Joseph and Mary, the kingdom has become available to the whole 
world. 
So what do we learn about the relationship between married and consecrated 
states from this great fulcrum in history? Here we have a nexus of consecrated and 
married life once and only once in history—Mary and Joseph. Mary is both vowed virgin 
and mother, both truly married to a man and truly consecrated to Christ. For one moment 
in history, the disposition and the practice of conjugal love and continence are expressed 
in one conjugal societas, one amicitia. Here we have a return to Eden for a recapitulation 
of humanity in Christ. This holy couple, similarly to how Adam and Eve might have, 
receives the gift of procreation without recourse to the broken tool of concupiscence. This 
pivot point in salvation history has shown us that consecrated and conjugal life are not 
inimical to each other. They existed at once, for once, in one couple. They show us, 
furthermore, that the true origin of the practice of continence is in fact marriage, the true 
marriage of Mary and Joseph, a marriage that for its absence of intercourse was no less 
fecund. Rather than consecrated life influencing and bringing about married life, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
not needed a husband. He did not think the bond of conjugal faith should be dissolved because the hope of 
carnal intercourse had been taken away.‖ 
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conjugal life in Mary and Joseph that will inaugurate the age of consecrated life as a 
novel, Christian possibility and a necessary complement to marriage. In Mary and Joseph, 
religious and matrimonial life do not compete, they co-exist and constitute the center 
from which both states of life once again move forward in light of the Incarnation. Both 
spouses and virgins participate in Mary‘s spiritual and physical fecundity. Virgins model 
Mary‘s spiritual fecundity by bearing Christ in their heart. Married persons model Mary‘s 
physical fertility. They cannot bear Jesus as she did, but they bear Adam and bring Adam 
to rebirth in Christ through baptism. Both married and consecrated, thus, participate in 
Mary‘s motherhood of the Christ (as theoretically distinct from ―Jesus‖), born in their 
hearts to the extent that they obey the will of the Father ―with a pure heart and good 
conscience and a sincere faith‖ (1 Tm 1:5). 
The Incarnation, thus, turns the tables on the relationship between the married and 
religious states. Mary and Joseph‘s climatic marriage serves as the transition to the 
marriage between Christ and the Church, the one pure and holy bride composed of all 
Christians (including Mary). After the incarnation, the focus shifts from Mary the 
individual person to the Church as corporate bride. While Mary is the model, the virgin 
shares in Mary‘s motherhood of Christ only because she is a member of the Church. As a 
result, Christ may be born in their hearts not of their flesh (as he was for Mary). The 
signifying character, the sacramentum of marriage shifts, therefore with the life, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus. Christian marriage can now sacramentally image and make 
present the nuptial reality of Christ and church, that is, Christ‘s bond of love for the 
church.
153
 After Jesus, marriage serves as a sacramentum or sign of Christ‘s own practice 
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 The fall of man in some ways added to the list of the goods of marriage. Before the fall, man and woman 
had no need for redemption, merely development. After the fall, they require rebirth and renewal in 
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of abiding with his church, which gathers up all peoples into one bride exclusively for 
him the one bridegroom.
154
 Marriage, therefore, it must be indissoluble, faithful, and 
fruitful, just as is Christ‘s bond to the Church.  
Since Christ, the new Adam, the recapitulation of humanity has come as the seed 
of Abraham and fulfillment of the Abrahamic promises, the biological fruitfulness of 
marriage is relativized in light of the spiritual fruitfulness of the Church as mother.
155
 
Inasmuch as any Christian shares in the Church‘s motherhood, all newly baptized are that 
person‘s children. ―The Church gives birth spiritually to that head‘s members.‖156 The 
number of persons present on the planet suffices for God‘s kingdom, if only they would 
be born into that kingdom through spiritual parenthood of other Christians. From now 
until Christ returns, ―since among all peoples everywhere there is an abundant provision 
                                                                                                                                                                             
themselves and their relationships. The coming of Jesus and his redemptive marriage to the Church mediate 
this rebirth to the world. It is possible, then, for married partners, by grace, to be conformed in themselves 
and their relationship to the image of Christ‘s marriage to the Church as it was evident in Adam and Eve. In 
Tractates on John, 10.4, Augustine describes the connection between Jesus‘ saving work in his marriage to 
the church, and the first marriage between Adam and Eve, ―Adam sleeps that Eve may be made; Christ dies 
that the Church may be made.  Eve was made from the side of the sleeping Adam; the side of the dead 
Christ is pierced with a spear that the mysteries may flow forth by which the Church is to be formed.‖  
Here I used Tractates on the Gospel of John, trans. John W. Rettig (Washington: Catholic University of 
America, 1988). Augustine also states that the spouses participate in the redemptive work of Christ on the 
cross in bearing the weight of each other‘s sins (De bono coniugali, 6 [CSEL 41: 195]).   
154
 Speaking of Christ as married to the church must remain in some ways allegorical. At the literal level, of 
course, Jesus did not marry, and could not have literally married the church, which is a fellowship of 
persons and a post-paschal reality. Furthermore, if marriage is a relationship and practice involving sexual 
intimacy, then it becomes still more difficult to apply the term literally to Christ and the church. Finally, 
since the church as Christ‘s bride is at present incomplete, it would seem that the marriage of Christ and 
church is in some sense understood eschatologically. 
155
 Augustine writes, ―At earlier times, before Christ became man, there was need to have descendants 
physically for a large nation, for it to be the bearer of prophecy. Now, however, since members of Christ to 
be God‘s people and citizens of the kingdom of heaven can be brought in from the whole human race and 
from every nation, Let anyone who is able to accept it, accept sacred virginity (Mt 19:12), and only those 
who are unable to be continent should marry; for it is better to marry than to burn (1 Cor 7:9)‖ (De sancta 
virginitate, 9; Holy Virginity, 72).  
156
 De Sancta virginitate, 2.2; Holy Virginity, 58.  
200 
 
of the spiritual kinship required for creating a true and holy society,‖ virginity will be 
entered for the sake of the kingdom, and marriage need only be exceptional.
157
  
In fact, Augustine treats the ―threat‖ of universal abstinence as a boon; it would 
hasten the coming of the kingdom.
158
 Another way to say this is that all Christians 
already anticipate the one eschatological marriage when they are incorporated into 
Christ‘s bride via baptism. Spouses make provision for the world by giving birth to Adam, 
but they can make provision for the kingdom too (because they are church) by bearing 
those children again in the font of baptism. At the same time, the virgin makes provision 
for the kingdom alone, by her central focus on spiritual offspring. During this time 
between times, this time after the Incarnation but before the eschaton, Christian marriage 
is related to consecrated virginity not principally by comparison of merit, but chiefly 
through participation. Both participate in and symbolize in different ways the one nuptial 
union of Christ and Church begun through the Incarnation. Spouses represent the 
indissolubility of the bond between Christ and church while consecrated virgins represent 
the complete purity and integrity of the sanctified church. 
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 Augsutine, De bono coniugali, 9; The Excellence of Marriage, 41: ―Now, however, since among all 
peoples everywhere there is an abundant provision of the spiritual kinship required for creating a true and 
holy society, even those who desire to marry solely for the sake of having children should be advised to 
avail themselves rather of the greater benefit of abstinence.  
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 Augustine, De bono coniugali, 10; The Excellence of Marriage, 42: ―But I know what they are 
muttering: ‗What if everyone chose to abstain from all sexual union,‘ they say, ‗how would the human race 
survive?‘ Would that everyone did want this, provided it is based on a love that comes from a pure heart 
and a good conscience and a sincere faith (1 Tm 1:5). Then the city of God would reach fulfillment much 
sooner and the end of the world would come more quickly.‖ 
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Summary 
 
I will now spend a moment to bring together the insights from the sections above. 
I began by detailing Augustine‘s complex theological context: his Manichean past, the 
Donatist crisis, the Jovinian debate, and the Pelagian controversy all shaped his doctrine 
on marriage because they all dealt with fundamental theological issues of sin, grace, 
merit, and Christian identity. At the same time, each of these pieces of the context carries 
enduring socio-political, philosophical corollaries that have endured in modern 
theological tendencies. For example, the Jovinian (and even the Manichean) opponents to 
Augustine emphasized a social, corporate ecclesiology much like Augustine‘s, but went 
too far by not allowing for a fall from grace or adequate differentiation among members 
within the ecclesial body. The personal identity of each elect is lost in the communion of 
the saved. On the other hand, the Donatists and Pelagians emphasized an individualized 
ecclesiology and soteriology to the point that the church becomes an exclusive gathering-
place for holy individuals only. Recall my mention that these socio-political 
undercurrents still find a home in and even drive modern theologies of marriage and 
family, which find problems and solutions either at the individual or the social level. 
Augustine understood the strength of both positions, but also saw their flaws. He offered, 
therefore, his own medium veritatis, a three-fold good of marriage rooted in a corporate, 
spousal ecclesiology that maintains personal identity through the differentiation of virtues 
among Christians.  
Because all Christians share in the one marriage to Christ, all Christians share in 
the bonum nuptiarum, specifically proles and fides castitatis, though in different manners. 
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In a sense, these bonum nuptiarum are actually bona ecclesiae, the Church‘s goods. The 
final, synthesizing good shared by both consecrated and conjugal life is the sacramentum 
of marriage, which Augustine understands as the signifying aspect of marriage 
throughout the narrative of salvation history. It originally signified the union of persons 
in obedience and friendship, and the union of the mind in each person. In the time after 
the fall and until the Incarnation, it signified the diversity of peoples that would be 
brought together in the one church; and after the incarnation it signifies the indissoluble 
bond of Christ to his bride, the Church. Married and celibate participate in what marriage 
has signified throughout all of salvation history. What Augustine has offered is a non-
competitive narrative for understanding the relationship between the religious and 
consecrated life that maintains doctrines many find difficult to abide—in light of modern 
theological tendencies that have more in common with Jovinian and Julian than they do 
with Augustine. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study of Augustine‘s marital theology in its polemical context shows, then, 
the ancient character of a movement within the Church that is assumed by some to be 
rather new: namely, the attempt to level the playing field when discussing marriage and 
consecrated life. More importantly, though, I bring Augustine to the foreground for his 
unique alternative to the problems presented by a hierarchy of merit in the Church. My 
contribution has been to nuance what has been meant by Augustine‘s ―middle way,‖ 
hoping to have shown it is a new manner of conceiving the debate that accomplishes 
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three tasks: (1) maintaining an ascetic hierarchy while resisting any attempt to evaluate 
the merit of particular individuals; (2) prioritizing a social vision of Christian life less 
easily co-opted by competition and pride —each person is only bride of Christ by 
participation in the Church as bride; and (3) accounting for the good of marriage and 
virginity in a way that allows the two a participative share in those goods. Such is 
Augustine‘s ―medium veritatis,‖ his way of seeing the ―bonum nuptiarum‖ that envisions 
married and celibate Christians participating in one body, moving toward one good, an 
eschatological union with the one bridegroom.
159
  
In exploration of Augustine‘s complex bonum nuptiarum, which is primarily a 
bonum ecclesiae, the great good of sacramentum becomes the source for an Augustinian 
counternarrative for the relationship between consecrated and conjugal life. This telling 
sees virginity and marriage relating differently depending on the age of salvation history. 
In the garden, marriage is the image of all friendships (between men and women religious, 
or spouses). From the fall to the first noel, the virtues of virginity lie hidden in the 
prophetic witness and obedient marriages of the patriarchs, who inspire married couples 
and humble virgins of today. In Mary and Joseph is the nexus of what has come before 
and what will go after: the friendship of edenic marriage, procreation for the sake of the 
kingdom after the fall, a virgin and a spouse, and the conjugal and consecrated life united 
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 Modern readers find Augustine‘s hierarchy of merit difficult to bear, but Augustine must retain the 
hierarchy of merit for two reasons: (1) scriptural; and (2) theological. As to the first, he finds the hierarchy 
clearly described in Scripture—those who practice continence or have continence in habitu have a virtue 
more meritorious than those who do not. Second, those who make use of the sexual organs after the fall can 
only do so by making use of something that is somewhat broken or disordered—namely, the rebellious 
relationship between the mind and the sexual organs, between will and desire; therefore it is better to avoid 
the use of the sexual organs than to make good use of them. It is on this second point that Augustine 
disputed against the Pelagians in particular. See, for example, Contra Iulianum 3.23; Against Julian, 154–
55: ―Married who use the evil well cannot be accused, and the offspring must be regenerated in order that 
they may be delivered from evil. If the goodness of marriage were only good use of a good, we might well 
wonder how evil can be thence derived. But, since the goodness of marriage is good use of an evil, it does 
not surprise us that from the evil which the goodness of marriage uses well is derived the evil which is 
original sin.‖ 
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on one occasion in one person and one couple. Finally, after the incarnation marriage and 
virginity signify the two aspects of what is united in Mary: spiritual and physical 
motherhood, conjugal friendship and consecrated virginity (with the virtue of continence 
and obedience). To be spiritual mother of Christ is open to all Christians, and each person 
may be mother to all the members of Christ‘s body by participation in the Church as 
mother and bride. The true friendship of redemptive love and service witnessed in Eden 
is once again available to the married if they bear each other‘s weaknesses in all chastity 
and humility, just as that friendship is available to the celibate through humble, chaste 
obedience to the superior. Whatever we may want to say to distinguish the consecrated 
and conjugal states, we must first say with Augustine that both states are vanity apart 
from the Church; both married and religious participate in one marriage that supervenes 
their own state, the wedding of Christ and Church. Both image different eschatological 
aspects of that nuptial reality (e.g., marriage the indissolubility of the bond, and virginity 
the integrity and purity of the one bride), but neither can do so alone and apart from the 
other. Far from competing with each other, the states of life inform and educate each 
other in the practice of living with Christ in the household of God.    
The following chapter jumps off from the Augustinian narrative of participation 
in the direction of this ―abiding‖ with Christ in the household of God. The consonance 
and bi-directional dialogue between the states of life will be explored through a study of 
the Johannine principle of householding with God, the practices of ―Christian 
householding‖ as developed by modern scholars, and the domestic, familial language that 
has ever been a part of the way religious institutes understood their identity and mission. 
The first section, on the Johannine principle of abiding in God‘s household (most 
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completely developed by Mary Coloe) follows from Augustine‘s prioritization of 
ecclesial belonging. The Church is the primary context for all of life. Jana Bennett, 
Thomas Breidenthal, and Dolores Leckey embrace this concept and further explore its 
theory and practices for both married and consecrated life in a common ―Christian 
householding.‖  
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CHAPTER 4: HOUSEHOLDING WITH GOD 
 
Two chapters ago I considered modern scholars who attempted to counter what 
seemed an artificial, antagonistic connection between consecrated life and married life. 
These authors suggested that monastic spirituality had been invading the lives of married 
people and obstructing an authentic spirituality of marriage from developing in the 
Church. If married couples sought holiness, their recourse was to live less like married 
people and more like consecrated religious Christians. I argued that such a view 
depended on an overstated difference between the consecrated and the married life, as 
well as a subtle and likely unintentional perpetuation of a competitive approach to the 
relationship between these two states of life. Furthermore, these approaches could do 
more to locate the Christian married life within the church. In particular, in the effort to 
identify unique spiritualities of the family that distinguish it from religious life, the 
authors missed the shared ecclesial practices and identity at the center of both states of 
life. In the chapter immediately preceding this one, I complicated this typical, 
competitive narrative by suggesting an Augustinian foundation for reimagining the 
relationship between married and consecrated life: one that saw them as participants in 
the same the same threefold, ecclesial good of proles, fides, and sacramentum. We saw 
that both states in life participate in these goods. Sharing in this complex good is the task 
of being church, the bride of Christ, the household of God.   
Chapter Four makes three movements toward better understanding the 
consonance between consecrated and conjugal life, each of which follow from 
Augustine‘s project, which saw married and virgins practicing life in the City of God. 
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The previous chapter dealt with the adversarial relationship between monastic and 
married life, but this chapter must contend with the false conception of a unidirectional 
relationship between consecrated and conjugal life, that is, thinking monasticism has 
influenced marriage but marriage has had little to say to monasticism. The first step is to 
develop the Johannine concept of ―dwelling with God‖ to suggest that all Christian life is 
a domestic project, a cohabitation in the household of God. Part two shows the way 
vowed religious life has understood its own identity and practices in domestic, familial 
language. Particularly, this language occurs in early cenobitic life and in post-Vatican II 
reforms of religious institutes. Finally, part three forwards and critiques principles and 
practices of Christian householding as they appear in the work of twentieth-century 
scholars. ―Christian householding‖ functions as a term large enough to incorporate all 
forms of Christian life together. The result of the chapter will be to undermine the claim 
that the ―dialogue‖ between monastic and married life throughout the tradition has been a 
one-sided invasion of monastic spirituality into married life, and replace it with the 
understanding of ―Christian householding‖ as a set of ecclesial principles and practices 
that undergird both consecrated and conjugal Christian community. 
 
CHRISTIAN LIFE AS DOMESTIC: THE WITNESS OF JOHN’S GOSPEL 
 
 In this section I argue for ―householding‖ as a primary ecclesiological principle 
and as a term that can contain and embrace the practices of both vowed religious and 
married Christians with respect to their identity as members of the Church. To understand 
this term I begin with Scripture, particularly the Gospel of John, though one could easily 
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begin with Paul‘s letter to the Ephesians or Timothy, which explicitly proclaims that the 
church is properly called ―the household of God‖ (Tm 3:15; Eph 2:19) or the ―household 
of faith‖ (Gal 6:10).1 
As Mary L. Coloe has proposed in her 2007 monograph Dwelling in the 
Household of God: Johannine Ecclesiology and Spirituality, a key symbol for 
understanding Johannine ecclesiology and spirituality is ―household.‖2 Coloe applies 
narrative criticism to John‘s Gospel and finds in the text an extended depiction of life in 
the household of God. The terms ―meine,‖ and ―oikos‖ take central roles in John‘s 
Gospel.
3
 The author repeatedly refers to Christian life as a dwelling with God (meine).
4
 
                                                          
1
 Much of the New Testament uses the terms of domestic life to describe Christian community and 
belonging. Thomas Breidenthal, Christian Households bases his concept of Christian householding on 
Paul‘s letters to the Corinthians and to Timothy rather than John‘s Gospel. Furthermore the word root of 
oikos appears in 1 Cor 16:15; 1 Cor 9:17; 1 Cor 4:1–2; Col 1:25; Titus 1:7–8 (Ekkehard W. Stegemann and 
Wolfgang Stegemann [The Jesus Movement: A Social History of Its First Century, Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1999], 277). Among other household terms used by Paul are adelphos/adelphe as well as ―children,‖ 
―father,‖ and ―sons‖ (Rom 16:1; 1 Cor 4:15; 1 Thess 2:11; Phil 10; Rom 8:16–17; and Acts 2:17. 
2
 Coloe (Dwelling in the Household of God: Johannine Ecclesiology and Spirituality [Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical, 2007]) begins by noting the shift in God‘s presence from the temple to the Christian community 
mediated by the use of the term ―household‖ which refers to the temple itself (Jn 2:16, Jesus cleanses the 
temple; Jn 14:2 last supper) as well as a personal community (e.g., Gen 24:38; 28:21; 46:31; Josh 2:13; Jdg 
6:15; 9:18; 16:31; 1 Sam 22:15; 2 Sam 14:9; 1 Chr 28:4). The temple represented God‘s place of dwelling 
in creation, but ―the incarnation makes personal the mode of God‘s being in the world, first in Jesus; then, 
in and through his departure and gift of the Spirit, God‘s dwelling has its locus in the community of 
believers, born into the Father‘s household‖ (ibid., 2–3). The temple raised up by Jesus is not only his body 
but is the Christian community, ―my father‘s household‖ (ibid., 3). 
3
 The new Testament makes multiple references to ―oikos‖ and ―oikonomia.‖ See Karin Lehmeier, Oikos 
un Oikonomia: antike Konzepte der Haushaltsführung und der Bau der Gemeinde be Paulus (Marburg: N. 
G. Elwert, 2006); and  P. Brandt, and A. Lukinovich, ―Oikos et oikia chez Marc comparé à Matthieu et 
Luc,‖ Biblica 78 (1997): 525–33 for a word study of ―oikos‖ and ―oikia‖ in Mark, Matthew, and Luke. 
Households, economics, and God‘s dwelling among his people are also central concerns of the Old 
Testament. See Leo G. Perdue, et al., Families in Ancient Israel (Louisville, KY: Westminster, John Knox 
Press, 1997), esp. 223–58; and C. R. Koester, The Dwelling of God: The Tabernacle in the Old Testament, 
Intertestamental Jewish Literature, and the New Testament, Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 
22 (Washington: Catholic Biblical Association, 1989). ―Oikonomia,‖ management of the household, is also 
the root of the modern English ―economy.‖ This link between the household and ―economy‖ is particularly 
interesting because the modern attempt to make the home a center of affective, consumptive, recreational 
life together makes it harder to understand a vision of home as being intrinsically related to economics. The 
New Testament concern for the management of the oikos will touch with modern economy again in chapter 
six, where I will look at practices of poverty in Christian marriage.  
4
 The question of Jesus coming to ―dwell‖ is central to the Gospel of John. Scholars have used ―dwelling‖ 
language to link Jesus to the wisdom tradition (Prv 8:34; Wis 7:28). The wisdom tradition is also linked 
John‘s gospel to the wisdom tradition through the imagery of Jesus as the wisdom of God coming to dwell 
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Jesus meets people in homes (Jn 12, Lazarus‘ home), takes disciples to his home (Jn 2:12, 
after Cana), and tells his disciples that he will make a home for them (oikos) (Jn 14:1–5, 
last supper discourse). An oikos becomes a temple when Jesus enters (Jn 12, anointing of 
Jesus), and both the Christian and the Christian community become the temple of God 
when the Father and the Son dwell (meine) within them (Jn 14:1–15:17, last supper 
discourse). Furthermore, the Gospel‘s narrative structure characterizes life with Christ in 
terms of the experiences of a household: chapter 1 presents an invitation to join the 
household and ends with a type of betrothal; chapter 2 continues with a marriage to 
formally begin the householding; we see a birth in chapter 3; a death in chapter 11; a 
welcome and description of life in the household in chapters 13–17; and chapter 20 
shows us the promise that our householding with God never ends, but continues in the 
resurrection.
5
 
 What does Coloe mean by ―household?‖ Coloe is clear that Christian 
householding is not coterminous with the extended or nuclear family-life of the first-
century Jews or that of Hellenistic society. The term ―household,‖ has a historical shape 
linked to the time John‘s Gospel was written, and this shape has been filled in by 
sociological study.
6
 The term ―household,‖ however, must be allowed to exceed its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with man for a time and returning to God. The Wisdom of God both does and does not find a home among 
men. The image of wisdom inviting the unlearned to be in her presence is also related to Jesus‘ ministry in 
John‘s Gospel. See Richard Dillon, ―Wisdom Tradition and Sacramental Retrospect in the Cana Account 
(Jn 2, 1–11),‖ Catholic Biblical Quarterly 24 (1962): 268–96. 
5
 Coloe, Dwelling in the Household of God.  
6
 It is popular to apply social sciences to early Christian community, and the Johannine community in 
particular. Raymond Brown‘s hypothesis regarding the shape and history of the Johannine community is 
one such sociological experiment, though an older one. The classic text is Brown, The Community of the 
Beloved Disciple (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). More recent, and more social-scientific are the attempts 
of Bruce J. Malina, Richard L. Rohrbaugh, Social-Science Commentary on the Gospel of John 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998); and Wolfganag Stegeman, et al., The Social Setting of Jesus and 
the Gospels (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002). Modern studies of household and church are numerous. 
Among the influential are Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch, Families in the New Testament World: 
Households and House Churches (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997); Jan Gabriël van der Watt, 
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sociologically narrated and historically descriptive meaning if it is to function as a 
symbol for dwelling with God.
7
 Coloe uses the term as a metaphor, that is, as a linguistic 
double meaning. ―The linguistic tension between the ‗is‘ and the ‗is not‘ is the dynamic 
that enables a metaphor to create a new perception or reality. The meaning of a metaphor 
transcends the literalness of the words…and the image evoked by the metaphor creates a 
new reality in the mind of the reader that cannot exactly be translated.‖8 While 
householding with the Trinity takes place within an earthly, domestic setting, the 
structures of earthly households pass away and are not the end or defining characteristic 
of Christian householding.
9
 We cannot reduce the gospel of Christ to the claim that Jesus 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Family of the King: Dynamics of Metaphor in the Gospel According to John, Biblical Interpretation Series 
47 (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Joseph H. Hellerman, The Ancient Church as Family (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2001); David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek, eds., Early Christian Families in Context: An Interdisciplinary 
Dialogue (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003); and Roger W. Gehring, House Church and Mission: The 
Importance of Household Structures in Early Christianity (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004). 
7
 I am dubious of the explanatory power of Social Science for making sense of Scripture. Social scientists 
apply their own theoretical frameworks to historical social realities that can no longer be directly studied. 
The explanatory frameworks brought to bear on the texts and the communities determine the theological 
conclusions and significance up-front. ―For example,‖ writes John Milbank, ―Engels saw Christianity as the 
religion of the oppressed lower orders in the Roman Empire; Nietzsche saw it as an expression of the 
resentment of the powerless and excluded; Weber, on the other hand, saw Christianity as a ‗salvation-
religion‘ of the urban middle classes, displaced and individualist, in contrast to the merely magical religion 
of the peasants and the aristocratic cults of honour‖ (Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 
[Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1990], 114). Sociology offers as much of a value-laden narrative as theology 
does. See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 111–12. Milbank writes: ―What Biblical sociology 
tends to forget is that, were more historical ‗evidence‘ available, it would only consist of more texts. These 
other texts might or might not confirm the account of, for example, Christian genesis that is given in the 
Gospels, but they would not reveal to us a level of ‗social genesis‘ unmediated by a series of interpretative 
perspectives. The point here is not that one never has ‗unbiased‘ access to the social genesis, but rather that 
there is no pre-textual genesis: social genesis itself is an ‗enacted‘ process of reading and writing. Curiously 
enough, it is much easier to talk about ‗the social background‘ of a text when it stands relatively alone; in 
the mesh of intertextuality provided by a situation of rich evidence, the objective social object much more 
evidently disappears…Biblical sociology is at its best when it appeals to extra-Biblical historical archives, 
although this work least of all permits it to arrive at sociological conclusions‖ (Ibid., 114). Joseph H. 
Hellerman (The Ancient Church as Family, 2–25) also critiques sociological and ideological explanations 
of early Christian Origins. 
8
 Coloe, Dwelling in the Household of God, 11. 
9
 John Howard Yoder (The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, second edition [Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1994], chap. 9) argues that the early Church was not moving to an accomodationist position (as 
argued by Martin Dibelius [Yoder, Politics of Jesus, 164–65]). Yoder rejects Dibelius‘s claim that the 
church took on common social structures because the teachings of Jesus were inadequate to create and ethic 
of everyday life. Instead, the early church realized that these social structures were fading away and the 
best witness to that fact was to live as if they were not ―givens.‖ 
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came to replace this or that culturally conditioned form of householding with some other 
culturally conditioned form of householding. In other words, Jesus did not come to 
replace 1
st
 century Jewish and Greco-Roman forms of patriarchal householding with 
21st-century quasi-egalitarian householding. 
While a strictly sociological study of John‘s Gospel might suggest that the 
Christian community was built upon prevailing patriarchal structures or acted to resist 
them, our concern with ―household‖ here is explicitly rather than implicitly theological. 
The term ―household‖ represents a reality that is not limited to this world. As Coloe puts 
it, ―the household model for the Johannine community is not to be found in the social 
sphere of the first century, but must be located in the world of divine relationships.‖10 
The household of God is an eschatological, mutual indwelling of God and the believer; it 
is present now inasmuch as the believer participates in common the life of God as Trinity, 
that is, communion of Persons. In John‘s Gospel, discipleship is menein, a dwelling with 
Jesus (e.g., Jn 1:39, the disciples of John go and stay with Jesus). John‘s Gospel explores 
the contours of this life and invites the Christian to participate in all its joys and sorrows. 
 Two symbolic events take place to signify the beginning of life of the household 
of God. First, John takes his reader through a narrative of ―gathering the household‖—
introduction, betrothal, and wedding. Coloe compares John the baptizer to the role of 
―friend of the bridegroom,‖ who would announce the bridegroom‘s intention to wed and 
negotiates with the bride‘s family to set up the betrothal. John is the preeminent disciple, 
inviting all who can hear him to a wedding with the bridegroom. Andrew also takes on 
this role of ―friend of the bridegroom‖ when he invites Philip, who finds Nathanael and 
leads him to Jesus (Jn 1:45). The betrothal begins with this encounter, when Jesus gives a 
                                                          
10
 Coloe, Dwelling in the Household of God, 11. 
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promise to Nathanael that he will see ―greater things still.‖ Nathanael and others follow 
Jesus to a wedding, where he is both guest and benefactor for the festivities. The wedding 
banquet and the wine imagery would recall for the Jewish reader images of the 
eschatological wedding banquet pictured in apocalyptic literature, as well as the wine of 
judgment and the cup of God‘s wrath. This wedding, wine, banquet imagery has also 
been interpreted as Jesus‘ way of inaugurating himself into the wisdom tradition, which 
emphasizes God‘s wisdom abiding with Israel. Other opinions find Jesus‘ actions of 
transforming water into wine to be a symbolic supersession of preceding prophetic 
traditions.
11
 Furthermore, Jesus‘ calling Mary his mother ―Gyne‖ or ―woman‖ 
emphasizes her recapitulating role as ―Eve,‖ as ―woman‖ who gives birth to the new 
Adam whose hour is to come. It is here that the first confession of faith is made (Jn 2:11, 
                                                          
11
 Dillon, ―Wisdom Tradition and Sacramental Retrospect,‖ Catholic Biblical Quarterly (1962): 68–96. The 
link between the wine of this feast and the eschatological, messianic age appears in Jer 31:12; Hos 14:7; 
Amos 9:13–14; Isaiah 62:5; and 1 En 10:19. Edmund Little proposes that the eschatological context 
pointed out by other scholars is only half the story. Not only does the abundant wine and wedding imagery 
call to mind the apocalyptic and eschatological feasts of joy in the messianic age, but they also call to mind 
the wine of damnation and judgment. Jesus‘ miracle at Cana foretells both aspects of the eschaton (Echoes 
of the Old Testament in the Wine of Cana in Galilee (John 2:1–11) and the Multiplication of the Loaves 
and Fish (John 6:1–15): Towards and Interpretation, Cahiers de la Revue biblique 41 (Paris: J. Gabalda). 
Luís Chacón, in his exhaustive word-study of the conversation between Mary and Jesus at the wedding, 
determines that the meaning must be prophetic, and is certainly linked to the appearance of ―gyne‖ again at 
the cross (Luis Chacón, ―Principales lineas de interpretación de Jn 2.3c–4 en la historia de la exégesis,‖ 
Estudios eclesiásticos 77 no 302 (Jl-s 2002): 385–460. Other scholars take a sociological approach, 
reducing Jesus‘ decision to act to a concern to protect his ―doxa‖ or ―honor‖ (Matthew S. Collins, ―The 
Question of Doxa: A Socioliterary Reading of the Wedding at Cana,‖ Biblical Theology Bulletin 25 (Fall 
1995): 100–109. Edward W. Klink, III‘s study of Jn 2:1–11 offers multiple motivations and meanings 
behind Jesus‘ seemingly distancing statement to his mother: ―What is it to you and to me?‖ For example, 
Jesus may have been invoking the prophetic tradition of Elisha in 2 Kgs 3–4 (Edward Klink, III, ―What 
Concern is that to you and to me? John 2:1–11 and the Elisha Narratives,‖ Neotestamentica 39 no 2 (2005): 
273–87. Some feminist readings of Jesus‘ presence at the wedding of Cana and his conversation with his 
mother argue that Jesus used the event as an opportunity to distance himself from his mother in two ways: 
first, in that her biological motherhood was not important; second, insofar as ―the mother of Jesus‖ can be 
understood as the Jewish people with all its religious and political meaning, Jesus at Cana breaks his 
relationship to his Mother, saying his concerns are not her concerns (Lyn M. Betchel, ―A Symbolic Level 
of Meaning: John 2.1–11 (The Marriage in Cana),‖ in A Feminist Companion to the Hebrew Bible in the 
New Testament, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield, U.K.: Sheffield Academic, 1996), 241–257. This feminist 
interpretation is most problematic since its logic of rejecting the mother cannot make sense of the inclusio 
created by the return of ―gyne‖ and motherhood at the foot of the cross. If Jesus is in one place rejecting his 
mother (Judaism), why then is he giving it to his closest disciple so it can abide in his home? 
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―and his disciples believed in him‖) and the disciples are incorporated into the household 
of Jesus. ―After this he went down to Caper‘naum, with his mother and his brothers and 
his disciples; and there they stayed for a few days‖ (Jn 2:12). 
 The second chapter of John continues the domestic theme along nuptial lines.
12
 
Immediately after the wedding and the move to Jesus‘ home, Jesus and his disciples find 
themselves in the Father‘s house. After a typical wedding ceremony, the bridegroom 
returns to his own home, which is often still his father‘s house; here the veil is lifted in a 
revelatory moment.
13
 This is an important moment for the relationship, as the couple 
meets each other face-to-face at this moment. The Father‘s house is the temple, and the 
revelation is that a mess has been made of this house and the Father‘s son has returned to 
restore order. The Father‘s son must drive out those who have dishonored the house so 
that he may dwell there with his bride.  
Following close upon this return to the Father‘s house comes birth, the second 
symbol for entering life in the household of God (Jn 3, Nicodemus‘ clandestine, shadowy 
conversation with Jesus).
14
 In the context of second-temple Judaism, birth is not only a 
physical continuation of Israel, but it is an eschatological event pointing toward the 
restoration of Israel. Jesus‘ conversation with Nicodemus revolves around the 
eschatological meaning of birth. As Jesus tells Nicodemus, the birth of the flesh ends in 
                                                          
12
 There is an important distinction between ―nuptial‖ and ―domestic.‖ Nuptiality is a possible but not 
necessary characteristic of the larger Christian household, but it would have been the most common for any 
household in the New Testament age to be built around a marriage. It happens that John‘s Gospel uses a 
variety of images from domestic life, and many of them relate to marriage. 
13
 See H. Clay Trumbull, Oriental Social Life, 33, 43, 58 (quoted in Coloe, Dwelling in the Household of 
God, 34–35). Coloe links the typical walk back to the bridegroom‘s home and the revelation to the disciples‘ 
journey to Jesus‘ home and his ―Father‘s house,‖ where his identity as God‘s son is revealed. 
14
 Coloe, Dwelling in the Household of God (59): ―The birth of a child is so critical that the biblical word 
for a childless man comes from the same root as the Hebrew word meaning ‗destroyed‘ (arîrî). See B. 
Seevers, ―ariri,‖ in Willem A. VanGemeren, ed., New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology 
and Exegesis (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997), 3:527–31. In the Old Testament, Israel is referred to as 
the ―firstborn of God‖ (Exod 4:2; Exod 19:5; Jer 31:8). In the New Testament the ―firstfruits‖ applies to the 
Christian community (Jas 1:18; and Rev 14:4). 
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death while the birth of the spirit leads to life.
15
 Physical birth in the ages of the patriarchs 
and throughout Israelite history eventually led to Christ‘s incarnation, but Christ‘s 
dwelling in the world makes possible our own spiritual rebirth into the eternal household 
of God. After this discussion of birth, the bridegroom‘s friend John the baptizer makes 
his last appearance, testifying to the completion of the nuptial union. ―He who has the 
bride is the bridegroom,‖ says John; ―the friend of the bridegroom, who stands and hears 
him, rejoices greatly at the bridegroom‘s voice; therefore this joy of mine is now full,‖ 
(Jn 3:28–30).16 John the Baptist here rejoices at a twofold union: (1) Christ‘s nuptial 
union with humanity, the first fruits of which is the Christian community; and (2) the 
nuptial union of Christ with each believer as part of the one church his bride. Finally, as a 
sort of lived parable of John‘s testimony, Jesus encounters a Samaritan woman at a well 
(a traditional betrothal site) and reveals to her the nature of her true bridegroom who has 
come to claim her and her people.
17
 
 Having described incorporation into the household of God with the symbols of 
marriage and birth, John‘s gospel continues to characterize that householding, now 
speaking in liturgical terms. In chapter 12, as in chapter 2, the disciples and Jesus are 
present in an oikos, here referring to a building. But this building takes on a liturgical 
dimension and characterizes the household of God as a unity of action (worship) and 
                                                          
15
 John‘s Gospel continues to describe life in the household of God by dealing with other typical events in 
household life. For example, he renarrates the meaning of death in that household. The story of Lazarus in 
Jn 11 shows us a household of Jesus‘ friends where death occurs. John uses Lazarus‘ death to explore a 
household context for the desire of Jesus‘ presence and the problem of his absence (Martha and Mary send 
for him and lament that had he been present Lazarus would not have died), as well as the reliability of Jesus‘ 
word as the word of life (Martha and Mary do not understand the power of Jesus‘ word). The words of 
Jesus‘ call bring forth Lazarus from the tomb. 
16
 For Coloe this completes a narrative chiasm of A (1:19-34, witness); B (1:35-51 disciples of John and 
Jesus); C (2:1-12, wedding); D (2:13-25, My Father‘s House); C‘ (3:1-21, birth); B‘ (3:22-24, disciples of 
John and Jesus); and A‘ (3:25-36, witness of the bridegroom‘s friend). 
17
 See Coloe, God Dwells with Us: Temple Symbolism in the Fourth GospeI (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 2001) 85–113. 
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place (a material temple of God).
18
 When Mary anointed Jesus‘ feet with ―a pound of 
costly ointment of pure nard‖ and ―wiped his feet with her hair,‖ we see that the response 
to Jesus‘ presence and the power of Jesus‘ word to bring new life is worship. The house 
in which Jesus and the disciples are eating becomes a temple as ―the house was filled 
with the fragrance of the ointment.‖ This scene recalls Exodus 40:9 and Exodus 30:22-29, 
which instruct the Israelites to anoint with oil the instruments and of worship. The scene 
also brings to mind liturgical images of aroma and God‘s presence and glory filling the 
tabernacle and the temple (Exod 40:34–35; Lev 2:2; 1 Kgs 8:10-11). The household of 
God, where Christ‘s presence, power, and word are known, is a household of worship.19 
 The household of God not only welcomes new life and invites the response of 
worship, but makes demands of obedience. At the last supper, Jesus teaches his disciples 
the hospitality of God‘s household. He washes his disciple‘s feet (Jn 13:3–12). This 
process of welcome is also an inclusion of the disciples into the introduction of Jesus‘ 
own hour by means of a deep, mutual indwelling of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit in 
this new Christian community. The father dwells in Jesus. Jesus will send the paraclete to 
dwell in the believers. The Father and the Son too will dwell with the believer. The 
uniting principle of all this indwelling is love manifested in obedience. The Son‘s love 
for the Father, which the Christian community can have by the presence of the Holy 
Spirit, will bring to the community the remembrance of the words Jesus said. For ―If a 
                                                          
18
 There is a constant tension in the narrative between the temple of God as referring to Jesus, the temple in 
Israel, the Christian community, and the individual Christian. 
19
 Thomas has the same response of faith and worship to Jesus‘ presence and the revealed power of his 
resurrection (―My Lord and my God!‖ Jn 20:26–29). Coloe argues that the resurrection appearances in Jn 
20 have a liturgical, eucharistic setting and form, Dwelling in the Household of God, 171–81. The seven 
points of connection are these: (1) the day of both gatherings is the Sunday; (2) the disciples gather inside a 
house; (3) the doors are shut; (4) Jesus comes to them; (5) Jesus shows the disciples and Thomas signs of 
the crucifixion; (6) Jesus greets them with ‗peace‘; and (7) there is a response of faith. The first to note this 
connection was John Suggit, ―The Eucharistic Significance of John 20:19–29,‖ Journal of Theology for 
Southern Africa 16 (1976): 52–59.   
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man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to 
him and make our home with him.‖ In the last supper discourse (Jn 14:1–15:17) the 
disciples learn that dwelling with Jesus in God‘s household is going to mean becoming 
true brothers and sisters to Jesus, sharing in the cross and acting out of the same love 
Jesus has shown them. Jesus invites his disciples to abide with him: ―Abide in me, and I 
in you…He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from 
me you can do nothing‖ (Jn 15:4–5). But to abide in Christ is for Christ‘s word to abide 
in the disciple (Jn 15:7), and Christ‘s word is to love. ―This is my commandment, that 
you love one another as I have loved you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man 
lay down his life for his friends‖ (Jn 15:12–13).20  As the response to new life in God‘s 
household was worship, here in the last supper discourse the demand and fruit of 
dwelling in the household of God is radically self-giving love that joins disciples to the 
cross and the resurrection. ―The cross is the new tree of life,‖ writes Coloe, ―where the 
Nazarene Temple-builder creates the Father‘s household as a community of beloved 
disciples.‖21 
 What can be concluded from this domestic framing of John‘s Gospel? What does 
it mean that John uses domestic images and activities (betrothals, weddings, births, 
absences, deaths, rites of welcome, meals, and communal worship) to make sense of who 
Jesus is and what it means to be his disciple? First and most important, we conclude that 
all Christian life is domestic, a participation in the household of God. The domesticity of 
                                                          
20
 See also 1 Jn 2:24, 27, 28: ―Let what you heard from the beginning abide in you. If what you heard from 
the beginning abides in you, then you will abide in the Son and in the Father…But the anointing which you 
received from him abides in you, and you, and you have no need that any one should teach you; as his 
anointing teaches you about everything, and is true, and is no lie, just as it has taught you, abide in him. 
And now, little children, abide in him, so that when he appears we may have confidence and not shrink 
from him in shame at his coming.‖ 
21
 Coloe, Dwelling in the Household of God, 167. 
217 
 
Christian life takes on three forms: (1) the Christian and the Christian community (the 
church) can understand their participation in the household of God as a familial 
householding started by rebirth into that household now and fulfilled in an eschatological 
rebirth into God‘s heavenly kingdom. At the same time, though, we participate in this 
familial householding communally as Christ‘s spouse. These two aspects are contained in 
the mysteries of baptism and the Eucharist. (2) The Christian and the Christian 
community (the church) can take on the domestic moments of John‘s Gospel (e.g., the 
radical hospitality demonstrated by the footwashing; or John the Baptizer‘s role as friend 
of the bridegroom, betrothing people to this marriage and its fruit); (3) the Christian and 
the church are the temple, the dwelling place of God the Father inasmuch as they obey 
the words of the Son by the power of the Spirit, that is, when they love as Jesus loved—
completely and sacrificially. Vowed religious or non-vowed, single or married, Christian 
life is cohabitation with the triune God.  
 
FROM MANOR TO MONASTERY: CONSECRATED RELIGIOUS LIFE 
AS DOMESTIC, FAMILIAL PROJECT IN THE TRADITION 
 
Domestic Language in Early Rules of Life 
 
 In this section I take on a second assumption in the modern narrative of the 
relationship between married life and vowed religious life, namely that there has been a 
uni-directional flow from monastic life to married life throughout Christian history. In 
fact, a look at monastic regulas shows the opposite. The ecclesial principles 
―householding,‖ abiding, and ―domesticity‖ draw together both the married and monastic 
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life.
22
 This section will study the domesticity of vowed religious life in patristic, medieval, 
and modern sources to show the consonance between married and monastic life on the 
domestic ground. In the earliest sources, the use of familial language by the ―Rule of the 
Master,‖ (attributed to Pachomius) is apparent. In the centuries that follow, Benedict uses 
domestic, but less familial language to refine and explain the vowed religious life to his 
own community. Modern evidence of the influence of family on religious life is a trend 
after Vatican II toward greater use of familial language among religious orders.  
 The Rule of the Master, a 6
th
 century precedent to and a primary source for 
Benedict‘s own rule,23 explicitly employs familial language to characterize the way of 
life in the monastery. The Rule of the Master follows late antique understanding of family 
structure, where the abbot is the paterfamilias who delegates his power to subordinates, 
who rule over the household. The Rule of the Master calls the monks ―sons‖ of the abbot, 
and defines their relationship to the abbot in terms of the fourth commandment, as a 
matter of honoring one‘s parents. The abbot, in disciplining, ―must show now the 
harshness of a master, now the affection of a father.‖ Furthermore, he ―will combine in 
himself the characteristics of both parents for all his disciples and sons, by offering them 
equal love as their mother and showing them uniform kindness as their father.‖24 
                                                          
22
 I agree with Breidenthal, who states that ―The Christian tradition has always been quick to distinguish 
marriage from celibacy, and family life from the life of the religious community, but this always assumed 
that both were examples of Christian householding‖ (Christian Households, 43).  
23
 See The Rule of the Master, trans. Luke Eberle (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 73–75. 
Marilyn Dunn, The Emergence of Monasticism: From the Desert Fathers to the Early Middle Ages 
(Malden, MA: Blackewell Publishers, 2000); Timothy Fry, et al., eds., RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict in 
Latin and English with Notes (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1981); Douglas J. McMillan and Kathryn 
Smith Fladenmuller, sel. and intro., Regular Life: Monastic, Canonical, and Mendicant Rules (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997); and Georg Holzherr, ed., The Rule of Benedict: A Guide to 
Christian Living: The Full Text of the Rule in Latin and English (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994). 
24
 Rule of the Master, nos. 25, 30–31, p. 113. Benedict‘s rule uses less father-son language in, even though 
he uses a wisdom-literature style that often employed such tropes. Beginning with the ―Our Father‖ as a 
theme, the Regula Magistri immediately situates the monastic life in the domestic context, saying that ―if 
we have now found our mother the Church and have dared to call the Lord in heaven our father, it is right 
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According to the Rule of the Master, the abbot ―must always remember what he is, 
remember what he is called,‖ namely abbot, or father.25   
 Byzantine monasticism demonstrates the use of familial language throughout its 
tradition, even beyond rules of life, in some vitae.
26
 Specifically, in convents, mother 
superiors use familial, maternal language to describe community‘s relationships. As one 
monastic foundation has it, the mother superior is to care for the nuns ―as a true mother 
looks after her own daughters, and cares for them like her own limbs and organs.‖27 More 
interesting still is the appropriation of the female, familial imagery on the part of male 
monastic communities. The vita of Euthymios the Younger describes a spiritual father 
―who labored to give birth to his disciple through the Bible, who wrapped him in the 
swaddling clothes of prayers and admonitions, and nourished him with the milk of virtue 
and the life-giving bread of divine knowledge.‖28 Not only did the monastery take on this 
familial language, but it also took on familial functions. Monasteries offered what some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that we should leave our earthly father and our mother according to the flesh, lest being subject to both sets 
of parents we not only offend those who are citizens but, if we do not abandon the parents according to the 
flesh, we be considered adulterine offspring‖ (The Rule of the Master, no. 2–3, p. 96). 
25
 Ibid., 32, p. 113. 
26
 See Alace-Mary Talbot, ―The Byzantine Family and the Monastery,‖ Dumbarton Oaks Papers 44 (1990): 
119–29, at 120–23. The essay studies the witness of Byzantine typika (rules of life) to the relationship 
between byzantine biological family and monastery in the 9
th
 to fifteenth century byzantine tradition. 
Talbot finds that the relationships span a wide spectrum: ―They can vary from a rigid denial of all links to 
one‘s biological family to daily contact with relatives‖ (ibid., 127). The conclusion, though, is that 
monasteries‘ relationships to biological family outside the walls and within the walls relates to the founding 
members and their ethos rather than simply the date of founding. Talbot identifies ―aristocratic typika‖ and 
―non-aristocratic typika‖ not linked to date. ―Aristocratic typika were written for monasteries such as 
Kecharitomene, Pantokrator, Lips, and Bebaia Elpis, which are characterized as having lay founders, 
preferential treatment of aristocratic monks or nuns, strong family ties, an emphasis on administration and 
property, and a preference for the cenobitic form of monasticism. ‗Non-aristocratic‘ typika are rules for 
such foundations as Stoudios, Evergetis, Skoteine, and Theotokos Areias, which had monastic founders, 
replaced blood ties with spiritual kinship, emphasized equality of the monks, enjoined strict rules on 
enclosure and renunciation of relatives, and permitted some monks to live as hesychasts‖ (ibid., 128). 
27
 Typikon for convent of Beaia Elpis, ed. H. Delehaye, Deux typica byzantins de l‘époque des Paléologues 
(Brussels: M. Lamertin, 1921), chap. 35, p. 397–98 (quoted in Talbot, ―Byzantine Family and the 
Monastery,‖ 121). 
28
 Vita of Euthymios the Younger, ed. L. Petit, ROC 8 (1903): 169.10–13 (quoted in Talbot, ―Byzantine 
Family and the Monastery,‖ 121).  
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families could not, and monasteries provided a spiritual family where no biological one 
remained. ―Monasteries could offer a secure home for orphans, battered wives, the 
mentally ill, widows and widowers, the elderly.‖29 Despite the attempt and ideal of 
leaving behind the biological family for the spiritual kin, the reality of monastic life 
witnessed to the difficulty of actually dissecting the two completely. Often times, 
members of the same biological family resided in one monastery or in double 
monasteries (which were rare in the East), or biological parents would visit or influence a 
monastery wherein resided their child or children.
30
 At times, monasteries were even 
founded by a biological family.
31
 Connections to families went even as far as this: some 
monasteries included funerary chapels or church narthexes serving as mausolea.
32
 
The most influential rule of life, Benedict of Nursia‘s, takes a step away from the 
heavy use of earthly parental paradigm and language used in Pachomius‘ Rule of the 
Master
33
 in favor of a more spiritual understanding of fatherhood. Benedict‘s rule 
nonetheless characterizes the monastic life as a domestic enterprise, a project of living 
together in the daily tasks of life sustainably and in holiness. Benedict simply emphasizes 
brotherhood and lessens the focus on the abbot‘s fatherhood and status as ―master.‖ 
Dolores Leckey, in The Ordinary Way: A Family Spirituality, contends that Benedict‘s 
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 Ibid., 121. 
30
 Ibid., 123–24. The rule of Theodora, for example, allowed relatives to visit with nuns and allowed the 
nuns to visit their relatives at home provided they were accompanied by two nuns. Earlier, stricter rules 
allowed such visits only if a relative was terminally ill (ibid., 125).  
31
 Ibid., 121–22. 
32
 Ibid.,‖ 124. 
33
 This is a commonly cited distinction between the Rule of the Master and Benedict‘s Rule. See Benedict‘s 
Rule: A Translation and Commentary, trans. Terrence Kardong (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1996), 6; 
and Augustine, The Monastic Rules, trans. Sr. Agatha Mary and Gerald Bonner, The Augustine Series 
(Hyde Park, NY: New City, 2004), 64–65. The Bonner translation and commentary cites the work of 
Adalbert de Vogüé, who emphasizes The Regula Magistri‘s preference for ―vertical relationships‖ and the 
preference in Benedict‘s rule for ―horizontal relationships.‖ As a result, Benedict‘s rule uses less father-son 
language, even though he uses a wisdom literature style that often employed such tropes.  
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project was essentially and explicitly domestic.
34
 He saw his rule as organizing a 
domestic life that would lead to Christian perfection. Laymen of all ages, young to old, 
formed the household, not esoterically, but in ordinary events and rhythms of daily life.
35
 
Benedict‘s rule is ―not so much a treatise on spirituality or a strict regimen, but rather 
more a way of simply being in life, of setting up a household—Benedict‘s household of 
God.‖36 The Benedictine life is a dwelling with God: ―And so, brothers, we have queried 
the Lord about what is required of a dweller in his tent, and we have received the 
teaching about dwelling there. The question is—will we fulfill the duties of an 
inhabitant?‖37 Benedict calls the community to daily response to God through their 
common life.
38
 The way of salvation in the monastery is a quotidian answer to God‘s 
invitation: ―Let us listen with astonished ears to the warning of the divine voice, which 
daily cries out to us: ―Today, if you hear his voice, do not harden your hearts.‖39 This 
Psalm was recited daily in Benedictine monastic life (RB 9.3; 10.10). Thus, ―the Lord 
waits for us to respond by action every day to his holy warnings.‖40 In chapter four of the 
Rule, among the ―tools of good works‖ is the counsel to ―put the commands of God into 
action every day.‖ The ―tools of the spiritual craft,‖ ―if we have wielded them ceaselessly 
                                                          
34
 See Leckey, Ordinary Way, 6, 8. Her goal in writing the book was to ―draw forth and name those 
characteristics of community life that centuries of experience affirm as helpful guideposts on the spiritual 
journey.‖ ―The central focus of this book,‖ she says, is to ―apply Benedict‘s basic patterns to families of 
men, women, and children in different ways and with different styles and tastes in a rapidly changing 
culture.‖ Her project could be, in some ways, a ―monasticization.‖ Her project is related to but distinct from 
my project, which is not to import helpful ideas into a married spirituality but to identify the common 
ground and practices of vowed religious and married life. Breidenthal makes the same assertion (Christian 
Households, 43): ―The Rule of St. Benedict…clearly understands the monastic community as a household.‖ 
35
 Leckey, Ordinary Way, 7. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 RB, Prologue.39; Benedict‘s Rule, 5 (emphasis mine). 
38
 Benedict calls his monks ―cenobites‖ RB, 1.2; Benedict‘s Rule, 34–35. This word derives from the Greek 
―Koinos‖ and ―bios,‖ thus ―common life.‖ 
39
 RB, Prologue.9–prologue.10. Benedict‘s Rule, 3. Interestingly, the Rule of the Master (prologue 36) has 
another ―cotidie‖ (daily) that Benedict removed from his prologue 36. See Benedict‘s Rule, 19. 
40
 RB, Prologue.33; Benedicts Rule, 4. 
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day and night, and returned them on Judgment Day,‖ will win the reward of eternal life.41 
In the prologue, Benedict defines the task of the monk as an effort to grow in holiness 
together through the works of every life constantly responding to God‘s call. 
The body of the Rule contains for the most part practical details and descriptions 
of how this domestic project of training in holiness ought to happen; herein we see that 
the details of the rule order the humdrum tasks of daily life explicitly to the service and 
love of God and neighbor. I will provide here a few of examples. Benedict notes that 
sleeping arrangements should be separate beds in one room rather than separate cells, 
emphasizing the communal nature of this aspect of daily life. Highlighting their need to 
be always ready for the continual task of domestic holiness, Benedict‘s rule commands 
the brothers to ―sleep clothed and girt with belts or cords…so the monks will always be 
on the ready to rise without delay at the signal. They should hasten to beat one another to 
the work of God.‖42 Chapters 23–30 of the rule detail the important task of discipline in 
the community. Even included is a section on the discipline of children. Benedict then 
describes the qualities required for the practical office of cellarer. This brother would be 
responsible for maintaining, organizing, and distributing the community‘s goods. ―He 
should consider the pots of the monastery and all its goods as if they were holy bowls of 
the altar. He must not hold anything as negligible. Let him not be controlled by avarice, 
nor should he waste or dissipate the goods of the monastery. But he should take a 
balanced approach to everything and follow the abbot‘s orders.‖43 Chapter 32 treats the 
monastery‘s tools and goods. Chapter 35 describes the task of serving in the kitchen. As 
with the instructions to the cellarer, the treatment of the everyday items and duties in the 
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 RB 4.75–76; Benedict‘s Rule, 81, 95. 
42
 RB 22.5–6; Benedict‘s Rule, 224, 226. 
43
 RB 31.10–12; Benedict‘s Rule, 258–59. 
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monastery takes on the character of and are ordered explicitly to spiritual growth. ―The 
brothers should serve one another. Therefore no one may be excused from kitchen duty 
except for illness or occupation with an essential task, for thus is merit increased and love 
built up.‖ As part of the weekly cleaning task, ―both the one completing service and the 
one beginning it should wash the feet of all.‖ Furthermore, the serving monks would 
kneel before the others and ask for prayers, as well as invoke God for help, saying ―God, 
come to my assistance; Lord, hasten to help me.‖44 The rule goes on, detailing care for 
the sick in chapter 36, care for the elderly and young in chapter 37, the duties of the 
weekly reader in chapter 38, the amount of food and drink to serve, when to eat, and 
when and what kind of daily manual labor to do (chaps. 39–41, 48). The monastic 
concerns are the concerns of every household, every domestic situation, conjugal or 
otherwise. The monastic tradition is taking on the domestic life and infusing it with a 
divinely ordered pattern, using the language and principles of the early church and the 
gospel to understand what it is we do when we live together and how we ought to solve 
the real, practical problem that arise in common life, that is, in everyone‘s life.   
 We see the same kind of domestic concerns throughout another popular rule of 
the middle ages: St. Augustine‘s rule.45 Augustine emphasizes the realities of life in a 
common household even more than Benedict. While Benedict‘s rule begins with a tone 
and language invoking wisdom literature (―Listen, O my son, to the teachings of your 
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 RB, 35.1–2, 9, 15; Benedict‘s Rule, 289. 
45
 See Augustine of Hippo: The Monastic Rules, 26; and Luc Verheijen, Nouvelle approche de la Regle de 
saint Augustin, Collection spiritualite orientale et vie monastique (Godewaersvelde, France: Editions de 
Bellafontaine, 1980). Augustine‘s rule did not become widely popular until the 12th century. Gerald Bonner 
argues that this is chiefly because Augustine‘s rule was less tied to the notion of stability and, therefore, 
was better adapted to religious families wishing to pursue active life. The textual history of Augustinian 
rules is complex. Four fundamental documents exist that are argued conclusively to have direct connection 
to Augustine: the Ordo Monasterii, the Praeceptum (along with the feminine version of the Praeceptum), 
and the Obiurgatio (letter 211, which is a response to bumptious nuns).  
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master‖),46 Augustine‘s begins with a call to unity imaging that of the apostolic 
community and its concern for all things in common. ―In the first place—and this is the 
very reason for your being gathered together in one—you should live in the house in 
unity of spirit (Ps 67:7[68:8]) and you should have one soul and one heart (Acts 4:32) 
centered on God. And then, you should not call anything your own, but you should have 
everything in common (Acts 4:32).‖47 Not even garments are to be retained for exclusive, 
personal use, but returned to the store daily at the proper time.
48
  
While Augustine‘s rule does not cloister the monks, it provides for permanent 
companionship: ―When you go out, walk together; and when you come to your 
destination, stay together.‖49 Interestingly, the monks worshiped at mass with the rest of 
the diocese at a local parish.
50
 Like Benedict‘s rule, Augustine‘s has less concern for 
―vertical,‖ master-student relationships than he does for ―horizontal,‖ friend-companion 
relationships. This fact has much to do, no doubt, with Augustine‘s own commitment to 
deep friendships. The monastic life begun around his episcopal house developed from his 
experiments with communal life as a young Christian at Cassiciacum. He speaks of 
himself and his friends as Servi Dei (servants of God), a loose term for himself and his 
friends who have committed themselves to Christian discipleship.
51
 Carol Harrison, in a 
short article on friendship, monasticism, and marriage in Augustine, links the friendship 
so central to Augustine‘s monastic community back to his own reading of the friendship 
between Adam and Eve in the garden. For them, one ruled and one obeyed, but only 
                                                          
46
 RB, Prologue.1, Benedict‘s Rule, 3. 
47
 Augustine, Praeceptum, 1.2–3, in The Monastic Rules, 110. 
48
 Ibid., 5.1, in The Monastic Rules, 117. 
49
 Ibid., 4.2, in The Monastic Rules, 114. 
50
 Ibid., 4.6, in The Monastic Rules, 114, 71–72. Bonner comments that their attendance at the local parish 
serves as a reminder that the monastery is association of non-ordained people wherein the presence of a 
priest is the exception.  
51
 Augustine, Confessions, 9.22–25; Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 110–11. 
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because in order to preserve order in any society a leader must be chosen to avoid a clash 
of wills. In Augustine‘s mind, God‘s way of deciding the leader, at least initially, was to 
make one later in time than the first, or to make the later one from the material of the first. 
In Eden, says Augustine, this hierarchy would have been the case, even had God created 
two men.
52
 Ordered society requires an office of leadership, whether permanent or 
temporary. 
As we have seen, the early monastic Rule of the Master, the later Rule of 
Benedict, and the Rule of Augustine adopted in the Middle Ages each concerned 
themselves with questions of how to sanctify the quotidian project of life together. In 
other words, consecrated religious life is domestic and has used language of household, 
father, cellarer, etc. from the world of the households built around married people to 
frame its own patterns of life. The Rules integrated the concerns of domestic life with the 
explicit desire to order those domestic activities toward prayer together and training in 
virtues together, the kind of virtues that help persons live in God‘s kingdom, God‘s 
household. All this has demonstrated that, far from being a unidirectional influence from 
monastic to married life, monastic life has learned much and borrowed much or the 
domestic wisdom from Christian households centered on marriage. 
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 See Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 9.5; On Genesis, 380: ―If it was expedient that one should be in 
charge and the other should comply, to avoid a clash of wills disturbing the peace of the household, such an 
arrangement would have been ensured by one being made first, the other later, especially of the latter were 
created from the former, as the female was in fact created. Or would anyone say that God was only able to 
make a female from the man‘s rib, and not also a male if he so wished?‖ See also De bono coniugali 1.1; 
and Carol Harrison, ―Marriage and Monasticism in St. Augustine: The Bond of Friendship,‖ in Studia 
Patristica 22 (Louvain: Peeters, 1997), 94–99.  
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―Family‖ Language in Modern Consecrated Life 
 
 While the notion of cenobitic life as domestic project is well attested to in ancient 
and medieval sources, we find an increased use of domestic, even familial language to 
describe consecrated life among modern documents of religious orders. For example, as a 
result of reforms following the Second Vatican Council, the Dominican Order changed 
the language it uses to describe the place of lay persons in the mission and charism of the 
order. At the 1974 General Chapter Meeting, the Dominicans did away with the terms 
―first order,‖ ―second order,‖ ―third order secular,‖ or ―tertiaries,‖ and ―third order 
regulars.‖ Instead, they adopted the term ―Dominican Family,‖ as a way to render to all 
these ways of being Dominican an equal dignity and share in the responsibility for the 
mission and charism of the order.
53
 The term ―family‖ is newly employed for the purpose 
reducing the seemingly liminal character of the lay associate to the mission and charism 
of the order. By calling themselves the Dominican Family, the order attempts to assert 
that lay persons forming lay fraternities approved by the order are true and full members 
of a Dominican family; they are not merely partial or tertiary members unable to make 
the full commitment. Lay persons associated in the Dominican family are making the full 
commitment to the mission and charism of the order that is commensurate with their own 
state in life.
54
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 As early as 1968 a new rule of life was created and approved in 1969 on an experimental basis. This rule 
did away with the term ―third order‖ in favor of ―Lay Fraternities of Saint Dominic.‖ This change in 
language was officially legislated in the Acts of the General Chapter of 1974. In 1983 the General Chapter 
in Bologna issued the first official document on ―The Dominican Family.‖ From this point forward, official 
documents use ―Dominican Family‖ to refer to all the persons associated formally with the order.  
54
 The rule of the Dominican Laity states that lay persons ―are incorporated into the Order by a special 
promise according to the statutes proper to them.‖ Further, ―they constitute with other groups of the Order, 
one Dominican Family.‖ ―As members of the Order, they share its apostolic mission by study, prayer and 
preaching according to the state proper to lay persons.‖ Rule of the Lay Fraternities of St. Dominic, nos. 2, 
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Other orders (e.g., the Franciscans) have made similar moves along this trend, 
using ―family‖ as a term that suggests an affective bond of love and cooperation between 
members. We can read in the Rule of life for the Order of Secular Franciscans that the 
Secular Franciscan order ―holds a special place in this family circle.‖ ―The Franciscan 
family, as one among many spiritual families raised up by the Holy Spirit in the Church, 
unites all members of the people of God—laity, religious, and priests—who recognize 
that they are called to follow Christ in the footsteps of Saint Francis of Assisi. In various 
ways and forms but in life-giving union with each other, they intend to make present the 
charism of their common Seraphic Father in the life and mission of the Church.‖55 
 This use of ―family‖ as a big-tent term to include all persons associated with a 
religious order is, of course, a mixed bag. On the one hand it affirms the equal dignity 
and the sharing of responsibility for the charism and mission by all those formally vowed 
into the order. In addition, the use of the term family is typically accompanied by 
descriptions of the common end of the order and the common good sought by the order. 
Both of these uses of ―family‖ align well with the understanding of family as a social unit 
with shared responsibility and benefits that is ordered cooperatively through common 
practices toward a common good and common end.
56
 There is a certain non-voluntary 
character to the family that resonates with religious life. Both religious and spouses 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3, 4, available at 
http://curia.op.org/en/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=41&Itemid=102, accessed on 
February 8, 2011. 
55
 The newest version of the Rule of Life for Secular Franciscan Order includes this familial language. The 
rule is available at http://www.nafra-sfo.org/sforule.html, accessed on February 8, 2011. Additionally, the 
General Constitutions from 2000 also make family language official. See Rule 1: ―Rule 1 There are many 
spiritual families in the Church with different charisms. Among these families, the Franciscan Family, which 
in its various branches recognizes St. Francis of Assisi as its father, inspiration, and model, must be included‖ 
(Secular Franciscan Order, General Constitutions [Rome: National Fraternity of the Secular Franciscan Order, 
2001], available at http://www.nafra-sfo.org/index.html, accessed on February 8, 2011). 
56
 See David Matzko McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home, chap. 4. 
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choose to enter into their particular domestic forms of life that pre-date them, but there is 
much about even one‘s spouse and the religious community that they will not choose and 
would not have chosen. Just as children do not choose their siblings in a conjugal family, 
members of a religious order do not always choose the sisters and brothers with whom 
they live and work. Domestic life must go on, whether in the monastery or in the home, 
regardless of whether or not a particular member of the community finds it easy to love 
her fellow community members any given day.  
The life of the community, if it is a domestic project of householding with God, 
continues not for the sake of the community itself, nor for the sake of the affective bonds 
between the members, but for the sake of the common good and end, the union of each 
and all with God and each other. Likewise, both the family and the religious order have a 
shared common end and a common good—the sanctification of the persons in the 
community and a ministry to those outside the community. The work done for this 
common end together will often create the affective bonds some would posit as 
necessarily prior to and constitutive of the community itself.
57
 One common good that 
both vowed religious and matrimonial families share is training in chastity.
58
 Another 
task common to both the religious ―family‖ and the conjugal family is, as expressions of 
the life of the Church, is ―to bear the story of God from generation to generation, and for 
this reason and in this expansive sense, family is the way of the church. To love with the 
love of God, we are called to live as community, as an embodied interpretation, through 
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and productive relationships. 
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Chastity and the Common Good (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000). 
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time, of the world as the household of God.‖59 The religious family reproduces and 
regenerates and traditions the love of God incarnationally through the quotidian, domestic 
tasks of their ―family‖ life just as the conjugal family‘s daily round must embody their 
cross-bearing, love-building, and disciplined training of each other in holiness. There is 
much, then, to recommend the language of ―family.‖ 
At the same time, though, the language of ―family‖ employed by religious orders 
in contemporary documents unfortunately remains open to the problems of the modern 
understanding of family as ―haven in a heartless world.‖60 Family, in Robert J. 
McAllister‘s account, ―occurs as a spontaneous outgrowth of loving relationships.‖61 
McAllister, a psychologist devoted to study and treatment of vowed religious, argues that 
emotional love is the one vital ingredient to the family community. Once a group 
becomes goal-oriented community it is no longer a family. The family, he argues, does 
not arise from need.
62
 Whether or not he is correct (I believe his characterization is overly 
romantic and inaccurate), McAllister‘s position represents a common narrative of family 
life in twentieth- and now twenty-first century America. Religious communities are 
different from families on McAllister‘s account because communities are formed by 
―definite decisions and practical objectives…they are established because common goals, 
similar beliefs, geographic propinquity, temporal need, or official fiat unite.‖63 McAllister 
warns that vowed religious persons living in community set themselves up for 
disappointment and frustration when they expect the same affective bonds and 
fulfillments from their religious community that they should expect from their family. As 
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a psychologist dedicated to treating consecrated persons, McAllister provides ample 
example of the kinds of problems that manifest in the lives of those entering religious life 
with misguided expectations for a ―family life‖ in their religious community.64 Religious 
communities should not advertise that their community life will ―extend to include a 
sense of intimacy, which it cannot produce, and to promise an atmosphere of affection, 
which it cannot provide.‖ Finally, he counsels that ―religious communities should not 
mistakenly assume that they can proffer to candidates or to professed members a life that 
compares with family life or creates relationships similar to family relationships.‖65  
The use of family in the Franciscan and Dominican documents aligns in places 
with the understanding of family that favors affective bonds and sees the family as a 
privileged, even therapeutic place of emotional fulfillment and personal development. 
While I agree with McAllister that this alignment with a definition of family along 
affective, romantic lines is potentially dangerous, I agree for the opposite reason. I find 
his operative definition of family deficient. Marriages entered for reasons other than 
simply ―falling in love‖ seem to be ruled out as ―family.‖ In McAllister‘s account, 
persons marrying for the explicit purposes of growing in holiness with a particular person 
and raising up saints for Christ, or those who marry for economic benefit, would not 
actually be forming families but rather communities. While I am wary of ―family‖ 
language that overemphasizes affective bonds and reduces the non-voluntary character of 
the family once it has been entered, McAllister embraces this understanding of family as 
essentially a center of mutual affection and fulfillment. I find ―family‖ language 
potentially dangerous for religious communities because it often involves the kind of 
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definitions of ―family‖ McAllister promotes. Reductively emotional family language is 
dangerous when applied to religious life because it is associated with the destructive 
trends of increasing breakdown in modern matrimonial life. If the use of ―family‖ in the 
documents of religious orders leads to a privileging of affective bonds rather than bonds 
of a shared charism and mission, that is, their common good, then these religious orders 
will be destabilized in the same ways as the modern family has been. In adopting a 
preference for ―affective‖ bonds, culture becomes increasingly indifferent to structure, 
since structure is less and less determinative for the definition of ―family‖ in twenty-first 
century culture. In other words, the use of ―family‖ in these documents easily 
corresponds to overly voluntaristic, romantic definitions of family, where family is 
entered for one‘s own fulfillment and abandoned when no longer emotionally 
satisfying.
66
 ―Religious life is intrinsically communitarian,‖ writes Schneiders, ―but it 
does not exist to provide a surrogate family, social rehabilitation, psychological 
therapy.‖67 Too many people are joining religious orders for ―community:‖ ―an expressed 
desire for community today, however sincere, does not necessarily imply an outward 
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 Sandra Schneiders develops a similar insight. She employs as evidence the largely unhappy lives of 
consecrated celibates who entered or seek entrance to religious life for the sake of ―community‖ as an end 
in itself. She hopes to maintain a distinct identity for consecrated life. ―This particular lifestyle…creates a 
particular kind of community that is distinct from that of family life or householding. And it has a special 
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consecrated life, not household life. If she were writing a ―new context for family and householding life‖ I 
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orientation toward the love of others in love,‖ which is necessary for religious vocation.68 
In their charitable desire to embrace the world, this new use of ―family‖ vocabulary may 
in fact leave some religious orders open to the same debilitating effects of the modern 
destabilization of family life in general. 
 
CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS OF CHRISTIAN HOUSEHOLDING 
 
Principles and Practices 
 
John‘s Gospel has suggested the domesticity of all Christian life, that being 
church is the practice of cohabiting with God and being incorporated into his family by 
marriage and birth. Additionally the tradition of the rules of life has shown an ever 
increasing use of domestic, even familial language to understand the identity, mission, 
and practices of householding with God and each other. Modern scholars, too, have 
pondered how both religious and married persons might participate in the one practice of 
householding with God. In this section I will analyze and critique the work of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer,
69
 Thomas Breidenthal,
70
 Jana M. Bennett,
71
 Dolores Leckey,
72
 and Wendy 
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 Thomas E. Breidenthal, Christian Households: The Sanctification of Nearness (Cambridge: Cowley, 
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 Jana Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood; and Bennett, "Mark 8: Support for Celibate Singles 
Alongside Monogamous Married Couples and Their Children," School(s) of Conversion: 12 Marks of a 
New Monasticism (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2005), 112-123. Bennett writes on the 8
th
 Mark of the new 
monasticism, but the twelve marks are as follows: (1) relocation to the abandoned places of Empire; (2) 
sharing economic resources with fellow community members and the needy among us; (3) hospitality to 
the stranger; (4) lament for racial divisions within the church and our communities combined with the 
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Wright,
73
 all of whom have experienced, studied, and written on the practices of common 
life, specifically those that can unite vowed religious and married people. Rather than 
walking through the individual writings of each author, I will offer below a thematic 
analysis of the principles and practices commonly held by the authors. While there are 
marked differences between the authors (e.g., Bonhoeffer is Lutheran, Breidenthal 
Episcopal, and Bennett Catholic), and much must be left out, their common ground is 
wide enough for me to draw together their thought around certain themes. After the 
analysis I will offer a critique of specific authors and positions. 
First, the term ―Christian householding‖ needs definition. According to Thomas 
Breidenthal: ―Broadly speaking, a household is two or more people sharing the daily 
round of life to a significant degree and over a period of time, whether the sharing is 
freely chosen or not.‖74 The fact of householding, though, is nearly universal at some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
active pursuit of a just reconciliation; (5) humble submission to Christ‘s body, the church; (6) intentional 
formation in the way of Christ and the rule of the community along the lines of the old novitiate; (7) 
nurturing common life among members of intentional community; (8) support for celibate singles alongside 
monogamous married couples and their children; (9) geographical proximity to community members who 
share a common rule of life; (10) care for the plot of God‘s earth given to us along with support of our local 
economies; (11) peacemaking in the midst of violence and conflict resolution within communities along the 
lines of Matthew 18; (12) commitment to a disciplined contemplative life. Available at 
http://www.newmonasticism.org/12marks.php (accessed on 18 October, 2010). 
72
 Dolores Leckey, The Ordinary Way. Leckey‘s thesis is ―that the monastic dynamics of ordinary living 
were a framework for experiencing God in family life‖ (ibid., 93). She structures the book around 9 
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ability to work; (7) study, continuing to understand and enhance our commitments; (8) stability, foundation 
of the family; and (9) hospitality, a rhythm of receiving and reaching in solidarity. 
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 Wendy Wright, Sacred Dwelling: A Spirituality of Family Life (New York: Crossroad, 1989). 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 2. I wish to point out two strengths of this definition: (1) it is 
intentionally loose enough to include monastic communities, married life, celibate persons, and even mixed 
communities of married and celibate persons. The definition does not somehow privilege nuclear families, 
as if they have the market cornered on domesticity. Marriage is but one form of householding among three 
general types: marriage, monasticism, and all variations of single life. He includes marriage not because of 
its social function (which seems increasingly minimal), nor because of its status as a romantic center, nor 
even ―as an institution subordinated to the claims of social (including ecclesiastical) continuity.‖ Instead, 
marriage is included in the definition of ―householding‖ because it is ―a form of life together which, like all 
Christian life together, cannot unlock its particular goods until we have determined what Christians suppose 
the purpose of any kind of life together to be‖ (ibid., 4). (2) The definition frames householding in terms of 
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point in every person‘s life. The question at hand is to identify explicitly ―Christian‖ 
householding. One may name this project ―Christian‖ if it fits certain criteria: principles, 
motivation, end, shared doctrinal beliefs, or particular practices, for example. All the 
authors studied are concerned to identify those criteria. Among the authors listed, Dolores 
Leckey and Wendy Wright concern themselves mainly with finding ways that monastic 
life (understood as a domestic project) can be applicable to the conjugal household while 
Bonhoeffer, Breidenthal, and Bennett intend to schematize forms of common life that 
could be taken up by diverse groups of people (including vowed or non-vowed celibate 
persons, married persons and their children, or even a combination of married and 
celibate persons). 
Bennett is most explicit about the variety of forms Christian householding can 
take. ―If we do truly believe that water is thicker than blood [baptism is stronger than 
biological kinship], it is also necessary to question the assumption that only those with 
specific blood ties ought to be living together.‖75 Since she takes the position that married 
and non-married ways of life are complementary, then it follows that married need the 
celibate single and the celibate need the married in real and practical ways. Integrating 
single celibates with married Christians in one living situation allows for a fuller sharing 
of prayer and apostolate, and a more direct witness and accountability between the two. A 
recent movement called the New Monasticism has attempted this sort of living, with rules 
                                                                                                                                                                             
practice rather than affect. The household is not, on Breidenthal‘s account, a group of people bound by 
mutual affection, but by the kinds of things that they do together. Breidenthal is free to note, therefore, that 
householding is for most people not a matter of choice. For example, no child chooses his parents and, for 
that matter, the child always comes to the parent as a stranger, a beggar. A household is comprised of a 
―broad range of living arrangements, from the partnership of people who share shelter, sleep, sex, food, 
childrearing, financial resources and so forth, to communities on the monastic model, to people who live 
alone but whose daily life is a rich weave of shared meals, hospitality, deep attachments, and daily care for 
others, or whose solitude is heavy with the remembered presence of the dead‖ (ibid., 2). 
75
 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 185. 
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of life for each community, with twelve general marks characterizing the new monastic 
project.
76
 The New Monasticism attempts to bring diverse forms of Christian community 
to the abandoned places of the Western society.  
If Christian householding is a participation in the church, then the gathering 
around the household table ought to reflect the gathering around the Eucharistic table. 
Christians need each other to learn how to live in love together.
77
 The source and summit 
of this life together is the eucharistic meal, where all Christians unite to receive and 
become the very body and blood of Christ.
78
 Both married and consecrated religious have 
come together at the eucharistic table for as long as both have been practiced. The altar 
where all sacrifices become united in the one Christ broken for all ought to be imaged in 
the common table where Christians receive and break in thanksgiving our daily bread. A 
common life among those Christians related through baptism rather than blood provides a 
living expression of our mutual dependence and our radical reunderstanding of ―family‖ 
once we have been reborn and adopted into brotherhood and sisterhood with Christ.    
Having in mind the kinds of communities these scholars envision, we can now 
move on to the principles and practices of Christian life in community shared by these 
authors. Inevitably, these practices relate to each other by a dynamic tension, or polarity. 
But this tension does not, must not, mean choosing only one or the other. It is the tension 
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 Some of these communities are Catholic worker houses, communities founded during the 60‘s (Reba 
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and the polarity that make the practices and principles solid footing for Christian 
householding. The tension insures against destructive extremes in either direction.
79
 In 
treating the various principles and practices below, we will note the polar interactions 
between them. I will identify four sets of principles in polar tension. First, the 
intentionality of Christian householding goes hand in hand with the supravoluntary, given 
nature of householding itself. Second, the nearness, availability, familiarity, and 
vulnerability of inhabiting a space and sharing daily activities with other people stands in 
a proper tension with the formal, ritual, patterned, even liturgical elements of the 
Christian household. Third, the exclusivity of the Christian household, especially the 
sexual exclusivity of the conjugal household requires a polar tension with openness, and 
permeability. Finally, the ora of the Christian household must always be directed to and 
energize the labora of the community for those within and without its borders. Without 
tension, principles and practices risk losing vigor or becoming overbearing. Proper 
tension helps to ensure that each principle and practice is employed as a strong push or 
pull.  
Above all, Christian householding appears under the complementary principles of 
intentionality and given-ness or stability. There is a sense in which Christian life together 
must be chosen, willed with a firm conviction about the specific project entered. At the 
same time, though, Christian householding always surpasses our own ability to choose, 
and often times countermands our own willing. Dietrich Bonhoeffer is especially clear on 
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this point—Christian life together is not about finding ―the community we‘ve always 
wanted.‖ Christian life together is not about finding a cadre of people who like each other 
and want to live together for community‘s sake. In fact, it is quite the opposite. ―Jesus 
lived among his foes,‖ writes Bonhoeffer. ―The kingdom,‖ he continues, ―is to be in the 
midst of your enemies. And he who will not suffer this does not want to be of the 
kingdom of Christ; he wants to be among friends, to sit among roses and lilies, not with 
the bad people but the devout people. O you blasphemers and betrayers of Christ. If 
Christ had done what you are doing who would ever have been spared?‖80 Whenever 
Christians can say with the Psalmist, ―Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for 
brethren to dwell together in unity!‖ then he knows the privilege he is experiencing is the 
exception to the rule of life together.
81
 But to hold out for this dream as the norm is to 
betray what Christ has done in the Incarnation. ―He who loves his dream of a community 
more than the Christian community itself becomes a destroyer of the latter, even though 
his personal intentions may be ever so honest and earnest and sacrificial.‖82 
Not only is Christian householding sometimes contrary to what we would like or 
will or hope to experience, but even when it aligns with our will, it does so in an 
excessive way. For example, when two people marry, they choose to make an 
unbreakable covenant. The ramifications of that choice, though, and even the direct 
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like a dream. God is not a God of the emotions but the God of truth‖ (ibid., 27). Bennett makes a similar 
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object of the choice, always remain mystery. No person can ever completely know 
another, especially since we are historically contingent, ever-changing beings. We know 
that when we receive our spouse in matrimony, we receive a book half-written and as yet 
unread. Furthermore, the couple welcoming and hoping for children is welcoming a 
mystery, welcoming a stranger, an alien, a naked and begging, and homeless infant: 
―Children are strangers by nature, because they come into the picture as if out of 
nowhere.‖83 At the same time, those ―we thought we knew well become unfamiliar when 
they are filled with the pain of mental or physical illness.‖84 Furthermore, when 
Christians choose to open their home to the stranger, their expectations may be shattered, 
often for better consequence than they had originally hoped.
85
 Schneiders and McAllister 
want to downplay the all-importance of choice in Christian community. It must also be 
remembered that not every person in a Christian household may have chosen to be there. 
Children, for example, do not choose their parents, or their siblings, or any of the 
members in their home. Likewise, monks profess vows in a particular religious institute 
and a specific community within that institute, but they did not elect the members of that 
community. Wendy Wright, on the other hand attempts to distinguish between monastic 
and conjugal Christian communities on the basis of choice. She criticizes the notion that 
the monastery is a place where a monk ―creates an intentional family‖ because she finds 
it far more a matter of choice than familial belonging.
86
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Ultimately, the common element behind the tension involving choice in Christian 
householding is the claim that true Christian community must be received as gift. We 
cannot demand community, only receive it gratefully. ―The very hour of our 
disillusionment with [our] brother becomes incomparably salutary because it so 
thoroughly teaches me that neither of us can ever live by our own words and deed, but 
only by that one Word and Deed which really binds us together, the forgiveness of sins in 
Jesus Christ.‖87 Christian householding, then, must be intentional, that is, it must be 
hoped for and desired; Christian householding, though, may only be desired as gift, as a 
grace, as better than what we in fact wanted both in principle and practice. 
As an expression of the relationship between intentionality and given-ness, 
Christian households commit to stability amidst the unanticipated events and 
contingencies of life. Whether or not Christians enter projects of householding 
temporarily or permanently, they benefit from a commitment to stability. Breidenthal 
succinctly notes the necessity of stability in married and non-vowed Christian 
householding. In marriage, the kind of openness and vulnerability spouses have with one 
another (e.g., economic, emotional, sexual) necessitates permanence and stability to 
prevent major damage to either spouse.
88
 In religious life, the vow of stability is not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
while the spouses can elect to be open to new members, neither they nor the existing members of the family 
have much say in what that new member will be like (this assumes the couple is not using genetic 
manipulation now available through in vitro fertilization).  
87
 Bonhoeffer, Life Together, 28. 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Householding, 105–107.  The demand of permanence in marriage has a long 
history in the Catholic Church. Arguments have shifted from the nature of the marriage bond, to the 
requirements of parenthood, to the nature of married love, to anthropological and Christological grounds. 
For Augustine, the permanence is demanded on account of Scriptural command (De bono coniugali 7) and 
the sacramentum, or signifying character of the marriage. As an image of Christ‘s union to the Church and 
our Christian unity in God‘s kingdom, it is impossible for the consummated marriage between Christians to 
be dissolved by any human power; the bond ends at death of one party. (See De bono coniugali 18, 24.) For 
Aquinas, the demands of educating and caring for the child, and the sacramental character of the marriage 
bond as a sign that makes present the bond of Christ to Church, both demand that the marriage commitment 
be permanent (See Summa theologiae, supplementum, q.67, art.1, response, and reply to objection 2). In 
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principally given by one individual to another individual, but permanence and stability 
are owed by a person to the community and the rule.
89
 Stability is a continuity of place 
and practices or rituals.
90
 According to Leckey, stability in Christian householding, apart 
from vowed religious life, is required for a similar reason. Those entering it must realize 
the fact that their every action forever has wide and permanent consequences for those 
with whom they share life. The practice and principle of stability, or permanence, is an 
important medicine for short attention spans and the ever-driving force of the market 
asking us to seek and consume more and more, newer products, and newer persons. 
Leckey argues that stability ―unmasks our temptations to flee people, work, and love.‖ 91  
Those living in the Christian household do well to realize the power of place: ―by 
this vow the monk is reminded that he need not travel across the face of the earth to find 
God.‖92 Rather, in permanent commitment to a particular community we make total 
acceptance of God‘s plan that we ―be inserted in to the mystery of Christ through this 
particular family and no other.‖93 For those in Christian households (married and 
religious), the gift of stability is the peace of accepting God‘s promise that we can seek 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20
th
 century theology, especially in Vatican II‘s Gaudium et spes and Paul VI‘s Humanae vitae, the Church 
began to articulate the permanence of the marriage bond because of the spouse complete and total gift of 
self to one another in love. The quality of marriage as a covenant and partnership of the whole of life rooted 
in conjugal love is what demands and inherently creates the permanent bond (see GS, 50; and CIC, 1055, 
1056; and FC, 11, 20). 
89
 See Breidenthal, Christian Households, 99. ―Like marriage,‖ writes Breidenthal, ―the monastic rule 
invites us to share what is most our own, yet it invites us to share this not with one primary partner, but 
with a larger (though clearly defined) group. In both forms of householding, the body is given over, in 
differing though equally unsparing ways, in the hope that the soul will follow.‖ 
90
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91
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religious life. There is never a time when the consequences of a person‘s action are limited to themselves. 
They always affect those with whom we share life because we always share life with others. 
92
 Ibid., 119–121. 
93
 Ibid. 
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and find God with this person or that family.
94
 As we recall from the section above, 
though, seeking and finding God with this person of family is more often harder than 
easier. It is perhaps in these moments especially when we must rely on or discover the 
fact that ―God‘s stability is found in ever expanding boundaries of community and that 
the bonds of baptism are as real as the bonds of marriage or blood.‖95       
At the same time, though, Christian householding is not always stable. Fracture 
attacks Christian households through the many contingencies of life. The brokenness of 
life manifests itself either in moral failure (e.g., infidelity or lack of perseverance in a 
religious vow) or historical accident (e.g., death, reassignment, loss of a job, sickness, 
etc.). The response to these fractures and commitments to stability is, in Leckey‘s mind, 
the same virtue needed to develop permanence at all: perseverance.
96
 In terms of cardinal 
virtues, one might say fortitude. Perseverance is the continuing commitment to live 
honestly and completely the way of life of the community, despite the inevitable failings 
we encounter therein.
97
  
While breakdown in the ecclesial practice of Christian householding is a fact 
generally brought on by a failure of multiple parties, Bonhoeffer leaves room for 
responsible dissolution of Christian householding. He writes:  
                                                          
94
 Ibid., 119–20. I am not comfortable with her implicit claim here that permanence in marriage is a 
commitment to this one person while permanence in religious life is a commitment to this community. 
McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home, is at pains to highlight the need for a return to ―place‖ in marriage 
and family. His goal in the book is to once again find a way to give sex and love a stable location. His 
answer is to grab sex and love from the winds of market capitalism‘s logic of consumption and plant them 
back in the home, but only a home contextualized within the Church. 
95
 Ibid., 127. McCarthy (Sex and Love in the Home, chap. 5); and Bennett (Water is Thicker than Blood, 
181–85) share Leckey‘s strong claim for the ecclesial bonds of persons in Christian community. We must 
find ways to depend on, even need, people in our local parishes if this understanding of stability is to be 
true.  
96
 Leckey, Ordinary Way, 122–24. 
97
 Ibid., 123. 
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Where Christ bids me to maintain fellowship for the sake of love, I will maintain 
it. Where his truth enjoins me to dissolve a fellowship for love‘s sake, there I will 
dissolve it, despite all the protests of my human love. Because spiritual love does 
not desire but rather serves, it loves an enemy as a brother.
98
  
 
The question of dissolving Christian householding is complicated, but the authors all 
assume that situations are possible wherein breakdown might be for the good. It is 
important to keep in mind, though, that dissolution here is of complex households not 
joined permanently by an ontological bond such as the bond of matrimony. These authors 
are speaking about households that may be composed of a group of non-vowed non-
married persons, or a group of married persons and non-married or religious persons 
living in one place. These forms of domestic life may change or dissolve as the 
community discerns new directions on ministry, or for some other reason part of the 
membership is relocated due to a new job. 
The question that confronts so many attempting to live in Christian households is 
this: where can stability be found amidst failures and misfortunes? Leckey suggests the 
cross of Christ and the wider ecclesial, social community, as of primary importance.
99
 
She gives the example of St. Catherine of Genoa, whose husband repeatedly broke faith 
in their Christian householding, yet St. Catherine continually forgave her husband, even 
paying off debts he had incurred through vice. Eventually she and he went on to lives of 
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 Bonhoeffer, Life Together, 35. Bonhoeffer makes the strong distinction between human love and divine 
love with respect to their attitude toward Christian community. Human springs from and has the nature of 
desire—desire for human community—and will tyrannically hold on to that community. Spiritual love 
starts when human love stops: at the point when it looks like the desire will not be fulfilled (ibid., 35). I am 
disposed to find a greater connection between human and spiritual love than Bonhoeffer, especially in light 
of GS, 48–49, which claim that conjugal ―love is an eminently human one since it is directed from one 
person to another through an affection of the will; it involves the good of the whole person, and therefore 
can enrich the expressions of the body and mind with a unique dignity, ennobling these expressions as 
special ingredients and signs of the friendship distinctive of marriage‖ (GS, 49). Furthermore, this 
―authentic married love is caught up into divine love and is governed and enriched by Christ‘s redeeming 
power and the saving activity of the Church‖ (GS, 48). Human love is distinct from divine love, but never 
disconnected from it or counterposed to it as if one were over against the other, especially in the sacrament 
of conjugal love. On this point my assessment differs from Bonhoeffer‘s. 
99
 Leckey, Ordinary Way, 127. 
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serving the poor and sick in their city.
100
 John Paul II has explored this topic as well. 
Despite the fact that many modern scholars have criticized him for what can be seen as 
his potentially discouraging or alienating emphasis on the ideal of married life rather than 
its ―reality,‖101 John Paul II actually approached the difficult realities of marriage from a 
popular direction. As Karol Wojtyla, he wrote a drama titled The Jeweler‘s Shop, which 
dealt with marriages both smooth and difficult, brokenness and reconciliation, jealousy 
and coldness, joy and resentment. His psychological and theological depth allows the 
audience to see the true stability in marriage is the love of Christ which is always present 
to reconcile, take up, and transform the love of the spouses.
102
 
In the practice of stability, Christian households necessarily encounter the next 
pair of polar householding principles in Christian community: familiarity and formality. 
At the bottom of the relationship between familiarity and formality is the principle of 
―radical availability,‖ or our susceptibility to nearness, ―a condition of accessibility to 
                                                          
100
 Ibid., 124. The insight that we encounter God in the brokenness of the world around us, often in the 
imperfections of Christian community is made by Florence Caffrey Bourg (Where Two or Three Are 
Gathered, 118).  
101
 See, e.g., Christina Traina, ―Papal Ideals, Marital Realities: One View from the Ground,‖ in Sexual 
Diversity and Catholicism: of Moral Theology, ed. Patricia Beattie Jung with Andrew Coray (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical, 2001), 269–88. 
102
 John Paul II, The Jeweler‘s Shop: A Meditation on the Sacrament of Matrimony Passing on Occasion 
into a Drama, trans. Boleslaw Taborski (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1992). Interestingly, John Paul II‘s 
insight on the true stability of marriage sometimes found only in the midst of its challenges and fractures 
take us back to the first section on given-ness and intention. It is precisely because the sacrament of 
marriage so exceeds what we could have willed that it has stability; in the sacrament of marriage God acts 
with and through the consenting couple to do more than they could have asked for. St. Paul writes in 
Ephesians 3:14: ―For this reason I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and 
on earth is named, that according to the riches of his glory he may grant you to be strengthened with might 
through his Spirit in the inner man, and that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; that you, being 
rooted and grounded in love, may have power to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and 
length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, that you may be 
filled with the fullness of God. Now to him who by the power at work within us is able to do far more 
abundantly than all that we ask or thing, to him be glory in the church and in Christ Jesus to all generations, 
for ever and ever. Amen.‖  
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others which cannot be chosen because it can never be successfully refused.‖103 Among 
the scholars in question, Breidenthal has done the most to explore these categories. He 
asks the question: Why do Christians live together? Salvation, the Church, The Trinity, 
and the human person are all social realities. We live together because we cannot live 
otherwise.
104
 Again, it is not a question of whether we hold house together, but what kind 
of householding will we enact? Just as Christ did, we experience life as a sanctification 
(or rejection) of unavoidable nearness. Jesus experienced this kind of nearness. From the 
woman at the well (Jn 4), to the Syrophoenician woman (Mt 15:21–28; Mk 7:24–30), to 
the woman who grabs his clothes (Mk 5:24–34), to the crowd of his townsfolk clamoring 
to throw him from the cliff (Lk 4:14–30), to the crowd forcing him into the boat (Lk 5:1–
3), to the crowd filling the house so that people stood outside to listen (Mt 12:46–50; and 
pars.), to the five thousand who sat, listened, and ate with him (Jn 6 and pars.), people 
compel Jesus to act by being physically present. Their very proximity held a claim on 
him. In our own householding it is this nearness, often nonvoluntary and intrusive, that 
                                                          
103
 Breidenthal is aware of Gabriel Marcel‘s term ―disponibilité.‖ A difference between the two notions of 
availability is in the matter of the will. For Marcel, ―disponibilité‖ is an attitude of availability to be chosen, 
whereas for Breidenthal we cannot avoid our availability (Breidenthal, Christian Households, 32). 
104
 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 20. Leckey‘s version of the ―familiarity‖ and ―nearness‖ is 
―intimacy.‖ Like Breidenthal, she gives a biblical, narrative account of God‘s intimacy with his people. 
Genesis begins with the question of seeking, finding, and being sought by or hiding from intimacy with 
God. Human‘s intimacy with God (a cycle of being sought, seeking, being found, embracing, and rejecting) 
is a story of God‘s revelation of Godself to us and of ourselves to us. Intimacy with God is costly to 
humans, and demanding. Finally, it is costly to God, as God himself enters history to show what the highest 
intimacy with him looks like, We are shown that to be one with and love God we must lose ourselves and 
find God in the neighbor. This kind of intimacy, a being present and knowing one another in love was 
practiced in the early Church as witnessed to by Acts (Ordinary Way, 10–13) . For Leckey, intimacy ought 
not to be reduced to sexuality. She uses the friendship of the spouses, the relationship of parent to child, 
and an openness to relationships outside the home (e.g., with neighbors, the poor) as examples of intimacy 
(ibid., 21–31). 
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provides the rough reminder of our calling to love and forces us to either grow in that 
love or reject it.
105
 
 Nearness cannot be avoided and it cannot be made safe. Nearness is an occasion 
of grace, as when one spouse nurses another back to health. But nearness is also an 
occasion of the cross, as in the case of marital abuse or coldness. The dialectical tension 
of Christian householding comes in the fact that the nearness of grace always depends on 
the nearness of the cross. Attempting to insulate Christian householding from the cross 
inevitably insulates household from the nearness of grace. The less we allow ourselves to 
need each other, the less we experience the grace of receiving aid. At the same time, the 
less we allow ourselves to need each other, the less we can be let down or injured—the 
less we experience the cross and give mercy.
106
 The patriarchal family and radical 
individualism are both attempts to hide from our availability.
107
 Our refusal to hide from 
availability to the neighbor, our willingness to embrace nearness to others comes from a 
nearness to Christ, the kind of nearness ironically rejected by those living near Jesus in 
his own home town (Lk 414–28; Mt 13:53–58; and Mk 6:1–6). Ongoing Christian life 
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 As Breidenthal writes, ―Nearness is never something we choose, any more than connection to another is 
something we can choose.‖ Furthermore, ―If we resist our connection, then an encounter with the neighbor 
is likely to seem like an assault, an interruption, or a detour,‖ (Christian Households, 23, 24). 
106
 Bonhoeffer emphasizes the need for practices of confession within Christian householding. If we do not 
make confession and reconciliation a common practice, we live with the lie that we are a pious fellowship 
and we will be shocked when we find a real sinner among the ―righteous.‖ ―We cannot find the Cross of 
Jesus if we shrink from going to the place where it is to be found, namely, the public death of the 
sinner…Where sin is hated, admitted, and forgiven, there the break with the past is made‖ (Life Together, 
114–15). Furthermore, this confession must happen  between persons rather than in an unmediated manner 
between God and the individual. Confessing solely to God is so easy because it is ―living on self-
forgiveness and not a real forgiveness‖ (ibid., 116). Bonhoeffer does not have the Catholic sacrament of 
penance in mind here, but rather a confession among members of the household. His insights hold true for 
the sacrament, though. Additionally, practicing confession in the Catholic Christian household has the same 
great benefit that it would in any other Christian household. It is the reconciliation reached through 
confession that prepares us for true communion with our fellow householders, the wider church, and 
ultimately with Christ in the Eucharist (Life Together, 121–22). 
107
 About the ways that individualism and patriarchy avoid nearness. For example, a father who comes 
home and declares his need to relax in front of the TV without being bothered by the children, or without 
domestic duties, is attempting to avoid nearness.  
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together in the household is a compilation of events of nearness: waking, dressing, meals, 
washing, prayers, play, study, work, and more. Christian householding ―takes these 
occasions of nearness and, as it were, stretches them out, so that we come to life in the 
constant knowledge of our extreme availability to one another, as persons who are in 
each other‘s power.‖108  
 In Breidenthal‘s thought, this task of Christian householding maintains a 
dialectical tension between ―familiarity‖ on the one hand, and ―universality‖ (or formality) 
on the other.
109
 Every form of Christian householding fits somewhere on the pole 
between the formality of the church as public, universal gathering, and the familiarity of 
the home as a place of nearness and vulnerability.
110
 At the institutional level, the 
representatives of this distinction are the married household (familiarity) and the Church 
(universality).
111
 Christian householding, then, exists in dialectical tension with ―Church.‖ 
Breidenthal is quick to point up the distinction, which he rhetorically emphasizes: ―The 
Church‘s claim to universality is a necessary check to our tendency to let familiarity be 
an excuse for insularity, exclusivity, and bigotry. Familiarity must be balanced by a 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 35. 
109
 For Breidenthal, ―familiarity‖ must be distinguished from ―nearness.‖ Familiarity is the knowledge 
about a person that comes from living in a household with that person, a knowledge of idiosyncrasies, 
foibles, and particularities. It is an informality that amounts almost to a taking for granted. On the other 
hand, ―nearness‖ is a term that means an acceptance of each other person‘s demand on me by the fact of 
their physical proximity, a demand grounded in our common origin and destiny, and the example of 
Christ‘s incarnation. Nearness does not necessitate familiarity. It can be experienced in a more formal, 
universal setting such as a Eucharistic liturgy, or in a familiar setting such as a household dinner.   
110
 For Breidenthal, religious communities live out the Church‘s commitment to universality and inclusivity, 
but they also involve a great deal of in-house familiarity. ―The monastic life is life together with a 
maximum of space between all fellow householders‖ (Christian Households, 43). On the other hand, the 
Christian household centered on conjugal love minimizes the distance between the members, because the 
nearness that is sanctified  (sexual, physical nearness) is so tied up with emotion and vulnerability. ―This 
extreme availability, which is death-dealing in the context of sin, is life-giving when it occurs in Christ‖ 
(ibid., 49). 
111
 Jesus came to sanctify the nearness present in both familiarity and formality. Familiarity is not enough 
for true understanding between persons. Jesus‘ own life witnesses to as much. The disciples often do not 
understand Jesus, and Jesus‘ own hometown people find him too familiar to draw near to him and his 
message. On the other hand, strangers such as the woman with the hemorrhage, the Syrophoenician woman, 
and the woman at the well draw near to Jesus despite their lack of familiarity with him. 
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genuine welcome to the stranger, even if the stranger does not wish to be made into a 
friend. The church in its essence is always city, it is never hearth.‖112  
Breidenthal‘s concern is to distinguish ultimate, eschatological reality from 
earthly, provisional society. In the kingdom of God, eschatologically speaking, we will 
love each person with the same familiarity and affective power that people often have for 
those in their own households. But here on earth, such familiarity at a large scale would 
be untenable. Christian households are necessary as ―spiritual workplace,‖ as training 
ground for the kind of familiarity we will have in heaven but which would be dangerous 
on earth. Therefore, where ―church‖ refers to the public worship and communal activities 
of people who may or may not live together, it requires a certain amount of formality, 
enough so that the stranger is welcomed.
113
 For example, on Breidenthal‘s reading of 1 
Cor 11, Paul sees the Eucharist as a public, formal rite, not a household dinner. ―Church 
is not essentially a household marked by familiarities, but a mystery where there are not 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 14. Bonhoeffer, too, recognizes the tension between the familiarity 
of a Christian community and the formality of universality of the wider church. For Bonhoeffer, though, 
this tension is more of a contrary than contradictory nature. If the Christian householding community‘s 
familiarity ever secludes it institutionally or attitudinally from the wider church, the community has already 
failed. ―Life together under the Word will remain sound and healthy only where it does not form itself into 
a movement, an order, a society, a colloquium pietatis, but rather where it understands itself as being a part 
of the one, holy, catholic, Christian Church‖ (Bonhoeffer, Life together, 37). This strong claim appears to 
pose a challenge to the Catholic practice of forming associations of lay faithful and religious and secular 
institutes of consecrated life. I believe, however, that his clearly Augustinian insight here relates to a central 
point of this dissertation (recall chapter 3 and the ―church within a church‖ problem of the Montanists, 
Donatists, and Pelagians). Any project of Christian householding, whether conjugal or consecrated or both, 
exists first within the context of the Church and, therefore, shares first and foremost in the goods and 
practices of being church. Any practice of Christian householding must be assessed on the criteria of its 
contribution to and fittingness within the ecclesial context. Bonhoeffer‘s insight aligns with this claim; 
being church and practicing Christian householding is not about being with the people you share every 
common interest with, but being with the people you happen to be with. ―Every principle of selection and 
every separation connected with it that is not necessitated quite objectively by common work, local 
connections, or family connections, is of the greatest danger to a Christian community‖ (Ibid., 37).  
113
 It may be counterintuitive to some that a certain amount of formality makes a stranger welcome. A 
certain, open and accessible formality, though, invites the outsider into the patterns and rhythms of the 
community plainly and clearly. One does not become a member of the community by achieving a special, 
close, or exclusive friendship with any parishioner but by joining oneself to the others present in the same 
act of worship, incorporating oneself into the same mystery.  
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outsiders and no insiders.‖ In our provisional ecclesial communities awaiting the 
consummation of God‘s kingdom, we offer the Eucharist until the Lord‘s return. In our 
fallen state, nearness must be re-sanctified, and therefore requires some exclusivity and 
training. Christian householding is the practice of this training. ―The household 
accomplishes the sanctification of nearness which the church cannot, as a public 
gathering, accomplish, but which finally only the church can fully reveal. Thus, each 
Christian household is a mirror to the whole church of the church‘s corporate destiny;‖114 
at the same time, the church as public gathering always pulls the household away from 
the insular familiarity. The household, as a ―little church,‖ participates and requires 
practices of universality and openness to the stranger not typically associated with the 
family hearth.  
While the practice of householding should be a familiar embrace and 
sanctification of our nearness, households (Christian and otherwise) must decide whose 
nearness they will embrace. Who is part of the household and who is not? Who shares 
responsibility for its charism and mission, and who is a temporary participant or guest? 
Thus the next two principles of exclusivity and permeability address this point. The kinds 
of Christian households envisioned by Breidenthal,
115
 Bennett,
116
 and Bonhoeffer
117
 have 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 15. I find Breidenthal‘s distinction between household and church 
too strong, and will revisit this fact in the critique section. 
115
 Ibid., chap. 6. Breidenthal does not explicitly describe a vision of common life combining persons from 
these different states of life, but his nine disciplines would allow for such a form of living. His sixth chapter 
explores how each of his nine disciplines of Christian householding apply to marriage, monasticism, and 
single life. The result is that the reader unconsciously sees the possibilities of some kind of integration of 
these life forms.  
116
 Bennett envisions explicitly the possibility of married couples, consecrated religious persons, and non-
vowed Christians living a common way of life together. This vision flows now only from her theology but 
her experience of life in a community associated with ―new monasticism.‖ See "Mark 8: Support for 
Celibate Singles Alongside Monogamous Married Couples and Their Children,‖ (112–123) for a 
description of her experience in this kind of community. Shane Claiborne and others have also begun 
intentional communities involving persons of various states in life (The Irresistible Revolution: Living as 
an Ordinary Radical [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006]). Their movement invites members from varied 
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more inclusive groups in mind: non-vowed single persons, a conjugal family, a vowed 
religious community, or any combination thereof. Wright and Leckey, on the other hand 
are looking more at how the insights from consecrated religious life can help conjugal 
life.
118
  
On the one hand, the great vulnerability presented in daily life together demands a 
kind of exclusivity. ―The gift of familiarity is a gift to be honored and protected, and the 
inclusion of strangers inside the circle of privacy presents understandable problems if it 
has not been agreed to by every other member of the group.‖119 Furthermore, in order to 
live the Christian household according to the Benedictine principle that life together is a 
school of virtue, it will need to involve the same group of people over a long term. The 
virtues required for life in the kingdom of God, as social habits (whether infused or 
acquired), can only be actualized in community and over time with repeated practice and 
correction. Additionally, a community committed to availability for each individual must 
not exceed a certain size lest members begin to be ignored or generalized.
120
 Finally, 
members must share the goals of the community and the willingness to work for their 
completion in fidelity to the household‘s practices. A group that welcomes every person 
to all aspects of its life together will reach no goal other than increased size (and that only 
                                                                                                                                                                             
states in life much as the Catholic Worker Movement, the Community of the Beatitudes, Focolare (The 
Work of Mary), and other associations of the lay faithful do. 
117
 Although, strictly speaking, it seems Bonhoeffer would oppose the life of a religious institute, his work 
is supportive of and relevant to their practice. 
118
 Wright (Sacred Dwelling, 136–37) wants to take the theological inheritance that understands life as a 
continual formation and reformation out of the celibate male context and see how it fits in married life. 
Leckey (The Ordinary Way, 2) notes the various shapes of families (two-parents intact, one parent, and 
alternative families such as ―extended Christian households‖), but the book focuses almost exclusively on 
applying monastic principles to married families or families with only one parent.    
119
 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 101. 
120
 Ibid., 99–100. 
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until people decide they want to leave for something better).
121
 Thus, Christian 
householding requires a kind of exclusivity. All Christian households have central 
members and a many layers of persons participating in, aiding, and being helped by that 
household; among the crucial tasks of the household, then, is to identify those categories 
and negotiate the way they are entered and left.
122
   
While the Christian household needs be exclusive, it also requires permeability. 
Households require boundaries, but they must not be hermetically sealed. ―Permeability‖ 
can be understood as referring to the porousness of the body‘s boundaries, the ease or 
difficulty with which anything crosses over those boundaries. Permeability is as 
important to the life of the household as it is to the life of a living cell. A human blood 
cell‘s membrane physically distinguishes it from the surroundings, but the cell can only 
exist and achieve its telos because that boundary is selectively permeable. The cell exists 
not as an individual unit but as part of an interwoven system.
123
 
The relationship of the Christian household to the Church is similar. For Christian 
households, one important aspect of permeability comes in the form of accountability. 
The wider society (principally the church and the neighbor) demand a kind of access to 
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 Ibid., 100–01. Monasteries, for example, must have ―means of ensuring that those who are admitted into 
the monastic household understand the weight of responsibility they bear for the souls of their brothers and 
sisters.‖ 
122
 Authors suggesting creative forms of Christian householding have been vague on this topic. Bennett 
suggests that more robust marriage prep programs, might be pondered, and that intentional Christian 
communities need to set up communal discernment practices for dating, novitiate, and engagement (Water 
is Thicker than Blood, 173–75; and  ―Mark 8,‖ 119–20. Bennett mentions Michael Lawler‘s proposed 
betrothal process as a possible means for reunderstanding marriage and better preparing people to live it as 
a means of Christian householding, though Bennett is critical of the idea (ibid., 173). I share her critiques. 
For more on Lawler‘s proposal, see, e.g., ―A Marital Catechumenate: A Proposal,‖ INTAMS Review 13 
(2007): 161–77. The question of exactly how to regulate the permeability of Christian households has not 
been answered.  
123
 The cell is permeable to Oxygen and Carbon dioxide, as well as water (and many other molecules). This 
permeability allows the cell to act in concert with the rest of the body by delivering transferring Oxygen 
and Carbon dioxide molecules. In the same way, permeability facilitates the life of the Christian household 
and its working as a cell within its primary context, the body of Christ, the ecclesial society. 
251 
 
the activities, resources, and persons within the household‘s boundaries. The household is 
permeable to the needs and standards of the wider ecclesial community.
124
 At the 
practical level, the church as public gathering cannot survive without the financial and 
bodily participation of households in liturgy and evangelism. Furthermore, the church as 
public gathering cannot survive as ―Christian‖ unless participating households are 
themselves ―Christian.‖ In other words, the households participating in the institution 
constitute its character. If the institution describes itself in accord with certain principles 
of action (faith, hope, love, works of mercy, etc.) then the households that constitute the 
institution must abide by the same principles. Not because the institution says they must 
but because the institution cannot otherwise claim to be what its constitutive parts claim it 
is. If the households comprising the church do not feed the poor out of love for Christ, 
then the church they constitute can hardly be called Christian and can hardly be called a 
sacrament of Christ‘s love in the world.  
At the same time, though, households are permeable to the needs of the wider 
ecclesial community because the households need the wider ecclesial community. For 
example, our household feeds the hungry and clothes the naked, but with a small kitchen, 
two bedrooms, and one bathroom, our hospitality is limited. We need the Church‘s 
kitchen and meeting area, not to mention its parishioners, to put on our meals and 
clothing give-aways. Bennett, therefore, correctly critiques modern theologies of 
marriage and family that seek to answer social woes exclusively or principally with more 
focus on marriage and family.
125
 Similarly, David Matzko McCarthy develops a theory of 
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 Here one might recall my first chapter‘s application MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice‖ to marriage; the 
ecclesially determined standards and goods partially determinative of Christian marriage. 
125
 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 5–9. Specifically she has in mind the work of the Religion, 
Culture, and Family Project associated with Don Browning. 
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the ―open‖ household over-against the typical model of the closed, nuclear family to 
counteract individualistic, non-Christian philosophy and ethics of marriage. The answer 
to the family‘s problems will not be found within the encapsulated nuclear family, but in 
the neighbor who helps paint your house and those friends from the church down the 
street who have you over for dinner.
 126
 Seeing other Christian practices of life together, 
participating in them, and even contributing to them is more helpful for the good life of 
one‘s own household than any managerial, specialist counseling session a person could 
buy. Seeing how my neighbor deals with his picky toddler at dinner, relying on my 
neighbor to shovel my sidewalk if I‘m in a pinch—these little interactions do more for 
the good life of my household and my community than hiring an expert in child-rearing 
or a professional service to shovel for me.   
In addition, Julie Hanlon Rubio and Lisa Sowle Cahill have both developed 
Christian social-ethics approaches to the theology of marriage that see the family‘s task 
as intrinsically extraverted.
127
 Finally, John Paul II, in Familiaris consortio outlined four 
tasks of the family, each of which is per se missional, that is, ordered outward to the 
service of life, society at large, and the church in particular.
128
 McCarthy‘s summary 
statement serves for what all these authors have in common: ―The meaning of family is 
larger than us, particularly as it plays a part in the life of the church.‖129 The Christian 
household, then, exists not as an isolated nucleus but as an organ within the church, and it 
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 McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home, chap. 8. 
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 See Julie Hanlon Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist, 2003); and 
Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000). 
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 FC, 17. The domestic church is to be a communion of persons, to serve life, to serve the development of 
society, and to share in the mission of the church. In addition, Paul VI, in Evangelii nuntiandi 71 refers to 
the family as sharing in the Church‘s evangelical mission. ―One cannot fail to stress the evangelizing action 
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can only accomplish its end within the context of the whole. It must be permeable then to 
the demands and benefits of presence within the ecclesial body.  
How does accountability to the primary context, which is the Church, work? First, 
there is accountability to the share each form of Christian householding has in the 
common destiny of the ecclesial body. As Bennett writes, ―Neither state of life [married 
or consecrated religious] should be seen as having a different ultimate purpose than [sic] 
the other.‖130 At times, she continues, the role of an abbot-figure or a member of the 
hierarchy outside the community may be necessary to hold members to account for these 
goals and practices.
131
 A Breidenthal has it, ―outsiders can call us to account for our 
tendencies to collusion and complicity against God and neighbor,‖ especially in matters 
wherein we may have blinded ourselves.
132
 Therefore, he continues, ―most monastic 
communities have an official ‗visitor,‘ often someone who is not a monastic, who can be 
counted on to speak the truth in love.‖133 Left to themselves, the idolatrous tendencies of 
familiarity would take over Christian households, and they could soon become sectarian 
and self-serving. Christian households must be permeable to the wider community to 
accomplish their apostolic mission, but they must also allow wider community to pass 
through their boundaries in order to support them with resources and accountability along 
the way. For example, a few families living in a lower-middle class neighborhood where 
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 Bennett, ―Mark 8,‖ 119. 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 104. This thought corresponds well to Lonergan‘s notion of scotosis, 
a self-blinding to questions or data that would lead to conclusions the subject is not interested in reaching. 
(For more on bias and scotosis see note 32, introduction.)  
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 Ibid. Furthermore, ―the church, especially the local church, can act as a collective ‗observer‘ of every 
household, helping each household stay on track‖ (ibid., 104). This is related to what Stanley Hauerwas has 
said when he means that for Christians sex is public and that Humanae vitae is a social encyclical 
(Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic, [Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame, 1981], chap. 10). Similarly, see David Matzko McCarthy, ―Procreation, the 
Development of Peoples, and the Final Destiny of Humanity,‖ Communio 26 (1999): 698–721.  
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kids go unwatched in front of drug houses and street corners, might decide to invite all 
the neighborhood kids to a park once a week for a ―neighborhood recess.‖ Pretty soon, 
the neighborhood kids need no invitation. Instead, they are ready and waiting, or are even 
approaching their neighbors‘ doors to play on other days. The households of all these 
children are permeable to the influence of the people putting on the ―neighborhood 
recess,‖ and likewise the household putting on the neighborhood recess opens itself up to 
the influence and even potential risk of being affected by the children and parents of the 
other families in the neighborhood (for better or worse). 
The final principle shared by these authors as they develop the life of Christian 
householding, namely prayer, is also related to the outward turning and permeability of 
the Christian household. Among the principles and practices, prayer is unique in that it 
ought not have any kind of tension with other principles of life together. In fact, enacting 
this principle would lead to its maximization in Paul‘s exhortation to ―pray constantly, 
give thanks in all circumstances; for this is the will of God in Christ Jesus for you‖ (1 
Thess 5:17–18). Leckey identifies prayer as the integrating practice of Christian 
householding. Prayer brings together the virtues of intimacy, egalitarianism, authority, 
study, play, stability, solitude, and hospitality.
134
 Members of the Christian household 
pray together and alone. Leckey emphasizes the importance of devotionals such as the 
rosary, and the sacraments, especially the Eucharist,
135
 but Bonhoeffer emphasizes the 
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 Leckey, Ordinary Way, 75. Prayer invites intimacy when we share our deepest concerns in the presence 
of God. Prayer is a time of equality before the greatness of God and a chance, therefore, to grow in 
solidarity. Prayer qualifies all human authority as we experience the authority of Christ and examine our 
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for God in us, and consequently for all those who are in God.  
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 Leckey, Ordinary Way, 70–72. 
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need of the community to make meditative prayer in solitude available for every member 
of the community individually: ―we have a right to this time, even prior to the claims of 
other people, and we may insist upon having it as a completely undisturbed quiet time 
despite all external difficulties.‖136 Where a Christian household ―lives close together in a 
constricted space and the individual does not have the quietness he needs, regular times 
of quiet are absolutely necessary. After a time of quiet we meet others in a different and 
fresh way. Many a household fellowship will be able to provide for the individual‘s need 
to be alone, and thus preserve the fellowship itself from injury, only by adopting a regular 
order.‖137 With this statement, Bonhoeffer introduces a thought common to all the authors: 
regular times and rituals of prayer as a household. The typical suggestion includes 
common morning prayer, meal prayers, mid-day prayer, evening prayer, as well as daily 
meditative prayer and Scripture reflection for each member in solitude.
138
 Prayer together, 
as it did for the early cenobitic communities, must serve as the organizing principle of the 
household‘s day. Prayer provides daily anchor-points. Far from over-determining daily 
life, the structure offered by daily prayer and the liturgical year function as a kind of 
skeleton for creative overlay.
139
 
If taken as primarily reflective and contemplative, the most complementary 
characteristic of the Christian household for prayer would be ministry, which is active 
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 Leckey, Ordinary Way, 63. The idea of prayer as the organizing principle of the day is important for 
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and focused both within and without the walls of the home.
140
 For Bonhoeffer, the 
Christian household exemplifies the following ministries: holding the tongue, meekness, 
listening, helpfulness, bearing, proclaiming, and authority.
141
 Bonhoeffer focuses on how 
the members of the community practice these ministries first among each other as a 
requirement for authentic community in Christ. His vision does not have in focus the 
work of Christian householding for the wider community. Breidenthal, though, 
incorporates Bonhoeffer‘s intramural ministries as part of an outward direction for the 
Christian household. Christian householding is ―a vocation to life together which is both 
familiar (family-like) and universal (church-like).‖142 As ―familiar‖ the household is a 
spiritual ―workshop,‖ for the occupants to practice the kind of love that will be 
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experienced eschatologically. As ―universal,‖ the household is already a place where the 
eschatological love of God‘s kingdom can be practiced in the form of hospitality 
ministries. Leckey sees the ministry of the Christian household more in terms of the 
scriptural and monastic tradition of welcoming any stranger as Christ himself. She begins 
her chapter on hospitality with a reflection on Abraham‘s generous, unknowing 
hospitality to three angels (Gen 18) and continues reflecting on Chapter 53 of Benedict‘s 
rule, where the monks are reminded to welcome any as they would welcome Christ, 
allowing them to enjoy a week of leisure before giving them a share in the community‘s 
work.
143
 Becoming the kind of household that not only welcomes the stranger but seeks 
and finds the outcast takes practice and prayer, but in light of how we have conceived of 
the Church as the household of God and Jesus‘ practice of inviting people to life in that 
household, we must conclude that active hospitality to strangers, as a fruit of prayer, is 
essential to the identity of any Christian household.
144
 
 
Critique 
 
Having analyzed the thought of scholars proposing forms of Christian 
householding to find their common ground and shared insights, I will now critique the 
thought of these same scholars in an effort to raise some questions as well as forward 
their sound proposals. I will offer six critiques of the scholarship on Christian 
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 This practice is especially important as a means to counteract the modern dichotomization of the public 
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householding: (1) Breidenthal‘s overdrawn distinction between household and church; (2) 
the lacking development in theories of preparation and formation; (3) the need for 
understanding domestic practices of dealing with sin in ecclesial terms; (4) the 
underdevelopment of ―parenthood‖ as a common task of all who inhabit the household of 
God; (5) a lack of grounding in Christology and Trinity; and (6) the absence of the virtues 
poverty, chastity, and obedience from practices and principles of Christian householding. 
The first critique reconsiders Breidenthal‘s strong distinction between the task of 
the ―household‖ and the task of the ―church.‖ Breidenthal drives the wedge too far 
between Christian householding and the ―church,‖ which he sees as ―public gathering.‖ 
He is correct to affirm that the relation of the household to the Church is one of 
interdependence and common purpose, but I think his following statement contains some 
difficulties: 
The household, which is necessarily small and self-centered, needs the horizon of 
the church to keep it focused on the ultimate goal, which is redeemed connection 
with everyone. Thus the household must subordinate itself to the church through 
regular attendance at prayers and participation in the Lord‘s Supper, the 
sacrament of the kingdom of God. At the Same time, the church needs the 
household, with its commitment to and its experience of holy familiarity, to 
remind the church that it is not a support group for solitary pilgrims.
145
 
 
Breidenthal seems to be putting the household over against the church as if the two were 
separate entities rather than nested ones. Breidenthal seems to overlook the fact that the 
household‘s relation to the church goes beyond common purpose to include common 
practices, even common identity (especially in the case of the conjugal household, which 
is domestic church). The household attends liturgy and participates in ecclesial activities 
not out of subordinate dependence on the church but because when the household 
participates in liturgy and other ecclesial activities it is church. The church and the 
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household do not need each other for reminders of mundane concerns (household) and 
eschatological destiny (church) but rather because the church is constituted by 
households whenever those households engage in the practices of the church.
146
  
Although Breidenthal overstates the distinction between church and household, 
his nine disciplines of Christian householding have much to recommend them. The 
benefit of Breidenthal‘s approach is threefold. First, his criteria for naming any kind of 
householding ―Christian‖ are based in practices, whose corollaries are virtues. Such 
criteria highlight the consonance between married and vowed religious vocations better 
than the criteria of ―relationship.‖ Understanding marriage as a particular kind of 
relationship is helpful for understanding what is unique about the sacramental bond 
between man and woman, and in so doing tends to put the focus on individuals. 
Obviously, the vowed religious does not have that kind of relationship with any one 
member of his or her congregation. If there is consonance between these two vocations, it 
can be found in an analysis of the practices and virtues common to both, practices and 
virtues that give both a share in the mission and identity of being church. Second, 
imagining Christian householding in terms of nine disciplines removes from focus the 
question of which way of life is ―superior.‖ The vision of disciplines emphasizes that 
marriage and vowed religious life are training grounds in Christian discipleship, 
preparations for a common end, the kingdom of God. Thus the competitive spirit 
vanishes, but not simply because the referees have called a tie game. Rather, when 
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disciplines take center stage, both forms of life come into focus principally as schools of 
virtue, and more importantly, schools of the same virtues.  
Third, seeing Christian householding in terms of disciplines or practices addresses 
the confusion in answering question: ―what counts as domestic church?‖ Within the 
scholarly debate, finding the answer relies on two sets of criteria. Some authors 
emphasize the formal (ontological) elements of a Christian household as determinative 
(e.g., sacramental marriage and baptism). On the other hand, others highlight the 
functional (subjective, volitional) elements of a Christian household as determinative 
(e.g., intending to be a domestic church, living the practices and principles of Christian 
householding).
147
 Florence Caffrey Bourg, for example, diminishes the ―ontological‖ 
criteria because they give too much weight to ―ideals‖ instead of ―reality.‖ ―Ideally,‖ she 
writes, ―all domestic churches might arise from an intact, sacramental marriage, but in 
fact, many families that seem to deserve the name do not.‖148 Holiness, then, determines 
for these scholars what can be called a domestic church.
149
 Breidenthal‘s criteria, though, 
suggest a complementarity between the form and function of Christian householding.
150
 
One criterion cannot be relied upon to the exclusion of the other.  
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Also at stake is the question of whether matrimony or baptism makes the conjugal 
household into domestic church.
151
 I take the position that Christian marriage is definitive 
for application of ―domestic church‖ to any Christian household. Thus I claim that both 
baptism and sacramental marriage are required for designation as ―domestic church.‖ 
Therefore, any Christian household that includes sacramentally married persons is 
domestic church. Domestic Church is a distinct kind of Christian householding. All 
domestic churches should be Christian households, but not all Christian households can 
be domestic church—even if they can describe themselves with the language of ―family.‖ 
This choice is important to the thrust of the dissertation because I am looking for 
consonance and common ground amidst diversity. If all Christian householding is 
―domestic church,‖ then when we look for consonance between conjugal householding 
and vowed religious life in community, we are not finding consonance between different 
                                                                                                                                                                             
see Florence Caffrey Bourg, Where Two or Three Are Gathered; and for a critique of the history of the 
term‘s application see Joseph C. Atkinson, ―Family as Domestic Church: Developmental Trajectory, 
Legitimacy, and Problems of Appropriation,‖ in The Church, Marriage, and the Family, ed. Kenneth D. 
Whitehead (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine‘s, 2004), 378–91. He identifies the problems of legitimacy, 
epistemology, and appropriation in attempts to use ―domestic church.‖ I contend that any effort to dislocate 
one criterion from the other is erroneous. Formally, the Christian household is a group of baptized 
Christians intentionally committed to being a sacrament of Christ in the world in and through a domestic 
setting. Functionally, a Christian household is a group of baptized Christians actually being a sacrament of 
Christ in the world in and through a domestic setting. 
151
 Bourg, Where Two or Three are Gathered, 68–80. Bourg argues for the primacy of baptism in defining 
―domestic church.‖ She gives five reasons ultimately geared toward expanding the inclusiveness of the 
term, taking the focus off ―marriage‖ and putting it on ―family.‖ Family, for her, is an ascetic, domestic 
discipline educating, evangelizing, and doing works of mercy that cultivates a sacramental perspective of 
God‘s work in daily life (ibid., 105–107). For Bourg, where there is Christian family, there is ―domestic 
church.‖ For Bourg, the most essential feature of domestic church is actually ―the way members see and 
interpret the world and their lives‖ (ibid., 28, 95–101). Bourg‘s worry about ―juridical, objective, or 
ontological definitions of ―domestic church‖ is that they might offend emotional sensibilities. If there are 
clear observable features that make a household a domestic church, then some families might be seen as 
―other‖ or ―inferior‖ to families that do qualify as domestic churches (Where Two or Three are Gathered, 
28–29, 69). I find her concern compassionate and important but suffering from two oversights: (1) defining 
―domestic church‖ is not about making eternal judgment or even judgment of virtue. It is entirely likely that 
an ―irregular‖ family situation may be far more virtuous than any given ―domestic church.‖ That this is a 
fact need not make us shy away from clear definitions, but it should redouble efforts at humility. (2) That 
no definition of ―domestic church‖ is possible without observable features and marks that will potentially 
be misused to rank and label some families as ―other‖ or ―inferior.‖ Bourg even gives ―signs‖ that a family 
has the proper vision and interpretive framework to qualify as domestic church. They are ―shared baptism, 
sacramental wedding, and regular Eucharistic worship.‖ These are signs, though, and not determinative.   
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melodies in one song; we are merely describing one melody that sounds different when 
heard in the open air or under water. The ―domestic church‖ and all other forms of 
Christian householding share their ecclesial identity but in different ways. 
So the general practices and principles for how to live any Christian household 
are universal, but the identity of that Christian household as ―domestic church‖ depends 
on the presence of the marital sacrament in the household. For this sacrament symbolizes 
and makes present Christ‘s bond to his bride in the domestic practices of the couple and 
all who hold house with them, whether by choice or not. They gain the title ―domestic 
church‖ because the sacrament redoubles church‘s presence as the sacrament of Christ. 
Where the church is, there is Christ, and where marriage is, there Christ promises (by 
taking up the human conjugal love into his own indissoluble love) to be present in the 
couple‘s commitment to practices and principles of holding house together.152 All other 
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 See David M. Thomas, ―Home Fires,‖ in The Changing Family: Views From the Theology and the 
Social Sciences in the Light of the Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris consortio, ed. Stanley L. Saxton  
(Chicago: Loyola University, 1984), 16. Thomas takes an approach similar to Bourg‘s. For Thomas, 
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Kasper (Theology of Christian Marriage, trans. David Smith [New York: Crossroad, 1981], 38) makes a 
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special charism (1 Cor 7:14) of accepting children, forming living cells in the Church by life together as 
believers, and hospitality and openness in the home. My position is that the Church is family ontologically, 
that is, we actually become sons and daughters of God in baptism. Thus we must conclude that all Christian 
householding is in a certain sense ―domestic church.‖ By this I mean that Christians living together engage 
in a domestic project, and they are members of the church. The ecclesiality of their householding is 
accidental to it. The ecclesiality of their householding comes from their baptism into God‘s household 
rather than from their householding itself. The converse is true of marriage. Married persons‘ ecclesiality 
comes from the householding itself, which is initiated and made possible by the sacrament of matrimony. 
Conjugal householding is domestic church essentially rather than accidentally. This is true because the 
ecclesiality of their householding comes from the sacrament of matrimony, that is, from their permanent 
vow to engage in a life-long domestic project for the purpose of allowing Christ‘s own indissoluble bond of 
love for the church to be present in and through their own practices of Christian, conjugal householding. 
Married couples enjoy a specification and intensification of the baptismal grace of adoption into God‘s 
household, but the sacramental grace makes their Christian householding an instantiation of the one 
household of God. All other forms of Christian householding are participations in but not new, unique, 
sacramental instantiations of the ecclesial reality of Christ‘s saving love for and bond to his bride the 
church. Our own domestic projects do not become ―domestic church‖ in this strong sense without the 
sacramental presence of Christ‘s bond to whole church. This bond, the substance of which is Christ‘s love, 
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Christians forming domestic communities may commit to similar practices and principles, 
but their bond and commitment to those ecclesial practices of householding is not made 
indissoluble by sacramental grace.
153
 The bond between members of all other Christian 
households does not require the sacramental action of God because it is not indissoluble. 
No matter how permanent the vow made by members of any other Christian household, it 
remains a human vow (certainly aided by God and having eternal consequence) that does 
not ex opere operato include a divine action that makes the bond between spouses an 
efficacious sign of the indissoluble bond of Christ to humanity, the bond that makes us 
his bride, which makes us church. Therefore, without matrimony, the term ―domestic 
church‖ cannot properly apply to a Christian household. This is true even if the 
household is ostensibly more Christian and more engaged in the work of the church than 
any household that includes a married couple. 
The consequences of these debates are significant. Using both functional 
(subjective) criteria and formal (ontological) criteria allows us to judge the identity of a 
Christian household as ―domestic church‖ by answering three questions: (1) Does a 
community hold house together? (2) Are the members of the community baptized or near 
baptism? And (3) is at least one couple in the household married?  If the answer to all 
questions is ―yes,‖ then the community is domestic church, even if it includes persons 
beyond the ―nuclear family,‖ and even if it involves failure and ―irregularity.‖ Even if its 
members are unfaithful to the principles and practices essential for Christian 
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through the domestic project that is uniquely blessed with the graces necessary for that task.  
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 Here presents another opportunity to note the distinction between religious consecration and marriage on 
the level of the Church‘s seven sacraments. This distinction is important and should receive attention in 
another study, but receives only limited focus here since my concern is principally with the consonance 
between the two states in life.  
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householding, the Christian household that is domestic church retains the identity of 
domestic church regardless. The Christian household, however, is only a good domestic 
church if its members exemplify the practices and principles, virtues and internal goods 
essential to Christian householding.  
 Too much focus on ―domestic church‖ though, will distract from the main point 
of this chapter, which is that, although conjugal life and vowed religious life in 
community are distinct, the consonance between these two domestic projects lies in the 
principles and practices of Christian householding that they share. With this in mind, I 
will return to my critique of these principles as they appear in the authors studied.  
 The second major critique of approaches to Christian householding that attempt to 
bring together consecrated and conjugal life is that they offer little theorization or 
practical information about preparation and formation. Even Leckey and Wright, who are 
explicitly looking to bring insights from monastic life into matrimony, give little space to 
the concept of novitiate or formation. Only Sandra Schneiders, whose work on the 
renewal of consecrated religious life (not Christian householding) after Vatican II 
compares the processes of formation and vows for religious with the process of 
discernment and preparation for marriage.
154
 Schneiders‘s reflection on the renewal of the 
novitiate in consecrated life provides a seed for future work to understand preparation for 
marriage in light of this phased entry into the religious life without full membership until 
final vows. I believe a program for marriage preparation could be developed to 
incorporate the insights from the concept of religious novitiate, and this dissertation, 
which finds a common ground between conjugal and consecrated life in community, 
could serve as a basis to develop such a program. 
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 My third critique of the principles of Christian householding is to note a need for 
deeper research and greater precision in the area of dealing with contingency of accident 
and sin, as well as the ordering of brokenness toward reconciliation. The question of 
dissolving Christian householding is complicated, and can only be answered by looking 
specifically at the kind of community in question. The authors treat this question, but 
much more, careful consideration and precision is required.  
For example, a Christian conjugal union, as a sacrament of Christ‘s union to the 
Church, cannot be dissolved, but the practices of conjugal householding may require 
temporary, even legal dissolution (e.g. cohabitation and right to physical proximity may 
need to be terminated in the case of abuse) in the loving service of all the parties to the 
household. On the other hand, a congregation within a religious institute (as a canonical 
reality) or a household of married persons and religious together, or an intentional 
community of celibate, non-vowed Christians may well be dissolved for any number of 
reasons. Ultimately, though, the motive remains the loving service of the community‘s 
members toward their common destiny. The criteria for decision about whether a 
household must be dissolved, then, will vary based on the kind of household. 
 Let me spend a bit more time dealing with the question of dissolution in a 
domestic church (which I have identified as a Christian household based around a 
conjugal family). For the non-Catholic authors (Breidenthal and Bonhoeffer), a Christian 
household based in marriage has a covenantal and civil standing above that of any other 
intentional Christian community, but nonetheless its dissolution is possible. To avoid 
sidetracking the discussion, I cannot focus on the possibility or impossibility of the 
dissolving the marital bond, but rather I must take up the question of the ceasing the 
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domestic church‘s practices. If a Christian household (specifically a domestic church) 
truly is ecclesial by virtue of its covenantal, sacramental commitment to certain domestic 
practices, then those practices never cease. Breakdown in positive practices of Christian 
householding in the domestic church does not cause the conjugal communion to cease 
being domestic church. Rather, the breakdown initiates a new set of ecclesial practices in 
the conjugal household: practices of suffering, admonition, conversion, and reconciliation, 
thanksgiving, and restitution. These are practices as ecclesial as the common family meal 
or the marital consummation ever could be.  
Even in conflict, the struggling spouses engage in ecclesial practices of 
householding with God. We can understand both the typical and grave domestic church 
breakdown by analogy with typical and grave breakdown in wider household of God, the 
church in general. At a more typical level, spouses not communicating well, spouses at 
odds with each other over seemingly ―simple‖ issues (neatness, a specific child-rearing 
practice, a rude comment, etc.), feel real division between them. They will go on 
occupying the same home, continuing the same domestic tasks, but their union is 
incomplete, and they will slowly drift apart as the cool feelings become cold and frigid 
and a hermeneutic of suspicion takes over. As a result they will feel little desire to 
express or experience the fullness of their union in a bodily way. Sin, even minor sin, 
disrupts the communion of persons in the household. The same is true for the ecclesial 
community in general. Many baptized Catholics slowly drift apart from the Church. This 
growing rift may not be due to any serious sin, but merely a result of lack of 
communication, a failure (by either party) to listen, a discovery of fault in an authority 
figure, or an ―uncharitable‖ sermon or church teaching. The cool feelings for the church 
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at large may turn, as they can in the domestic church, to feelings of suspicion and anger. 
These situations are not unlike those that most frequently cause alienation in marriage. 
Just as the toothpaste cap causes divorce, so too the ―problems people have with the 
church,‖ which are often perceived of as simple issues (e.g., why don‘t they just ordain 
women already?) cause rifts and coldness among the inhabitants of God‘s household. 
Because of this coldness these members of God‘s household are unlikely to seek or 
express their communion with each other in joyful worship, especially in the summit of 
Christian life, the Eucharist. At a more grave level, in the household of God at large, any 
member of the household, having committed mortal sin, separates herself canonically 
from full communion with her Bridegroom in the Eucharist. In the same way, grave sin 
among the domestic church must exclude the spouses from the fullness of its communion. 
This exclusion from communion may even require legal action in separation. 
Just as the Church at large exists as a domestic project with practices for 
exclusion, admonition, reconciliation, and restitution, so to the domestic church exhibits 
such practices. We must continue to contextualize all the practices of Christian 
householding, even painful ones, as ecclesial ones. In all Christian householding, 
practices of exclusion must be pastorally ordered toward reconciliation and restoration of 
communion. Christian households, both the church at large and the domestic church, in 
this example, must continually cultivate opportunities and practices ordered toward 
rediscovery and reconciliation. Inviting ecclesial events such as ―Theology on Tap‖ 
might re-open lines of communication between the church and a person whose feelings 
for her have cooled. This renewed communication between the riches of the church‘s 
tradition and the fallen away Christian might lead to a deeper development of faith, hope, 
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and love, and a deeper commitment to the practices of life in the household of God than 
were ever present in this person‘s life previously.155 Reconciliation in the domestic 
church might happen in a similar way. A newly discovered common interest, a moment 
of crisis demanding teamwork, a retreat or marriage formation night, or even a class 
preparing for their infant‘s baptism might serve as a touchpoint to reconnect lines of 
communication and commitment between spouses more or less estranged. At the same 
time, dealing with sin in the wider household of God is not unlike dealing with it in 
domestic church. Minor mistakes in the ecclesial communion are brought to mind and 
expressed before the community begins the opening prayer at mass. Further, request for 
forgiveness and commitment to forgiveness in the Lord‘s prayer, as well as the kiss of 
peace, precede the reception of the Eucharist in the communion rite. In the same way, 
practices of confessing minor sins ought to be a regular part of prayer in any Christian 
household or domestic church. More serious divisions, though, require formal processes 
of reconciliation and reincorporation that involve the entire household. Couples may need 
professional pastoral counseling or even legal, temporary separation before they can 
return to forgiveness and full communion with each other. The Church‘s practice of 
sacramental penance serves as an official rite for a member the church at large to return 
to communion in the household by reconciling formally with the bridegroom, Christ, 
through contrition, forgiveness, and grateful penance.  
As this short exploration has shown, the practices of Christian householding must 
not be limited to those done in happy times, good times, acts of worship, feasts, acts of 
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 Thus, the idea here is not ―romantic.‖ I am not suggesting that the church or married couples are most 
closely connected when they rediscover the ―passionate heat that brought them together.‖ No, the true love 
between members of the conjugal household, whether the Church in general or the domestic church, is a 
love that grows through understanding of and commitment to common work for a common end. Passionate 
feelings at times occur in householding, but they are not its essence. 
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tenderness and care. The household of God, if it truly is a household, will have to deal 
with the same problems of brokenness that every household meets daily. Christian 
households experience breakdown, but if the experience of breakdown can be located 
ecclesially, we can find ways in which the focus can remain on reconciliation and return 
to communion. The way is open here for much more research. Perhaps one source might 
be to look at practices of discipline in religious communities throughout history. This 
work, though, will have to be saved for another volume. 
 A fourth critique of the principles and practices of Christian householding 
mentioned above is the underdevelopment of the practice of parenthood as common to all 
Christian households. Bennett mentions the idea that parenting should be a task shared by 
the whole church, but she does not have occasion to develop the idea.
156
 Similarly, 
Breidenthal highlights the fact that Benedict‘s rule includes sections on how to handle 
and discipline children, and that St. Paul includes marriage in Christian householding, but 
does not explore the topic in much depth.
157
 Leckey, for her part, spends the most energy 
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 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 183–85. Bennett goes on to highlight some examples of the kind 
of efforts she envisions. In the face of parishes where married parents are often forced to do all the legwork 
for Christian education, Bennett imagines non-married celibate persons (vowed or non-vowed) contributing 
to the work of Christian education at the parish level, or helping children learn to worship in the mass. 
Some celibates at a Catholic Worker house in Indiana have run a preschool for the children of single 
mothers living there. A community Bennett herself lived with occasionally invited married people over, 
made them dinner, and cared for their children so that the parents could have some time for conversation. 
(―Mark 8,‖ 120). 
157
 See Breidenthal, Christian Households, 52: ―For Paul, marriage counts as Christian householding 
because it makes the familiarity between husband and wife, and between parents and children, the means 
by which they learn to be each other‘s neighbor…Looked at this way, Christian parents raising children do 
not look so different from Christian monks trying to live in community. Parents and monks alike are 
struggling to turn life together, with all the familiarity that goes with it, into a means of embracing nearness 
and extending to others the communion we already have with Christ. Both the parental family and the 
monastery turn out, in this view to be distinct but related versions of the same thing—the Christian 
household. Both kinds of households are called to the sanctification of familiarity within the household, and 
to hospitality and care for the stranger. But each takes a different approach and faces different pitfalls.‖ He 
continues to state that the monastic temptation is toward individual isolation if their flight from familial and 
exclusive friendships is not intentionally linked to a spirituality of nearness. On the other hand, the family‘s 
temptation is the over-emphasis on familial and exclusive friendships to the detriment of the big picture 
(ibid., 52). 
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on the topic of parenting, taking good insights from Benedict‘s Rule of Life and the older 
Rule of the Master. She is looking primarily at how the rule might help married 
Christians in their own role as parents. Parenting, though, does not make any scholar‘s 
list of principles and practices.
158
 All the scholars understand Christian householding as 
necessarily welcoming to children, but it seems only coincidentally so. It does not seem 
as if Christian householding is per se ordered toward parenting, a task that goes far 
beyond the mere welcoming of the child.  
Christian householding, though, does not exist for its own sake, nor merely for the 
sake of those who voluntarily enter its practice. The practice trains persons in the 
sanctification of nearness through exclusive, familiar relationships that prepare for the 
eschatological, universal familiarity of the kingdom of God, but the Christian household 
exists as it does for the sake of those who will enter it in the future, for those to whom the 
practice of sanctifying nearness will be traditioned. This practice of traditioning is 
parenthood. Although Breidenthal‘s study of Christian householding spends little time on 
the practice of parenting as a discipline common to consecrated and married life, Jana 
Bennett explicitly takes up the question in her own attempt to see a common ground for 
married and consecrated life. 
 Bennett finds parenthood a central shared task of both married and celibate 
members of Christ‘s body. ―I also hope,‖ she writes, ―that married people will see in 
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 This topic does not take a major position in Leckey, Ordinary Way either. Her nine elements of 
monastic structure readily applicable to families include intimacy, equality, authority, prayer, solitude, play, 
study, stability, and hospitality. Leckey deals with the link between parents and children, as well as the 
question of family structure (Ordinary Way, 21–24, 39, 50, 58, 110,  and 127), but parenting itself does not 
make the list of major elements. More interesting is the fact that her discussion of hospitality mentions 
receiving unexpected and planned for guests. Unfortunately, children do not appear as the object of this 
hospitality. Stanley Hauerwas has made much of contending the opposite point. See Hauerwas, ―Radical 
Hope in the Annunciation: Why Both Single and Married Christians Welcome Children,‖ The Hauerwas 
Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, 2001), 505–518.    
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themselves the possibility of being married ‗monks,‘ while those who are single will see 
in themselves the possibility of being Christian parents, and that these are all states of life 
bound up in the one Household of God of which we are part.‖159 ―Neither state of life 
should be seen as having a different ultimate purpose than [sic] the other.‖160 Celibate 
single persons, whether vowed or not, are to share in the duties of Christian parenting. 
This claim is made from a robust understanding of the extent to which baptism makes 
new children, for whom all have responsibility.  
Augustine‘s sermons about baptism generating new children, and making all 
Christians new parents suggest a very new and distinctly Christian way of 
understanding what it means to have and raise children…this is one of the ways 
the unmarried may be parents, because they, too, are responsible for parenting the 
newly baptized ‗infants.‘161  
 
Bennett‘s conclusion also lends itself to arguments for strengthening of the role of 
Godparents on the same account. ―It is a myth of contemporary society and some 
contemporary theology,‖ she writes, ―to see that households can be self-sufficiently run. 
We see this sense of self-sufficiency in the view that parents are alone responsible for 
how their children behave in grocery stores or in church…The fact of our baptism and its 
relationship to our roles as both parents and children suggests that non-biologically 
related people have a responsibility to raise children.‖162    
A look at Benedict‘s rule itself gives us an even clearer picture of how both 
vowed religious and married life share in parenthood. Below I offer just a beginning at 
where this kind of reflection might go. In his rule, St. Benedict self-consciously describes 
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 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 158–59. 
160
 Bennett, ―Mark 8,‖ 119. 
161
 Bennett, Water is Thicker than Blood, 175. 
162
 Ibid., 184 
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the monastic life in terms of the parent-child language and relationships.
163
 In the very 
first sentence of the Rule‘s prologue, Benedict calls the reader ―son.‖ ―Listen, O my son, 
to the precepts of thy master, and incline the ear of thy heart, and cheerfully receive and 
faithfully execute the admonitions of thy father, that by the toil of obedience thou mayest 
return to Him.‖164 Here, Benedict casts the abbot in the paternal language of Old 
Testament wisdom literature, as the wisdom teacher as father leading his pupil the son.
165
 
Second, Benedict calls the head of the monastery the ―abbot,‖ a word closely related to 
the Aramaic term Jesus uses to refer to his heavenly father, ―Abba.‖ The abbot is 
considered to hold the place of Christ in the monastery, which means that all he does 
must flow from a true sonship to God the Father. As the rule states: ―He is believed to 
hold the place of Christ in the monastery since he is addressed by a title of Christ, as the 
Apostle indicates: You have received the spirit of adoption of sons by which we exclaim, 
abba, father (Rom 8:15).‖ The abbot is father, but only inasmuch as he authentically 
witnesses to God his own Father. The abbot is commanded to care for the spiritual 
development and the development in virtue of the monks as a father does for his children, 
with attention to the particulars of each child. ―As occasion may call for, let him show the 
severity of the master and the loving affection of a father.‖166 Quoting Proverbs 23:14, 
Benedict reminds abbots: ―Strike thy son with the rod and thou shalt deliver his soul from 
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 Adalbert de Vogüé (The Rule of Saint Benedict: A Doctrinal and Spiritual Commentary, [Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian, 1983], 66) emphasizes the role of spiritual paternity in the Benedictine rule and life. 
164
 RB, prologue, 1–2. ―Obsculta, o fili, praecepta magistri, et inclina aurem cordis tui, et admonitionem pii 
patris libenter excipe et efficaciter comple, ut ad eum per oboedientiae laborem redeas.‖ In the background 
can be heard the wisdom tradition and its notion of parenthood as the traditioning of wisdom for right 
living. See Proverbs 1:7, ―Hear, my child, your father‘s instruction, and do not reject your mother‘s 
teaching.‖ 
165
 See, e.g., Sirach 2:1; 3:1–3; 5:1; Proverbs 1:8, 10; 2:1; 3:1, 11; 4:1; 5:1. 
166
 RB 2.24: ―miscens temporibus tempora, terroribus blandimenta, dirum magistri, pium patris ostendat 
affectum.‖ 
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death.‖167 Benedict notes that the monasteries may take in boys of young age. Further, 
chapter 30 provides a rule for the correcting young boys.
168
 For as long as these practices 
endured, the monastic life was concerned not only with spiritual fatherhood of adults, but 
with the daily practice of turning boys into men: the spiritual formation, education, and 
daily training in virtue of children. The monks become adoptive fathers of a sort.
169
 The 
role of fatherhood in the monastery, though, must not be sought or even desired. It is 
received as gift and heavy burden, as an act of obedience and an expression of 
humility.
170
   
 The beauty of Benedict‘s notion of the abbot‘s fatherhood is the way he always 
locates it as subordinate and subject to the Fatherhood of God. The abbot is called ―abbas‖ 
or ―father,‖ because he witnesses as Christ did to the true fatherhood of God. Benedict 
shifts the fatherly image from the abbot to God the father, and back again throughout the 
rule. For example, in the very first sentence of the rule, which begins ―Listen, my son, to 
the precepts of the master, and incline the ear of your hear to them, and willingly follow 
and complete the admonitions of your affectionate father, that you may return to him 
through the work of obedience.‖171 Earlier on, I cited this passage as an example of 
Benedict seeing himself or the abbot in a fatherly role, leading the monastic sons back to 
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 RB 2.29: ―et iterum: Percute filium tuum virga et liberabis animam eius a morte.‖ 
168
 RB 30.1–2; Benedict‘s Rule, 249–50: ―Every age and mentality [degree of understanding] should have 
an appropriate regimen [discipline]. Therefore, as regards children or youths, or those who have little 
understanding of the gravity of excommunication, when such people misbehave, they should be deprived of 
food or pressured with sharp blows to correct them.‖  
169
 See RB 59; Benedict‘s Rule, 485–92. This section deals with sending a child to live in the monastery, 
essentially to be raised in the monastic life with the option of membership at a later date. 
170
 See RB 7.31; RB 1980, 197: ―The second degree of humility is, when a man loveth not his own will, nor 
is pleased to fulfill his own desires but by his deeds carrieth out that word of the Lord which saith: ‗I came 
not to do my own will but the will of Him that sent Me‘ (Jn 6:38);‖ and RB, 64.: ―But when the Abbot hath 
been elected le him bear in mind how great a burden he hath taken up (suscepit =  accepted, received also) 
and to whom he must give account of his stewardship.‖ 
171
 RB, pr.1: ―Obsculta, o fili, praecepta magistri, et inclina aurem cordis tui, et admonitionem pii patris 
libenter excipe et efficaciter comple, ut ad eum per oboedientiae laborem redeas.‖ 
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God, their eternal father. However true this may be, close attention to the text shows that 
the ―affectionate father‖ of this passage may be read as God the father as well. The hint 
comes from the pronoun ―eum‖ or ―him.‖ The fact that the pronoun is used suggests that 
an antecedent exist. In this case, the antecedent is ―pii patris‖ or ―of the affectionate 
father.‖ It is this same ―father‖ who in the first clause addresses the reader as ―child.‖ 
This first passage then, can be read in two ways: (1) the abbot, as father, entreats his 
children to listen to his affectionately given advice, so that they may return to God; (2) 
God the Father addresses the reader as ―child‖ and admonishes him to willingly follow 
his own affectionately given advice, so that the reader may return to him, to God the 
Father.  
A second example of this kind of constant subordination of the abbot‘s fatherhood 
to God‘s fatherhood comes in chapter 2, where Benedict explains on what grounds the 
abbot is an ―abbot,‖ or father, but then he goes on to call the abbot a ―shepherd‖ and 
refers to God as father. ―The abbot must, therefore, be aware that the shepherd will bear 
the blame wherever the father of the household finds that the sheep have yielded no 
profit.‖172 Here the father is God and the household is the monastic community and the 
entire church. 
 Much of what is true of parenthood in the monastic household of God is true of 
parenthood in the married household of God. Married couples can learn about their own 
vocational task from the practices of monastic parenthood. Biological parents are the first 
educators and evangelizers of their children in the basic virtues of living in a communion 
of persons. Likewise, the abbot and all the brothers receive and are the first educators of 
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 RB 2.7; RB 1980, 173: ―Sciatque abas culpae pastoris incubere quidquid in ovidubs paterfamilias 
utilitatis minus potuerit invernire‖ (emphasis mine). 
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their new brothers in the basic virtues of living in an explicitly Christian life in common. 
This is just what a domestic church, or Christian family, should be, an explicitly Christian 
life in common. Just as was the case in monastic parenthood, the children learn more by 
example than by word.
173
 Just as the abbot must account for the profitability of his sheep 
(their spiritual progress), so too the biological parents are held accountable for the destiny 
of their child‘s soul.174 Just as the abbot‘s paternity is authentic only as a Christoform 
witness to the Divine Paternity, so too biological parents exercise authority in justice only 
insofar as they witness to the true paternity of God the Father. Finally, just as no monk 
may seek or intrigue to attain the paternal role of abbot, likewise biological parenthood 
must always be received as gift rather demanded as right or sought as something to be 
made by man.
175
 Both roles of parent and abbot share a non-voluntary character. The 
abbot does not choose to be elected and serve as father to the holy monks but not the 
rebellious ones; likewise biological parents always receive their children as strangers 
(though they typically know and intend to be engaged in the kind of activity that makes 
one a parent). The ground is rich, thus, for research into what the parenthood of 
monastics and married persons share. 
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 See RB 2.12; RB 1980, 173: ―he must point out to them all that is good and holy more by example than 
by words...demonstrating God‘s instructions to the stubborn and the dull by a living example.‖ 
174
 See Alphonsus Liguori, who is citing St. John Chrysostom in a sermon on parenthood: we have been 
given ―a great deposit in children; let us attend to them with great care‘—hom. ix., in I. ad Tit. Children 
have not been given to parents as a present or possession, which they may dispose of as they please, but as 
a trust, for which, if lost through their negligence, they must render an account to God‖ (quoted in 
Alphonsus Liguori, ―Liguori, ―Sermon 36,‖ in Sermons of St. Alphonsus Liguori: For all Sundays of the 
Year, 4th edition [Rockford, IL: TAN Books, 1982], 269–78, at 270). 
175
 See note 72 above; see EV, 43: ―Thus, a man and woman joined in matrimony become partners in a 
divine undertaking: through the act of procreation, God‘s gift is accepted and a new life opens to the future.‖ 
See also EV, 92, where John Paul II states that serving the Gospel of life ―is a responsibility which first 
concerns married couples, called to be givers of life, on the basis of an ever greater awareness of the 
meaning of procreation as a unique event which clearly reveals that human life is a gift received in order 
then to be given as a gift. In giving origin to a new life, parents recognize that the child, ‗as the fruit of their 
mutual gift of love, is, in turn, a gift for both of them, a gift which flows from them.‘‖ See Donum vitae 4, 
which argues that human dignity demands that the human person be received as gift and be created in the 
act of self-gift. 
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 A fifth critique of the principles and practices of Christian householding in the 
authors treated above is the absence of trinitarian and Christological grounding for the 
practices. This critique harkens back to chapter two as well, where I noted the lacuna of 
Christ and the Trinity as the true nexus for and attempt to bring consecrated and conjugal 
life into dialogue. If these principles and practices are to be authentically Christian they 
must be rooted in this nexus, Christ the second Adam and the second person of the 
Trinity. Chapter 5 will develop this Christological, trinitarian connection between these 
two states of life. This development will provide a more sure footing for the principles 
and practices that have been developed, as well as for those yet to be developed.  
The final critique of the principles of Christian householding shared by these 
authors is that the virtues of poverty, chastity, and obedience attract relatively little 
attention. Only Wendy Wright does any kind of reflection on them, and she looks 
explicitly in the context of the domestic church, not any broader version of Christian 
householding. These evangelical virtues have much to do with the life of the Christian 
household, especially the conjugal household, or domestic church, as we will see in the 
next two chapters, but much more could be done to look at their relevance for the entire 
household of God. In what way, for example, do all those living in God‘s household 
practice obedience, chastity, and poverty? In what way would these virtues apply in the 
kind of mixed communities that Breidenthal and Bennett imagine? I will leave these 
questions, however, and return to the one closer to the heart of the dissertation: what do 
the virtues, states, and vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience have to do with marriage 
as domestic church, as practice of Christian householding? How do these virtues 
demonstrate the consonance between consecrated and conjugal life? 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this chapter I set out to demonstrate the way consecrated religious life and 
married life in the Church share in their domestic character. The hope has been to avoid a 
unidirectional flow of witness or influence and invite a mutual cooperation in the one task 
of abiding in the household of God as His children and as the parents of the ―least of 
these.‖ In fact, I argued, monastic life and married life are sharers in practices common to 
all Christian householding. To that end the chapter began with a scriptural development 
of an ecclesiology of ―householding‖ from John‘s Gospel, relying on previous work by 
Mary Coloe. Following on this notion of householding, part two noted the domestic and 
familial language and images employed by early, medieval, and modern documents of 
vowed religious life. This chapter proposed four sets of polar practices or principles that 
exist in these scholars‘ conceptions of Christian householding: intentionality and given-
ness; familiarity and formality; exclusivity and permeability, and prayer and ministry. 
Finally, I forwarded and critiqued principles and practices of Christian householding in 
the work of twentieth-century scholars who see all of Christian community in domestic 
terms. This final section offered six critiques of the scholarship on Christian 
householding: (1) Breidenthal‘s overdrawn distinction between household and church; (2) 
the lacking development in theories of preparation and formation; (3) the need for 
understanding domestic practices of dealing with sin in ecclesial terms; (4) the 
underdevelopment of ―parenthood‖ as a common task of all who inhabit the household of 
God; (5) a lack of Christology and Trinity; and (6) the absence of the virtues poverty, 
chastity, and obedience from practices and principles of Christian householding. 
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The following chapter takes a step toward answering the critiques above. It 
investigates three two additional paths for encountering consonance between consecrated 
life and married life. The first is the religious vows, or the evangelical virtues themselves. 
The study contributes to filling the gap in the principles of Christian householding where 
poverty, chastity, and obedience ought to appear. A start has been made by David 
Crawford at the level of Christian anthropology. Crawford argues that the evangelical 
counsels as lived by Christ—poverty, chastity, and obedience—reveal the nature of the 
human person and human community. Therefore, to live a human life of Christian 
perfection necessitates participation in these virtues. The second path is Christ. Both 
marriage and monasticism, then, as ways of pursuing Christian perfection, are necessarily 
christomorphic—they lead to the imitation of Christ who was poor above all, perfectly 
chaste, and obedient unto death. The challenge is to understand the ecclesial context for 
these virtues, taking the focus off of the individual, pursuing holiness on her own but as 
part of the ecclesial body. The third path, which remains untrodden, is to find a trinitarian 
ground for the consonance between married and religious life. Trinitarian language has 
been applied in places to married life (Christifideles laici, and the work of Marc Cardinal 
Oullet) and in other places to consecrated life (Vita consecrata). What remains is to draw 
together these sources in a synthesis and flesh out the consequences. 
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CHAPTER 5: THEOLOGICAL LOCI FOR CONSONANCE AMONG THE 
STATES: ANTHROPOLOGY, CHRISTOLOGY, AND TRINITY AS 
FOUNDATION FOR MARRIED AND RELIGIOUS STATES 
 
 The last chapter saw marriage and consecrated life drawn together through a study 
of an ecclesial principle, their participation in the one household of God. Among my 
major critiques was to point out the lack of attention given to the vows of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience as principles of Christian householding, as well as the lack of 
Christ as the nexus of Christian householding, and finally a disconnection from the 
Trinity as the Christian mystery central to both states of life. This chapter explores three 
additional methods for hearing consonance in the melodies of married and consecrated 
religious life, each of which answers critiques made throughout the dissertation.  
Part one explores the centrality of vows: specifically how might we call the 
consent given in marriage a vow in the same way that we name religious profession with 
vows? This step explicitly answers the lacuna just mentioned, that of losing the notion of 
vow at the center of both religious and matrimonial forms of Christian householding. 
Establishing that vows lie at the center of both Christian states of life, which we already 
understand as forms of Christian householding, has the benefit of furthering the 
consonance between these states without ―monasticizing‖ marriage. Vows made in an 
ecclesial context are essential to both states, not borrowed from one for the sake of the 
other. 
 The second part is developed from the thought of John Paul II, David Crawford, 
and Hans Urs von Balthasar.
1
 I will show that the vows of religion themselves (poverty, 
chastity, obedience) connect religious and matrimonial life because they lie at the heart of 
                                                          
1
 The concept of attunement is developed by Hans Urs von Balthasar in Theological Aesthetics: The Glory 
of the Lord, vol. 1, Seeing the Form (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1982). 
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what it means to be a human person (anthropology) and what the human person is called 
to be (Christology). They sum up the state of the person coram conjuge and coram Deo, 
that is, they show us what a person can give and what a person requires. The vows 
themselves are summed up in the person of Christ, the model and source of both conjugal 
and consecrated states of life. Turning our attention toward Christ, we see the connection 
of both religious and marital life to poverty, chastity, and obedience in Christ, who 
reveals to us through these virtues all that the human person is called to become.  
The third section finding consonance between religious and married life answers 
another critique of previous attempts—a lack of proper attention to the Trinity. Not only 
is Christ the source of human fulfillment and flourishing and in a life of poverty, chastity, 
and obedience, but he is the source of our eternal beatitude as Second Person of the 
Trinity who invites us to share in his divine life as communions of persons. Specifically, 
trinitarian language has been used to describe both conjugal and consecrated states of life, 
but always in separate treatments. I intend to bring these descriptions together in one 
account. The connection between religious and married life, then, will not only be 
anthropological and Christological, but trinitarian as well. 
 
IS CONSENTING TO MARRIAGE THE SAME AS MAKING A VOW? 
 
The thesis of this section is that one can call the giving and receiving of consent to 
Christian marriage in the Catholic Church the making of vows. The purpose of making 
the argument is to further the consonance between the consecrated and conjugal states as 
vowed ways of life. It is of little consequence that both would be vows simpliciter; the 
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real upshot is that both are ecclesial vows, that is, they situate Christians more deeply 
within the life of the Church.  
Contrary to popular understandings of marriage, neither the rite of marriage nor 
canon law refers to anything in the celebration of matrimony as a vow. The key words 
from the Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium (hereafter, OCM) are consensus, manifestastis, 
and promittere (OCM, 60–64)2, and key words from the Codex Iuris Canonici are foedus 
(CIC, 1055), contractus (CIC, 1055.2), and tradere (CIC, 1057.2). Words central to both 
are consensus and accipere (OCM, 60–64, and CIC, 1057.2; 1095–1107). The person 
assisting the marriage first asks about the intentus of the couple (Interrogationes ante 
consensum). The spouses then express (exprimere) and manifest (manifestare) their 
consent in the presence of God and Church (coram Deo eiusque Ecclesia consensum 
vestrum exprimite)
3
 by means of answers to questions or by recitation of promises 
(promittere). The person assisting then formally receives the consent (receptio consensus) 
which the spouses just manifested in the presence of the Church (coram Ecclesia 
manifestastis).
4
  
Not only do canon law and the OCM avoid the word ―vow‖ (votum), but canon 
law seems to place an impediment against thinking of what happens at matrimony as 
―vows,‖ properly speaking. Canon law defines ―vow‖ as ―a deliberate and free promise 
                                                          
2
 See the Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium, editio typica altera (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1991), 
16–19. References to the Latin of the rite will be from the 1991 OCM, which has no official English 
translation publicly released. I will note wherever the Latin differs from the 1969 OCM. The English of the 
rite will come from the 1969 translation. 
3
 OCM, 61, p. 17. 
4
 OCM 1991, 64, p. 18. 
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made to God about a possible and better good, [one that] must be fulfilled by reason of 
the virtue of religion.‖5 
More specifically, a vow is public if a legitimate superior accepts it in the name of 
the Church; otherwise, it is private. A vow is solemn if the Church has recognized 
it as such; otherwise, it is simple. A vow is personal if the person making the vow 
promises an action; real if the person making the vow promises some thing; 
mixed if it shares the nature of a personal and a real vow.
6
 
 
Given these definitions, if one is to refer to what couples do in celebrating their marriage 
as making vows, a case will have to be made for it.  
Let us now establish that the giving of intent and consent in the wedding rite has 
the character of a vow. I am not attempting to demonstrate that any official Church 
document has called the giving of consent a vow, but whether the consent given in 
marriage fulfills the definition of public, solemn vow given in canon law as it refers 
particularly to the vows of religious life. First, is marriage ―deliberate‖ and ―free?‖ The 
answer is yes. These facts are established three ways: (1) it is common practice in diocese 
of the United States to require a 6-month period of preparation before marriage can be 
solemnized in a Catholic parish; (2) by the priest‘s investigation of impediments; and (3) 
in the three questions of intent before the fiancés formally manifest their consent. The 
priest asks, ―have you come here freely and without reservation to give yourselves to 
each other in marriage? Will you love and honor each other as man and wife for the rest 
of your lives? Will you accept children lovingly from God, and bring them up according 
to the law of Christ and his Church?‖7 The first question asks the couple to declare their 
                                                          
5
 CIC 1191.1: ―Votum, idest promissio deliberata ac libera Deo facta de bono possibili et meliore, ex 
virtute religionis impleri debet.‖  
6
 CIC 1192.1–1192.3: ―Votum est publicum, si nomine Ecclesiae a legitimo acceptetur; secus privatim. 
Sollemne, si ab Ecclesia uti tale fuerit agnitum; secus simplex. Personale, quo action voventis promittitur; 
reale, quo promittitur res aliqua; mixtum, quod personalis et realis naturam participat.‖  
7
 ―Venistisne huc sine coactione, sed libero et pleno corde ad Matrimonium contrahendum?‖ OCM 1991, 
60. 
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freedom to marry and their deliberate desire to marry. The second and third questions 
verify that they intend the same things about marriage that the Church intends, that is, it 
asks the couple to express their deliberate intent to contract a marriage as understood by 
the Church. That the consent be deliberate is clear also from rotal jurisprudence; 
ignorance can prevent a marriage from being valid.
8
 The giving of marital consent, then, 
is necessarily free and deliberate. 
Second, is marriage a ―promise made to God?‖ Based strictly on word usage, 
―promise‖ might appear to be inessential to the marriage rite. ―Promise,‖ promitto, 
appears in but one of the two options for giving consent. The promise (promitto) spoken 
in matrimony is spoken not to God directly. Rather, the spouses say ―Promitto me tibi 
fidem servaturum‖ (I promise to preserve faithfulness to you).9 The other form avoids 
―promise‖ (promitto) entirely; instead this second form (approved in the United States, 
and without a Latin text) uses ―take.‖ ―I, N., take you, N., for my lawful…‖ (OCM 1969, 
25, in The Rites, 542). The fact that only one of the two forms of the vows includes the 
term ―promise‖ countermands any attempt to argue that ―promise‖ is essential to the 
consent that ratifies a marriage. If ―promise‖ were essential to the consent, then it would 
necessarily be included in any form of the ―vows.‖ Since ―promise‖ is essential to ―vow,‖ 
and ―promise‖ is not essential to matrimonial consent, then we might conclude that 
matrimonial consent is not a vow. 
                                                          
8
 See Jerry M. Sherba, ―Canon 1096: Ignorance as a Ground for Nullity,‖ Canon Law Society of America, 
Proceedings 59 (1997): 282–299; Elissa Rinere, ―Error Which Causes the Contract,‖ Studia Canonica 38.1 
(2004): 65–84. 
9
 The current English translation has the couple saying ―I promise to be true to you.‖ (OCM 1969, 25). This 
official translation allows the suggestion that the spouses are actually making promises to God about their 
relationship to each other. 
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Overcoming these literalist readings of the rite and its translations is not difficult 
if one understands the meaning of the verb ―promise‖ to be a person‘s binding 
commitment entered into by word (whether spoken or written). Whether or not the word 
―promise‖ is used, couples bind themselves by word to certain actions on behalf of the 
spouse and to dispositions toward the spouse. The consent, therefore, has the character of 
a promise regardless of the term‘s appearance in the rite. Furthermore, the Catechism of 
the Catholic Church states that ―Baptism and Confirmation, Matrimony and Holy Orders 
always entail promises.‖10 Since, in Aquinas‘s formulation (which the CIC essentially 
follows), vows and promises are equivalent, we can say that the fiancés make vows when 
they give their consent in the form of a promise.
11
 
Third, is the giving of consent a promise made ―to God?‖ The marriage rite is set 
up with the assumption that the consent is expressed in the presence of God and the 
Church (coram Deo eisusque Ecclesia consensum vestrum exprimite).
12
 Whether or not 
the fiancés explicitly think of themselves as talking to God at the moment they are 
expressing consent (I think this number is quite low), the language of the rite 
contextualizes the expression of consent as something that takes place in the very 
presence of God. The promise of matrimony, then, is as much made to God as it is to 
anyone else present. Furthermore, the 1969 English translation of the OCM takes the 
focus off of the person to whom the consent is given and emphasizes what is consented to. 
Fiancés express a promise made to God about disposition toward and actions on behalf of 
                                                          
10
 CCC, 2101. 
11
 See Aquinas, ST II-II, q. 88, a. 1, s.c.: ―It is written (Ecclesiastes 5:3): ‗If thou hast vowed anything to 
God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.‘ Therefore to vow is to 
promise, and a vow is a promise.‖ For Aquinas, three things are essential to a vow: ―the first is deliberation. 
The second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow‖ 
(ST II-II, q. 88, a. 1, resp.). 
12
 OCM 1991, 61. 
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the spouse. It reads, ―I promise to be true to you‖ rather than ―I promise to you that I will 
be true.‖ We could thus read the English text as a promise to God mediated by the spouse, 
the assistant, and the witnessing body of the church. This is all for the better, for the 
promises are made not only to God, but to the spouse, the assisting minister, and the 
gathered community. Finally, the contextualization of the marital consent within a liturgy 
characterizes the activity as an act of worship. The only legitimate object of worship is 
God. All liturgical actions, then, including the consent of marriage, have God as their end.  
Fourth, is the giving of marital consent a ―free and deliberate promise made to 
God about a possible and better good?‖ We cannot answer ―yes‖ or ―no‖ to this question 
before asking another: vows concern promises about a good that is ―possible and better‖ 
than what? First, the answer cannot be ―better than any other possible good.‖ If this were 
true, then the a vow could only concern the ―best possible good.‖ Since the canonical 
definition of a vow follows Aquinas‘ definition, his clarification on the matter of a vow is 
instructive here: 
That which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, 
is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And 
this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is universally 
necessary for salvation.
13
  
 
It is not necessary for salvation that a person indissolubly, irrevocably bind herself to 
another as a partner in seeking sanctification through a consortium vitae et amoris, yet 
this is the commitment of marriage. Because it is voluntary, making a commitment to 
work for the salvation of at least one person can be considered a better good than making 
no commitment to seek any particular person‘s salvation. The marital consent promises a 
better good than a non-vowed celibate life because it takes on duties and obligations 
                                                          
13
 Aquinas, ST II-II, q. 88, a. 2, resp. 
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beyond those required of the Christian life in general, namely, the practices and duties of 
marriage as an ecclesial practice of Christian householding, a consortium totius vitae et 
amoris. 
Finally, does the expression of marital consent establish duties that ―must be 
fulfilled by reason of the virtue of religion?‖ The virtue of religion, according to Aquinas, 
belongs under the species of ―justice,‖ as religion is the virtue of giving to God what is 
God‘s due.14 Understood thus, fulfilling the duties of marriage must be seen as acts of 
devotion to God, acts of worship. If our duties to the spouse exist as a result of a vow, 
then the primary reason to fulfill them is that their fulfillment is owed to God. Again, the 
liturgical context and nature of the marital rite makes a suggestive case for the necessity 
of fulfilling marriage vows by reason of the virtue of religion. First, the marriage rite is 
performed coram deo and coram ecclesiam. Second, the Church strongly suggests linking 
the rite of matrimony to the Eucharist by celebrating the rite in conjunction with a nuptial 
mass. The spouses are encouraged to contextualize their own expression of consent to 
love and honor one another within the Lord‘s consent to love his Church and give himself 
to the Church in his life, death, and resurrection. The couple‘s marriage situated within 
the prayer over the gifts, the eucharistic memorial, and the eucharistic preface. In this 
way the spouses are invited to see their own future self-sacrifice as participations in 
Christ‘s own paschal mystery made present in the celebration of the Eucharist.15  
A case has now been made for calling the expression of intent and consent a vow 
as the term is defined in canon law in the context of religious life. For the rest of this 
chapter, then, I may speak of the marital ―vows‖ as the complex manifestation and 
                                                          
14
 Aquinas, ST II-II, q. 81, articles 1, 2. 
15
 OCM, 1991, 231–39, pp. 74–77; The Rites (1969), 543–45, 563–69. 
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expression of intention and consent spoken by the fiancés, received by the assisting 
minister or lay person, and witnessed by the gathered faithful during the nuptial rite, but I 
must now ask further what kind of vow is the expression of marital intent and consent. 
The religious profession is considered a public, solemn, and mixed vow. Is the marital 
vow a public, solemn, and mixed vow?  
First, are the marital vows public? According to canon law, ―a vow is public if a 
legitimate superior accepts it in the name of the Church; otherwise, it is private.‖16 
Certainly, since the nuptial rite requires an assistant and witnesses, and since the Church 
has made many efforts throughout history to reduce clandestine marriages, the vows are 
understood to be public in nature. They are the concern of the entire ecclesial community, 
the entire body of Christ. After all, the spouses are not merely married coram deo and 
coram ecclesiam, but they are married (as Christians) in Christ. Their marriage affects all 
who are in Christ and places requirements on all who are in Christ. These points are 
easily understood, but do the marital vows fit canon law‘s definition of ―public?‖ The 
Code of Canon Law defines ―vow‖ within a section on the ―other acts of divine worship‖ 
(CIC, 1191–92). The use of ―superior‖ in the definition of ―vow‖ seems to suggest that 
authors of the code have religious profession explicitly in mind. I doubt that the authors 
of the code, by mentioning ―superior,‖ are attempting to rule out ―vow‖ as the action of 
fiancés during the marriage rite. Nonetheless, we must take the code seriously here. Even 
if a superior is required for a valid vow, the actions of spouses can still be regarded as 
vows; if we consider a ―superior‖ to be a person canonically responsible for holding the 
vowing party accountable to the object of the vow, then we can easily describe the action 
of fiancés in the nuptial rite as public. After all, they express their consent to each other, 
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 CIC, 1192. 
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the assistant, and the congregation, all of whom represent and are the church. The 
assistant, the other spouse, and all the faithful witnessing (as well as those not present), 
are canonically bound to offer ―the Christian faithful the assistance by which the 
matrimonial state is preserved in a Christian spirit and advances in perfection.‖17 They 
are canonically bound to provide the assistance necessary for the fulfillment of the vows. 
Especially the assistant and the two official witnesses bind themselves to supporting and 
holding accountable the spouses. In this sense, then, the spouses can be said to make their 
vows to a superior; therefore, the conjugal vows are public vows. 
 Are the conjugal vows, like the vows of religion, mixed vows? Are they both 
―personal‖ and ―real?‖ According to canon law, ―a vow is personal if the person making 
the vow promises an action; real if the person making the vow promises some thing; 
mixed if it shares the nature of a personal and a real vow.‖18 The religious profession of 
obedience is a personal vow to actions done in obedience to the rule and the superior. The 
religious profession of poverty is a real vow that makes all material wealth the property 
of the community rather than the individual. The vow of chastity requires an omission of 
certain actions, as well as a commitment to positively chaste actions; it is, therefore, a 
personal vow. Taken together, then, the vows of religion are mixed. The same is true for 
the conjugal vows. The conjugal vows are unquestioningly personal; spouses promise to 
―give yourselves to each other in marriage,‖ to ―love and honor each other as man and 
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 See CIC, 1063–1064: ―Pastors of souls are obliged to take care that their ecclesiastical community offers 
the Christian faithful the assistance by which the matrimonial state is preserved in a Christian spirit and 
advances in perfection. This assistance must be offered especially by: (1) preaching, catechesis adapted to 
minors, youth, and adults…(2) personal preparation to enter marriage, which disposes the spouses to the 
holiness and duties of their new state; (3) a fruitful liturgical celebration of marriage which is to show that 
that the spouses signify and share in the mystery of the unity and fruitful love between Christ and the 
Church; (4) help offered to those who are married, so that faithfully preserving and protecting the conjugal 
covenant, they daily come to lead holier and fuller lives in their family…It is for the local ordinary to take 
care that such assistance is organized fittingly.‖  
18
 CIC, 1192.3. 
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wife,‖ and to ―accept children lovingly, and bring them up according to the law of Christ 
and his Church.‖ All of these promises require a whole host of actions and practices, 
what Gaudium et spes calls a ―totius vitae consuetudo.‖19 Further, the conjugal vows are 
no less real vows than the religious vows. The distinction is that the conjugal vows are 
implicit rather than explicit regarding the ―things‖ concerned. The plain fact is that no 
spouse could fulfill the actions required in the personal aspect of the vows without a 
sharing of things. Secondly, one of the forms of expressing consent uses the words ―for 
richer, for poorer.‖ The implication here is that the spouses will be richer or poorer 
together, and that possession of certain material wealth will not be a condition of their 
union.
20
 The conjugal vows, like the vows of religion, are mixed. 
Finally, we must ask what it means to say that a marriage vow is solemn. A 
marriage vow will not be solemn in the same sense that religious vows are solemn. Some 
religious institutes center around simple vows (e.g., institutes of apostolic life) and others 
around solemn vows (e.g., monastic orders).
21
 Whereas simple vows make actions 
contrary to the vow illicit, solemn vows make actions contrary to the vow invalid. For 
example, a member of an apostolic religious congregation requires permission to use 
items she owns, but a member of the Jesuit order is canonically incapable of owning any 
property. In marriage, though, all marriage vows are solemn. Aquinas offers some help in 
understanding how ―solemn‖ applies to marriage. Aquinas uses the term ―solemn‖ and 
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 GS, 50. 
20
 Civil marriage law understands both of the spouses to be sharers in the property of the marriage, 
requiring an equal division of assets in the case of divorce. Of course, this has less to do with the notion of 
sharing the whole of one‘s life and more to do with protecting divorcees (especially women) from 
destitution upon divorce. I am not making recourse to the civil law for support to the claim that marriage is 
a real vow. 
21
 See John P. Beal, et al., New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 2000), 
1417–18. 
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―solemnization‖ to speak of the marriage rite.22 His explanation offers good reason that a 
marriage ought to be considered as including solemn vows. ―Solemnization,‖ writes 
Thomas: 
Is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some 
particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage 
is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over 
their bodies to one another…or [when a person] embraces the state of perfection 
by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule.
23
  
 
―It is not customary,‖ he continues, ―to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a 
new state, as we have said above.‖24 For Aquinas, it is on account of the total gift 
involved that one can consider the nuptial rite and the religious profession solemn. If we 
understand the marital promise to give oneself and receive the other, then we would be on 
solid ground to call such the conjugal vow solemn indeed.  
 This section has shown that the giving and receiving of consent in marriage can 
be called a vow as the term is understood in canon law and the theology of Aquinas. The 
upshot of this fact is that marriage can be more fully understood as a participation in 
vowed ecclesial life, not because married people are borrowing some aspect of what is 
proper only to religious life, but because both are sharing in a common ecclesial practice 
of making vows about the way people commit to living in God‘s household. 
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 Civil codes of many states in the United States refer to ―solemnization‖ of marriage. A solemnization 
was required and is required in many civil codes for the marriage to be considered valid. The Anglican 
communion still refers to the marriage rite as a ―solemnization.‖ This fact is reflected in the development of 
marriage theology and pre-marital preparation programs among Anglican theologians. For example, Bishop 
Spong (John S. Spong, Living in Sin? A Bishop Rethinks Human Sexuality [New York: HarperCollins, 
1988]) and Adrian Thatcher have both proposed step-wise entrances into marriage that begin with a 
betrothal rite, a civil marriage, and a later solemnization of the marriage in an ecclesial rite. See Thatcher, 
Marriage After Modernity: Christian Marriage in Postmodern Times (Sheffield, England: Sheffield 
Academic, 1999), chap. 4. 
23
 Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 88, a. 7., resp. 
24
 Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 88, a. 7, rpl. obj. 2. 
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MARRIAGE AND CONSECRATION AS ANTHROPOLOGICALLY 
FUNDAMENTAL 
 
Vows, which take central position in both consecrated and matrimonial life, provide 
a consonance between the matrimonial and consecrated states. Those making vows of 
religion and marriage both offer themselves as gift to an other, and both accept all that an 
other has to give. The question among scholars remains, what is the most basic gift the 
human persons can make to each other in community? What does the human and the 
human community need to be given? In light of the Christian anthropology of John Paul 
II, which finds a spousal, or nuptial, orientation at the center of human existence, one 
group of scholars will find celibacy to be the most revelatory vow of religion, and the one 
that both links and distinguishes conjugal life and consecrated life. On the other hand, we 
will find in Aquinas and von Balthasar the opinion that obedience, as a gift of the will, 
constitutes a more fundamental gift than celibacy. On this account, marriage and religious 
life are both distinguished and united by the living of these vows. 
 Much of this chapter will deal with truths about each human person, but what 
must remain in the forefront of our minds is the social, ecclesial shape of the argument I 
have been making and continue to make here. Whatever they may tell us about the human 
person, the religious and conjugal vows only speak in the ecclesial context. They are only 
possible, after all, for persons who, by baptism, constitute a communion of persons in 
Christ, a communion of persons formed into the bride of Christ. David Crawford, who 
studies the anthropological foundations within the vows of religion, notes the following: 
―Marriage and virginity are also fuller ‗expression‘ (FC, 11, 56; RD, 7) or ‗articulation‘ 
and ‗disclosure,‘ of the interior meaning of the communion initiated in the ‗fundamental 
292 
 
choice‘ of faith (VS, 65–66), contained universally in Baptism, and the other sacraments 
of initiation.‖25 This baptism foresees already the future vows. Furthermore, the vows of 
religion and matrimony are, in a sense, the church‘s vows. Rather than disclosing this or 
that truth about each individual, they declare the truth about the church as Christ‘s pure 
and holy bride, as God‘s holy people renouncing sin and embracing the way of the Lord 
Jesus. In the vowed religious, the church prophetically declares Christ‘s complete gift of 
self in renunciation and obedience; in the married the church prophetically declares 
present Christ‘s complete gift of self in favor of his indissoluble bond of love for the 
Church. The vows of religion manifest ecclesial truths: (1) that the church is Christ‘s 
body, living in and sharing his virtues of poverty, chastity, and obedience; and (2) that the 
Church is Christ‘s bride given to the bridegroom fully, faithfully, freely, and fruitfully. 
Thus, while I may be speaking in the coming sections of what the vows tell us about 
anthropos, what they say is only intelligible within the context of the church and because 
of what Christ has done by joining himself to humanity in the Incarnation. 
With John Paul II, David Crawford has made the claim that ―the states of life—
that is to say, marriage and consecration—are ‗fundamental to,‘ and therefore disclose the 
meaning of, Christian community and, indeed, all authentically human community.‖26 
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 David Crawford, ―Christian Community and the States of Life: A Reflection on the Anthropological 
Significance of Virginity and Marriage,‖ Communio 29.2 (2002): 337–365, at 342. Crawford‘s thesis is 
about Christian community rather than the Christian individual, ultimately: ―The thesis of this essay, then, 
is that the states of life—that is to say, marriage and consecration—are ‗fundamental to,‘ and therefore 
disclose the inner meaning of, Christian community and, indeed, all authentically human community. By 
‗fundamental‘ I mean that marriage and virginity engage the human person‘s desire and freedom for 
community at their deepest level, the level at which the human person is capax Dei. This is because human 
desire and freedom are ordered at their deepest level within the human vocation to communion in love (cf. 
Veritatis Splendor, 86)‖ (ibid., 341). Furthermore, Matthias Scheeben, in the classic Mysteries of 
Christianity (trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. [St. Louis: Herder, 1946], 374, 543–44) points to the nuptial character 
of all the sacraments of initiation. The Incarnation itself is a union of Christ to all of humanity that is 
nuptial in character because it prepares for and makes possible a union of one flesh, a nuptial union 
between the Christian and Christ, as well as the entire Church to Christ.  
26
 David Crawford, ―Christian Community,‖ 341. 
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Recall that Christian community can be understood as householding with God, and that 
entering the household was understood through John‘s Gospel with domestic language 
(birth, death, filiality, and marriage).
27
 Crawford‘s claim is, in a sense, an intensification 
of the reality I described in the last chapter. For Crawford, spousal language reveals not 
only a part of ecclesial and human domestic reality, but spousal language discloses the 
reality of ecclesial community and all human community. As Crawford puts it, ―marriage 
and virginity engage the human person‘s desire and freedom for community at the 
deepest level, the level at which the human person is capax Dei. This is because human 
desire and freedom are ordered at their deepest level within the human vocation to 
communion in love.‖28 This desire is a desire to love and be loved; this freedom is a 
freedom for communion with God and man.  
Both of these capacities (for love and freedom) are fulfilled, Crawford suggests, 
in Mary the mother of God, in whom resides both virginal and nuptial vocations. But 
even though Mary is one person, we must continue to see this as an ecclesial truth. Mary 
is an embodiment of the Church. She is mysteriously mother, body, and bride of Christ at 
once. Recall from chapter three how Augustine claimed that virgins and married persons 
share in Mary‘s motherhood of Christ by bearing the same Christ in their heart. As 
Crawford has it: ―Both the counsels and marriage offer the form and content of the 
Marian fiat and receptivity, and therefore, as I would argue, of nuptial ‗belonging,‘ and 
all Christian and human communion.‖29 Mary‘s fiat, and the church‘s with it, are 
meaningful not because they are said by Mary as individual woman, but because they 
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 Chapter four spoke of John the Baptist as the friend of the bridegroom calling us to wed the Lord who is 
both bridegroom and wedding guest. This same Lord is also our brother. This same Lord also washes and 
feeds us, and raises us to life. John‘s vision of the ecclesial life is domestic. 
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were and are uttered by one taken up into the mystery of salvation. In Mary‘s case by the 
grace of immaculate conception, in the church‘s case by the grace of the Spirit at 
Pentecost and the continued grace in the sacraments of Christian initiation. 
What is it about marriage and consecrated life that makes them revelations of 
human nature and the nature of human community? Crawford had proposed that both 
states in life relate to the fundamental human desire to love and be loved. Von Balthasar 
has suggested that ―any true love has the inner form of a vow.‖30 The fact that both the 
married and religious states of life are constituted by vows provides Crawford guidance. 
The vows of religion, for Crawford, fundamentally disclose the nature of the human 
person as creature. Poverty ―expresses the true situation of the creature before his 
Creator.‖ Vowing poverty makes a prophetic reality of the fact that we are radically 
contingent beings, dependent and without rightful claim before God to personal goods 
and resources, let alone existence itself. The vow of poverty reminds the religious and the 
non-vowed that we depend on God as and for our origin, our sustenance, and our telos. 
We did not originate ourselves, nor do we sustain ourselves by something we have 
created. As church we do not sanctify ourselves. We offer continual thanksgiving at the 
eucharistic table for the holiness God has wrought in us. Finally, we are destined for 
something beyond ourselves completely. Poverty is witnessed by the Incarnation (Phil 
2:16), as well as in the Trinity itself, which contains an eternal ―from‖—Son begotten 
from the Father, Spirit proceeding from Father and Son.
31
 
Obedience too reveals the contingent nature of the person coram Deo. In our post-
lapsarian context, the vow of obedience is our constant reminder of the long narrative of 
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salvation history. Because of the Fall, all Christian life takes the character of ―returning to 
God.‖32 Following the exitus/reditus motif, obedience is a reminder of the fellowship and 
friendship with God that we left behind, as well as the friendship and fellowship with 
God to which Christ invites us. Christ‘s own obedience discloses not only what we are 
from but what we are for. God the Son is begotten from the Father and exists for 
obedience to the Father‘s will. The Son‘s obedience is so complete that the Son‘s will is 
identical to the Father‘s will. This fact is expressed in the Christological doctrine of 
Christ‘s two wills, both human and divine.33 In light of who Jesus is and what he has 
done, we are invited to live as Christ did, entirely for God‘s will and purpose, which is 
our participation in his reign on earth now and his eternal heavenly kingdom to come. As 
Crawford has it, ―Creaturely, finite freedom is the ‗image of the triune Persons‘ infinite 
freedom, and again, in the first instance, the image of the ‗from‘ and ‗for,‘ and the 
freedom in the obedience of the Son.‖ ―Freedom, in other words, is both ‗given‘ to the 
creature and authentically his own.‖34 Interestingly, even our obedience amplifies our 
awareness of the poverty mentioned above. We cannot obey as Christ does, freely and 
completely. Our power to obey freely is itself a gift from God: one we possess as our own, 
but one that did not originate in us. Furthermore, obedience requires discipline and 
asceticism. 
 Before moving on, I would like to offer a nuance to Crawford‘s exposition of 
obedience, poverty, human nature, and freedom. We must keep in mind that his thesis is 
to demonstrate that the evangelical counsels reveal the nature of Christian and human 
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community, not merely individuals. In what we have seen above, the focus, though, 
seems to land more on the individual than the community. That the social question is not 
explicitly taken up here need not imply that he rejects it. What I would like to do is 
foreground the social implications of what he has said about poverty and obedience. 
Poverty declares our need for community, and obedience enacts our commitment to 
return to God in community (that is, together), understanding that obedience to God the 
Father must be mediated in and through community. For poverty in solitude is destitution, 
and obedience in isolation ends with pride, the obedience to oneself alone.  
 
Consecrated Celibacy as Anthropologically Fundamental 
 
While poverty and obedience are important, it is virginity (consecrated celibacy) 
that often takes primacy of place and honor in thinking on the vows of religion.
35
 
Crawford argues that virginity is fundamental in the deepest, anthropological-ontological 
way:  
Poverty expresses the fact that man‘s origin and end can never be claimed as his 
own; obedience expresses the fact that freedom always implies obedience to the 
truth of the other. However, virginity‘s particular expression of creaturehood 
seems more explicitly to indicate the fundamental human ‗desire‘ and possibility 
of belonging to God.
36
  
 
Virginity transforms and contains within it the breadth of human love, which 
involves desiring the other for oneself (eros) as well as desiring the good of the other 
(agape). Relying on John Paul II‘s theology of religious life in Vita consecrata and 
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Redemptionis donum, as well as on John Paul II‘s collection of audiences now titled Man 
and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, Crawford identifies the deepest 
human response as nuptial, and concludes with John Paul II that the deepest human desire 
is also nuptial or spousal.
37
 Thus, what makes virginity fundamental among the religious 
vows is the same thing that makes it so similar to the conjugal vows. Or, as Crawford has 
it, the vow of virginity ―reflects the totality of the gift of self as bodily-spiritual 
creature.‖38   
Crawford is not alone in finding sexual renunciation the most fundamental of the 
religious vows. Nor is he alone in relating it explicitly to the marital vow of fidelity. 
Sandra Schneiders, who does not treat Crawford‘s work, shares his conclusion that 
virginity is the essential vow of religion; in her in-depth analysis of consecrated celibacy 
she defines it as the central vow of the consecrated religious life in community. In fact 
she calls vowed religious life by the title ―consecrated celibacy‖ throughout the work. 
Schneiders prefers the term ―consecrated celibacy‖ to ―virginity,‖ as the latter often over-
focuses on physical state and has been reduced to a commitment that makes a person 
more available for ministerial freedom. Schneiders prefers ―celibacy‖ for its 
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 In VC, 14, John Paul II calls this vow the first and essential counsel. Further, in Redemptionis donum, 11 
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anthropological richness. She, with John Paul II, values the nuptial language of 
consecrated celibacy. Sexual abstinence in celibacy, she writes, ―is analogous to the role 
of sexual fidelity in monogamous marriage.‖39 It is a corollary flowing from the total gift 
of self to the other—in marriage the spouse, in celibacy Christ.40 Schneiders defines 
―consecrated celibacy‖ as ―the freely chosen response to a personally discerned vocation 
to charismatically grounded, religiously motivated, sexually abstinent, lifelong 
commitment to Christ that is externally symbolized by remaining unmarried.‖41 
Furthermore (for Schneiders), celibacy is the fundamental vow of religion because it 
alone is a biblical counsel, the vow most prophetic in the face of contemporary culture, 
and the most anthropologically basic vow.
42
 ―Celibacy is the constitutive vow of religious 
life because it creates the lifeform of unmediated quest for God to the exclusion of all 
other primary life commitments.‖43 In Schneiders‘s account, who and what we love 
determines who we are and whose we are. Thus celibacy is the definitive vow of religion 
since by it a person commits to love and seek God exclusively. 
What we have seen in these authors
44
 is that some theologies of the consecrated 
and conjugal life place celibacy in a central a position because the authors assume the 
anthropological priority of the human person‘s nuptial potency as developed by John Paul 
II. Marriage to another Christian or marriage to Christ himself are the two responses to 
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the fundamental human potency to be given to and receive another person completely and 
definitively as mysterious union of spirit and flesh. Both are connected to the 
eschatological union of the church with its bridegroom, but in distinct ways: one is an 
anticipation of the eschatological union of the entire church to Christ as bride to 
bridegroom; the other is the commitment in this world to make present by grace that 
eschatological reality in the relationship of one man and one woman.
45
 This nuptial 
reality, as a reality of receiving and giving, reveals where we are from and what we are 
for. Therefore, if this nuptial reality really is at the heart of both religious and conjugal 
life, it also determines that both religious and matrimonial life ―constitutively and 
objectively possesses the ‗form of holiness.‖46 The consonance between religious and 
conjugal life, then, includes the fact that both are ―specific source‖ and ―original means‖ 
of sanctification.
47
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 See VC, 7. John Paul II writes that consecrated virgins, ―either alone or in association with others, they 
constitute a special eschatological image of the Heavenly Bride and of the life to come, when the Church 
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which is the proper and specific way in which the spouses participate in and are called to live the very 
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46
 Crawford, ―Christian Community,‖ 354. 
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While Schneiders and Crawford identify the prophetic and signifying quality of 
the vows (especially celibacy), they leave out the understanding of the vows as ―means‖ 
or ―practices.‖ Consecrated life functions as a means because it is constituted by practices 
ordered explicitly to growth in holiness (e.g., through a rule of life). Marriage, too, 
functions as such a means because each spouse daily ministers to the other the grace of 
the sacrament constituted by their marriage as a ―totius vitae consuetudo et communio.‖48 
Marriage and virginity are complements, but not because one is a group of holy persons 
to pray for the other, nor because one renounces what the other takes up. True, 
consecrated celibacy witnesses to a complete devotion to our primary relationship with 
the God who created, redeemed, and gives himself to each person in the power of the 
Spirit, but ―marriage helps consecration to avoid a kind of individualism: in revealing 
something of the nature of nuptiality, it shows that virginity is not a kind of ‗aloofness,‘ 
or a self-centered search for ‗my holiness,‘ but is ordered to a radical communion of 
persons,‖49 a similar earthly communion of persons and the identical trinitarian 
communion of persons toward which matrimony orders spouses.   
It is no surprise, then, when Crawford makes the further claim that, since the 
states of life both reveal anthropological truth, the states of life also disclose ecclesial 
truth. The states of life tell us as much about community as they do about the individual. 
Again, at the center of this claim lies the assumption that the nuptial desire and response 
of the human person is most fundamental, and that this desire and response is active in 
the life of both vowed religious and married persons. In this way of thinking, the 
consecrated life is directed toward the universal, the whole ecclesial community whereas 
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marriage is directed toward a particular person and a particular ecclesia domestica as a 
specific instantiation of the ecclesial communion.
50
   
While Crawford and Schneiders identified celibacy as the most fundamental vow 
of religion because they follow on John Paul II‘s notion of the nuptial orientation at the 
center of the human person,
51
 another contemporary theologian, Jörg Splett gives 
primacy to virginity for different reasons. Splett bases his anthropology of human 
relations and desires on Paul Zulehner‘s phenomenology of humanity‘s primordial and 
intrinsically measureless desires for name, power, and a home.
52
 Zulehner‘s is a 
specification of Paul Ricoeur‘s phenomenological understanding of human striving for 
property, dominion, and recognition.
53
 For Splett, these measureless desires are 
manifested in a fundamental I-Thou relationship.
54
 The Christian is the one who, like 
Jesus in his desert temptation, has died to the totalizing hunger of these desires in 
preference for the word and will of God. In other words, ―my human person is nothing 
but how I am called by God and how I am to answer his call.‖55 The response of the 
Christian is to find oneself named, empowered, and at home in and with another. The ―I‖ 
is found in and with a ―Thou.‖ For the consecrated religious, this I-Thou relationship is 
principally between the believer and God in as unmediated a way as possible. If it is 
mediated, then it is mediated by the whole religious community. 
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That this human-divine, I-Thou relationship is the fundamental one for the vowed 
religious is expressed and effected in the vow of chastity. Together with God, the 
consecrated religious is oriented toward love for and service to whomever God places in 
her path, in a union and service that are mediated through life with God. On the other 
hand, for married persons, the principal I-Thou relation is between the spouses. The 
spouses seek a relationship as unmediated as possible, a sign of which is their conjugal 
intercourse. It is first with and in the spouse that each finds a name, empowerment, and a 
home. That this relationship is fundamental for the spouses is expressed and effected in 
their conjugal vow of fidelity. Together with her spouse, a wife is oriented toward union 
with and service to God, a union and service that are mediated through life with the 
spouse. 
On the one hand, there is much to recommend these conclusions about the 
fundamental centrality of celibacy and its ability to create availability for ministry. 
Vowing not to marry another person would seem to create the freedom for more radical 
devotion to ministry in the larger community. By renouncing sexual intimacy with any 
one person, the religious seems to become more available for more widespread relational 
commitment as well. Vowing spousal fidelity to Christ in consecrated celibacy, the 
religious prefigures the universal, eschatological wedding in which the entire church will 
participate. Vowing poverty explicitly orders one‘s use of material things to the good of 
the community and subjects that use to obedience of the community. Vowing obedience 
involves honoring the will of the community in preference to one‘s own.  
On the other hand, many authors in the last 15 years authors resist this apparently 
over-simple dichotomy. As we saw in the introduction and chapter 1, For Donald Miller, 
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Lisa Sowle Cahill, Julie Hanlon Rubio, Florence Caffrey Bourg, and David M. McCarthy, 
the family has for too long been besmirched as radically more inward-focused than 
consecrated life. If it truly is an ecclesia domestica, then it ought to be as outward-
focused on mission and ministry of evangelism and charity to the poor as the rest of the 
church.
56
 Further, Parrella and Russell have argued that the vowed religious life provides 
no more of an unmediated experience of and devotion to God than the married life;
57
 
therefore it cannot be characterized as any more universally oriented than married life. 
Ultimately, while authors disagree over the universal/particular orientations, and the 
ministerial/inward foci of the states of life, it is agreed that both disclose in a 
complementary way the nature of the person and the nature of human, ecclesial 
community. Both, then, while distinct, are consonant with one another. 
 
Vowed Obedience as Anthropologically Fundamental 
 
Not all theologians of the twentieth century assess the vows through a lens that 
finds celibacy at the center. Those who find another vow at the center of conjugal and 
religious life often follow the lead of Aquinas. Aquinas treats the vows in the Summa 
theologiae and in his less studied work The Perfection of the Spiritual Life. In both places, 
Aquinas identifies the religious state as a unity in three parts:  
[1] as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity; [2] as quieting the 
human mind from outward solicitude, according to (1Cor 7:32): ―I would have 
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you to be without solicitude‖; and [3] thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers 
himself and his possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the 
religious state is constituted by these three vows.
58
 
 
Among these aspects of human life (external possession, body, and will) and the three 
vows, the will and its corollary, obedience, rank first as most essential because they 
include the other two and are preferred in Scripture:  
The vow which, of all the three religious vows, belongs most peculiarly to the 
religious life, is that of obedience. This is clear for several reasons. First, because, 
by obedience man sacrifices to God his own will; by chastity, on the other hand, 
he offers his body, and by poverty his external possessions. Now, since the body 
is worth more than material goods the vow of chastity is superior in merit to that 
of poverty, but the vow of obedience is of more value than either of the other two. 
Secondly, because it is by his own will that a man makes use either of his body or 
his goods: therefore, he who sacrifices his own will, sacrifices everything else that 
he has. Again, the vow of obedience is more universal than that of either poverty 
or chastity, and hence it includes them both. This is the reason why Samuel 
preferred obedience to all other offerings and sacrifices, saying, ―Obedience is 
better than sacrifices (1 Kgs 15:22).
59
 
 
So important is the vow of obedience, that even ―if a man without taking a vow of 
obedience were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not 
therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity observed even 
by vow.‖60 Aquinas has made an argument that depends on a stepwise anthropology. A 
sacrifice of the body includes a sacrifice of the way the body interacts with external 
possessions. A sacrifice of the will, however, involves a sacrifice of the body as well as 
external possessions, for the one giving up his own will no longer determines for what 
end to use his body nor controls the use of what were his external possessions.   
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The notion of ―holocaust‖ is also central for why Aquinas privileges obedience 
over celibacy. Aquinas sees the religious state as a ―holocaust,‖ or complete offering to 
God. Aquinas depends here on the distinction between ―sacrifice‖ and ―holocaust‖ made 
in the Jewish law, and an interpretation of that distinction made by St. Gregory‘s 
commentary on Ezekiel, which states, ―when, therefore, a man vows one thing to God 
and does not vow another, he offers a sacrifice. When, however, he dedicates to the 
Almighty all that he has, all that he takes pleasure in, and his entire life, he is offering a 
holocaust.‖61 Because the vows of religion offer the whole of the person, they are the 
perfection of charity
62
 and penitence in sacrifice to God.
63
 They are a holocaust to God. 
Furthermore, ―nothing,‖ writes Aquinas: 
is dearer to any man than the freedom of his will, whereby he is lord of others, 
can use what he pleases, can enjoy what he wills, and is master of his own 
actions…Nothing is so repugnant to human nature as slavery; and, therefore, there 
is no greater sacrifice (except that of life), which one man can make for another, 
than to give himself up to bondage for the sake of that other. Hence, the younger 
Tobias said to the angel (Tobit 9:2), ―If I should give myself to be thy servant, I 
should not make a worthy return for thy care.‖64 
 
Aquinas‘s position was not lost with the turn to an appreciation of love as motive 
and constituent element in marriage. There are twentieth century theologians who 
embrace Aquinas‘ position as he argued it. For example, Hans Urs von Balthasar argues 
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that ―one must agree with Thomas Aquinas when he says that obedience is the most 
essential and most decisive act of the total gift of self (2a 2ae 186, 8).‖ Seeing obedience 
rather than celibacy at the center of self-gift does not prevent an explicitly thomistic 
understanding of the vows from linking the religious state and the married state. In von 
Balthasar‘s thought, for example, both the matrimonial state and the religious state are 
constituted by a complete gift of self in vows.  
Von Balthasar must place obedience at the center of each state of life if there is to 
be a consonance between them. It is obedience that simultaneously draws the two states 
of life together and distinguishes them. Both married and religious make a complete gift 
of self that is a gift of the will necessarily involving both body and possessions. For Von 
Balthasar the distinction is in the direct recipient of this gift. For the religious, the gift is 
made to God in the most unmediated way; whereas for the married person the gift is 
made directly to the spouse, who mediates it as a gift to God.
65
 The religious can 
completely expropriate her will for the common good of the church and be subject to 
Christ through the Church, but the married person‘s will can be completely expropriated 
only within the confines of the marriage and family, whose claims on the will of each 
spouse precede those of the wider church: 
It would not make sense, nor would it likely be beneficial, for a married woman to 
make a private vow to her confessor concerning one of the three areas of life 
[possessions, body, soul], since the power over these spheres belongs in principle 
to the common spirit of marriage and family that holds sway between the 
marriage partners. If this spirit is understood and lived aright, it already 
expropriates the individuals sufficiently and trains them in the gift of self. Thus 
one can say that the states of life ought not to be mixed, precisely because they 
are already adequately united in that which distinguishes them, namely in selfless 
Christian love.
66
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So the difference between von Balthasar and John Paul II, for example, is not that only 
one of these theologians can speak of total self-gift in marriage. The distinction is 
between the language used to describe the constitutive elements of that gift.  
Von Balthasar‘s position is clear, but perhaps he misses an avenue whereby 
spousal will can be understood as completely expropriated for the common good of the 
whole Church. After all, the claim of the dissertation is that married and monastic 
belonging in ecclesial communion is the vital link between these states of life. If one 
understands the Christian family as domestic church, the smallest unit of the church, then, 
even if the family is the immediate context, the will of the spouses is put directly at the 
service of this domestic church, which simultaneously serves the common good and 
mission of the entire Church. Perhaps, then, it is not a question of whether the will can be 
completely expropriated for the common good of the Church, but rather it is a question of 
who mediates the expropriation of that will. For the will of spouses or celibates can be 
expropriated, and both can be expropriated ecclesially. In the case of the religious, the 
superior of the order mediates the expropriation as a representative of God the Father; in 
the case of the married person, the other spouse (or the spouses ―common will‖ for their 
marriage) mediates the expropriation as a representative of Christ the bridegroom.  
 
Nuptial and Obediential language of Vowed Life:  
Point of Contact, Point of Distinction 
  
 The question now appears, is there any way to find a common ground between 
those who use the ―nuptial‖ language of self-gift and the ―obediential‖ language of self-
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gift? The answer is yes. For both groups, the principle of ―giftedness‖ lies behind the 
anthropological truth disclosed by the vows of religion, and also by the vows of 
matrimony. I mean this in two ways. First, the vows disclose the radical contingency of 
the human person, his or her need to receive the gift of communion, the gift of love, the 
gift of God‘s will in the person‘s life. Even before the fall it was not good for Adam to be 
alone; partnership is requisite, commanded. In nuptial terms one would say that each 
person is incomplete unless she has received the gift of love from another in an 
unconditional, indissoluble way. This gift can be received in marriage, but it is always 
received by the child, who in the first days of life accepts love from the tender embrace of 
a nursing mother or the cooing father. Those using ―obediential‖ language would 
emphasize the fact that the call to a vowed life (whether matrimony or religious orders) 
requires a gift and is, therefore, supra-voluntary. So whether through marriage or 
consecrated life, a vowed life requires in itself an abnegation of the will. As von 
Balthasar puts it, ―the act of handing oneself over to God must be done not at one‘s own 
disposal, but only on the basis of a particular condition of being disposed of, being called, 
and receiving grace; otherwise this act would contradict itself as soon as it was posited.‖ 
All one can do is ―to allow oneself to be brought into this state.‖67 Both see a lack in the 
human person, but where the ―nuptial‖ language sees it filled by the reception of love 
from a person (whether Christ is mediated by religious community or a human spouse), 
the ―obediential language‖ sees this lack filled by a gracious gift of God‘s will in the 
person‘s life (for example, in Mary‘s fiat). It is Mary who brings both of these positions 
together in herself. Mary receives the love of a person (Christ the Son of God, and also 
Joseph of Nazareth) as an act of obedience to God. 
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 By the second sense of human ―giftedness,‖ both nuptial and obediential language 
of the vowed life demonstrate the human person‘s potency to be given to another 
completely. For those who use nuptial language this means that a person‘s definitive and 
unconditional gift of self to another is expressed in the giving over of the body, which is a 
sign of and necessarily involves the presence of the whole person. Thus we find sexual 
exclusivity of marriage and the sexual exclusivity of religious life central for those using 
nuptial language. 
For those using obediential language this capacity for gift of self is expressed in 
terms of the will rather than the body alone as sign of what is given. When one hands 
over the will, the body necessarily comes with it. Again Mary serves to synthesize the 
two positions well. Her fiat involved the gift of both body (the pregnancy and her 
perpetual virginity) and the will (she would not have chosen pregnancy out of wedlock 
for herself). ―Mary is the origin and foundation of both Christian states of life: quite 
explicitly of virginity (Lk 1:35), but also of marriage, since we cannot overlook her 
presence at Cana and under the Cross. She is Virgin and Mother; but considered more 
precisely, she is Mother because she is Virgin.‖68 Mary‘s complete gift of self draws 
together the tension between celibacy and obedience at the root of a vowed life. 
 
MARRIAGE AND CONSECRATED LIFE AS  
CHRISTOLOGICALLY FUNDAMENTAL 
  
 Not only do the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience disclose what human 
nature has and what the human person lacks, but as evangelical counsels (or as some have 
it, evangelical imperatives) they disclose the truth about Christ and thus the truth about 
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what we as church, as Christ‘s body and Christ‘s bride are invited to become and are in 
fact incorporated into with baptism. 
 In this section I make the argument that the evangelical counsels are 
Christomorphic, that is, they take the shape of Christ‘s life, death, and resurrection. For 
the most part, my exploration here will be more directly related to the life of the 
consecrated religious, and I will leave to chapter six a fuller demonstration of the 
evangelical counsels in the conjugal life. This section is most concerned to show how 
these counsels are firmly rooted in Christ, and are, therefore, a proper goal of all practices 
of Christian householding.  
―Those called by God to the practice of the evangelical counsels,‖ states Perfectae 
caritatis, ―bind themselves to the Lord in a special way, following Christ, who chaste and 
poor (cf. Mt 8:20; Lk 9:58) redeemed and sanctified men through obedience even to 
death on the Cross (cf. Phil 2:8).‖ In the words of the Blessed Columba Marmion, O.S.B., 
―Christ is ‗the Religious‘ supereminently, and the character of the Rule is 
Christocentric.‖69 As John Paul II puts it in Vita consecrata, those who live the 
evangelical counsels ―make Christ the whole meaning of their lives,‖ and they 
―reproduce the form of life that Jesus accepted and lived.‖ Consecrated life is a ―living 
memorial of Jesus‘ way of living and acting.‖70 Inasmuch as they are lived, they conform 
the Christian to Christ. The life of the vows is a gift from the Father to be like the son, 
joined to him in a special way by imitation, by a marriage of sorts, but through the Spirit 
by which the life of the vows expresses the eschatological fulfillment the Church awaits 
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(VC, 14).
71
 Because all Christians are incorporated into Christ, all should be conformed 
to his virtues in a manner appropriate to their state. Furthermore, if (as was argued above) 
the religious vows reveal a truth also found in marriage, then it follows that these vows 
have a role in conforming conjugal life as well as religious life to Christ‘s own life, death, 
and resurrection. 
 
Christ the Poor 
 
 Jesus Christ, son of Mary, son of God, is at once the richest and poorest man to 
live. The loci for developing the evangelical counsel of poverty are biblical and 
traditional. Mt 19:16-22 (rich young ruler; passage through the eye of a needle; reward in 
heaven), Lk 18:18-23 (rich young ruler; passage through eye of needle; reward now and 
in heaven), and Mk 10:17–22 (rich young ruler; passage through eye of needle; reward 
now and in heaven) are three gospel passages directly associated with the vow of poverty. 
Jesus called particular people to sell all and follow him (rich young man). His closest 
followers, the twelve, left all and followed him to great reward. Others took similar 
action without an explicit request from Jesus (Zaccheus [Lk 19:1–10]; Matthew [Mt 9:9]). 
On yet other occasions, Jesus seems to make renunciation a requisite for discipleship 
(―So therefore, whoever of you does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple‖ 
[Lk 14:33]). At a broader level, Jesus‘ own iterant lifestyle witnessed to a kind of poverty. 
Jesus claims that ―foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the son of man 
has nowhere to lay his head (Lk 9:58). When he sends out his disciples to preach he 
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forbids them to carry anything beyond the most basic needs (Mt 10:5–15; Mk 6:7–13; Lk 
9:1–6, 10:1–11). Even more extreme, Jesus seems to suggest that people throw planning 
and caution to the wind ([Mt 6:25–34] be as the birds and the lilies; care for today not 
tomorrow). Finally, Jesus even seems to reverse the proverbial wisdom of his forbears 
when he states in the sermon on the mount/plain: ―blessed are the poor‖ (Mt 5:3–12; Lk 
6:20–26). Finally, in light of their experience of Jesus, and after Jesus has risen and sent 
the Spirit, the Christian community in Acts 2:44–45 and 4:32–35 voluntarily shared 
possessions in common in order to provide for the needs of all.  
 At the same time, though, Jesus was not destitute, and commentators have been 
quick to declare that Jesus does not condone destitute poverty.
72
 Although Jesus 
possessed nothing as his own, he certainly relied on and commended supporters who 
remained wealthy. Jesus and his disciples travelled with a communal fund of money (held 
by Judas [Jn 12:6]). Martha, Mary, and Lazarus (who hosted Jesus [Lk 10:38; Jn 11–
12:3]), Joseph of Aramathea (in whose tomb he was buried [Mk 15:42–43]), Zaccheus 
(who hosted Jesus [Lk 19:1–10]), and the woman who spent 300 denarii on perfume for 
Jesus (Mk 14:1–11; Jn 12:1–11) each possessed substantial means. Each of these 
generously applied their means on behalf of the gospel. For Jesus, the question of riches 
often came down to a question of where and what. Where are your riches, and what 
counts as riches? (E.g., Mt 6:19–24, store up treasure in heaven, not on earth.) Christ‘s 
poverty claims that God is man‘s only treasure and portion. Jesus witnesses to this fact 
during his desert temptation, recalling a spirituality rich in the Hebrew Scriptures. When 
the devil tempts him to rely on his own power for sustenance, Jesus rejects him with 
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God‘s word in Scripture (Deut 8:3), saying that ―man shall not live by bread alone, but by 
every word that proceeds from the mouth of God‖ (Mt 4:4; Lk 4:4). In John‘s gospel, just 
after Jesus has told a woman at a well that he offers life-giving water, the disciples return 
from their trip to buy food. They then ―besought him, saying, ‗Rabbi, eat.‘ But he said to 
them, ‗I have food to eat of which you do not know.‘ So the disciples said to one another, 
‗Has any one brought him food?‘ Jesus said to them, ‗My food is to do the will of him 
who sent me, and to accomplish his work‖ (Jn 4:31–34).    
 The witness of Jesus‘ own life, the lives of those who followed him and supported 
him, and the life of the early Church suggests that poverty is as much about ―giving 
everything‖ as it is about ―having nothing.‖73 In one sense, poverty is not a means to 
holiness but a reaction to what Christ has done in our life. Francis Moloney offers an 
interesting exegesis of the ―rich young man story‖ as it appears in the synoptic Gospels. 
A young man approaches Jesus and asks what he must do to attain the kingdom of heaven. 
Jesus replies, and the man is satisfied to be on track. But the man continues, asking Jesus 
what he must do to be perfect. Jesus replies that he must sell all, give to the poor, and 
then come follow him. As is well known, the man leaves crestfallen, for he has many 
possessions. The assumption is that he does not sell all and follow Jesus. One 
interpretation of this passage is that there are two kinds of Christians, those called to 
attain the kingdom (by following the commandments), and those elites called to radical 
renunciation. Moloney refuses any such reading. Instead he suggests that Jesus was not 
describing a higher path, but merely the one and only path: the path of ―immediate, 
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wordless obedience of the one called.‖74 Moloney casts the entire passage as a drama of 
who should take the initiative in discipleship. Jesus issues the call, and we can merely 
give the response. For this particular person to be a disciple of Christ, he was required to 
sell all and follow Jesus as an itinerant. Jesus strongly states that asking ―what must I do?‖ 
is the wrong question. The correct question is ―where Jesus is calling me to respond to sin 
in my life and oppression in the world with conversion and love?‖ Moloney‘s claim 
amounts to a redefinition of evangelical poverty. Living in poverty is a reordering of our 
material possessions for the common good in actions that proclaim, ―All that I have I give 
to the community, and all that I need I receive from the community.‖75 It is not only a 
state
76
 but a virtue, a habitual disposition ―which is one of the external consequences of 
our life in Christ, [and] is a part of the vocation to ‗perfection‘ of all the baptized (see 
Lumen Gentium 40).‖77 
 Authors such as Moloney are quick to cast off notions of the evangelical counsel 
(or imperative) of poverty as a state,
78
 and this is with the obvious intention to avoid 
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indifference, paternalism, or a gospel of wealth, but at the same time the claim that 
poverty is simply a virtue rather than a state is not wholly accurate. Even if poverty is a 
virtue (I agree that it is), one must ask the question: what kind of community or what kind 
of concrete conditions would have to maintain for this virtue to be practiced? Conditions 
of real need must obtain for poverty as imperative evangelical virtue to be practiced. 
Jesus was not only disposed to share all that was at his disposal for the good of all, 
but he actually disposed of all he had and all he was so that he might order it for the 
common good of the world he created and the humanity he would take up. ―For you 
know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,‖ writes Paul, ―that though he was rich, yet for 
your sake he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich‖ (2 Cor 8:9). As 
John Paul II puts it in Vita consecrata, Christ ―gave up all to come to earth, receives all 
from and gives all back to the Father.‖ Because Jesus renounced his divinity as 
something to be grasped at, he made possible our own divinization (Phil 2:6–10; Eph 
3:14–21; 2 Peter 1:3–4).79 Because Jesus renounces his own inheritance by becoming a 
curse (Gal 3:13), he shares it with all those he makes his brothers and sisters and thus co-
heirs (Jn 1:1–9; Rom 8:10–17; Gal 3:29; Eph 3:6; Tit 3:7; Jas 2:5; 1 Peter 3:7). Jesus, 
through whom all creation is made, enters that creation only to be rejected by it. How 
great a poverty this is. It can only be heightened by the poverty of Holy Saturday, when 
Christ, as von Balthasar has proposed, experienced the true suffering of hell as no human 
could experience it. He suffered the greatest poverty imaginable, the loss of God from 
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Godself. Only one who had experienced the beatific vision and complete union with God 
could understand, let alone experience complete separation from God. Christ, and no one 
else, has experienced the deepest poverty possible.
80
 Because Jesus renounced his very 
nature as ―the life,‖ as ―the light‖ and experienced death and the darkness of separation 
from God, he shares his eternal life with all. Jesus, far from merely considering all his 
possession as ordered for the common good, actually existed in conditions of poverty that 
required dependence on others, especially God the Father. Jesus did not help us ―from 
above‖ but joined us in the dust to remake humanity again. Poverty, then, is ultimately 
not a virtue isolated in an individual piety; rather, poverty is a definition of our 
relationships in community. Christian, religious poverty is a commitment to solidarity 
with our co-inhabitors in God‘s household.81             
Jesus entered the world as we all do, in the position of radical dependence—
namely, infancy. His mother depended on the mercy of Joseph, who could have easily 
rejected her. In John 5:19 Jesus relays his radical dependence on the father for everything, 
even all that he does: ―Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of his own 
accord, but only what he sees the Father doing.‖ Further, when Jesus says, ―Foxes have 
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holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man has nowhere to lay his head,‖ 
(Mt 8:20; Lk 9:58) he is not merely stating his radical ―otherness,‖ but a simple fact 
about his own life. Just as he lives a life of dependence, Jesus puts his disciples in 
situations of radical dependence. He sent his disciples to preach carrying no extra food, 
water, or supplies (Lk 10:1–11); their dependence on hospitality becomes a matter of life 
and death.  
The virtue of evangelical poverty then, even as a disposition to make all our 
goods available for the common good and to receive our personal good from the 
community, is reduced wherever there is an attempt to insulate people from the fact that 
we actually need each other.  The American dream of married suburban self-sufficiency 
and independence has created a class of people for whom the conditions necessary to 
learn the virtue of poverty are all but completely non-existent.
82
 The American dream is 
that I will never have to depend on anyone except myself. If I will need to rely on 
someone else, then I should not undertake the task. Over against this notion is the 
evangelical notion of poverty. Not only must we seek dependence on others, but we must 
realize the unavoidability of such dependence.   
This interdependence reminds us of the essentially communal aspect of poverty as 
principle of Christian life together. Certainly poverty is the individual person‘s 
renunciation of possession as her own, but no less is poverty the formation of a 
communion of goods. This social aspect of poverty is most clear in the early Church‘s 
example of poverty in the Jerusalem community (Acts 2:44–45 and 4:32–35). The early 
                                                          
82
 McCarthy (Sex and Love in the Home, 2–3, 66, 80, 88–89, 93, 96, 155, 171–72, 174, and 243)  describes 
this kind of situation. He describes the virtue of reciprocity, which is developed only in conditions where 
needs and dependences are real. Asymmetrical reciprocity is a kind of positive feedback loop whereby 
persons respond to the needs of each other in non-symmetrical ways.  
318 
 
Jerusalem community, the desert fathers, and the vowed religious who came after them 
ordered their renunciation to goal of reaching the kingdom of God. This meant their 
poverty was entered for the sake of those in need, in solidarity with those who do not 
choose poverty, and as a commitment to creating the kind of community that prepares for 
and attempts to participate now in the coming kingdom . In his rule, we hear Augustine 
emphasize the fact that poverty is about creating social conditions for growth in 
evangelical virtue as a community and not about the holy actions of one or another 
individual:  
Before all else, live together in harmony (Ps. 68:7), being of one mind and one 
heart (Acts 4:32) on the way to God. For is it not precisely for this reason that you 
have come to live together? Among you there can be no question of personal 
property. Rather, take care that you share everything in common. Your superior 
should see to it that each person is provided with food and clothing. He does not 
have to give exactly the same to everyone, for you are not all equally strong, but 
each person should be given what he personally needs. For this is what you read 
in the Acts of the Apostles: ―Everything they owned was held in common, and 
each one received whatever he had need of‖ (Acts 4:32, 35). 
 
Though Augustine‘s rule is clear on the social orientation of renunciation, St. Basil, the 
first to call a community together around a formal rule, did so because eremitism failed to 
develop social virtues, the kind of virtues that would necessarily characterize sanctified 
life. After all, Jesus describes beatified life as a kingdom , a social reality. Basil also saw 
that one, all-inclusive community would also fail to offer the conditions for growth in the 
evangelical virtues. The community would be too large for the brothers to know and love 
each other. They required smaller communities if they were to live in love.
83
 
Our modern, western communities must be mined for possibilities for creating the 
conditions to develop the virtue of poverty. Let me provide an example in which the 
social conditions necessary for the virtue of poverty obtain. The Thompson family just 
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came home from the hospital with baby number three. They are overwhelmed, at their 
wits‘ end. The Jones family hears their yelling from next door. Instead of calling the 
police, the Jones‘ offers to cook some meals for the Thompsons and takes their older 
children to the park each day for the next week. Two weeks later, when the Jones‘ faucet 
springs a leak, Tom Thompson offers to come over and fix it, etc., etc.
84
 This principle of 
becoming aware of one‘s own and others‘ needs, and then responding to them, is a basic 
application of Jesus‘ response to the Pharisees‘ complaint about the woman who cleans 
Jesus‘ dirt-covered feet with her hair and tears. She has been forgiven much and so loves 
much (Lk 7:36–50). She experienced much need, that need was met gratuitously, and her 
response is a disposition to act with that same kind of gratuitous love by washing her 
savior‘s feet, a need which Jesus‘ host did not even notice.  
 Even for the middle class of the Western world, the conditions necessary to 
develop the virtue of poverty will require active renunciation. We should not be surprised 
that this is the case, though, for even the early monastic fathers, whose standards of living 
(before renunciation) were not nearly as comfortable as Western, 21
st
-century middle 
class standards, thought the renunciation of material goods was central to their life.
85
 
Filled by our possessions and our comfort there is no room in us for what can truly fulfill 
                                                          
84
 This kind of asymmetrical reciprocity is developed and supported by McCarthy in Sex and Love in the 
Home, 93–94, 101–06, 133–37; and Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity (New York: Routledge, 1986). 
85
 Until the standardization of vows (poverty, chastity, and obedience) ―poverty‖ did not appear in the vows 
of many religious communities, notably Benedict‘s. From the earliest fathers of the desert, which began 
with a famous renunciation, and through the golden age of monastic life, though, renunciation of personal 
possession was not explicit in the profession itself of many communities because the needfulness of this 
renunciation would have been so obvious and so much in the forefront of their minds. It is merely assumed 
by the rules. See, for example, Augustine‘s and Benedict‘s rules, where he notes as matter of course that 
any person entering the monastery sells all he has and holds all things in common. The poverty of these 
communities was not initially vowed, but it was most certainly lived. Augustine writes: ―Among you there 
can be no question of personal property. Rather, take care that you share everything in common...Those 
who owned possessions in the world should readily agree that, from the moment they enter the religious 
life, these things become the property of the community‖ (The Rule of Saint Augustine, trans. Raymond 
Canning, OSA, Cistercian Studies 138 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1996), 1.3, p. 11. 
320 
 
us. Poverty correlates well with the orthodox, apophatic approach to theology, wherein 
our first theological step is always a renunciation. Before ascend to God, we must 
renounce that God is an object of our knowledge, and we identify all that God is not, and 
all that I am not.
 86
 Wherever it is practiced, a moment of renunciation in voluntary 
poverty is an apophatic theological moment declaring what will not satisfy me. Only God, 
not material possessions will satisfy.  
Thankfully, the tradition of monasticism provides ample example of how this 
renunciation of any thing as ―mine‖ is done in the spirit of the early Jerusalem 
community and in imitation of Christ. In the early desert Fathers, this renunciation of 
anything as ―mine‖ took the form of having a common store from which weekly 
allotments were meted out.
87
 In Augustine‘s rule of life this humility and simplicity 
meant a willingness to wear whatever tunic was handed to you in the morning from the 
store, even if you preferred another.
88
 St. Francis and St. Dominic, not content with 
merely ordaining all goods of the community to the common good, attempted to live 
poverty not merely as a disposition to share all with the community, but as a state of life. 
Their early practices of owning nothing, even at the institutional level, witness to poverty 
not only as a response to what Jesus has done, but as a means (as Ignatius of Loyola 
would put it) for God to fulfill the request of our soul: Lord, ―place me with your Son.‖    
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Christ the Chaste 
  
 As with poverty, chastity finds its exemplar in the Lord. Conciliar and synodal 
documents call Jesus ―the exemplar of chastity.‖89 Moreover, the evangelical virtues 
lived by consecrated religious are a participation in and an effort to make present to the 
whole world ―Christ who is chaste, poor, obedient, prayerful, and missionary.‖90 These 
documents understand Christ‘s chastity in a twofold sense. First, it is the means by which 
Jesus, and now vowed religious, can ―dedicate themselves with undivided heart to the 
service of God.‖91 In a sense, there is a logic of effectiveness at work in this claim—that 
celibacy makes a person more radically available for the service of God in ministry (a 
claim which one may or may not find convincing). As Perfectae caritatis has it, chastity 
for the sake of the kingdom is ―the most suitable means‖ for this devotion.92 Jesus was of 
pure and singular devotion in his love, and the religious, it is argued, imitate that devotion 
by making themselves radically available for prayer and ministry. Second, chastity, as 
expressed in consecrated celibacy, is a sign of and witness to the eschatological goods we 
all share as members of the one church, the one body of and bride of Christ. It is an 
eschatological maximalism that anticipates the fulfillment toward which the Church is 
tending.
93
 Christ‘s pure love for the Church is the model for consecrated celibacy, a pure 
and complete gift of love that unfailingly bears fruit.  
 Theologians since the Second Vatican Council have reacted against the logic of 
availability for ministerial effectiveness and any claim that celibacy is lived by Jesus 
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because it somehow makes persons more available than the conjugal life. For instance, 
Moloney‘s 1984 work A Life of Promise, and Sandra Schneiders‘s 2004 monograph 
Selling All: Consecrated Celibacy both resist the argument that the Christ chose the life 
of chastity because it allowed for greatest ministerial availability. Both of these authors 
ultimately rely on nuptial language to explain how Christ‘s life is the root of celibacy.94 
Moloney goes about the task with a rereading of Mt 19:3–12 (Pharisees question Jesus on 
marriage and divorce), which is a typical locus for the superiority of celibacy in the Bible. 
There are two interpretations of Jesus‘ statement that one might make himself a eunuch 
for the kingdom of God. The first is to say that Jesus made himself a eunuch to better 
participate in the bringing of God‘s reign. This is the interpretation most associated with 
the logic of ministerial availability. The second interpretation is to say that Jesus made 
himself a eunuch because God‘s reign was so present to him that he could not possibly 
give any part of his life exclusively to any one person.
95
 In Moloney‘s exegesis Jesus can 
do no other than to live a celibate life; he has ―fallen for‖ God‘s reign in the same way a 
person ―falls for‖ a beloved. There is nothing else the smitten parties can do but devote 
their entire lives to each other. This is the romantic imagery employed by Moloney to 
argue that celibacy was essential to who Jesus was rather than simply the most effective 
career choice. 
 While I sympathize with Moloney‘s attempt to avoid reducing Christ‘s celibacy to 
a means chosen for effectiveness, I am wary of his overly romantic language that 
attempts to put marriage and consecrated life on a level playing field of affective love. 
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―Celibacy,‖ he argues, ―is nothing else but the existential consequence which flows out of 
the prior experience of the urgent presence of the kingdom of God.‖96 ―Just as, in an 
authentic situation of sexual love, the couple can do no other than marry and consecrate 
themselves to each other and their families through a life of consecrated chastity, so also 
the celibate, in an authentic situation of celibate love, can do no other than be a ‗eunuch 
because of‘ the kingdom of love in his or her life in a different but parallel form of 
consecrated chastity.‖97 I would suggest that persons who plan to marry because ―they 
can do no other than…‖ should wait for a moment. This kind of intoxicating, over-taking 
love is not permanent but effervescent and momentary. People who marry or choose 
celibate life because they have, in Moloney‘s words, ―fallen,‖ and ―can do no other,‖ will 
quickly find that they very easily can and may very soon want to do something other. 
Unfortunately, the reasons for marriage cited by Moloney are normal, but they ought not 
be normative. The kind of irreplaceability and definitive love Moloney wants to see at the 
center of celibate and conjugal love in Christ develops over time through struggle. It is 
received as gift, as Christ‘s love. Christ‘s witness to this love comes at the dark moment 
of Gethsemane, when he was tempted to do something other than live out his love of 
complete devotion to God. In the same way, for example, true married love is found in 
challenge of saying ―yes‖ to marital chastity when it is so easy to do other than live out 
the love of sexual self-possession and self-gift.      
 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, in his meditations on consecrated celibacy, has offered 
perhaps the best way to understand the union of ministerial effectiveness and the essence 
of a kenotic love that ―can do no other.‖ For von Balthasar, virginity is ―a participation in 
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the bodily mystery of the Cross and Resurrection.‖ ―The Lord‘s surrendered flesh and 
blood,‖ he continues, ―is the origin of all Christian fruitfulness through the ages; it is the 
archetype and source of the consecration of life in the ‗vowed state‘. This bodily 
midpoint (where the spirit takes on bodily form and where eternal goods become a man‘s 
very essence) makes it possible to understand the form that structures the life of those 
who follow the Lord.‖98 The Lord Jesus, for von Balthasar, does not give up his body 
because he knows it will be the best way to bring the kingdom , but his redemptive love 
for all of creation, as expressed in the incarnation, requires the sacrifice of his entire 
person, body and soul, for whatever God‘s plans may have in bringing about that 
redemption. He loves and redeems all of creation and so must make a universal gift of his 
whole person. He would be unavailable for this kind of gift if he were married to one 
person. Christ‘s own body, given entirely to God on the cross and offered once again 
entirely for the Church in the Eucharist is at once the font and result of the gift of self in 
virginity.
99
 Furthermore, Christ the chaste, as font and first fruit of consecrated virginity, 
is witnessed in the life of Mary. Mary is both mother and virgin, even more, she is mother 
because she is virgin, and she could respond to God with pure, complete love because the 
grace of Christ was already at work within her by the Immaculate Conception.
100
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Christ the Obedient 
 
 The obedience of Christ is perhaps the most well attested of the evangelical 
counsels from the New Testament sources.
101
 According to the witness of Paul, ―by one 
man‘s disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man‘s obedience many will be 
made righteous‖ (Rom 5:19). Christ‘s obedience is a recapitulation of Adam‘s failure, an 
obedience that makes possible our rebirth in baptism by which we have a share in 
Christ‘s filial obedience to God. In the letter to the Philippians, Paul holds out Christ‘s 
own humility and obedience for the community, saying Christ removed from himself the 
glory of his godhead and ―humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death 
on a cross‖ (Phil 2:8). The author of Hebrews also invokes Christ‘s obedience as an 
encouragement for Christians suffering for their faith. ―Although he was a Son, he 
learned obedience through what he suffered‖ (Heb 5:8).  For his own part, Jesus is 
reported in the Gospels speaking about his own obedience. It is a complete obedience that 
puts him in harmony of action and word with the Father. As to his actions, particularly 
those relating to the Sabbath, Jesus says, ―Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do 
nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing; for whatever he does, 
that the Son does likewise‖ (Jn 5:19). Moreover, ―I have not come of my own accord; he 
who sent me is true, and him you do not know. I know him, for I come from him, and he 
sent me‖ (Jn 7:28–29). As to his teaching, Jesus makes clear that ―My teaching is not 
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mine, but his who sent me; if any man‘s will is to do his will, he shall know whether the 
teaching is from God or whether I am speaking on my own authority‖ (Jn 7:16–17). 
 Christ‘s obedience comes from his close connection to the Father‘s will; in fact 
the connection between the two wills is so close that they are identical. This fact is 
reflected in the Christological doctrine regarding the Christ‘s two wills, human and 
divine. It is because Jesus‘ will is at once God‘s will that obedience and poverty are so 
connected in Christ. Christ completely gives over his own will to the will of the Father, 
so that his own will is the Father‘s. In this obedience is his freedom. The son‘s attitude 
discloses the mystery of human freedom, that we as communion of persons are together 
destined for a path of obedience to the Father‘s will, a path that will demand our response 
in practices of Christian householding made free by grace.
102
 Christ does and teaches 
nothing of his own but only what he sees the Father doing (Jn 5:19; Jn 7:28–29). Jesus 
has nothing to sustain him and no mission but the will and word of God (Jn 6:38; 8:38–50; 
Mt 4:4). Indeed Jesus‘ mission is not simply to gather whom he wills, but the flock 
chosen by the Father. Christ has no flock except the one the Father gives him, and the 
flock belongs to Christ as a gift of the Father‘s love because Christ obediently lays down 
his life (Jn 10:1–18, good shepherd discourse). Hans Urs von Balthasar has put it in this 
helpful way: 
The existential act of the Son is his permitting himself to be sent from the Father 
into human life and to be made incarnate by the Spirit in Mary‘s womb and then 
to behave in all the situations of his human life as the one sent by the Father, the 
one made available to the Spirit and led by him in his mission. The fundamental 
act of his existence is that he does, not his own will, but the will of his Father, and 
all his individual tasks are specifications of this fundamental act, all of what he 
does and what he refrains from doing, all his dealings with those around him, but 
also his suffering and dying. Only this fundamental act supplies the key to the 
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Christological paradox that Jesus can appear with the highest claims and, at the 
same time, the greatest humility.
103
 
 
In the practices of Christian householding, those incorporated into Christ through baptism 
share in this fundamental act of being made available for the will of God in the service of 
the community whether it is composed of consecrated religious, a conjugal family, or a 
combination of both. 
 Christ‘s obedience offers again the same the tension we saw with poverty, a 
tension between ―virtue‖ and ―state.‖ As we saw, Christ‘s obedience is closely tied to his 
poverty. Is obedience a disposition, a virtue of general humility? Or is obedience a state 
of humble submission to God‘s will as mediated through a superior or another to whom a 
vow is made? The weight of Scripture and monastic rules would seem to fall on the 
notion that obedience is both. It is a state of obedience to God mediated by a particular 
person, community, or common will, and this state is only fulfilled as a practice of the 
virtue of humility.
104
 The documents of Vatican II offer both kinds of language as well. 
In Perfectae caritatis, we find that, ―in professing obedience, religious offer the full 
surrender of their own will as a sacrifice of themselves to God and so are united more 
firmly and securely to God‘s salvific will.‖105 Lumen gentium echoes this account of 
renunciation. It is done to ―become subject of their own accord to another man on 
account of God, in the matters of perfection. This is beyond the measure of the 
commandments, but is done in order to conform oneself to the obedient Christ.‖106 The 
synod on religious life that produced Vita consecrata develops this language of sacrifice; 
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consecrated religious ―sacrifice their own freedom to accept the mystery of Christ‘s filial 
obedience and thus profess that Jesus Christ is infinitely beloved and loving as the one 
who delights only in the will of the Father.‖107 The obedience of the religious, then, is not 
merely modeled on Christ‘s obedience, but is a participation in the mystery of Christ‘s 
filial obedience and his all-consuming delight in the will of the Father. This kind of 
participatory language helps allay the fears of some theologians and psychologists, that 
obedience can be destructive to the human person, especially those for whom it remains a 
means to continue in emotional, spiritual, and psychological immaturity. The motive and 
goal of obedience is to come to a union of will with the Father as close as possible to 
what Christ Jesus experienced, a union that joins our will to the Father‘s without 
obliterating our own personal will and identity. 
Christ‘s example of obedience is of especial importance in that it demonstrates the 
essentially social character of obedience as a virtue. Even Christ, whose obedience to his 
Father was as unmediated as possible, experienced obedience not as an autonomous 
individual but in a social context. Christ learned, practiced, and knew obedience at the 
very least as mediated by his mother Mary and father Joseph. Luke‘s Gospel (Jesus lost at 
the temple) and John‘s Gospel (Jn 2:1–11, Cana) give example of Christ practicing 
obedience in domestic settings. Christ‘s example must demonstrate for us that obedience 
is not the task of an individual but a practice of life together. If even Christ‘s obedience to 
the Father was mediated in a social, domestic context, then certainly we must understand 
obedience of the vowed religious as a practice situated in the context of Christian 
householding as well. This fact was not lost on the spiritual masters who first organized 
desert ascetics into communities. One of the central reasons for the development of 
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cenobitic life was the discovery of this insight. Monks attempting to live in unmediated 
obedience to the will of God more often than not ended up being ruled by self-will rather 
than divine will. Benedict, for his part, emphasizes the need for mediated obedience, that 
is, obedience as a domestic practice, as a key reason for making religious life a domestic 
project rather than an individual project. Of the four kinds of monks Benedict describes, 
two of them are detested for their lack of mediated obedience to God‘s will: 
The sarabites, the most detestable kind of monks, who, with no experience to 
guide them, no rule to try them as gold is tried in a furnace, have a character as 
soft as lead…Two or three together, or even alone, without a shepherd, they pen 
themselves up in their own sheepfolds, not the Lord‘s. Their law is what they like 
to do, whatever strikes their fancy. Anything they believe in and choose, they call 
holy, anything they dislike, they consider forbidden.
108
  
 
Still worse are the gyrovagues, who ―spend their entire lives drifting from region to 
region, staying as guests for three or four days in different monasteries. Always on the 
move, they never settle down, and are slaves to their own wills and gross appetites.‖109 
Benedict would not abide those seeking the way of the Lord who could not submit 
themselves to a rule other than their own. 
We must ask why Benedict made such a strong case for the expropriation of one‘s 
own will. Was he overly pessimistic about human capacity to know God‘s will? Was he 
infantilizing with respect to spirituality? Certainly not. Benedict sought to protect his 
monks from slavery to a soft will that confused one‘s own desires (however noble or 
ascetic they might be) with God‘s, but his interest in placing monks in the state of 
obedience was out of a desire to grow in them the virtue of humility and strike down the 
ever-present threat of pride. He was honest about human experience. Even the most 
ascetic Christian would benefit from expropriation of the will. The experience of the 
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desert Fathers had taught Benedict and the cenobitic monks much in this regard. For 
these early heroes of renunciation, obedience had a primordial importance as a 
counterweight to asceticism. Even though they lived and battled alone, their obedience 
was integral to their quest for God. Obedience was identified in practice with humility, 
and reminded all that pride was the radical enemy of Christian life.
110
 As the Virgin 
Syncletica reminds those she counsels, ―Bodily mortification begets pride, whereas 
obedience produces humility.‖111 Obedience to a master who visits but occasionally and 
commands at times absurdities, however, proved difficult for the early desert Fathers.
112
 
In light of the difficulties, it was a belief in the power of obedience and humility to 
overcome the specter of pride that in part led to the dominance of cenobitic life from 
Basil to Pachomius, to Augustine, and Benedict.
113
 Any acquaintance with Augustine‘s 
understanding of sin, for example, makes clear the primacy of place and power he 
accords pride.
114
 Within his own rule Augustine wars that the danger of pride is always 
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lurking. It is so powerful because, while other vices encourage evil deeds, ―pride waits to 
destroy good deeds.‖115  
The simple fact in Benedict‘s preference for cenobitic over anchoritic life is that 
life in community demands a virtue that often slips away in solitary life—humility. 
Living in community means living according to a rule other than one‘s own, and if that 
community is to be a means of salvation, it means finding, loving, and obeying Christ in 
each member of that community.
116
 Benedict‘s own desire to replace pride with humility 
is so strong that his rule constructs a step-wise approach to the virtue that can only take 
place within a situation of mediated obedience. Always, the state and the virtue are held 
together. ―The first step of humility,‖ he writes, ―is unhesitating obedience, which comes 
naturally to those who cherish Christ above all.‖117 Benedict‘s twelve-step ladder seems 
to be an attempt to work from the outside in as much as from the inside out. It is by no 
means Pelagian, though. Benedict sees the twelve rungs of humility‘s ladder in light of 
Jacob‘s ladder. ―Without doubt, this descent and ascent can signify only that we descend 
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by exaltation and ascend by humility. Now the ladder erected is our life on earth, and if 
we humble our hearts the Lord will raise it to heaven.‖118 As Paul Evdokimov writes of 
the vowed life of holiness, we sweat but God does the work. The spiritual life is ―no 
question of reward or merit, but of man working within the divine action.‖119 It is the 
monk‘s task to practice obedience and God‘s to grow humility within him.  
In summary, Benedict‘s insight, and the insight of the practice of obedience and 
humility in vowed religious life in community is that, for humans, obedience to God must 
be mediated personally, communally, dialogically. Even for the first Christian disciples, 
even for Mary the theotokos, God‘s will was not immediate. As von Balthasar aptly puts 
it, ―the disciple‘s obedience to the Master is in the first place unambiguously obedience 
to a human being.‖120 ―The disciples‘ paradigmatic, archetypal obedience to the Lord,‖ he 
continues, ―is and remains obedience from man to man in the clearest possible way; it 
remains a genuinely dialogical and genuinely incarnate obedience, which through the 
juxtaposition of two wills and two freedoms always keeps the person from believing he is 
obeying God when in fact he is ultimately obeying only his own self.‖121 Obedience, then, 
is not essentially the sacrifice of one‘s will to an arbitrary other‘s will, even the will of a 
spiritually superior director. Rather, it is a state and virtue of coming to know God‘s will 
in humility through accepting the way another shows us how our own will is hardly 
identical to God‘s. In this way we finally participate in Christ‘s obedience to the Father 
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by doing what Jesus does, namely, putting ourselves at the service of others, even our 
enemies.      
 
Christ the Poor, Chaste, and Obedient Bridegroom 
 
 As we have just argued above, the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience flow 
from and lead to Christ, that is, they are christologically fundamental. As virtues and 
states they are gifts of God that become habitual in the Christian through practices of 
living in the household of God, conforming her more to Christ in a harmony of will and 
action. This section briefly shows that the person of Christ takes these virtues up into the 
life of Christian spouses, through spousal language used about and by Christ. A fuller 
treatment, though, awaits chapter six. Christomorphic virtues are as fundamental to 
marriage as to religious life, that is, through it Christ discloses truth about marriage in the 
heart of his identity and mission. It is among the Lord‘s frequently chosen images for 
speaking of himself and proclaiming the kingdom .
122
 Christ not only reveals himself as a 
poor, chaste, and obedient Son but as poor, chaste, and obedient spouse. His possession 
of the evangelical virtues applies equally to his role as groom. Christ the groom is poor 
because he has shared his inheritance with the church, counting the spiritual treasure of 
his merit not as his own but to be shared with his spouse. Christ is chaste because his love 
for the Church is complete and exclusive, an eternal act of the will rather than a flight of 
the passion (Rm 8:31–38, nothing can separate us from the love of God). This pure love 
bears fruit in the coming of the Spirit and its gifts in the life of the Church (Gal 5:22). 
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Christ the son and bridegroom is obedient because he weds as a completion of the 
Father‘s will to bring the blessing of the Abraham‘s covenant to all nations, to make a 
holy people for himself, a pure and spotless bride (2 Cor 11:2; Eph 5:25–32; Rev 19:7; 
21:2, 9; 22:17). It is this obedient, chaste, and poor Christ who reveals the essence of 
marriage to us, the indissoluble and redeeming love that serves and purifies, often in and 
through suffering. Christ‘s marriage, after all is begun, or ratified, with Mary‘s words of 
consent at the annunciation (Lk 1:38, ―let it be to me according to your word‖); it is 
brought to completion on the cross, when Christ declares ―it is finished‖ (consummatum 
est) (Jn 19:30); and it is renewed when Christ‘s obedient gift of self is made present again 
in the worshipping community and the bread and wine at each Eucharist.
123
 
 
MARRIAGE AND CONSECRATED LIFE AS TRINITARIAN 
 
 We have seen now an anthropological, Christological nexus that both draws 
together and distinguishes conjugal and consecrated life. Both are rooted in what we are 
as persons (beings oriented toward self-gift, and reception of other) and what we are 
called to become in Christ the poor, chaste, and obedient. There is, however, a third, still 
deeper theological connection between the two states of life. If the vows have disclosed 
that consecrated and married persons are called to be conformed to Christ, then it follows 
that they are also invited into Christ‘s life in the Trinity (Lumen gentium 2; Ad gentes 2). 
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The central mystery of Christianity, the Trinity itself, orchestrates the most profound 
consonance between these states of life. While authors have considered the relationship 
between consecrated life and the Trinity (principally John Paul II in Vita consecrata), as 
well as the connection between the Trinity and marriage (chiefly Marc Cardinal Oullet in 
Divine Likeness: A trinitarian Anthropology of the Family), neither has seen this as an 
opportunity for dialogue. In what follows, I will outline the fundamentally trinitarian 
grounding in both states of life and demonstrate how that foundation both draws together 
and distinguishes marriage and vowed religious life. 
 In the course of this section, ―model,‖ ―metaphor,‖ ―analogy,‖ and ―image,‖ will 
be used in describing the relationship between created realities and the Trinity. Each of 
these has a host of meanings and histories. Therefore, where the terms first appear a note 
will accompany them to indicate the precise use of the term in work.  
 
Consecrated Life and the Trinity 
 
The Second Vatican Council has made clear the trinitarian grounding of the 
Church in general. The Church finds its origin in the Trinity, ―proceeding from the love 
of the eternal Father…founded by Christ in time and gathered into one by the Holy 
Spirit.‖124 Originating in the Trinity, the Church also finds there its model:125 ―The 
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 Lumen gentium, 40. 
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 Here the Council uses ―exemplar‖ to describe the relationship of the Church to the Trinity. An exemplar 
is the object of imitation. It is a model for fashioning a re-presentation. The Church‘s unity is not the 
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highest exemplar and source of this mystery is the unity, in the Trinity of Persons, of one 
God, the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit.‖126 It is precisely the trinitarian nature of 
religious life as a specification of ecclesial life, though, that we seek. Reflections and 
studies of the nature of vowed religious life (especially historical studies) abound, but 
only infrequently, does ―Trinity‖ appear in these studies. One recent monograph and a 
journal that dedicated an entire issue to this relationship have worked to fill this void.
127
 
 The Trinity, as the origin and exemplar of all ecclesial communion, is also the 
exemplar of unity in vowed religious life. Perfectae caritatis summarizes the Trinity‘s 
role in religious life: ―After the example of Jesus Christ who came to do the will of the 
Father (cf. Jn 4:34; 5:30; Heb. 10:7; Ps 39:9) and, ‗assuming the nature of a slave‘ (Phil 
2:7), learned obedience in the school of suffering (cf. Heb 5:8), religious under the 
motion of the Holy Spirit, subject themselves in faith to their superiors who hold the 
place of God.‖128 To enter religious life, then, is to step into the narrative of the Trinity‘s 
own life: the life of the Son who does the will of the Father in the power of the Spirit. In 
other words, it is to follow or imitate the drama of the Trinity‘s life as it is revealed to us 
in Christ.  
John Paul II continues and expands this narrative line of thought when saying that 
those entering religious life state with their lives: ―confessio Trinitas.‖129 Those 
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professing the vows of religion are responding to a gift that draws them to the giver. As 
the Son responds eternally in kenotic love (as he is eternally begotten of the Father,) so 
the religious too are ―a patre ad patrem.‖130 They receive their charism and vocation from 
the Father, but that vocation is a grace that allows nothing else but a return to the Father. 
This reditus to the Father is worked ―per filium,‖ in the footsteps of Christ, who is 
himself the way, and in whom every virtue comes to perfection. With the counsels, the 
religious embarks on ―a divine way of living embraced by Christ as an expression of his 
relationship as the Only Begotten Son with the Father and the Holy Spirit.‖131 Finally, the 
consecrated life is lived ―in Spiritu,‖ that is, as a reliving of James, Peter, and John‘s 
experience on Tabor.
132
 It is their experience of being enveloped in the cloud wherein 
Christ is transfigured and to remain on the mountain, sharing Peter‘s overwhelming 
desire to abide with the one he now sees as God (Mt 17:1–13; Mk 9:2–13 ―Master, it is 
well that we are here; let us make three booths, one for you and one for Moses and one 
for Eli‘jah‖). 
 This Tabor experience, this falling in love that tends toward a desire to abide in 
the presence of the beloved, can authentically lead and be part of the complete gift of self 
to God in the explicit vows of the evangelical counsels. Nonetheless, I would not want to 
romanticize the decision. This love is a love for the whole Trinity: (1) for the Son, which 
leads to closeness to him; (2) for the Holy Spirit, which opens hearts to his inspiration; 
and (3) for the Father, the origin and supreme goal of the consecrated life.
133
 The practice 
of these counsels themselves witness to the Trinity. Chastity proclaims the infinite love 
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that links the three Divine Persons indissolubly and unconditionally. Poverty, by 
proclaiming that God is man‘s only treasure and portion, becomes an expression of 
dependence and gift that participates by grace in the self-gift and interdependence among 
the three Divine Persons. Obedience reflects the filial rather than the servile relationship 
between the Son and the Father, which is so fruitful that from it the Spirit proceeds. 
 Not only does the life of the individual religious confess the Trinity, but the 
common life of the religious community attempts to imitate the shared life of the three-
in-one God as well. As the Second Vatican Council so well expressed in Lumen gentium, 
God the Father desires to make of humanity one family. Religious orders witness to this 
fact in their life of fraternal love. Giving form to the Lord‘s saying, ―call no man your 
father on earth, for you have one Father, who is in heaven‖ (Mt 23:9). Only the abbot or 
abbess is called by a name other than ―brother‖ or ―sister,‖ and this title is highly 
qualified, having nothing to do with the particular person holding the office. Instead, the 
term refers to the One whose will and paternal love are represented in the direction of the 
abbot or abbess.
134
 This life together, according to the medieval rule of St. Francis, is 
nothing other than the living of the gospel,
135
 that is, a conformity to the life, death, and 
resurrection of the Son, ―who gathers the redeemed into a unity, pointing the way by his 
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example, prayer, words, and above all his death.‖136 Christ the Son recapitulates 
humanity in the Incarnation, providing both the example and the capacity for us to live as 
communion of persons in love. Finally, it is the Holy Spirit that enlivens this communion 
of love. Imagine the initial gathering of frightened disciples in the upper room. They had 
come together in their love for the Father and their desire to imitate his Son, yet their 
community bore no fruit for it was deadened by confusion, and fear of death and failure. 
When the Spirit descended on Pentecost, the confidence and first fruits of the Church are 
born.
137
 As the early disciples did not embody life of the Trinity as a communion of love 
that overflows beyond its own borders until the flame of the Spirit rested on their heads, 
so too a religious community is dead without the Spirit enlivening their mission and 
aiding their authentic development of and reliance on their original charism.
138
     
           
Conjugal Family and the Trinity 
 
 Theological reflection on the relationship between the family and the Trinity sets 
any author or reader before a theological minefield. On the one hand, creedal statements 
about God as ―Father,‖ and Jesus as ―begotten‖ ―Son‖ explicitly draw a link between 
God‘s trinitarian life and the life of the human, conjugal family. The image of Church as 
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born from Jesus‘ side on the cross,139 and the picture of Jesus as the new Adam with 
Mary as the New Eve also seem to invite trinitarian ideas for the conjugal family.
 140
  
Risks abound, though, in any attempt to relate the Trinity to human family, or any 
social body for that matter. Whose family? Which relationships? There is a temptation to 
use the conjugal family (or any family) as an expansive analogy for the Trinity, that is, as 
a means to discover the nature of and relationships among the Trinity. This analogical 
method is a bottom-up approach. If conjugal family (or any family) is the source of 
information on the Trinity, then there is a chance that destructive relationships and 
practices of family life may erroneously be mistaken for revelations of the nature of 
trinitarian life. These destructive relationship and practices could become reified and 
normative since they are taken as analogies of the Trinity. Furthermore, a strictly 
analogical approach does not comprehend the great rift between the divine, uncreated, 
eternal nature of the Trinity and the created, temporary nature of the universe. After all, 
the Church officially holds that ―all resemblance between the Creator and his creature is 
limited by an always-greater dissimilarity.‖141  
Part of the mystery of the Trinity is finding a way to talk about reality that is 
essentially related ad alium yet that alium is yet itself. As Aquinas has it, ―relation in God 
is not an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for 
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the divine essence subsists…that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature 
itself.‖142 In other words God exists as unity relation, but distinction of persons is 
required for that relation, yet these distinct persons must be in essence identical for the 
relation to be real and not accidental. God, thus, is three who are one. God is per se 
related to another who is Himself. God is per accidens related to creation, which exists 
not by necessity or emanation but by creation ex nihilo.  
The immanent Trinity remains mystery unbeheld until the beatific vision, yet God 
has made known his relation to creation through the revelation of the economic Trinity. 
God has revealed Himself as Father and source of all being, as Son who is Word and 
truth of the Father become flesh, and Spirit who proceeds from both to sanctify. As 
relation ad alium, the Trinity is most definitively in Christ Jesus. We learn that the 
Trinity is per se self-donative and generative. In salvation history, the Trinity is God for 
us. God for us is the Father who creates a universe for fellowship with himself. He walks 
in the garden with Adam and Eve. God for us is the Father who sends his Son, Jesus in 
perfect filial obedience to return us to his friendship. In Christ Jesus, God reveals himself 
as God for us, who empties himself to bring us into communion with himself and sends 
his Spirit to vivify that communion.  
To show just how difficult it is to avoid problems with Trinity and the family, let 
me explore one modern example of a trinitarian theology of the family that has much to 
recommend it.
143
 Frederick J. Parrella, whose work was introduced in chapter two, is 
clear in noting that God has revealed himself as three relations ad alium, yet the ―other‖ 
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to which each Person of the Trinity is related is also itself. He then goes on to talk about 
human relatedness by mean of an implicit analogy wherein the relation ad alium of each 
person of the Trinity to the other is as the relation ad alium of each human person to each 
other, especially within the family. Human persons are constituted in their relationships 
to others and for others. ―We are God‘s image only in so far as we stand in relation to 
others.‖144 For Parrella, the primary occasion and location for these relationships of 
persons ―ad alium‖ is the family. ―The family,‖ he writes, ―allows us an insight into the 
very heart of God.‖145  
No other commitment is as absolute in its intensity nor as eternal in its duration as 
marriage…In uttering Thou, he stands in relation, existing ad alium with his 
whole being. In this process he becomes himself, in se, a person. Sexuality in 
marriage is the unique language that expresses the all-encompassing power of the 
relationship. Through this language, two persons are so intensely ad alium in 
body and soul that the spirit of love between them becomes incarnate as a free and 
independent third person, the child. No other formal relationship allows a human 
being to reveal God as Trinity so perfectly.
146
 
 
Marriage, then, especially in its genital expression of integrated sexuality is the privileged 
means of expressing the Trinity in the world. 
 On this regard I would issue three caveats with Parrella‘s point of entry to the 
family as analogy for the Trinity. First, the Bible and the Christian tradition have often 
referred to the human person ―in‖ or ―to‖ the image of God (Gen 1:26–27), but only 
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Christ ―is the image of the invisible God‖ (Col 1:15). Thus we must be more reserved 
than Parrella is here with respect to the ability of the human person to reveal the nature of 
the Trinity. Second, at the social level, we must hesitate to say that the human person is 
God‘s image inasmuch as he is related ad alium, that is, related to a person other than 
himself. The difficulty in claiming that our relatedness to other persons provides an 
analogy for the intersubjective relatedness of the Trinity is that the ―other‖ to which each 
person of the Trinity is related is still one subject is still itself. This is not true when 
speaking of humans relating to other humans. Though each human is an instantiation of 
―human nature,‖ each person of the Trinity is not merely an individual instantiation of 
―God‘s nature.‖ Any social analogy, then, will fail to maintain the intrasubjective unity 
and relatedness of God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. With these caveats in place 
we can continue exploring Parrella‘s thought. 
Third, we must recognize that Parrella‘s move to privilege married sexuality risks 
absolutizing the revelatory power of marriage, and especially the sexual act within 
marriage, potentially making it an idol. Despite his best efforts, Parrella has fallen prey to 
the chief danger of using trinitarian analogy; it would appear that married people have the 
market cornered on expressing God‘s own nature. When Parrella states that marriage is 
the superlative form of eternal commitment, he would seem to be forgetting Jesus‘ own 
words in response to the Sadducees, ―In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given 
in marriage, but are like angels in heaven‖ (Mt 22:30). If the marriage commitment were 
eternal, then widows or widowers would be theoretically incapable of remarriage. Of 
course, Parrella may be referring to the fact that the marriage commitment is ordered 
toward the eternal reality of the child born of the spouses, a child destined for eternal 
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beatitude. If this is the case, he is forgetful of the tradition regarding the true fruitfulness 
of the consecrated celibate spousally given to Christ. Further, when Parrella argues for 
the superlatively eternal commitment of marriage, he erroneously privileges genital, 
orgasmic expression of human sexuality. From his claim, it follows that that the only way 
to authentically give oneself completely and intensely to another, the only way to become 
a person in the fullest sense, is to give oneself over in genital activity. What of chaste 
celibacy? Is it not a complete gift of self? Does not the religious give over herself as 
sexual person? Is this gift not an expression of an intense desire to be wholly and 
completely ad alium, where the other is the Trinity itself, or the entire human family? 
Cannot this self-donative love of the religious be equally as intense as the love of spouses, 
even though it is not expressed in orgasm? Is the self-donative love of the consecrated 
celibate person not as fruitful as that of the married person, even though it results only in 
spiritual offspring? Unfortunately, in his effort to resist the subordination of marriage to 
monastic spirituality, Parrella has perhaps unwittingly subordinated consecrated religious 
life to sacramental marriage.  
Parrella‘s desire to understand the family‘s relationship to the Trinity is helpful 
and needed. My critique is not that the using the term ―image‖ is wrong or misguided. 
Quite the opposite. My critique is that the image of the Trinity is so powerful that it can 
enlighten our understanding of all examples of true human community. The nuclear 
family centered on Christian marriage does not have a unique claim to being in the image 
of the Trinity. Vowed religious life in community has the same domestic characteristics 
that make the home a space and time for relatedness ad alium. For example, married 
sexuality—conjugal intercourse and marital chastity in general—may be part of the 
345 
 
unique way that the spouses attempt to conform their lives to the image of the self-
donative love of the Trinity, but vowed religious sexuality expresses the same self-
donative, fruitful love in its chaste celibacy. Again, just as children and parents have 
claims on each other without regard to each other‘s wants or even feelings, the members 
of the religious congregation have a claim on each other beyond the individual religious‘ 
own willing. The claim is based on the permanence of the community formed and the 
telos of the community, to become the kind of persons who seek first God‘s kingdom. 
Take, as another example, the vow of poverty. Poverty canonically requires each to 
provide for and rely on the other. Vowed religious, then, participate with married 
Christians in the same task of existing as beings in relation, beings directed toward 
another. Therefore, both married and religious must live in the image of the same divine 
reality, the Trinity, but in distinct ways. In an effort to find a unique spirituality for the 
nuclear family, Parrella has missed the catholicity of the one baptismal family working at 
the same task of imaging the Trinity. The Trinity unifies married and religious life more 
powerfully than it sunders them. Instead of finding in the Trinity an occasion for bringing 
together the religious and married life, Parrella sees there a moment of distinction.  
On the other hand, there is a temptation to limit all reflection on the Trinity and 
the family to a strictly katalogical approach, that is, to say that the Trinity allows us to 
discover the nature, meaning, and relationships among the human, conjugal family.
147
 
The katalogical approach is a top-down method, but contemplating the Trinity to discover 
the family runs a double risk: (1) it may never get off the ground, because there are no 
adequate ways to speak of the divine reality; or (2) it may end in silence as one 
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continually finds the Trinity‘s revelation in history to be a revelation of what the Trinity 
is not. In other words, if we take a top-down approach to understanding the family 
through the Trinity, where can we begin? With what words, images, and categories do we 
start? Second, as we continue from where we begin, will not all words, images, and 
categories that will not then become ―analogical‖ by the very fact that we use them and 
their common meaning to signify the truth about the Trinity? 
 These worries can be in great part allayed by combining the analogical and 
katalogical approach to reflection on the relationship between the Trinity and the 
conjugal family. On the basis of our sources of revelation, Scripture and Tradition, we 
can hold a kind of warrant for the analogical method. At the analogical level, Catholic 
theological reflection could say that God‘s creation of man and woman in God‘s image 
suggests at least a potency for disclosing truth about God within the created order. That 
potency has been diminished by the fall, but nonetheless remains. Augustine, after all, 
found in human psychology an analogy of memory, intellect, and will for Trinity.
148
 On 
the other hand, ―it is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh‖ that the truth of God 
and God‘s will for creation becomes revealed definitively and completely.149 Therefore, 
the question to ask of the reality of family is not, ―What can the family bring to our grasp 
of the trinitarian mystery? But rather: What does the Trinity wish to express through the 
family?‖150   
Church Fathers of the fourth and fifth century, such as Gregory Nazianzen and 
other Cappadocians, supported the family analogy for the Trinity. These Fathers of the 
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Church relied on the first human family of Adam, Eve, and Seth (or Abel) to make their 
analogy. For them, the human family‘s intrasubjectivity discloses the Trinity‘s 
intrasubjectivity in that all the members of the family share in the primordial 
anthropos.
151
 The conjugal family‘s intersubjectivity discloses the Trinity‘s 
intrasubjectivity because Adam, as Father, is ungenerated; Seth (or Abel), as Son, is 
begotten; and Eve, as Spirit, proceeds from Adam in a manner other than generation.
152
   
 The tension in seeing the conjugal family as analogy for the Trinity is visible 
already with Augustine. For his part, Augustine rejects the family as an analogy for the 
Trinity.
153
 The family does not tell us what the Trinity is. In De Trinitate Augustine‘s 
concern is chiefly that finding a group of three persons to be the image of the Trinity is 
contrary to what Scripture reveals. In coming to this conclusion, Augustine is reading 
Genesis 1:26–27 (man and woman made in God‘s image) in light of 1 Cor 11:7 (man is 
the glory of God; woman is the glory of man).
154
 Augustine finds that the image of God is 
seated in each person‘s mind rather than a man, wife, and child. Each person is made to 
the image of the whole Trinity. Thus, inasmuch as any person, either male or female, has 
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 As Lionel Gendron writes, ―For these fathers [Gregory of Nazianzen and other Cappadocians] it was 
relatively easy to show the consubstantial unity of the Trinity thanks to the image of the human family, and 
particularly thanks to the first family,‖ ―La famille: reflet de la communion trinitaire,‖ in La famille 
chrétienne dans the monde d‘aujourd‘hui (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1995), 127–48, at 133 (trans. Oullet).  
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 See Gregory of Nazianzen, Oratio XXXI (Theol. V), Patrologia Graeca 36, p. 144. 
153
 For a detailed study of symbol of family and the Trinity, see Lionel Gendron, Mystère de la Trinité et 
Symbolique familiale: approche historique (Rome: Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, 1975). See also, 
Karin Heller, ―The Interpersonal Communion of Trinity, Origin and Aim of Communion between Man and 
Woman,‖ in Dialoghi sul mistero nuziale: Studi offerti al Cardinale Angelo Scola, ed. Gilfredo Marengo 
and Bruno Ognibeni (Rome: Lateran University, 2003), 115–29. 
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 Genesis 1:26–27, ―Then God said, ―Let us make man in our image, after our likeness…So God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.‖ See also, 1 
Cor 11:7: ―For a man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but woman is the 
glory of man.‖ Augustine has to find the harmony between these two passages, since he believes Genesis 
affirms that both men and women are created in the image of God, and he believes Corinthians does not 
contradict Genesis (See De Genesi ad Litteram 3.22; De Trinitate 12.2.9). See also Roland J. Teske, ―The 
Image and Likeness of God in St. Augustine‘s De Genesi ad ltteram liber imperfectus,‖ Augustinianum 30 
(1990): 441–51.  
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the potency to contemplate and order their lives toward eternal reality and beauty, they 
are in the image of God.
155
 The sexual, material difference between male and female, 
though, is not an image of the distinctions in the Trinity but is an image of the parts of the 
human mind. Man, considered as only one aspect of the human‘s mind, represents the 
mind rising up to God; the woman, considered only in her aspect as partner or helper, 
represents the mind ordering the things of this world in themselves. In this way, man and 
woman together represent both aspects of the human mind, but concomitantly each has 
the image of God in him or herself because each has the entirety of a mind. Augustine, 
here, finds a way to synthesize Paul‘s claim that woman is the glory of man, and man the 
glory of God, while affirming a reading of the Genesis creation account wherein each 
woman and man is created in the image of God.  
To say that the family of husband, wife, and child discloses an analogy for the 
Trinity creates additional problems for Augustine. Again, the central problem is scriptural. 
It would certainly make his synthesis of 1 Cor 11 and Genesis 1:26–27 more difficult. 
Aside from this fact, the family as Trinity fails to communicate the truth of the Trinity‘s 
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 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 3.19–20, 22; On Genesis, 237–38, writes that ―There may be the most 
subtle arguments, to be sure, about the actual mind of man, in which he was made to the image of God, that 
its activity as a kind of rational life is divided between the contemplation of eternal truth and the 
management of temporal affairs; and that in this way it was made, as it were, male and female, with the 
former function directing, the latter conforming. With this division of roles however, that part alone is 
rightly said to be the image of God which clings in contemplation to the unchangeable Truth. It was as 
symbolically representing this that the apostle Paul says the man alone is the image and glory of God, while 
the woman, he goes on, is the glory of the man (1 Cor 11:7). And so, although this external diversity of sex 
in the bodies of two human beings symbolizes what is to be understood internally in one mind of a single 
human being, still the female too, because it is simply in the body that she is female, is also being renewed 
in the spirit of her mind in the recognition of God according to the image of him who created that in which 
there is no male and female.‖ See also, De Trinitate xii.2.5–9; On The Trinity, 324–27. ―We should not 
then understand man being made to the image of the supreme trinity, that is, to the image of God, as 
meaning that this image is to be understood in three human beings. Particularly so in view of what the 
apostle says about the man being the image of God, for which reason he removes the covering from his 
head while he warns the woman to wear it: he says, The man ought not to cover his head, since he is the 
image and glory of God. But the woman is the glory of the man (1 Cor 11:7). Now what are we to say to 
this? If the woman in her own person completes the image of the trinity, why is the man still called the 
image when she has already been extracted from his side?‖ 
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intrasubjective identity, that it is all one substance, one God. Augustine is not convinced 
by the Cappadocian confidence that male and female sharing in the one nature of 
anthropos suffices. Furthermore, the family comes-to-be over time whereas the Trinity‘s 
relations of generation and spiration exist without time. If Adam is Father and Eve Spirit, 
then the Son (being Seth) would not have existed from all time (except in germ). This 
does not abide with the co-eternality of the three persons.
156
 Finally, the family as 
analogy for the Trinity miscommunicates the intersubjective relations between the three 
Divine Persons. Augustine notes that some have called Eve, the first wife, analogous to 
the Holy Spirit. This is not altogether inappropriate for the way it demonstrates the 
relationship of origin from the Father, but it confuses the relationship between Son and 
Spirit. If Eve is to the Spirit, and Seth to the Son, then how can it be said that the Spirit 
proceeds from the Son? Eve does not proceed from the Seth. Imagining Eve as Spirit also 
erroneously assumes that there is something about ―womanness‖ that aligns with a 
principle of distinction within the Trinity. Since the distinction between male and female 
is merely bodily, no such principle in truth exists in the woman.
157
  As we have seen 
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 Augustine, De Trinitate, xii.8; On the Trinity, 326: ―What happens if we take this image of the trinity as 
realized not in one but in three human beings, father and mother and son? It would seem to follow that man 
was not in fact made to the image of God until a wife was made for him and until they had produced a son, 
because there was as yet no threesome or trinity. Is someone going to say, ‗The trinity was there all right, 
because in their germinal nature even if not in their proper form the woman was there in the side of her 
husband and the son was there in the loins of his father‘?‖ 
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 Augustine, De Trinitate, xii.5, On the Trinity, 324: ―It will be clear that I do not find the opinion very 
convincing which supposes that the trinity of the image of God, as far as human nature is concerned, can be 
discovered in three persons; that is, that it may be composed of the union of male and female and their 
offspring, in which the man suggests the person of the Father, what proceeds from him by way of birth that 
of the Son, and thus the third person of the Holy Spirit, they say, is represented by the woman, who 
proceeds from the man in such a way that she is not son or daughter, although it is by her conceiving that 
offspring is born; for the Lord said of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from the Father (Jn 15:26), and yet 
he is not a son. The only thing about this mistaken opinion that carries any conviction is the point that, as 
the origin of woman according to the reliable authority of scripture shows clearly enough, not everything 
that comes into being from one person to make another can be called son…The rest of the theory is so 
absurd, indeed so false, that it can easily be refuted. I pass over what an error it is to think of the Holy Spirit 
as the mother of the Son and the wife of the Father.‖ 
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above, Augustine hesitates to use any intersubjective analogy for the Trinity. Instead he 
prefers the intrasubjective analogy of one person because he thinks it a bigger mistake to 
miss the unity of the Trinity rather than its distinction among the Persons.
158
  
Despite his hesitancy, Augustine does provide one intersubjective, ecclesial 
analogy for the Trinity (in terms of the love binding the Christians in the Church) that 
eventually works its way back into the family as analogy for the Trinity.
159
 In the 11
th
 
century, Richard of St. Victor developed Augustine‘s concept of love as uniting principle 
in a way that would be taken up in following century by Bonaventure and applied to all 
conjugal family as image of the Trinity. As communion of love, the Trinity was a 
communion of ―three Friends gathered together in one love: a Lover, a Beloved, and a 
condilectus loved by both.‖160 Richard applied this thought to the original family and the 
Trinity in a way that might have made sense for Augustine; he answers the problems of 
the relations between the Persons of the Trinity.
161
 Augustine, though, would still have 
been uncomfortable with the inability of this social analogy to represent the perfect unity 
of identity in the Trinity. For Augustine‘s ecclesial analogy, love binds the Trinity, but 
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 Maurice Nédoncelle, ―L‘Intersubjectivité humaine est-elle pour saint Augustin une image de la Trinité?‖ 
Augustinus Magister, vol. 1 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 586. 
159
 Oullet expands on this idea (Divine Likeness, [24]) when he writes, ―In his Tractatus XXXIX, while 
describing Church unity founded on the charity between the community members, Augustine states that 
therein lies an analogy of the unity which exists between the divine Persons. He observes, in fact, that love 
possesses the capacity to create a common soul and a common heart among those who love one another. He 
perceives this capacity especially in God, in whom the Holy Spirit appears as the bond and the fruit of the 
mutual love of Father and Son. However, he also sees it in ecclesial love, which the Holy Spirit brings to 
life and consecrates within the community. This analogy will henceforth become the most fruitful and most 
adequate approach to the trinitarian mystery.‖ 
160
 See G. Salet, Richard of St. Victor, La Trinité (Paris: Cerf, 1999), cited in Oullet, Divine Likeness, 25. 
161
 As Salet writes, ―It is from Adam‘s substance that Eve, Seth and Enoch proceed. But the first procession 
alone was immediate, the second was both mediate and immediate: for Seth proceeded from Adam‘s 
substance immediately, in that he was procreated by him, and also mediately, in that he is also engendered 
by Eve,‖ (Richard of St. Victor [quoted in Oullet, Divine Likeness, 25] ). As Oullet rightly points out, ―The 
originating processions in God follow from this double immediate and mediate mode: the Son proceeds 
immediately from the Father, whereas the Spirit proceeds from the Father by the mediation of the son‖ 
(Divine Likeness, 25).  
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love is at once the substance of the Trinity. In the social analogy of Richard of St. Victor, 
love binds the persons, and is a person itself, but it is not the substance of all three 
persons.  
In the generation after Richard of St. Victor, Bonaventure takes the notion of a 
condilectus, a third good shared by both the lover and the beloved, deep into the life of 
the conjugal family. The child, for Bonaventure, is not merely that which is loved by both 
man and woman, but the child is the very hypostasis of the parents‘ love. ―This new 
analogy thus takes up as its own the social analogy [two friends and a condilectus], no 
longer only favoring the family dimension but this time insisting on it. For this reason, 
we believe that it may indeed be called a typically familial-social analogy of the 
Trinity.‖162  
 What we have seen developed from the patristic version of the family analogy is a 
sort of inversion of identities within the original (Adam and Eve) and typical (man and 
woman) conjugal family. For the Cappadocian authors, Adam was analogous to the 
Father, Seth (or Abel, or Enoch) the Son, and Eve the Spirit. By the time of Bonaventure 
the identities of Eve and Seth (or Abel or Enoch) have reversed. Adam remains in the 
place of Father, but Eve represents the Son, and Seth (or Abel or Enoch) holds the place 
of Spirit. The payoff in switching these identities resided in understanding how the Spirit 
can proceed from both the Father and the Son while being the principle of unity between 
them. This was not the chief theological concern for the Cappadocians. They were more 
concerned to explain how the Spirit proceeds as other-than-generated. The typical-
familial vision of the Trinity established in the scholastic period fell from use until the 
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 Oullet, Divine Likeness, 25, here relying on L. Gendron, La famille, 140; and Klaus Hemmerle: 
―Matrimonio e Famiglia in una antropologia trinitaria,‖ Nuova Umanità 6 (1984), 3–31, at 31. 
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seventeenth-century, when Petau and Tommasinus briefly took up the analogy. Once 
again it disappeared until the 20
th
 century, when it reappeared under the impulse of M. J. 
Scheeben and others.
163
 The analogy has gained strength in no small part due to the 
increased attention given to love (especially see Gaudium et spes 48–52) as the cause and 
principle bond of marriage.
164
 
 While it is important to draw on this tradition of thought that sees in the 
communion of marriage an image of the Trinity, I believe, with Cardinal Oullet, that John 
Paul II is correct when he argues for a qualification of the family as analogy for the 
Trinity. John Paul II desires a katalogical approach to the question: ―the original model of 
the family must be sought in God himself, in the trinitarian mystery of his life.‖165 Note 
John Paul II‘s use of ―model‖ here. The family is to make itself like what has been 
revealed about the Trinity. For John Paul II, the actual connection between the Trinity 
and the conjugal family is not strictly a correspondence between the persons themselves 
(as man or woman) but between the ―communio personarum.‖ In other words, the family 
should attempt to imitate the communion of persons that God has revealed the Trinity to 
be, to provide a kind of image of that communion for and in the world: 
In the words of the [Second Vatican] Council, the ‗communion‘ of persons is 
drawn in a certain sense from the mystery of the trinitarian ‗We‘, and therefore 
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 Oullet (Divine Likeness, 26) here cites the work of M. J. Scheeben, M. Schmaus, and H. Muhlen, as well 
as H. Doms, B. Haering, and Th. Rey-Mermet as examples of trinitarian theologies of marriage and family.  
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 GS, 48: ―Thus a man and a woman, who by their compact of conjugal love ‗are no longer two but one 
flesh‘ (Mt 19:f), render mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union of their persons 
and of their actions… Christ the Lord abundantly blessed this many-faceted love, welling up as it does from 
the fountain of divine love…Authentic married love is caught up into divine love and is governed by 
Christ‘s redeeming power.‖ See also GS, 49: ―The biblical Word of God several times urges the betrothed 
and the married to nourish and develop their wedlock by pure conjugal love and undivided affection. Many 
men of our own age also highly regard true love between husband and wife as it manifests itself in a variety 
of ways…This love is an eminently human one since it is directed from one person to another through an 
affection of the will; it involves the good of the whole person…This love God has judged worthy of special 
gifts, healing, perfecting, and exalting gifts of grace and of charity. Such love, merging the human with the 
divine, leads the spouses to a free and mutual gift of themselves.‖ 
165
 John Paul II, Letter to Families, 6.  
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‗conjugal communion‘ also refers to this mystery. The family, which originates in 
the love of man and woman, ultimately derives from the mystery of God.
166
  
 
Furthermore, ―this conforms to the innermost being of man and woman, to their innate 
and authentic dignity as persons‖ with the capacity and need to live in truth and love.167 
Inasmuch as the conjugal family is a true communion of persons, it is made to the image 
of the Trinity.  
Following John Paul II‘s thought, we can call Trinity a communion of love that 
eternally engenders, maintains, and gives the Divine Persons to, from, and for each other; 
the Trinity contains a genealogy of persons that is the source of the genealogy of persons 
in the conjugal family. When spouses consent to be ―willing to accept children from God,‖ 
they are taking up a mission that is revealed by the life of the Trinity, whose love is so 
personal as to actually be a person. The married couple is choosing to live in this image, 
as a communion of persons whose love is a personal reception of the other as person and 
a gift of one‘s own person; this love becomes a person in the child welcomed into the 
home as gift, as stranger, as Christ, as good in herself or himself.
168
 Gendron points out 
that John Paul II is here developing the social, ecclesial, thought introduced by Augustine, 
which became a love of friendship and the original family in Richard of St. Victor, and 
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 Ibid., 8. Earl Muller has developed a ―communitarian analogy‖ of the Trinity from Pauline sources. See 
Trinity and Marriage in Paul: The Establishement of a Communitarian Analogy of the Trinity Grounded in 
the Theological Shape of Pauline Thought (Frankfurt: Lang, 1990). 
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 John Paul II, Letter to Families, 8. 
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 Stratford Caldecott, in ―The Drama of the Home: Marriage, The Common Good, and Public Policy,‖ (in 
Kenneth D. Whitehead, ed., Marriage and the Common Good: Proceedings from the Twenty-Second 
Annual Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine‘s, 2001], 1–26, 
at 19–21), reflects on the idea of the child as the ―embodiment‖ of the common good of the marriage. He is 
relying on John Paul II, Letter to Families, 10–11. John Paul II writes, ―In the newborn child is realized the 
common good of the family. Just as the common good of the spouses is fulfilled in conjugal love, ever ready 
to give and receive new life, so too the common good of the family is fulfilled through that same spousal 
love, as embodied in the newborn child. Part of the genealogy of the person is the genealogy of the family, 
preserved for posterity by the annotations in the Church‘s baptismal registers, even though these are merely 
the social consequences of the fact that ‗a man has been born into the world‘ (cf. Jn 16:21)‖ (Letter to 
Families, 11, emphasis original).   
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which became the love of each marriage for Bonaventure.
169
 John Paul II ties together 
what these authors had been developing by noting the supra-biological, spiritual 
fruitfulness of the family‘s love—the cooperation of the family with God in their 
willingness to accept children as persons given from God and ordered to God: 
In affirming that spouses, as parents, cooperate with God the Creator in 
conceiving and giving birth to a new human being, we are not speaking merely 
with reference to the laws of biology. Instead, we wish to emphasize here that 
God himself is present in human fatherhood and motherhood quite differently 
than he is present in all other instances of begetting ‗on earth.‘ Indeed, God alone 
is the source of all that ‗image and likeness‘ which is proper to the human being, 
as it was received at creation. Begetting is the continuation of Creation.
170
    
 
Creation is an act of the Trinity, and spousal love is a willingness to participate by 
receptivity in that act of creation at the spiritual and biological levels. 
 It is this weave of spiritual and biological fecundity originating in the trinitarian 
communion of persons that points finally to the ecclesiality of the family and the human 
person and recovers Augustine‘s use of ecclesial imagery to reflect on the Trinity. Recall 
that the Trinity has been understood as the source of ecclesial communion; it is the Spirit 
of brotherhood that allows each person to call Christ the Son our brother, and therefore 
God our (Abba) Father. It is the Father who wills us to be his people born by the Son on 
the Cross and enlightened at the Pentecost by the Spirit to send the good news to the 
nations. These unifying and evangelical impulses of the Trinity in ecclesial communion 
of persons carry over into the conjugal communion of persons, creating in the family 
engendered by sacramental matrimony a domestic church. John Chrysostom commanded 
the families of his diocese to ―make your home into a church.‖171 He was speaking of the 
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 Gendron, La famille, 144. 
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 John Paul II, Letter to Families, 9 (emphasis original). 
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 John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis 6.2 (PG 54, 607), trans. Oullet, Divine Likeness, 41: ―On 
returning home [from liturgy], let us prepare two tables, one for food and one for the Word of God, 
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practices required for a trinitarian communion of persons: ―domestic concord, openness 
to strangers and the poor, welcome and hospitality as essential virtues.‖172 Paul VI, 
developing on the Second Vatican Council‘s renewal of the term ―domestic church,‖ 
emphasized in Evangelii nuntiandi that the family‘s criteria of ecclesiality was 
evangelization. The home is a legitimate source of evangelization. John Paul II, in 
Familiaris consortio makes three kinds of references to the family as ―domestic church.‖ 
One is to affirm that the family is such an ecclesial reality, sharing by word, sacrament, 
and unity in the life and mystery of the Church.
173
 Second, with Paul VI he restates the 
family‘s evangelical mission.174 Finally, he sees the family as a sanctuary (as a church 
building has a sanctuary) wherein prayer and worship are offered.
 175
 For John Paul II, 
because the conjugal family‘s proper identity and role is to share in the Trinity‘s (and 
thus the wider Church‘s) genealogical and function, ―the family is more than a field for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
whereupon the man should repeat the things that were said in Church. Let the wife learn and the children 
hear; nor should the servants be deprived of this reading. Make of your home a church, because you are 
accountable for the salvation of your children and servants.‖ See also Chrysostom, Expo. In Ps 41:12 (PG 
55, 158), trans. Oullet, Divine Likeness, 41: ―All, even the smallest ones, must feel actively committed to 
seeking the message of the Word of God and to living it together…Make your home into a church. For 
where we find psalmody, prayer, and the inspired songs of the prophets, there is certainly no mistake in 
calling such a gathering a ‗church.‘‖ 
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 John Chrysostom, Homily 20 on Ephesians: ―If we regulate our households in this way, we will also be 
fit to oversee the Church, for indeed the household is a little Church. Therefore, it is possible for us to 
surpass all others in virtue by becoming good husbands and wives‖ (On Marriage and Family Life, 57). See 
also, John Chrysostom, Homily 26 on Acts: ―Do this [make vigils of prayer], thou also the man, not the 
woman only. Let the house be a Church, consisting of men and women. For think not because you are the 
only man, or because she is the only woman there, that this is any hindrance. ‗For where two ,‘ He says, 
‗are gathered together in My Name, there am I in the midst of them.‘…If you have children wake up them 
also, and let your house altogether become a Church through the night: but if they be tender, and cannot 
endure the watching, let them stay for the first or second prayer, and then send them to rest‖ (J. Walker et 
al., trans., and Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 11 [Buffalo, NY: Christian 
Literature Publishing, 1889], available at http://newadvent.org/fathers/210126.htm, accessed on February 9, 
2011). From these quotes it is apparent that for Chrysostom, the household is a church because it shares in 
the practices of the Church and because it benefits from Christ‘s promise of presence to the gathered 
Christians. Lisa Sowle Cahill, in Family: A Christian Social Approach (50–60), emphasizes Chrysostom‘s 
attention to the domestic church as locus of training in virtue through practices of almsgiving and prayer—
over against the vice of greed. She goes on to compare him favorably to Augustine, whom she characterizes 
as being more concerned with lust than greed, and less concerned about the practices of child-rearing. 
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 See FC, 21, 38, 48, 49, cited in Oullet, Divine Likeness, 41. 
174
 See FC, 51, 52, 53, cited in Ibid. 
175
 See FC, 55, 59, 61, cited in Ibid. 
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implementation of church pastoral policy, but is an authentic manifestation of the 
Church.‖176  
 
The Trinity: Point of Contact, Point of Distinction 
 
 In the preceding two sections I have laid out some of the ligations both vowed 
religious life in community and matrimonial life have to the Trinity. What remains is to 
identify and explore points of contact and points of distinction in the ways each state is in 
the image of the Trinity. In brief, the points of contact are three. The Trinity is (1) the 
source of both consecrated and married life; (2) the model of unity within marriage and 
consecrated life in community; (3) and the source of the fertility in both states.  
First, Trinity is source. For the religious, the Trinity unites each member in the 
practice of eschatologically prophetic brotherhood with Christ, the Son who leaves and 
returns to the Father in obedience as one who comes to make all people his brothers and 
sisters. In the married state, the spouses are united on account of the sacrament because in 
it their love is taken up into the love of Christ, the Son and second person of the Trinity, 
who serves and even dies for his spouse in obedience to the Father‘s will. The Trinity is a 
touchpoint for both conjugal and consecrated life because entering either state is entering 
the narrative of the Trinity. For the religious, it is to respond to the Father‘s call to belong 
exclusively to the Son and live in the Spirit as though God‘s reign has already begun. 
Again, for the religious, professing the vows is to confess to having been sent by the 
Father to live the life of the Son and bear the fruit of the Spirit in the world. For the 
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domestique,‖ Eglise et théologie 12 (1981), 9–34.‖ 
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married, the spouses enter the narrative of the Trinity because in their sacrament, their 
love is incorporated into Christ‘s love so that they may serve and love each other as 
Christ loved and served the Church—humbly, in suffering, and unto death. Furthermore, 
their love for each other, as a participation in Christ‘s love, sends the Spirit of 
sanctification into the world and bears the fruits of the Spirit in the lives of the spouses 
and their household. Finally, the spouses insert themselves into the narrative of the 
Trinity by ordering their own parenthood as a participation in Christ‘s own statement, ―I 
do nothing of my own, but only what comes from the Father, what I see the Father doing.‖ 
When they see their children as the Father‘s work that they are invited to participate in, as 
God‘s gift which they must relinquish better than they received it,177 as the naked Christ 
knocking at the door, they then enter the Son‘s total dependence on the will of the Father 
for his own mission in the world.  
Recall from chapter 3 that Augustine‘s primary understanding of human 
belonging is ecclesial. Where persons are being Church, whether vowed religious or 
married, they are being one church, sharing in the one creative fecundity of the Trinity. 
True, Augustine saw the motherhood of the virgin as preferable and more fertile to the 
motherhood of the married, but they both participated in the begetting of Christians, in 
the begetting of Christ in the world. It is with this thought that we step into a 
consideration of how this trinitarian language provides a point of convergence and a point 
of distinction for further reflection on married and consecrated religious life.  
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 Lk 19:11–27. The context of this parable is Jesus‘ ascent to Jerusalem, which was accompanied by 
much anticipation by his disciples. The parable speaks to our own context, awaiting the kingdom . Our 
marrying and parenting occur in this context and ought to be lived with the same radical trust (and yes even 
risk) taken by the more aggressive of the servants. We are not to bury ourselves or our children in the 
ground to protect them from fear that we will mess them up, or that the world ―isn‘t a safe place for kids.‖ 
The parable is an answer to the rhetorical question: how could I bring a child into such a messed up world? 
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The ecclesiality of marriage and consecrated life brings the two states together in 
their witness to the Trinity. All Christians, whether consecrated religious or vowed in 
matrimony, share the same baptismal initiation into the Trinity‘s own life by their 
integration into the body of Christ. At the same time, the church is the household of God, 
where Christians, whether consecrated religious or married, abide with Christ under the 
motivation of the Spirit in the one household of the Father. Being Church, then, is a 
domestic project of returning to the Father by imitating the Son under the inspiration of 
the Spirit. Both states of life witness to the trinitarian aspects of this householding. 
Religious life practices a domestic task of filial love for one another in shared 
brotherhood to Christ by the power of the Spirit and called to return in filial obedience to 
the Father. As we saw in chapters three and four, this project as envisioned by John‘s 
Gospel and the practice of Benedictine monastic life is decidedly domestic. Through the 
regular life of waking, praying, maintenance, cooking, cleaning, eating, and work, the 
religious fill each moment with charity for their fellow community members and for all 
peoples. The work of the community members for the maintenance of daily life, whether 
inside the household or outside (for non-cloistered religious orders), is an obediential, 
receptive participation in the creativity of the Father. The obedience each renders to one 
another and the abbot, and the service of prayer and care each monk renders for one 
another and the world is a participation in Christ‘s own obedience to the Father, his 
prayer for the church, and his humble service of his flock. Finally, the joyful spirit which 
can raise a community member to prayer, to a humble act of service, or to their apostolic 
work outside the community is a share in the Spirit that inspired the original community 
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of Christians in the upper room and filled those who heard the message with new life in 
Christ.   
Married life, for its part, has a privileged share in this householding with God, for 
its own practice of householding with God is a task of being domestic church. In this 
sense, by participation in the life of the Trinity, the spouses‘ sometimes humdrum tasks 
of ordering a household, working for the economic preservation of the family, and 
educating children are transformed. Economic work and ordering the household becomes 
an obediential, receptive, and appropriated participation in the creativity of the father.
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But they are also a graced participation in the evangelical mission of the son. Bearing, 
educating, and caring for children becomes a participation in Christ‘s humble servant 
leadership that washed the feet of the disciples, tended to a mother-in-law, and gathered 
children for blessing. This task of educating children also becomes a share, too, in the 
Spirit-filled mission of the Church, not only because the parents are the child‘s first 
preachers of the good news of freedom from sin and death, but because the family shares 
in the Church‘s and the Trinity‘s outward, diffusive orientation. The family, if it is 
domestic church, if it is the household of God, not only welcomes the child and the 
stranger, but actively runs over its own boundaries into evangelical opportunities 
wherever they are. Finally, the Spirit of love inspires any action in the household to be 
accomplished as an act of love. Whether changing a diaper or waiting for a turn in the 
shower, the work of the domestic church is a participation in the enlivening Spirit sent to 
guide and sanctify the church in the world.         
Third, because ecclesial belonging, as domestic project, is trinitarian, it is 
genealogical. Just as the life of the Trinity is fruitful, that is, its love generates persons, so 
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 John Paul II, Laborem exercens, 25. 
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too must be our domestic abiding with Christ as church fruitful. The consecrated religious 
witness to a new era of salvation history, where the command to be fruitful and multiply 
has been transformed into an evangelical, spiritual command to bring people to life in the 
household of God.
179
 The married Christian too witnesses to this transformation of the 
command to be fruitful and multiply. Rather than understanding biological procreation as 
a duty required for the fulfillment of God‘s promise to Abraham, or as a matter of self-
fulfillment, or as means to carry on their own name and possessions (or even the 
continuation of the human race), spouses now welcome God‘s gift of the child as a 
spiritual fruit of their love. The couple is to see the child as God‘s own, principally the 
work of God, not their own work, to be loved for her own sake and guided to authentic 
development as daughter of God. This view follows from the spouse‘s understanding that 
their mission as spouses and parents is an authentic participation in the evangelical 
mission of the Church. This is their crowning participation in that evangelical mission.  
While there is much about their trinitarian grounding that brings together conjugal 
and consecrated life, the Trinity also offers points of distinction between the consecrated 
and the conjugal life. As we said before, persons in both states are sent by the Father to 
live the evangelical mission of the Son and share in the sanctifying power of the Spirit; 
however, each state lives this reality distinctly. While the primary factor drawing together 
these two states is the community in which the vows of religion and matrimony take 
place, the ecclesial community, which is itself rooted in the Trinity, the primary 
distinction lies in community as well. For the consecrated, the principal community is the 
brothers and sisters of a religious order, not any one brother or sister. For the spouses, the 
                                                          
179
 In chapter three I noted how Augustine develop this position based on his understanding of the meaning 
of marriage at different stages of salvation history. 
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principal community is the communion of persons created in the consent and 
consummation (i.e., a communion initially involving only two persons). Whether in 
active or contemplative orders, the religious participate in the evangelical and sanctifying 
mission of the Church to the whole world because they are bound to practices of 
Christian householding with the religious community and any person who happens 
inhabit the community wherein they profess their vows. The foundational community for 
married persons, on the other hand, is from the bond between spouses, who commit to 
practices of Christian householding with one person in particular (at least initially). 
Spouses are sent by the Father to love a particular person as Christ loves the Church, to 
order a life with that person according to the sanctifying Spirit. Furthermore, they are sent 
to be one in Christ and love the Church as Christ does. They must bring Christ‘s love to 
the whole Church by, through, and with their service to one another and their immediate 
community. This conjugal life, insofar as it is rooted in the Trinity will be diffusive, 
personal love; its love will become persons received from God the Father in an 
expression of love for the spouse. The religious life, insofar as it is rooted in the Trinity 
will be diffusive, personal love; its love will become persons received (in baptism) from 
God the Father in an expression of love for the entire people of God, who constitute 
Christ‘s body.  
Of course, even in this distinction we have another point of common ground. First, 
both the vows of the marital sacrament and vows of religion can only be made by those 
already living in the same community, that is, the household of God. In other words, only 
baptized Christians can make these vows. Second, even though the wedding vows bind 
two persons and the religious vows bind a larger group of persons, both the nuptial and 
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the religious vows are public, graced, made in the presence of the church, and as 
members of the ecclesial community that will hold the vowing subject accountable. Third, 
even though the spousal communion of persons created by the consent and 
consummation essentially bonds only two persons, it is not any more ―voluntary‖ or 
―nuclear‖ than entrance into religious life. The conjugal covenant binds two persons, not 
two autonomous individuals. These two persons come to the altar with all manner of 
familial connections and histories; the newly created marriage bond does not sever those 
persons from their previous households (whether biological or volitional). In fact, the 
conjugal covenant creates new bonds to those pre-existing households. The spouses may 
need to invite their parents into their home as they advance in age, for example. Also, just 
as the other members of the religious order were not chosen by the novice, the spouses do 
not elect who will be in their wife‘s extended family, or who their wife‘s uncle may 
decide to marry in five years. The bonds between persons in religious communities and 
extended kinship groups are equally non-voluntary and equally wide-ranging. The 
distinction here is that vows of religion explicitly bond the person to the entire 
community, whereas vows of matrimony explicitly bond the spouses to each other and 
any persons who may enter that community over time (e.g., children).    
 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Let us pause for a moment to reconsider the trajectory of thought in this chapter. 
Where have we come from in this chapter, and what point have we reached? The chapter 
considered three theological loci for consonance between marriage and consecrated life: 
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vows, Christ and his evangelical virtues as the nexus of both Christian states, and finally 
the Trinity as fundamental source and model for the states as ways of life in God‘s 
household.  The chapter began by arguing that marrying people do make vows. I 
continued by forwarding and developing the arguments of those who claim that the vows 
of consecrated religious life disclose a fundamental reality of human nature and 
community, both what it is and what it lacks. At the basis of the human person and 
community various authors found a nuptial orientation or the will. Despite this difference, 
both considered the human person to be oriented toward complete gift of self as 
expressed in both consecrated religious life and matrimony. If the vows of religion tell us 
about who we are, I proposed that they also disclose what (or better, who) we are called 
to become—Christ. Christ, it was argued, is the source and summit of poverty, chastity, 
and obedience. Since the destiny of each Christian, having been incorporated into 
Christ‘s body, having become a part of the community witnessing to the story of Christ‘s 
life, death, and resurrection, is for a Christoform life, then we must hold that the 
evangelical counsels are in truth a kind of evangelical imperative. They will be lived in 
the life of all Christians inasmuch as any Christian truly lives in Christ. Just as the vows 
of religion find their font and form in Christ, so too does conjugal life. The sacramental 
bond of marriage was first made present by Christ‘s own generous (poor), exclusive 
(chaste), and unconditional (obedient) love for the church manifested in the life, death, 
and resurrection that sanctify his spouse and continue to enliven her through the 
Eucharist today. Finally, a third section showed that both consecrated and conjugal life 
find their source in, provide an image of, and participate in the narrative of the Trinity in 
ways that unite these states of life and ways that distinguish these states of life. Through 
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these investigations we have arrived at a rich theological consonance between the 
harmony of religious life and the melody of matrimony.  
From what I have argued above, we can conclude that married life and 
consecrated life meet in Christ who, as christos, anthropos, and Secunda Persona 
Trinitatis, reveals himself as poor, chaste, and obedient son and bridegroom, and who 
presents the evangelical counsels as the font springing forth both the consecrated and 
married life as practices of abiding in God‘s household.   
       There are two immediate implications of this conclusion about the meeting of 
consecrated and conjugal life in Christ as second person of the Trinity, along with what 
has been said in previous chapters about the shared practices and principles of marriage 
and consecrated life as two instantiations of Christian householding. (1) My conclusion 
should fairly put to rest worries of those who fear a ―monasticization of marriage.‖ This 
is the case not because aspects of spirituality practiced in consecrated religious life might 
be applicable to conjugal life, but because I have reframed the question of how the two 
states relate to and influence one another. Frederick J. Parrella and Peter Phan and others 
(see chapter 2) have shied away using from language from the religious life to explicate 
an ―authentic‖ married spirituality because it appears to them that such recourse to this 
language will lead to spouses who are semi-monastic, or spouses who cannot find 
holiness in what they do as married couple. They come to this conclusion because they 
see marriage and monasticism as parallel tracks to the same goal. In place of this image, I 
have offered a picture that imagines conjugal and consecrated life as intertwined practices 
of being conformed to Christ the poor, chaste, and obedient Christian householding. 
Poverty, chastity, and obedience constitute the fiber of both threads of this one twine 
365 
 
inasmuch as both are a participation in Christ. We need not fear recourse to language of 
―vows‖ and evangelical counsels as an incursion of monasticism into married life. 
Poverty, for example, belongs no more to the religious than it does to the married. We 
have now reached a point where we can speak of poverty, chastity, and obedience not as 
―things the religious life can offer married people‖ but as practices inherently though 
distinctly expressed in both states of life. The chapter that follows, therefore, explores 
marriage as a vowed life, especially as a life of implicitly vowed poverty, chastity, and 
obedience. 
(2) This chapter is, thus, a springboard for further reflection on Christian 
householding as a setting for the virtues and practices of poverty, chastity, and obedience. 
Such a reflection occupies chapter six. With the conclusion that the evangelical counsels 
are foundational in both married and consecrated religious life, a trove of theological 
experience, vocabulary, and imagination are opened up for the field of moral theology in 
marriage. As we have seen, even accounts of Christian householding relying on practice 
language do not have recourse to poverty, chastity, or obedience.
180
 A vast body of 
resources might now be plumbed to aid married persons in discerning and developing 
their practices of being and following the poor, chaste, and obedient Christ in their 
domestic Church. Among these resources are the notion of the novitiate, the liturgical 
richness of religious life in community, as well as the concept of religious life as regular, 
that is, lived according to a rule.  
Chapter six deals principally with integrating the insights of previous chapters 
into a framework for the third paradigm proposed in chapter 1: marriage as Common 
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 Julie Hanlon Rubio‘s recent monograph (Family Ethics: Practices for Christian Families [Washington: 
Georgetown University, 2010]) was organized around five practices: sex, eating, tithing, serving, and 
prayer. Poverty, chastity, and obedience, however, found no place in her treatment. 
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Way in Christ. Marriage, as Common Way in Christ, is an ecclesial, christomorphic 
practice lived according to principles of Christian householding, among them the 
evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience integrated by a regula vitae. 
Chapter six frames this paradigm out by bringing to bear MacIntyre‘s definition of 
―practice,‖ by prioritizing the ecclesial location of the practice through reference to 
Augustine‘s ecclesio-nuptial goods and the principles of Christian householding, and by a 
consideration of poverty, chastity, and obedience in the married state. The chapter ends 
with a reflection on the synthetic power of a regula vitae for the evangelical virtues in 
marriage, and closes with suggestions for future research into a novitiate for the married 
state.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL FOR MARRIAGE AS A COMMON 
WAY IN CHRIST—THE EVANGELICAL COUNSELS, HOUSEHOLDING 
PRINCIPLES, A REGULA MATRIMONII, AND  
A MARRIAGE NOVITIATE 
 
 
The first five chapters of this dissertation have paved the way for the constructive 
attempts offered here. The introduction identified problems affecting marriage and family, 
as well as typical solutions offered in terms of ―narratives‖ for where marriage is, how it 
got there, and where it must go. The diagnosis of the disease and the shape of its cure 
were related to the paradigms used to understand marriage itself. In demonstrating this 
claim I described the approach to marriage as ―relationship‖ and marriage as ―practice.‖ 
Each of these approaches contributes to solving some of the difficulties in marriage, but 
each leaves other challenges unaddressed. ―Relationship‖ language was too 
anthropological and not theological enough—with little connection to Trinity and the 
church as the context for the relationship. On the other hand, practice language also 
lacked a rich theological grounding, but had made a strong move to see marriage as 
principally within the Church. Some third paradigm that involves aspects of both 
―relationship‖ and ―practice‖ was required, with a theological foundation to ground it. 
The language for this paradigm, I argued, must come from the life of the Church rather 
than the grammar of the state or civil society, because Christian marriage‘s primary 
context is ecclesial and its primary end, as determined by that context, is the 
sanctification of the spouses. To this end, I hypothesized a consonance between vowed 
religious life and matrimonial life. 
Chapter two continued by turning to twentieth-century scholars who are aware of 
an area of ecclesial life that has more theological development as a practice rooted in 
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Christology and the Trinity, namely vowed religious life. While these authors offered 
many insights into the relationship between the two states of life, they ultimately 
maintain a version of the oppositional, competitive account that necessarily dichotomizes 
the two states and fails to see their common ground in Christ the second person of the 
Trinity. I intended to overcome the oppositional narrative with a counter-narrative that 
demonstrates complex relationship between these states, and the dialogue and sharing of 
images and concepts that has existed between them for throughout Christian history. The 
counter-narrative sees the two states as composing together the one bride of Christ who is 
united with and abides with the bridegroom; in other words, both marriage and 
consecrated religious life are complex domestic practices of inhabiting God‘s household. 
In the fourth chapter I arrived at contemporary scholars who envision Christian life in 
terms of householding practices. The principles of unity they offer for matrimony and 
monastic life are a good start, and they help alleviate the absence of a wider 
ecclesiological connection in theologies of the family. These principles of unity reminded 
us that both vowed religious life and conjugal life are shaped by the larger identity and 
purposes of the Body of Christ. While these principles are helpful, chapter four noted 
significant lacks, among them the understanding of life according to a regula, the 
evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, and Christ and the Trinity as 
foundation for these principles and practices. 
In chapter five, therefore, I grounded both married and religious life in vows, 
specifically the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. As we saw, these three are not 
only vows, but states and virtues as well. As virtues and states they are present in the 
nexus of Christian life: Christ, the second Adam and the second person of the Trinity. 
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Married and religious share in these virtues ecclesially, that is, by virtue of the 
sacraments of initiation all Christians are incorporated into Christ‘s body. They share, 
therefore, what pertains to Christ. They are one with Christ the poor, chaste, and obedient 
bridegroom. They also share in Christ‘s life as second person of the Trinity. Both 
matrimonial and vowed religious life are specifications of and confessions of the Trinity 
by the practices and relationships they hold as communiones personarum. 
 Having argued for the fundamental character of poverty, chastity, and obedience 
as vows, virtues and states in the nexus of Christ as new Adam and second person of the 
Trinity, I am now free to explore these vows, virtues, and states as they might be applied 
in marriage. The key distinguishing factor of my own attempt at this kind of exploration 
is that it does not interpolate poverty, chastity, and obedience as essentially monastic 
wisdom that can be lived in some partial way by married folk. In other words, the effort 
to understand poverty, chastity, and obedience in the married state is not a 
monasticization of marriage. I am instead basing the exploration on the stronger claim 
that these virtues, states, and vows, lie behind both religious and married life as 
principally ecclesial goods.
1
 These virtues and states—poverty, chastity, and obedience—
are primarily evangelical counsels or imperatives of the church, instantiated in slightly 
different ways in the lives of the consecrated (as we saw in chapter five), the married (as 
discussed here), and even single, non-vowed members of the church (who are not 
considered here). This chapter, then, will hypothesize householding practices for poverty, 
chastity, and obedience within the larger ecclesial practice of Christian marriage. 
                                                          
1
 The good of the child or procreation can be reflected on as an ecclesial good both married and consecrated 
share in by (though differently) by practices of parenthood. I cannot explore topic here, since it would 
involve more work in the theology and practice of religious life than I can do here, but a separate study of 
parenthood as a practice of the whole church is a natural complement for this study. 
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 The structure of the chapter will be to recall insights from the previous chapters 
and integrate them into the paradigm of marriage as Common Way in Christ. The first 
section recalls MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice‖ as applied to the goods internal to the 
marriage of the one Church to Christ. These goods come from the insights of Augustine 
and the scholars studied in chapter four. The second deals explicitly with expressions of 
poverty, chastity, and obedience in marriage through examples of these three that also 
integrate principles of Christian householding from chapter four. From here the chapter 
moves to a consideration of a regula matrimonii, as an integrating order for the practice 
of Christian marriage. Finally, the chapter ends with some suggestions for further 
research into a marriage novitiate. 
Being honest about where the practices of Catholic marriage are today and where 
they need to go requires affirming two points: (1) marriage is currently a status quo of 
Christian life entered for any number of reasons and for any number of goals apart from 
the ecclesial purposes and ends; (2) marriage should be referred to as a vocation requiring 
as much discernment, training, and intentionality as the consecrated religious life. 
Marriage can no longer be something people ―fall into.‖ Thomas Merton‘s thought 
represents the precarious position we find ourselves in today: ―The ordinary way to 
holiness and to the fullness of Christian life is marriage. Most men and women will 
become saints in the married state.‖2 This statement might seem to resonate with my 
position, but it can just as easily perpetuate an attitude to be avoided—that marriage itself 
should be ―ordinary,‖ and that‘s okay because God sanctifies his people in ordinary, 
worldly pursuits as much as he does in those extraordinary pursuits such as the vowed 
religious life. Just by adverting to marriage as ―ordinary‖ Merton subtly and 
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 Thomas Merton, No Man Is an Island (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 111. 
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unintentionally maintains the ―clericalism‖ and dualism of Christian life that 
contemporary theology so wishes to rid itself of. Calling marriage ordinary and saying 
that most people will become saints in marriage amounts to saying that consecrated 
religious life is something exceptional, un- or super-natural, and at least implicitly a 
greater or more radical calling. Among my emphases in this dissertation has been the idea 
that the practice of Christian marriage makes no small demand for virtue and is equally as 
extraordinary as religious life, both being Christomorphic practices in the Church.   
Furthermore, in the twenty-first century West, it is incredibly challenging to order 
the married state explicitly toward the service of God and neighbor. Very little cultural or 
economic formation and support exist for such successful performance of such a practice. 
More Christians are married than vowed religious, but it is not therefore to be assumed 
that the majority of married people are actually becoming saints in and through their 
marriage. So common are divorces and annulment proceedings in the Church that they 
are a scandal, raising serious questions about the Church‘s failure to prepare people well 
for marriage and protect people from attempting invalid marriages.
3
 At the descriptive 
                                                          
3
 Michael Lawler has made the argument that the marriage of baptized non-believers is not a sacrament, 
since all sacraments presume intention and faith. For Lawler, the intention and faith must be explicit. For 
Lawler, the faith of the church does not satisfy this requirement as it does in baptism. See Lawler, Marriage 
and the Catholic Church: Disputed Questions (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2002), 43–66; Walter 
Kasper, Theology of Christian Marriage (New York: Crossroad, 1980), 78–84;  Susan K. Wood, on the 
other hand, has argued in favor of the Church‘s current position, that the marriages of baptized non-
believers are assumed to be valid sacraments. See Wood, ―The Marriage of Baptized nonbelievers: Faith, 
Contract, and Sacrament,‖ Theological Studies 48 (279–301). Bernard Cooke‘s approach is to say that 
marriage comes in to being over a long period of time, and just as well may dissolve over a period of time. 
See Cooke, ―What God Has Joined Together…‖ in Kieran Scott and Michael Warren, eds., Perspectives on 
Marriage: A Reader (New York: Oxford University, 1993), 353–360. This debate has the laudable pastoral 
intent to find ways to decrease annulments and broken marriages. The most interesting pastoral solution is 
the introduction of a marital catechumenate in the Catholic Church. Two proposals for such a 
catechumenate have emerged in the Catholic Church (many already exist in the Episcopal Church). 
Michael Lawler‘s proposal is to invite couples to a formal betrothal rite that would initiate a period of 
cohabitation that would eventually be solemnized with the rite of matrimony. See Lawler, ―A Marital 
Catechumenate Proposal,‖ INTAMS Review 13 (2007): 161–77. A better, more developed proposal or a 
marriage catechumenate comes from Rev. Paul Holmes. Because he supports the Church‘s position that 
marriage begins with the sacrament of matrimony rather than with betrothal (as Lawler argues), Holmes 
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level, marriage might as easily be construed and lived a practice of self-fulfillment than a 
practice of sacrifice and service. Too many couples enter and live marriage unaware of its 
theological nature, and uninformed of the virtues and internal goods sought by this 
ecclesial vocation and practice.   
What must happen, and this dissertation makes an attempt, is to provide 
Christians the language and paradigm to understand marriage as a common way to 
holiness in the Church, a way that participates in similar principles of Christian 
householding as consecrated religious life and requires the same evangelical virtues as 
consecrated religious life.
4
 This is why it is so important to understand marriage with 
consecrated life as a practice of householding with God. Living in God‘s household 
requires a complete gift of self: one‘s external goods (poverty), one‘s body (chastity), and 
one‘s will (obedience). A person makes these gifts to God by becoming radically 
available and vulnerable to serve and love for the sanctification of another. In the case of 
religious life it is a universal availability that requires a permanent gift of  possession, 
sexual intimacy, and self-reliance to Christ, that is, through a renunciation of the 
possibility for possessing anything as one‘s own, for sharing sexual intimacy with any 
person at all, and for privileging one‘s own will over a superior‘s. These gifts are made to 
the one Christ, for the sanctification of the universal church, which constitutes the very 
body of Christ.
5
 In the case of conjugal life, spouses vow a particular availability that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
does not introduce cohabitation into the catechumenate. See Holmes, ―A Catechumenate for Marriage: 
Presacramental Preparation as Pilgrimage,‖ Journal of Ritual Studies 6.2 (1992): 93–113. The theory, as 
well as the rites necessary for the catechumenate are developed and presented in his dissertation, Betrothal: 
A Liturgical Rite of Passage. The Anthropological Perspective of Victor W. Turner as the Basis for the 
Development of a Catechumenate for the Betrothed (Rome: Pontifica Universita S. Tommaso d‘Aquino, 
1991).      
4
 By ―common‖ I do not mean descriptive of the majority. Instead I mean something to be shared. 
5
 This is not at all to say that the consecrated religious person has sexual intimacy with Christ, but rather 
that all possibility of that intimacy is given to Christ for the service of the whole church. 
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requires permanent gift of possession, sexual intimacy, and self-reliance to a spouse, that 
is, through a renunciation of the possibility for possessing anything as one‘s own, for 
sharing sexual intimacy with any other person, and for privileging one‘s own will over 
the spouse‘s. The gift is made to Christ through the spouse (and all community that may 
be engendered therefrom), for the sake of their salvation together, achieved by service to 
the other with each other. 
 
PRACTICING MARRIAGE AS A COMMON WAY IN CHRIST 
 
 In this first section, I will recall MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice‖ as it was 
applied to Christian marriage in light of the Augustinian ecclesio-nuptial good from 
chapter three, and the principles of Christian householding from chapter four. MacIntyre 
defined ―practice‖ thus: 
 Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity  
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.
6
 
 
A key component of this definition is that, if marriage is a practice, it is socially 
established. If it is socially established then its establishment and continued existence 
have a history. Furthermore, contemporary practitioners become sharers in this history. 
When they choose to begin the practice they elect to place themselves in relationship with 
all others currently living the practice, all who have lived it before them, and those who 
might follow them. In other words, to enter a practice is to enter an intergenerational 
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 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 189. 
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relationship, whether or not one likes it. Here we see two Christian householding 
principles rising into view: the supravoluntary aspect of Christian householding, and the 
permeability of the Christian householding across the boundaries of the nuclear family.  
 These two principles carry implications for the practice of Christian marriage. 
Married Christians must understand their supravoluntary, intergenerational relationship to 
those with whom they share the practice of marriage, beginning with their own biological 
parents. At the concrete level, a respect for the non-voluntary intergenerational 
relationship will mean greater permeability of their own home to that relationship. One 
example of this increased permeability is a greater openness to and even provision for 
intergenerational living. In light of the increasing privatization of elder-care, a 
privatization linked in no small part to the increasing cost of healthcare, the increasing 
life expectancy, and the already stressed position of most dual-income couples, ever more 
mothers and fathers, husbands and wives, end up spending their last, weakest, and 
sometimes loneliest and most frightening years with rare or occasional contact with 
family. Because they have become radically dependent, they are no longer included in the 
practice of householding. The society of individualism has created a situation where our 
practices of householding cannot abide those who need help, those who cannot make it 
―on their own.‖ Living with and caring for these people is becoming less a task of the 
Christian household but of private businesses or state-funded institutions. Take, for 
example, the company named Extended Family.
7
 There is much to praise about this 
business‘s endeavor to ―promote independence, good health, and engagement in life‖ for 
the elderly. Their services include all the kinds of things biological family or kin would 
do if they lived near their parents or could afford to take the time: opening mail, filling 
                                                          
7
 See http://www.extended-family.net/, accessed on February 3, 2011. 
375 
 
out and paying bills, taking to doctor appointments, helping with domestic maintenance, 
etc. They help keep elderly people in their home, but as an exercise of independence 
rather than as a domestic practice of life together toward shared goods. That this kind of 
company exists is evidence that we live in a society that prefers contractual relationships 
to open-ended and asymmetrical ones.
8
 Contractual relationships are easier, neater, and 
less risky, but they are also less human. 
In light of the fact that Christian householding is per se intergenerational and that 
commitments to sacrificial care do not end when people become ―independent,‖ we need 
to find cooperative activities within the practice of Christian householding to account for 
these facts. For example, Christian spouses ought not only to be open to intergenerational 
living arrangements but to plan for them. There are many ways this kind of planning 
could work. The Becker family, for example, decided to buy a house with and begin 
living with one set of their parents, even though they did not yet need extra care. The idea 
behind the move was twofold. First, the grandparents could, while still able, contribute to 
the childcare of the children during the day. Second, anticipating a future need for elder-
care, the children and grandchildren could accustom themselves to intergenerational 
living before it became a necessity. Learning to live together and love each other now 
would be much easier than when the stress would be much higher.  
The move, of course, involved challenges for all parties. For one spouse, it meant 
a decision to live with in-laws. For all, it meant sacrificing a certain independence. The 
decision was made, though, in the spirit of Christian householding, with the Dietrich 
                                                          
8
 See McCarthy, Sex and Love in the Home, 140, 141, 155, and chap. 9. McCarthy pointed out other 
examples of preferences for contractual relationships. For example, rather than hiring the neighbor kid to 
help paint a house, a person might hire a painter because it is easier and less risky. No need to teach a kid 
how to paint, worry if he will be late, or slow, or if he will spill paint everywhere. 
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Bonhoeffer‘s notion in mind that Christian life together is not about finding ―the 
community we‘ve always wanted.‖ Christian life together is not about finding a cadre of 
people who like each other and want to live together for community‘s sake. Rather, says 
Bonhoeffer, ―The kingdom is to be in the midst of your enemies. And he who will not 
suffer this does not want to be of the kingdom of Christ.‖9 As much as we love those who 
have traditioned the practices of Christian marriage to us, we can at times seem to be 
each other‘s enemies. 
This insight about intergenerational Christian householding takes on a new 
character when we understand that, as ecclesial practices of householding, religious life 
and Christian marriage widen the scope of those to whom we have a supravoluntary 
relationships, those to whom should consider offering hospitality and a share in our own 
householding. Intergenerational living within the biological household is not the only 
option. What if, in light of the rising need for elder-care, a new association of the lay 
faithful, or new religious order arose whose apostolate was to hold house with the elderly 
in need? If our truest family is those who are incorporated into Christ, then this 
suggestion need not sound so strange. What if large, lonely church rectories housing one 
priest became places of Christian householding for new kinds of Christian life together 
involving elderly from the parish? If true religion is to care for the widow, and if 
                                                          
9
 Bonhoeffer, Life Together, 17–18. He is relying on a statement by Martin Luther in making this point. 
Sandra Schneiders (Selling Al, chap. 8) draws a sharp distinction between religious life and intentional 
community. Schneiders reduces intentional community to a group of persons that comes together ―in order 
to satisfy their own or one another‘s emotional or affective needs‖ (ibid., 287–88). Schneiders is right to 
point out that experimentation [after Vatican II] showed that people want to be able to live together, but 
they tend toward the mistake of ‗intentional community‘ of likeminded people, which becomes exclusive 
and ultimately insular and destructive (ibid., chap. 9). Later she identifies ―intentional community‖ as one 
of three typical social groups. It is the one with the highest affective commitment and sacrifice for 
belonging. It has the highest payout of relational, affective benefit, but the highest cost of insularity and 
loss of individuality (ibid., 357–73). Ultimately, Schneiders argues that Christian life together in religious 
community should be a mixture of intentional community, bureaucracy (official, formal, administrative), 
and association (completely voluntary, low commitment).   
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Christian householding is truly a task of the whole church, then these options should not 
sound all that far-fetched.
10
  
At this point, another of MacIntyre‘s criteria for practice comes to the foreground. 
In the excellent pursuit of a practice, there are times in which external goods associated 
with the practice may be harder to attain, or even temporarily sacrificed for the sake of 
the internal goods and standards of excellence essential to the practice itself. As 
MacIntyre put it, faithfulness to the excellent performance of a practice and its standards 
leads ―from time to time [to] the taking of self-endangering and even achievement-
endangering risks.‖11 Furthermore, ―the possession of the virtues may perfectly well 
hinder us in achieving external goods.‖12 This is frequently the case in the practice of 
Christian marriage and householding, particularly if we keep in mind the householding 
principles of familiarity and formality. 
 Familiarity, as explored in chapter four, requires nearness, a quality of domestic 
life that cannot be made safe. It relies on the virtue and internal good of fides, fidelity in 
its fullest sense. For example, spouses must keep faithful to the common goods of their 
practice of Christian marriage. One of those goods might be time spent together in 
productive activity. Fidelity to a commitment to this kind of presence in the home may 
bar one or both working parents from greater job promotions that would result from or 
lead to extended absence from the life of the home. Faithfulness to standards of 
                                                          
10
 See M. Therese Lysaught, ―Practicing the Order of Widows: A New Call for an Old Vocation,‖ Christian 
Bioethics, 11 (2005): 51–68. Lysaught argues for a revival of the Order of Widows, a version of the kind of 
Christian householding I hypothesize here, in light of the 1998 document from the Pontifical Council for 
the Laity entitled ―The Dignity of Older People and their Mission in the Church and the World.‖ She thinks 
such a renewal would combat the devaluation, marginalization, impoverishment, debilitation, loneliness, 
and euthanasia of the elderly through a traditional, concrete, ecclesial practice while witnessing to the 
culture the Church seeks to transform. 
11
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 193. 
12
 Ibid., 196. 
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excellence in Christian householding as a spouse and parent include eating, praying, 
playing and working together for common goods (e.g. cleaning the house or repainting a 
wall) on a daily basis may involve achievement-endangering risks. The Bryant couple, 
before committing to marriage, considered the career path of the spouse who planned on 
being a primary income-earner. This spouse had already prepared for a career in medicine, 
but determined that the particular career of interest within medicine would require an 
infidelity of time and energy to the non-wage earning aspects of their future householding. 
The couple, through prayer and research discovered a new, less auspicious and 
prestigious career path that enables one spouse to work from home on two days of the 
week, and allows the couple to work for income together part-time.  
A second example also touches financial matters and emphasizes the ecclesial 
character of marriage as a Common Way in Christ. As MacIntyre reminds us, those 
purposes and ends are in part defined by the social body in which the practice takes place. 
For Christians, marriage takes place in the ecclesial body, so the purposes and ends of the 
Church are in part determinative of the purposes and ends of the marriage. The Roberts 
household, in an effort to make the Church‘s ends their own, gives a tithe of ten percent 
from the top of their gross income to their geographical parish. For them, faithfulness to 
the mission of this parish means a steady, planned financial commitment rather than a 
chunk here or a piece there. This kind of commitment, though, at a middle class wage is a 
substantial portion of their income. It means the loss of some external goods for this 
family, in their case cable TV and cell phone. Members of religious orders often make an 
even more radical statement of fidelity to the mission of their ecclesial institutions. For 
example, employees of educational institutions who are also members of religious orders 
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often give (with their order‘s permission) a substantial or even the entirety of their salary 
back to the institution. In both of these cases, standard of fides to the internal goods of the 
practice leads to a sacrifice of goods external to the practice of their Christian 
householding. 
A final aspect of MacIntyre‘s definition that brings Christian marriage, as 
common way, into discussion with the principles of householding from chapter four is 
that the cooperative activities and virtues determinative of the practice contribute to the 
internal good of ―living as X.‖ In the case of a painter, the virtues and activities of her 
practice extends the internal good of ―a painter‘s life, or living as a painter.‖ In the case 
of the Christian marriage as a Common Way in Christ, the virtues and activities of 
Christian householding integrate the internal goods of the practice into ―living as Christ, 
or the life of Christ.‖  
In particular, the householding principles of ora et labora are at work integrating 
the practice of Christian marriage into ―living as Christ.‖13 For example, the Jenkins 
household tries to envision its household practices as part of Christ‘s own actions through 
the work of the Church. To that end, the household commits to daily prayer for the 
hungry and homeless as a support for the ecclesial ministries that aid them. This ora, 
though, as a shared work for a common good internal to the practice of being church 
(feeding the hungry and sheltering the homeless) extends the capacity of the family to 
achieve that good in the concrete. In other words, it extends their ability to express the 
virtues of ―living as Christ.‖ One Saturday of the month, as a fruit of and natural 
companion to their prayer, the household, young and old alike, goes to the parish and sets 
                                                          
13
 See Russell, ―Marriage and Contemplative Life,‖ 48–57. Russell argues that ora can be considered the 
vocation of the family. 
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up the tables, food, and clothes for the wider ecclesial household who lives in need. The 
two and three year old children push chairs into places, the four-year-olds set out napkins, 
five-year-olds fold and set out clothes, the older children help cook hot meals and pack 
bag lunches, etc. Meanwhile, homeless and poor from the neighborhood make their way 
in and interact with the members of the Jenkins household (and other households). The 
ecclesial dining hall is transformed into a hearth where hospitality is offered in a familiar 
way to strangers who become friends. For the Jenkins household, this kind of activity is 
not an extra-mural, accidental aspect of their householding done because of their 
participation in a voluntary association. It is part of the practice of Christian householding 
done out of the standards of excellence built into the practice of living in the household of 
God. If ―living as Christ,‖ is the internal good achieved by the integrating the virtues and 
activities of their practice of Christian householding, then doing the things the Church (as 
sacrament of Christ) does is a standard for the achieving this internal good. ―Living as 
Christ,‖ is the integration of their activities of ora and their labora toward their share in 
the common purposes, ends, and goods of God‘s household.    
 The preceding section has attempted to explore concrete cooperative activities of 
marriage as a Common Way in Christ, an expression of Christian householding, a 
practice of being church. The section proceeded by recovering chapter one‘s application 
of ―practice‖ to marriage and strongly situating it with in the larger context of Christian 
householding. This was accomplished by combining the MacIntyrian concepts of internal 
goods, virtues, and standards of excellence determinative of practices with the principles 
of householding from chapter four. First, the historicity and intergenerational aspects of a 
practice were linked with the Christian householding principles of supra-voluntary 
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relationships and permeability. Concrete examples came from questions of 
intergenerational living. Second, the role of virtue in attaining internal goods, even in the 
face of sacrificed external goods came into contact with the householding principles of 
familiarity and fidelity. Examples of career decisions and tithing were explored. Finally, 
the integration of a practice‘s standards and virtues into the internal good of ―the life of x, 
or living as x‖ was borne out in the householding principles of ora et labora. It was seen 
that a conjugal household‘s integration of ―the life of Christ, or living as Christ,‖ 
involved praying and acting with the church (as sacrament of Christ) and for the church 
(as household of God). 
 These principles of householding and their relationship to the grammar of practice 
have helped establish marriage as a Common Way in Christ, a share in Church‘s own 
purposes and identity. What remains now is to further explore this Common Way in 
Christ that follows directly from chapter five, through the vows, virtues, and states of 
poverty, chastity, and obedience.  
 
CONJUGAL POVERTY, CHASTITY, AND OBEDIENCE 
 
Conjugal Poverty 
 
 The chief difficulty in suggesting concrete practices for marriage and family life 
is, well, reality. The fact of the matter is the wide variety of socio-economic and cultural 
situations of marriages and families in the world. For example, how can any practice of 
poverty be universally applicable, especially when a majority of the world‘s people 
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already live in conditions Americans would consider impoverished? Furthermore, the fact 
that the elective poverty of religious orders is often materially richer than the poverty that 
crushes so many in the world is flatly scandalous. What, then, is conjugal poverty? This 
exploration will think in terms of state and virtue, just as was proposed in the previous 
chapter, and in terms of the practices of Christian householding outlined in chapter four. I 
will look to Christ as the exemplar and the source making the virtue of poverty possible 
in the spouses. Traumatic material poverty may or may not be a reality for the married 
couple, but regardless, the state and virtue of poverty are necessary for the couple to live 
a life a Common Way in Christ. In other words, poverty has a deep theological meaning 
about dependence and reliance on God, but this section will avoid reducing poverty to a 
pious metaphor by attempting to maintain a connection to the real and economic aspects 
of poverty.     
 This notion of common possession goes beyond shared bank accounts and cars to 
common possession of goals, practices, values, and narrative. Practicing poverty in 
marriage means working toward what Lonergan calls a common consciousness.
14
 The 
household of two Christian spouses and their children (along with anyone else who might 
live with them), as place of formation, becomes a community where spouses achieve 
ever-greater sharing in the capacity to write and tell the narrative of their union in love 
with one another. Spouses must hold in common the ends, purposes, and goods of 
marriage if they are to come to the same understanding, judgments, and decisions about 
their common marital activities such as parenting and domestic maintenance. Achieving a 
                                                          
14
 Lonergan treats the relationship of ―common consciousness‖ and ―common conscience‖ to marriage 
explicitly in ―Finality, Love, Marriage,‖ Theological Studies 4 (1943): 477–510, at 494–96, 503, and 507. 
Lonergan expands on the terms and ideas involved with ―common consciousness‖ and ―common 
conscience‖ as they relate to meaning and communication, progress and decline in all human community in 
Method in Theology, 50–51, 79, and 356–58. 
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common consciousness takes time, and begins almost accidentally early in the couple‘s 
relationship. By the time of formal engagement, though, the couple must explicitly 
address the issue and begin sharing in ever more common activities for common ends. 
Once the couple enters marriage, they begin to share in the whole of life together, 
through activities that constitute the path toward a common consciousness or toward 
decline and division. Arriving at and living in the common consciousness necessary for 
sharing in such a narrative is only possible within a state of poverty, a realization that 
nothing in the marriage is mine, least of all the authority to determine the goals, values, 
and practices of the married household.   
 What is the state of spouse, coram conjuge, in the face of the other spouse? If the 
spouses enter into an institution that images the Incarnation, then we should find an 
answer if we ask the same question of Christ: what is Christ‘s state, coram conjuge? As 
argued in the last chapter, Christ‘s state is one of poverty. Christ made himself poor so 
that we (his spouse) might be rich. He puts himself in relationship with us so that we 
might share his inheritance. All his merit can become ours. All his reign can become our 
reign as we rule with him eternally. His kingdom becomes our kingdom if we are joined 
to him as his spouse. The clearest practice suggested by this theological description is 
that the marital consent is a vow of poverty coram conjuge. There is no more ―mine,‖ 
there is only ―our.‖ Whereas members become canonically incapable of owning property 
personally, spouses become morally incapable of owning property personally.
15
 There 
must be no financial, material aspect of conjugal life that belongs solely to one spouse. 
                                                          
15
 In terms of civil law, assets gained after the marriage are considered marital property held equally by 
both spouses, even if the property is not held in the name of both spouses. See, for example, Wisconsin‘s 
Marital Property Act of 1986 (available at 
http://nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fndefault.htm&d =stats&jd=ch.%20766, [accessed 
on January 7, 2011]). 
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All property should be held in common, as in a religious order. The couple and the 
religious order, then, must determine the poverty they will embrace at the institutional 
level. 
 For married Christians in the middle class and the wealthy, embracing poverty 
(both spiritual and material) presents a challenge that must be met. Poverty for these folks 
requires practices to break the myth of economic, social, and ultimately theological 
independence by creating conditions that require economic and spiritual reliance on 
others and fidelity to being reliable in answering the economic and spiritual needs of 
neighbors. One possibility that has worked is for households or members of a parish to 
share a car, a grill, washer and dryer, snowblower, construction skills, babysitting, etc.  
Married persons ought to practice the virtue and state of poverty by putting 
themselves in positions of dependence, as well as making themselves more available to 
those who necessarily depend on them. Householders can only develop the virtue of 
poverty from within real conditions of need. To describe what I mean, I will explore a 
common suburban family practice: the baby-sitting coop. The baby-sitting co-op, in 
many ways, is an example in the practice of poverty. Couples understand their poverty; 
they need babysitting and they cannot afford to pay for the service. Networks of families 
who are friends turn to each other for help. The currency for the co-op system is hours. 
Families begin with a certain number and spend or accrue hours as they have their 
children watched or as they watch other children. A system like this one has much to 
recommend it: availability to others, dependence on others, accountability, justice, and a 
disconnection from monetary economy. The co-op is a practice born of the state of 
poverty and fulfilled with the virtue of poverty.  
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At the same time, though, the practice decidedly maintains a market inspiration 
and economic structure. In other words, it does not go far enough to address the problems 
of the contractual individualism that has invaded practices of householding (even among 
Christians).  Yes it is relational and expresses availability and dependence, but it does so 
on a client-customer level. This co-op system operates on the market logic of saving and 
spending currency. Unfortunately, it attempts to concretize, contractualize, and monetize 
friendships in terms of relational and interpersonal capital. Our friendship has only so 
much capital to spend, so to speak. Once you‘ve spent your 40 hours, you are out of 
currency. You cannot ask for babysitting help until you‘ve accrued more hours watching 
other people‘s children. There is only one kind of currency to spend, namely, hours. So, 
while there is a certain justice in having symmetrical reciprocation and a standard 
currency, the project will fail at being truly a practice of friendship, availability done 
through the virtue of poverty because it does not allow for the way friendships typically 
work: asymmetrically.
16
 A meal and hospitality, or help in some other way, can serve as 
an expression of gratitude for baby-sitting and asymmetrically reciprocates the time and 
energy spent by the other family or single person. For example, occasionally my 
brother‘s family watches our children. Occasionally, my wife and I help my brother paint 
his house or work on landscaping. There is no logging of hours and no attempt to 
reciprocate in exactly the same way. There is only the understanding that we need each 
other and a willingness to be available for each other. Our needs arise from poverty and 
are fulfilled in poverty. As a second example, not all persons have the same skills or the 
same needs. A baby-sitting co-op might make sense for some groups of married persons, 
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 McCarthy defines ―asymmetrical reciprocity,‖ its practical, and theological implications well in Sex and 
Love in the Home, 133–51. 
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but some married couples with children are not in a position to look after their friends‘ 
kids. They may need to rely on non-married friends for help. With the co-op model, the 
married folk cannot repay the favor symmetrically. They will have to informally, 
asymmetrically show gratitude to that friend by being available to answer the call of their 
friend‘s poverty. Spouses, then, ought not to seek to insulate themselves from poverty, 
but to experience true need and make themselves available to fulfill the poverty of people 
who need them. 
Among the activities that create conditions requiring reliance and fidelity in 
poverty, though, is inviting God‘s gift of fertility in a marriage. Such an activity is an 
openness to the Augustinian, ecclesio-nuptial good of proles. The activities of conceiving, 
preparing for, and parenting a child demand mutual reliance and fidelity more than any 
other activity in the Christian household.  
Just as for Christ, poverty meant complete dependence on God the Father for all 
he was to receive (his flock) and all he was to do (the will of God), so for the married 
couple, the state of poverty and the virtue of poverty will be to exist in a similar, radical 
dependence on God the Father for the children they may or may not receive in marriage. 
A great number of couples find themselves faced with the specter of infertility. This great 
and heavy cross highlights the fact that spouses are dependent on the will of God for 
children. They are received as gift; they are not ordered and patiently awaited like items 
on a restaurant menu. They are given to the couple as Christ‘s flock is given to him—by 
the Father‘s will.17 As Christ cares for and shepherds his sheep, so parents shepherd theirs, 
with the same trust Christ has—that not a single sheep given him will be lost. This was 
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 See Jn 11:11–18, 29, where Jesus refers to his flock as those given to him by the Father, and for whom he 
will lay down his life. Jn 17:9–10, where Jesus prays during the last-supper discourse for those whom God 
has given him and whom he has guarded. 
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the trust St. Monica showed in her persevering prayer for Augustine. This is the trust 
parents show when they fulfill their wedding vow to boldly raise their children 
―according to the Law of Christ and the Church.‖ 
Especially early in marriage, before couples are accustomed to dual income and 
upper middle class life, the gift of pregnancy develops the virtue and state of poverty. 
Parenting is an activity for which only a rare soul finds herself or himself ―ready.‖ At 
least in middle America, ―not being ready‖ economically is all too often an excuse for 
Christian households to remain closed to God‘s gift of fertility. This state of affairs 
relates to a misconception of the economic resources parenting actually demands. Too 
often parenting is construed according to the logic of the market rather than the logic of 
the cross. A household can never be prepared for children if parenting is construed as a 
consumer activity. Spouses tend to prepare economically for children based on their own 
expectations rather than on questions of need. Often the gap between what a child needs 
and what parents want for that child, and what things the parents will train their children 
to want is large indeed. The current plague of obesity in America testifies that the middle 
class problem (and especially the problem among the poor) is not that parents can‘t give 
their children enough but that parents can‘t give children enough of the right stuff. Even 
among the poor, our problem is a more than enough consumption of what we don‘t really 
need. Our most scandalous poverty is our overabundance of junk that is bought, eaten, 
and played with by and for children. Parenting is an opportunity for voluntary and 
supravoluntary poverty at the economical level that Christian households must embrace. 
They must embrace poverty not merely because it is an accurate reflection of their 
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relationship to God in Christ, but also because the alternative is a scandalous affront to 
the solidarity called for in Catholic social teaching.  
Parents often feel a complete poverty of knowledge and ―things‖ when it comes to 
their first child. A positive pregnancy test is often accompanied by a rush to the store for 
all the newest parenting books and the mountain of things the latest parenting magazine 
says all mothers and fathers who love their children really need. Before a baby is even 
born, parenting is cast as a consumer activity. Loving the child means buying the right 
material goods. For Christians the story is no different. They are just told to buy different, 
―Christian‖ material goods (e.g., the Noah‘s ark pajamas instead of the Batman pajamas). 
This moment is a key touchpoint for nourishing the virtue and state of poverty in the 
Christian household. This is a moment of renunciation for the parents, who can declare 
that raising their children for Christ is not principally a consumer activity. It is economic 
activity, but most concerned with salvation economy and home economy, the creation of 
practices that will form the kind of person who can inhabit God‘s household. Relying on 
second hand children‘s clothes, furniture, and toys can be a way to resist the economy of 
consumption and embrace reliance on God and neighbor. All of our most useful 
children‘s furniture, for example, (cribs, beds, changing table) were received second hand, 
either purchased or received as gift from neighbors.
18
 Our minivan, too, we bought 
second-hand from our parish friends who needed a bigger car for their still-growing 
family. We sold our own car to a first-generation college student who needed a deal. 
Personally receiving and giving used goods contributes to the development of the virtue 
of poverty by building relationships of reciprocity. Furthermore, teaching children to 
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 Catholic pregnancy help centers often share and give material goods to expecting mothers along with 
preparation and training programs.  
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participate in shared resources like libraries and parks develops the virtue of poverty 
through learning care for common goods. 
Practically speaking, each couple should choose at least one ―thing‖ they will do 
without as a practice of poverty. Absence of this item should be obvious for the couple. 
Examples might be a cellphone, a television, cable TV, a second car, five degrees on the 
thermostat, etc. In deciding on this voluntary poverty, couples should be thinking about 
things that would be normal inclusions on a budget rather than luxury items or 
discretionary spending. This activity could be increased periodically to coincide with 
liturgical seasons or days. For example, Lent could be a time to increase a household‘s 
voluntary poverty for the sake of households who have no choice about their material 
lack of necessities. Furthermore, developing the virtue of poverty requires friendship with 
the poor. Friendship is different from institutional, or even patron-client charitable 
relationships with the poor. Friendship means a reciprocal relationship wherein people 
seek and work for the same ends together. This embrace of poverty challenges middle 
and upper-class families to take steps to not only help the poor but enter solidarity with 
them—to be with the poor. Families, yes families, might consider moving to less than 
desirable locations to live among those with less, might consider serving and eating at 
soup kitchens, might consider taking in a person (e.g., a foster child, a single pregnant 
woman) in need and working with them toward stability.  
These practices help remind spouses and parents of their radical poverty in the 
face of their own children. Parents can buy the newest and best material goods for their 
children, but they cannot ensure their children will become Christian disciples, or even 
that they will be happy in this life. Christian parents who realize their poverty also 
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understand that the greatest gifts they can give their children are those that initiate the 
child into the Common Way in Christ (the first of which is baptism) and those that form 
them in the practices of Christian householding. Baptism expresses the virtue of poverty 
inasmuch as it declares before the Church that the life the biological parents give to the 
child is secondary to the life the parents cannot give the child but God offers the Child, 
namely God‘s own life. The church (and the parents as members of the church) claims 
the child for Christ and the child is reborn into a life given by God and cared for by the 
parents. The child‘s life is not the parents‘ but Christ‘s to be formed and guided by the 
parents.      
Again, the reason to live in a state of poverty with the virtue of poverty is not 
because it makes life easier. In fact, needs make life difficult, and being available for the 
needs of others makes life difficult. The reason marriage requires poverty is, again, 
because it accurately represents our own position coram Deo and Christ‘s own position 
coram conjuge. In other words, we find poverty in Christ. Christ, the creator of the 
universe, becomes a naked, cold, crying, and hungry infant. Christ has radical need. He 
will die if Mary and Joseph do not make themselves available for his needs. Christian 
parents are continually reminded of this fact whenever they tend to their children‘s daily 
needs. Christ the king of kings becomes a babbling one-year old, a tantrum-throwing 
two-year old, a curious five year old, who needs training and formation in the virtues of a 
holy life. Christ cannot symmetrically repay his mother nor can she repay her child. We 
too find ourselves in a situation of radical need with the impossibility of repayment. Dead 
and lost in the darkness of sin and ignorance, of disordered desires and misdirected 
intellect, only baptism into Christ and formation in the virtues of faith, hope, and love can 
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fill us with the riches we require. Ours is the need, God‘s the gift. Ours is a need we 
cannot fulfill; his is a gift that cannot be repaid, symmetrically or otherwise. Our state is 
poverty, but a poverty fulfilled. Our posture is gratitude and joy at giving back to the one 
who fulfills our need all that we have to give, which is both nothing and everything at 
once. Arriving at an understanding of one‘s radical dependence and responding with 
gratitude leading to availability is the reality of conjugal living. The realization that it was 
―not good for the man to be alone‖ is a moment of poverty. Adam did not need Eve to 
complete him, but the two needed each other to fulfill their human vocation. All persons 
find themselves in the state of poverty, in need of human and supernatural fellowship. 
Some will fulfill their human vocation in community without vows; some will fulfill their 
human vocation vowing poverty in a particular religious community; and others with a 
vocation to marriage will fulfill their human vocation vowing a life of poverty in 
complementary, sacramental union with one other person. 
 
Conjugal Chastity 
 
Perhaps no aspect of marriage has received as much attention as sexuality. This 
fact is not without reason. Sexuality is an essential part of the human person; the 
partnership of the sexes has a primal connection to our sexuality; and our desire for 
holistic sexual, personal, complementary partnership can express in part our deepest 
desires for perfect union with God.
19
 Just as the consent to marriage, a consent to give all 
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 In married sexuality we know and are known, we see and are seen, we give and receive, we transcend 
ourselves yet are at home. Yet all of these relationships are conditioned, temporary, and imperfect. Only in 
the beatific vision will we be fully known while knowing all that can be known, will we be fully seen while 
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that one is and receive all that another is, includes the vow of poverty, so too does it 
include the vow of chastity. Spouses promise to ―be faithful to you‖ (promitto me tibi 
fidem servaturum). The fidem promised has been developed throughout Christian history 
to be understood in a totalizing sense of complete personal fidelity, but from the earliest 
sources it has always included sexual fidelity. Even in the days of Christ, conjugal 
fidelity included more than merely genital exclusivity: ―Every one who looks at a woman 
lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart‖ (Mt 5:28). Christ assumes 
that spouses will maintain chastity in a full sense, that is, a self-possession of not only of 
the body but also their thoughts and desires. For his part, Augustine continues this 
thought. The virtue associated with marital fidelity was chastity. He calls this fidelity 
fides castitatis (faithfulness of chastity).
20
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
seeing all that we can see, will we be fully given and fully receive the love of God, will we entirely 
transcend while entirely being at home. 
20
 ―Bonum igitur nuptiarum per omnes gentes atque omnes homines in causa generandi est et in fide 
castitatis; quod autem ad populum dei pertinent, etiam in sanctitate sacramenti‖ (De bono coniugali, 32, 
CSEL vol. 41, p. 226, my trans.).  The good of marriage, therefore, for all people and all men is in the 
cause of procreation and in the faith of chastity, but as they pertain to the people of God, the goods of 
marriage also lie in the sanctity of the ―sacrament‖ (bond)‖ (trans. mine). Nonetheless, in his mind fides 
cannot be reduced to sexual exclusivity. For example, he scolds a woman for an imprudent breaking of 
faith with the greatest end of the marriage, the sanctification of the spouses. She acted on her own rather 
than together with her husband. While her husband was away, she entered a life of poverty and celibacy in 
the husband‘s absence and against his will, giving their wealth to two travelling monks, and taking a 
personal vow of celibacy. The husband eventually ended up committing adultery. Augustine writes that 
―this great evil has occurred because you have not treated his heart with the prudence that you ought to 
have. For, even if by agreement with each other you were not having sexual intercourse, as a wife you still 
ought to have been mindful of your husband in other matters out of marital obedience, especially since you 
were both members of the body of Christ. Furthermore, her action constitutes a break of the fides castitatis: 
―For he should not have been deprived of the debt of your body that you owed him before his desire [for 
continence] had also joined yours for that good which surpasses marital chastity.‖ Furthermore, if she had 
waited to give away their possessions until they were both prepared, Augustine argues, ―God would be 
praised in your works since you would have so faithful a union that you would hold in common not only 
perfect chastity but also glorious poverty.‖ He asks whether ―anyone‘s temporal well-being have been more 
precious to you than his eternal well-being?...For, if bread shared with a poor person has great weight in 
heaven, how much weight ought we to think mercy has there, by which a human being is snatched from the 
devil, who is like a roaring lion seeking someone to devour‖ (Epistle 262, in Letters 211–270, 204–07). The 
woman seeking Augustine‘s advice in this letter seems to have privileged the external good of continence 
over the internal good and virtue of chastity. Furthermore, at the expense of obedience, she achieved 
poverty. Because her donation scandalized her husband and broke marital obedience, the poverty was 
achieved not as an internal good of Christian marriage, but by ill-performance of the marital practice. In 
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The virtue associated with the sexual fidelity of the marriage vows is the same 
virtue associated with the sexual fidelity required by the vows of religion: chastity. For 
Aquinas, chastity exists as a species of temperance, which is the power of properly 
ordering pleasures.
21
 Among twentieth-century theologians (and even in the Catechism of 
the Catholic Church), expressions of chastity given shape by the phenomenology of 
personalism and advances in psychology prevail.
22
 The human person is a unity of 
spiritual and bodily existence. Both of these aspects of the human person become 
especially expressive and vulnerable in sexuality, and especially open to dislocation from 
one another. In summary, then chastity is this: 
the successful integration of sexuality within the person and thus the inner unity 
of man in his bodily and spiritual being Sexuality, in which man‘s belonging to 
the bodily and biological world is expressed, becomes personal and truly human 
when it is integrated into the relationship of one person to another, in the 
complete and lifelong mutual gift of man and woman.
23
 
 
This lifelong mutual gift is clearly expressed in the conjugal vows, but may also be 
expressed in the vows of religious profession, as was explained in chapter five.   
If chastity is a virtue, then we must understand that it expresses a person‘s 
character but also forms that character. All couples will need formation in chastity. Not 
only is chastity a sign of marital love but also a generator of that love. In every marriage, 
spouses enter with different levels of chastity. Sound practice of religious life must offer 
a set of conditions and formative activities that aid in the development of chaste celibacy; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
other words, one might say she won the game (achieved continence and poverty), but only by cheating, by 
breaking faith with the standards and virtues internal to the practice of their Christian marriage.  
21
 See Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 151. The conjugal act was not only allowable in Aquinas‘s 
mind, but virtuous. See Summa theologiae, suppl., q. 41, a. 4 and q. 49, a. 4 (though as an expression of the 
virtue of religion). For a good historical overview of the development of chastity as a central virtue for 
marital sexuality, see John Grabowski, Sex and Virtue: An Introduction to Sexual Ethics, Catholic Moral 
Thought (Washington: Catholic University of America, 2003). 
22
 Grabowski, Sex and Virtue, 85–95. 
23
 CCC., 2337, p. 561. 
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no less does married life require conditions formation for developing chaste married 
sexuality. Specifically, the church sanctions the program, or skill, of natural family 
planning. Among the benefits of natural family planning is that it offers a set of 
conditions that can dispose couples to growth in the virtue of chastity toward the practice 
of chaste married sexuality integrated into the rest of married life. 
Because there is much confusion over the use of natural family planning in 
marriage, I would like to contextualize it within the wider practice of chaste married 
sexuality. I will offer below some clarity on these two terms: natural family planning 
(hereafter NFP), and a new term that I am offering as a practice (in the MacIntyrian sense) 
of chastity in marriage—chaste marital sexuality (hereafter CMS). It is easy to equate 
natural family planning with CMS, as if the use of the method is itself a virtuous 
expression of married sexual love. I think natural family planning must remain distinct 
from CMS as a possible (but not strictly essential) part involved in the whole. By way of 
analogy we can say that the Kieninger trap is to chess as NFP is to CMS. The skill of 
NFP is nested within the practice of CMS, which sits within the overall practice of 
Christian marriage, a consortium of life and love. 
Here I will offer definitions of NFP and CMS. NFP is a method of timing 
conjugal intercourse to either avoid or invite pregnancy based on data gathered from the 
normal female physiology. Two parts constitute natural family planning: (1) gathering 
and analyzing data from naturally occurring physiological signs to determine the 
probability that conception will result from conjugal intercourse on any specific day; (2) 
employing the conclusion of the first part as a datum for deciding whether or not to 
engage in the marital intercourse on any specific day. CMS, on the other hand, is an 
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integration of a couple‘s sexuality into the consortium vitae et amoris that is Christian 
marriage. CMS is a firm disposition to love the spouse as ―man‖ or ―woman‖ in all the 
quotidian interactions and activities of Christian marriage. Only occasionally do spouses 
express this love in sexual intercourse. For the most part spouses express CMS in the 
small, trivial touches throughout the day, in the way they dress, in the way they 
communicate with each other about sexuality openly, the way they pray about and for 
each other and their children, the way they talk about each other to their children and co-
workers, the kinds of media they consume, and the way they interact with persons of the 
opposite sex in general. CMS is a practice that orders sexuality with the whole of 
marriage, as a complex of activities and habits, toward openness to God‘s gift of life. 
This orientation sees openness to life as the status quo, and avoidance of pregnancy as an 
exceptional situation. NFP, in this understanding, would only be desirable, let alone 
necessary, in cases of serious reasons to avoid conception. These would be cases where 
the possibility of another pregnancy seriously endangers the goods internal to the practice 
of marriage. The endangerment of external goods is sometimes required of CMS, and so 
it is difficult to make the case that endangering these goods would constitute a serious 
reason to avoid pregnancy. NFP is a skill helpful for determining the when of conjugal 
intercourse, but CMS is the practice concerned with the how and the why of loving the 
spouse and children as man and father, or woman and mother as a whole. 
CMS, as a richly ecclesial practice, ties in especially well with one pair of 
principles from chapter four on Christian householding: familiarity (nearness) and 
formality (universality). Here the familiarity of the home and the universality and 
formality of the church meet. This first section treats the more obvious of the two: 
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familiarity. The link between chastity and familiarity is intuitive. No other part of the 
marital practice involves as much physical and emotional nearness. As a primary practice 
wherein couples experience the powerful affective love of familiarity, CMS can 
contribute to making the entire household into what Breidenthal calls a ―spiritual 
workplace.‖24 The Christian household, and especially chastity within it, are a training 
ground for the kind of familiarity we will have in heaven but would be dangerous on 
earth. Training in sexual self-possession teaches us that genital expression is not the only 
or even greatest way to love those to whom we are nearest. Frequently, it is washing out 
the diapers, shoveling the sidewalk, giving the kids a bath, and offering a shoulder 
massage to a tired wife that more deeply manifest and embody conjugal love than does 
expressing one‘s interest in sexual intercourse. The key of chastity is that it allows a 
person to put in action the statement, ―I love you with my whole body.‖  
This viewpoint is helpful especially for the formation of teens in Christian 
households. Many teens and young college students engage in sexual intercourse ―when 
they are ready for that next step,‖ or ―to give the deepest expression of our love for each 
other.‖ Genital contact is not in most cases a ―next step‖ or the ―deepest expression of 
love.‖ Genital contact is a consequence and physical expression of a personal, public 
(ecclesial), and sacramental commitment to love one person unconditionally and without 
fail. Apart from this context, it is unintelligible to say that sexual intercourse is the 
greatest expression of love for each other or that it is a ―next step‖ in romantic love. 
Genital contact in the context of Christian householding requires chastity because 
chastity is the capacity to order one‘s sexuality to this kind of exclusivity. Before 
marriage chastity enables a person to love without genital contact. Within marriage 
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 Breidenthal, Christian Households, 15. 
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chastity does the same thing; it gives the person the capacity to love with the whole body, 
except now there is occasional genital expression of love. Without an actualized capacity 
to love with the rest of the body, that is, without chastity, conjugal intercourse (even in 
marriage) expresses not married love, but lust. The familiarity of the bed is then more a 
concession to weakness than an embodiment of self-donation.   
What often goes unnoticed in marriages, and even in discussions of familiarity 
and chastity, is the dynamic tension between this familiarity and nearness against the pole 
of universality and formality. Christ comes to redeem and sanctify our nearness, part of 
which is sexual. To redeem our nearness to each other, Christ becomes near to us, 
formally, in a universal way. Christ incorporates any person into his body through the 
sacramental grace of baptism, an incorporation continued and enlivened in the 
participation in the grace of the Eucharist. If each of us is in Christ, all of our nearness to 
each other is nearness to Christ, a nearness manifested and actualized liturgically and 
formally. Sexuality, as part of the nearness of spouses in a Christian household benefits 
from this formality. At the concrete level, the formal, liturgical practices initiate the 
activities of sexual familiarity in Christian marriage through a universal, liturgical, rite of 
matrimony. The formal is bound to the familiar, commencing the ratified marriage 
created in the public words of consent. Soon after this formal rite, the familiarity of 
Christian marriage formally consummates the marriage. The very nearness, the intimate 
familiarity of the conjugal act between spouses in Christ completes the marriage‘s formal, 
universal, ecclesial foundation and inception.  
The link between the familiarity and the formal, liturgical aspects of marriage in 
the church is also a source of concrete actions for developing goods internal to CMS and 
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destroying its contrary vice of lust. For example, a couple who makes the formal pattern 
of the liturgical year their own, could decide to incorporate it into their pattern of sexual 
intimacy. If a couple truly experiences their conjugal union as an expression of joy, a 
celebration of their love, then they might consider the relationship between this 
expression of joyous, superabundant love and the days and seasons of fasting and 
penance in the liturgical year. The Church recommended abstinence from conjugal 
sexuality on a great many days in years past, and it is easy to think that any effort to 
renew or make a similar suggestion would betray a negativity about sexuality. If anything, 
asking couples to reconsider the relationship between sexuality and the liturgical year 
must be cast as an exceptionally positive understanding of conjugal intercourse. Because 
it is an authentic good and contributes to the joy of couples and their superabundant love 
for each other, it can be sacrificed not ―as something bad‖ but as something whose 
absence will be felt as a loss of a good that reminds us of the loss of Christ in death, as a 
good we hold away from ourselves in penance, and as a good that eventually reminds us 
in a small way of the return of Christ and his gift of eternal life to the world.  
Couples who want to grow in CMS, then, ought to attempt a greater integration of 
their conjugal familiarity into the formal seasons of the liturgical year. Specifically, 
couples could consider abstaining during Lent, or on Fridays in addition to abstaining 
from meat, on Wednesdays, during ember days, for the period of a novena, etc. Such 
commitments would necessarily take seriously St. Paul‘s letter to the Corinthians. ―Stop 
depriving one another,‖ he writes, ―except by agreement for a time, so that you may 
devote yourselves to prayer‖ (1 Cor 7:6). Their time of abstinence must, however, be 
intentionally discerned and must follow the words of St. Paul, lest it lead to even greater 
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lust or coldness. In other words, the time of abstinence must be for prayer together. This 
is not because sexual intercourse detracts spouses from prayer per se, but because 
practically speaking it in fact does detract from prayer. By the time spouses (especially 
those working long hours or those with kids) have enough time and energy to relax 
together, they may be faced with the option to either pray or be physically intimate. If 
they choose conjugal intimacy first, they may fall asleep together without prayer. If they 
spend time in prayer first, they may have little energy or time left for physical intimacy. 
These are concrete realities of married life. Sexual intercourse is splendid, but it takes 
time and energy that could be put into prayer, wiping the floors, discussion of what to do 
about Johnny‘s behavior problem, or just sleeping. This is in part why a temporary, 
intentional abstinence from conjugal intercourse entirely can be such a boon. It can 
relieve some of this pressure to find time for it all and the unspoken tension that can 
accompany that pressure.  
To bear fruit, this time should include daily prayer and Scripture together 
(perhaps the Divine Office), spiritual reading, and communication about the goods, ends, 
and purposes of sexuality in marriage. Prayer together during a time of abstinence should 
remind spouses that their conjugal intercourse is a physical expression of their marital 
love, a love that is a participation in Christ‘s own love for the church. This is a time for 
spouses to evaluate their practice and reconsider the standards of excellence and virtues 
necessary to help them live the life of chaste persons in the household of God. This is a 
time to remember and re-learn how to live Christ‘s love in non-genital ways. Without 
these little ways of love, after all, there is no chaste married sexuality, and there will be 
little desire to express love sexually—even when not in a time of abstinence.  
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Chaste married sexuality, in a MacIntyrian sense, extends the couple‘s capacity 
for and understanding of the goods internal to its practice. The more chaste spouses 
become, the more they will see their sexuality as integrated into their service to each 
other‘s sanctification and the sanctification of the world. Furthermore, the more chaste 
spouses become, the more they will see their sexuality integrated into the larger mystery 
of Christ‘s love for the Church. At the practical level, chastity will increase the ease with 
which couples love each other in the quotidian activities of life, and the ease with which 
they determine the demands of responsible parenthood through obedient attention to 
God‘s will in the education of their children and their openness to or avoidance of a new 
pregnancy. With CMS, as spouses possess their whole bodies and can love with them in 
non-genital ways, the more fully they understand what it means to give it freely, fully, 
faithfully, and fruitfully to each other and God when they love in the greatest physical 
intimacy. NFP, on the other hand, does not of itself extend these goods. This skill can 
serve as a path toward lust, frustration, infidelity, and ruin, or as a road toward sanctity, 
chastity, responsibility, and true conjugal love. The skill of NFP must be contextualized 
within the practice of CMS if it is to be intelligible.  
As with attempts at any practice, though, practitioners will encounter difficulty.
 25
 
Couples having difficulty with CMS, especially those growing in lust as opposed to 
chastity, might be suffering because they have unfortunately reduced CMS to NFP. If 
CMS is reduced to the question of when, it is clear that there exists some lack not in the 
practice of CMS itself, but in the couple‘s own formation in that practice.  They may not 
have the formation required to achieve the standards of excellence appropriate to and 
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 Mary Shivanandan, Crossing the Threshold of Love: A New Vision of Marriage in the Light of John Paul 
II‘s Anthropology (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1999), chap. 8. 
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definitive of the activity. In this case the fault lies as much with the Church as with the 
couple. CMS requires formation especially in prayer; the internal goods of poverty, 
chastity, obedience, communication, attentiveness, patience, and well-ordered conjugal 
sexuality are ineptly achieved without it. Prayer, and especially celebration of liturgy 
together as spouses garners the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the infused virtues (especially 
infused temperance, fortitude, and prudence) required for the practice. Another standard 
of excellence is communication. One partner‘s impatience may result from a lack of 
communication: about stress in the spouse‘s life, about an unstated conflict, about the 
woman‘s place in the cycle, about the decision to avoid or achieve pregnancy, etc. In 
other words, in as much as a couple actually practices CMS, they practice it well and they 
grow in virtue.  
From a Christian perspective, as part of the practice of CMS, there is no way to 
use the skill of NFP with a ―contraceptive mentality,‖ as some fear.26 The formation of a 
life-giving mentality is an internal good of CMS itself. There is a clear distinction 
between NFP and CMS. NFP is the skill of assessing probabilities of conception and 
abstaining from or engaging in sexual intercourse accordingly. The practice of CMS is a 
practice that may or may not require the skill of NFP to achieve and extend the internal 
goods of chastity, or responsible parenthood, etc. In chaste marital sexuality, as a 
Christian practice involving responsible parenthood, couples should be able to identify 
their fertility and prayerfully, thoughtfully, and virtuously discern God‘s will for a 
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 John Paul II has warned couples not to use NFP as the result of a ―decision to be closed to life which 
would be substantially the same as that which inspires the decision to use contraceptives‖ (see John Paul II, 
―Pope Calls Spouses to a Sense of Responsibility for Love and for Life,‖ in L‘Osservatore Romano [Dec 
17, 1990]: 3, no. 5). John F. Kippley argues that couples using NFP for selfish reasons are in fact selfish but 
not guilty of a contraceptive mentality, since a contraceptive mentality is a disposition to engage in 
contraceptive actions (see Kippley, Sex and the Marriage Covenant: A Basis for Morality, second ed., [San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 2005], 69–70).    
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couple‘s openness to inviting growth of the Christian family during any given cycle of 
fertility. Then, ordered by chastity, they can positively act to express conjugal sexuality 
appropriately based on that discernment.  
 
Conjugal Obedience 
 
 Less studied, but perhaps equally as incendiary as chastity, is the virtue and state 
of conjugal obedience. The question of marital obedience has a place in the feminist 
debates on patriarchy in the Christian tradition, which inevitably take up the endless 
exegetical arguments over biblical Haustafeln, moral exhortations appearing in 
Colossians 3:18:4–1, 1 Peter 2:18–3:6, and Ephesians 5:21, 22–6:9.27 I will not be 
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 The most common modern reading of the household codes is to say that they were accomodationist, that 
is, they were attempts by the early Christians to at find a place in the existing society. According to this 
theory the early church conceded to existing social hegemony while trying to infuse it with Christian values. 
This position comes largely from the work of David Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code 
in 1 Peter (Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981); Balch, 
―Household Codes,‖ in Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 3, ed. Gary A. Herion and David N. Freedman (New 
York: Doubleday, 1992), 318–20. For an overview of the accomodationist interpretation and critique 
thereof, see James D. G. Dunn, ―The Household Rules in the New Testament,‖ in The Family in 
Theological Perspective, ed. Stephen C. Barton (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 43–63. Feminist and 
liberation approaches to Scripture suggest that we must leave these Haustafeln in the past because they are 
not liberating for the weak but have become ingrained into some majority presentations of the gospel‘s 
essence. In this area the work of Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza has been fundamental. Furthermore, they 
represent a backward move from the initial Christian insight of radical equality in Christ. They represent 
the early church‘s attempt to address charges of social disorder. See Elisabeth Schuessler Fiorenza, In 
Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins (New York: Crossroad, 1983); 
Clarce J. Martin, ―The Haustafeln (Household Codes) in African American Biblical Interpretation: ‗Free 
Slaves‘ and ‗Subordinate Women,‘‖ in Stony the Road We Trod: African American Biblical Interpretation, 
ed., Cain Hope Felder (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 206–31.  At the same time, others have argued that 
Jesus‘ ethics did not provide for social or political organization, so the Christians had to turn to Greco-
Roman customs. See Martin Dibelius, An die Kolosser, Epheser, und Philemon, Handbuch zum neuen 
Testamentem 12 (3
rd
 ed., 1953), 48–49. John Howard Yoder and David Schroeder have challenged this 
position. See Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, 2
nd
 ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1994), 162–92); David Schroeder, Die Haustafeln des Neuen Testaments: ihre Herkunft und ihr 
theologischer Sinn. 2 Anmerkungen (Hamburg: Universitaet Hamburg, 1959). Yoder has challenged this 
position, stating that the Church‘s use of these moral lists was a radical witness to the contingent and non-
permanent nature of social structure in light of the gospel message. Yoder agrees that the household codes 
may have been a less revolutionary modification of an original vision of equality in Christ, but he adds the 
argument that the use of the household codes carried a Christological component, a witness to Christ‘s 
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arguing that any one member of the partnership of life and love has a gender-based claim 
to authority while the other has a gender-based position of subjection. One might claim 
that a wife obeys the husband because in the marriage she represents the Church and the 
husband represents Christ. This argument would be biblical in a certain sense, but I am 
not making that argument here. Certain aspects of the nuptial mystery and the practice of 
Christian married life are illuminated by this imagery, but certain insights, particularly 
those regarding obedience have attracted less attention. I will, therefore, take up a distinct 
vantage point on this same idea of marriage as mystery of Christ and Church. This 
section will propose obedience in marriage from another direction. I do not here submit 
that spouses must obey each other as they obey Christ, but rather they ought together to 
seek obedience to the Father inasmuch as together they are in Christ, who perfectly loved, 
knew, and obeyed the Father‘s will—so much so that he possesses that selfsame will.   
As previous chapters have argued, the primary social location for Christian 
marriage as a Common Way in Christ is ecclesial, and it is this focus on the ecclesial 
location of marriage that offers a distinct vantage for finding a common obedience in 
Christian marriage. Instead of reifying one individual spouse as ―Christ‖ and the other as 
―Church,‖ I ground marital obedience in the same foundation that grounds religious 
obedience, namely Jesus, the Son of God whose perfect obedience to the will of the 
Father was so encompassing that Jesus possessed the divine will itself. Perhaps we can 
understand conjugal obedience better if we focus on the couple‘s common share in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
revolutionary subordination to structural evils, subordination that destroys the power of the evil and 
witnesses to its impermanence. As to Ephesians 5:21–6:9, John Paul II has read the passage with an 
emphasis on 5:21. He reads 5:21 as the beginning of the new section (5:21–33). He argues that the author 
of the letter asks spouses to be ―reciprocally subject in the fear of Christ.‖ He supports a use of the 
head/body analogy for the relationship of husband/wife and Christ/church. See Man and Woman He 
Created Them, nos. 89–93, pp. 472–487. 
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Christ‘s obedience to the Father. After all, as baptized Christians the couple is joined in 
Christ. They are two parts of Christ‘s body linked forever for a mission in the service of 
the Church. Their conjugal love together is to be Christ‘s love for the Church. Their love 
is a share in God‘s own love; therefore, it is generative, free, and faithful. Furthermore, if 
the couple is seen corporately as Christ, rather than individually as Christ and Church, 
their mutual participation in the Son‘s obedience to the Father comes into sharper focus. 
What the couple is aiming at in their conjugal love is not only a mutual submission to one 
another in reverence to Christ. The couple is aiming even more at a united, corporate 
submission to the will of God together, that is, as, in, and with Christ. They are to be a 
sacrament of Christ‘s obedient love. 
Because each is Christian, each must share in Jesus‘ obedience to the father, but 
because together they are one flesh in Christ, they now have a specification of that 
obedience. They are enjoined to a common obedience to the Father‘s will together. God‘s 
will is for both to hear and for both to obey as one flesh and in one flesh, because the 
separate parts they were in Christ are now irrevocably joined in mission and identity. The 
spouses marry in Christ and serve the Church as Christ served her, unto death and 
resurrection. The sacrament of the spouses‘ marriage is a sacrament of Christ‘s love for 
the Church, so the spouse‘s conjugal love binds the couple in Christ for the Church. 
When they marry, their spousal unity in Christ makes present Christ‘s love for the 
Church, a love that is indissoluble and generative, chaste and obedient. As Christ did 
what he saw the Father doing and said what he heard the Father saying, so must married 
Christians. Their practice of Christian marriage must incarnate Christ‘s obedience to the 
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Father, an obedience that was at once painful and dreadful (from Gethsemane to the cross) 
and live-giving and glorious (at Cana, at Tabor, at Lazarus‘ tomb, and at the resurrection).   
What, then, will this complex obedience look like? Of course both spouses must 
submit to each other out of conjugal love, out of reverence for Christ residing in each, 
and as a general precept of Christian life (cf.1 Cor 13; Eph 5:21). In the concrete this will 
mean that if one spouse expresses a desire for some good (e.g., to read a book in the 
evening), that the other spouse will be disposed to aid in the acquisition of that good, 
even if desirous of a different but relatively equivalent good (e.g., playing a game with 
the spouse in the evening). This kind of giving way is important and requisite for 
Christian marriage, but it is not the subject of the marital obedience I am speaking of here.  
Because the religious and conjugal obedience are linked in Christ, I can look to 
the religious life for language and example of how conjugal obedience might be practiced. 
For vowed religious, obedience to a superior is a mediation of obedience to the Father 
and an attempted participation in Christ‘s own obedience to the Father as a complete gift 
of one‘s own will to the service of God. While a larger social institution such as a 
religious congregation has the numbers and structure to make a superior necessary and 
possible, the consortium of man, wife, and whoever else holds house with them does not 
initially seem to lend itself to the notion of a superior, even on a temporary, rotational 
basis. 
In considering obedience and the relationship between spouses, we can recall 
chapter three‘s earlier mention of Augustine‘s thought that any association of friends 
(even among just two men) would necessarily include one who commands and another 
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who obeys.
28
 Marriage, though, is a unique kind of friendship wherein the two are not a 
leader and a follower, but, as Augustine points out, the spouses are joined as two side-by-
side walking the same direction together.
29
 Given this image, the question for spouses 
remains—who commands and who obeys? To answer this question we must shift focus 
from the asking which individual obeys which, to the asking of whom the couple together 
gives obedience.  
The couple must give obedience to their shared will for the marriage. This will is 
at once their own and other-than-their-own. It is at once their will and (they hope) a 
mediation of the Father‘s will. When they consent to Christian marriage in the Church, 
they express their will to enter a common way of life in Christ, a practice of Christian 
householding with ecclesially established standards of excellence, internal goods, and 
virtues necessary for the achievement of those goods. The couple does not create these 
standards, goods, and virtues, but rather consents to them. Recalling MacIntyre, we are 
reminded: 
―the goods [of a practice] can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within 
the practice in our relationship to other practitioners. We have to learn to 
recognize what is due to whom; we have to be prepared to take whatever self-
endangering risks are demanded along the way; and we have to listen carefully to 
what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply with the same 
carefulness for the facts.‖30  
 
Concretely, working with this kind of obedience means that a couple must 
actualize a pair of principles from Christian householding: supravoluntarity, and 
intentionality. Let us presume that couple has a shared will and intention for their 
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marriage, that it be a common way of life in Christ. This shared will and intention creates 
a supravoluntary situation in their marital practice. The shared will should supersede their 
own personal wills whenever the two come into conflict. For example, a friend of mine 
skips breakfast and lunch to save money and accomplish more at work. Sometimes he 
stays up too late in order to increase productivity. He knows that these goods 
(productivity and riches) are external to the practice of marriage and are beginning to 
conflict with the will for marriage that he and his wife share. This husband would be well 
served by the virtue and state of obedience. In a conversation with his wife about the 
situation, he can ask her to mediate for him their shared will for these activities in 
marriage for the time being. The topic will be revisited in a determined amount of time. 
Their shared will to ―live as married people live‖ supersedes his own will to business 
achievement and penny-pinching. This husband, then, will submit himself in obedience to 
his wife‘s reasonable regulation of these activities: that he eat at least a small breakfast 
and lunch, that he not stay up late more than twice a week, etc. The wife is mediating 
their shared, spousal will to him. In time his own personal will shall be reshaped into 
their shared will.  
 
Summary 
  
 This section has explored some implications of Christian marriage as a common 
way rooted in the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Through the 
course of this exploration, principles of Christian householding were seen to be at work 
in these evangelical virtues. Poverty, chastity, and obedience were all explored as spouses‘ 
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common way of life in Christ. Through these virtues they manifest an ecclesial identity 
and purpose to go with each other to salvation. Furthermore, they realize their 
sacramental, marital mission to be a sacrament of Christ‘s love for the church. Examples 
for formation in each of these virtues and states were provided. Poverty is linked with the 
permeability of the household to its ecclesial and neighborhood context. Chastity is 
bound to principles of familiarity and universality. Obedience is tied to the 
supravoluntary and intentional character of marriage as a common way of life in Christ, a 
practice of Christian householding. In what follows, I will make a proposal that integrates 
the life of poverty, chastity, and obedience as lived by any in the church who make such a 
commitment.   
 
A REGULA MATRIMONII
31
 
 
If poverty, chastity, and obedience are essential virtues for Christian marriage as a 
Common Way in Christ, there must be a way to integrate them within that practice. 
Unsurprisingly, an answer comes from a method that has enlightened the life of the 
church for sixteen hundred years, the regula or rule of life. The rule of life encompasses 
the virtues and states of poverty, chastity, and obedience and integrates them within the 
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wide varieties of Christian householding. In this section I will treat a general format of a 
married rule, how it should be formed, and how it integrates the evangelical virtues.  
A rule of life should begin with a couple‘s own statement of what they believe to 
be their unique mission, or charism, as a married couple. This statement summarizes their 
common will for the marriage. They can feel free to include a narrative account of how 
God worked in their lives to bring them together, as this is often helpful in discerning a 
mission or discovering a charism. A couple would likely be aided by a spiritual director 
in making their rule, especially one with experience in religious orders. An example of 
such a statement of mission or charism could include a section like this one:  
Imitate Jesus in our everyday interactions with each other, friends, neighbors, and 
strangers. Specifically, being present, generous, and hospitable to people in our 
neighborhood; joyfully and thankfully accepting the difficulties and delights God 
gives us; and praying constantly for needs of others that we see, hear about, and 
remember.
32
 
 
This statement identifies a Christological foundation and a two-part charism for the 
household‘s practices of a Common Way in Christ. This household sees God calling them 
first to imitate Jesus through an incarnational presence and an intentional outreach to 
their neighbors (both inside and outside the walls of their house). Second, they see prayer 
as part of their unique charism; they commit to praying together as an act of solidarity 
with those in need and beyond their material reach.  
 Beyond this general statement of charism or mission, a regula Matrimonii should 
include a description of roles within the household, and explanations of virtues and goods 
internal to the common life of the household. For example, the distinction between child 
and parent, the general roles taken by each parent, the expectations of each and the role of 
each in the working of the household should be spelled out. If possible, the general 
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methods of discipline should be included as well. Following this description of roles 
should come the daily activities from rising to bedding down. As with all rules, the point 
is not to constrain but to free. The question is not whether to live by an order, for we all 
do. We all live according to a rule of life, even if that rule is ―to never live the same way 
two days in a row.‖ The question is whether to live by a good one that we rationally and 
prayerfully choose to fit the purposes and goals of our common life in Christ, or whether 
to live a haphazard one that we simply fall into in an unthinking manner?  
In this regard a rule can be specific with times or it can be general, merely stating 
the kinds of things that happen at certain times throughout the day and the week. The 
couple‘s married regula ought to include times and direction for prayer (both common 
and individual), work (domestic, for pay, and directly ecclesial, e.g., works of mercy, 
missionary activity, church council, etc.), and relaxing time for the household together. 
The rule ought to be ordered toward the household‘s stated mission and charism. For 
example, a household who see their mission as one principally of intercessory prayer for 
the world will build-in more time in for this activity. A household who sees their mission 
as related to educating their children in the home will have a rule designed uniquely for 
this purpose. A household who sees their mission as oriented toward their neighborhood 
will include regular time for outreach and being present for the people living around them. 
One example might be as follows: 
Normal weekday order: Upon rising, mother and father pray the morning offering. 
While mother readies herself for the day, father prepares and sets out breakfast 
with children‘s help. After a family prayer, the breakfast begins. After mother or 
father has finished eating, one reads the gospel of the day from mass. After 
cleaning up breakfast together, children are excused to dress. Mother helps 
younger children dress while father readies for work. Once all are ready, a family 
prayer for the day is offered and father begins work. Children and mother have 
time to play or read. School time for school-aged children begins while youngest 
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child naps. After school time, children play while mother takes care of home 
maintaining tasks. Children help mother prepare lunch and set table. Children 
clean up house. Midday prayer begins lunch. After lunch, younger children nap, 
and older children read or play board game with mother. Children awake from 
nap and have snack until father finishes daily work. Upon father‘s return, family 
offers prayer of safe returns. Father and children play outside with neighbors 
and/or work together on household maintenance while mother prepares dinner. 
Children set table and meal begins with family prayer. Once mother and father 
finish eating, Scripture devotional begins at table. Dinner ends and post-dinner 
clean up by whole family takes place. Children are prepared for bed. Mother reads 
with older children, father reads with younger children. After reading, family 
gathers for evening liturgy. After prayer, children go to sleep. Mother and father 
work on household maintenance for one hour, and then do evening prayer 
together. After evening prayer, mother and father have time for relaxation or, if 
necessary, additional work together until bed. 
  
This daily order is general enough to allow for flexibility regarding what time and how 
long certain activities take, but the shape of the day is, on the whole, set. This is an order 
for a typical weekday, and so no provision is made for errands and outings, which 
ordinarily take place with a modified daily order included in a rule. An order for 
Saturdays and Sundays should also be included. The rule is concerned principally to 
ensure that those standards of excellence and virtues necessary to achieve the goods of 
the Common Way in Christ are maintained. Here, the rule attempts to frame the entire 
day with prayer, ensure time for both parents to contribute to the children‘s education 
(understood in a wide sense), create time for parents to spend together, share work among 
all for common goods of the household, and promote the charism of the household.  
 The Common Way in Christ for married Christians is a living practice, and thus 
its charism, mission, and the activities required to achieve these purposes will change 
throughout the course of its existence. Therefore, a Christian household must revisit its 
rule occasionally and in prayer and discussion decide whether and how to amend it. For 
example, our own statement of mission and charism changed after we had children, and 
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again after we had children who could contribute to discerning that charism. Also, the 
daily order changes as children grow or with the addition of new children to the home, or 
with a move to a new city or location.    
The power of the regula matrimonii is that it integrates the virtues and states 
necessary to excel in the practice of Christian householding. First, the rule is a matter for 
obedience. Married couples mutually submit in obedience to the regula. Spouses 
understand the rule to be an expression of their shared will for their Common Way in 
Christ. Even if, at times, their own will is contrary to the rule‘s (and it certainly will be), 
the rule is a supravoluntary aspect of their Christian householding to which they owe 
obedience. The spouses should prefer the will represented by the rule rather than their 
own will if a conflict arises. Spouses, after all, in constructing this rule, are prayerfully 
hoping that their own will as expressed in the rule is actually God‘s will for their 
marriage. In a strong sense, then, the couple intends that this rule mediate God‘s will for 
their practice of a Common Way in Christ. Through obedience together to the rule, the 
household hopes they are obedient together in Christ to the will of God the Father. The 
spouses cannot expect each other to mediate God‘s will in the way a superior of a 
religious order does for the vowed religious, but the household listens to God‘s will for 
their household and creates a rule to mediate that will and live in mutual obedience to 
God through their practice of a regular life. 
Second, the regula matrimonii encompasses chastity. The spouses‘ sexuality is 
subject to the ordering of the rule. The rule may build in times of abstinence that 
coordinate with liturgical days or seasons, annual novenas, etc. Additionally, if a couple 
finds need to delay pregnancy, the rule can be helpful in ordering the skill of NFP to the 
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service of CMS. If a couple is discerning their stance toward further pregnancy, this 
process can be intentionally built into the rule. Couples following this kind of a rule will 
be encouraged to see their sexual expression as another regular part of their Common 
Way in Christ, but it will allow them also to be spontaneous. By building in extra time in 
the evening a couple may or may not decide to be physically intimate, but the option 
exists if the couple has interest. By incorporating times of abstinence, the couple will 
likely experience less unexpected coldness toward physical intimacy. The periods of 
abstinence can act to kindle the spouses toward one another.  
Finally, the rule incorporates a commitment to poverty. The rule might state, for 
one, state that no person in the household exclusively owns any goods therein. The 
mother and father should be given the role of determining just appropriation of goods to 
each person, though this task can be shared with other, older members of the household. 
Second, the rule should specify the level of economic simplicity a household hopes to 
achieve and what steps the household will take to achieve them. Traumatic material 
poverty may strike any household, and this is to be avoided, but intentional poverty of 
some kind ought to be sought. Households should put themselves in positions of reliance 
on others and positions where others rely on them, even if it something as simple as 
buying a snowblower together with a neighbor, or something as complex as owning a 
home together with another household, vowed religious, or single, non-vowed persons.  
The couple will also have daily orders that will account for home economics, that 
is, they will include shopping and errands. These daily orders encourage the virtue of 
poverty inasmuch as they resist the reigning economic milieu that seeks to make 
consumption the ordering principle of life. Greater intentionality and planning in 
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shopping leads to greater frugality and attention to Christian economic principles a 
household may find difficult to do when shopping more spontaneously. For example, 
thinking in terms of preferential option for the poor and commitment to personal 
relationship with the producers of goods, a family friend decided to buy a farm share 
from a local, family farm: an organic CSA (community supported agriculture that 
provides food to 30 families). This meant that the family would not buy any vegetables 
from grocery during the Spring, Summer, or Fall (even if the farm share gave them 
vegetables they did not prefer). Additionally, the family had to find the extra money to 
cover the expense by opting out of a cellphone and high-speed internet. Beyond the 
upfront cost, though, is the true risk involved; if the farm has a low yield, the family will 
not have many vegetables to eat. In previous years, the family has bought a work-share in 
the farm with two other families. The mandatory 100 hours of work was too much for 
one family, so three families in the neighborhood split the share and the work. This meant 
adjusting and creating a rule to cooperate with the other families. One day a week, they 
cooperated to put in their hours, some car-pooling to the farm, some staying at their paid 
jobs, and another staying with the children for the day. Families can also build poverty, or 
a dependence on God, into their rule of life, by using it to determine giving practices 
regardless of income. Regardless of how little comes in, or how much expenses may 
grow, the household commits to giving the same percentage of income.          
As we have seen, a regula matrimonii has the potential to integrate poverty, 
chastity, and obedience of married spouses into a Common Way in Christ. The promises 
of this kind of rule, though, extend beyond married households alone. One of the 
promises of a wider application of regulas in Christian, especially conjugal life is the 
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ability for a rule to unite conjugal and celibate life in one Christian household. Among 
the authors who spoke of principles of Christian householding, the rule did not take a 
central place, though Bennett and the ―new monastic‖ movements have taken a big step 
in that direction with their charter of the 12 characteristics of the ―new monasticism.‖33 
Living in community, in obedience to a rule, celibates and married persons can serve 
each other and share in common and distinct ministries. Shared domestic endeavors in the 
household of God can provide unique, ecclesial solutions to problems faced both by 
celibates and married families as well as new possibilities for missions and ministries. Of 
course such efforts must not be rushed into, as they require clear vision, expectations, 
goals, and roles, but neither should they be avoided. After all, it has been the claim that 
both married and religious people are sharing in one domestic project, cohabiting in the 
household of God.  
 
PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS FOR A MARRIAGE NOVITIATE 
 
 In this final section, I will make some suggestions regarding a marriage novitiate. 
This topic itself deserves its own dissertation. In fact, there are already two strains of 
thought at work within the Catholic tradition on this topic. Michael Lawler and Paul A. 
Holmes have both proposed versions of a married catechumenate.
34
 Their approaches are 
at once similar and radically different. Both want to recover from the tradition rites and 
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practices that prepare people for sacramental married life in a stepwise, liturgical, and 
pedagogical fashion. The radical difference, though, is that Lawler believes he has found 
strong support in the tradition for arguing that marriage begins at betrothal. Lawler‘s 
catechumenate, therefore, involves cohabitation and sexual intimacy. For his part, 
Holmes finds the historical and current teaching to say that marriage begins with the rite 
of matrimony. His catechumenate, therefore, involves many recovered and translated 
rites from the tradition, but no cohabitation or sexual intimacy.  
Holmes‘s position is closer to my own, but my research takes marriage 
preparation more into the direction of the novitiate. A novitiate is, perhaps, more along 
the lines of how engaged couples ought to prepare and for what they are preparing. The 
couples, like seminarians, are preparing for a sacrament of service, not a sacrament of 
initiation. In that sense, novitiate may be a more apt analogy for describing the time of 
engagement. Furthermore, if catechumens were to die during preparation, they can be 
said to possess their end by intent. Conversely, if a fiancé were to die before marriage, he 
or she would not be considered married by intent, nor would a survivor be considered a 
widow or widower. Again, in this sense the novitiate seems more apt. Also marriage is 
entered by spoken consent, as is religious life, whereas baptism is an action done to the 
new Christian. Finally, the novitiate preparing for religious orders or for the priesthood is 
not fully initiated into the order until the liturgical rite of profession. Until that time, they 
are not permitted the fullness of that life‘s practice. In the same way, engaged couples are 
not married until they perform that rite of matrimony. Thus, their participation in the 
whole of married life, including cohabitation and sexual intimacy is unintelligible as a 
way to prepare for the marriage. A full argument for use of the term novitiate for 
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marriage preparation is not offered here, though. In fact, the term itself may not be apt—
after all, while fiancés are preparing for a sacrament, novices in a religious order are not 
preparing for any of the seven sacraments. This section, then, lays out some ground for 
new studies by making suggestions for how engaged persons might prepare for their 
Common Way in Christ by beginning to practice poverty, chastity, and obedience as a 
process of formation and partial participation.  
First, a moment on poverty. Engaged couples, no less than spouses, should begin 
to work toward poverty as a state of common possession and a virtue of radical 
dependence on God. Engaged couples need to begin discussing their current spending 
habits, expenses, goals, career aspirations, budgets, and moral criteria for consumption. 
For some couples this will be a discussion about how they see themselves getting out of 
poverty. For others this will be a discussion of how to embrace intentional forms of 
poverty, dependence on God, and solidarity with the poor. Couples should also be 
introduced to the evangelical counsel of poverty explicitly, through discussions with a 
priest and spiritual readings.
35
 On those grounds, couples could consider renting or 
buying in a poorer section of their city than they otherwise might have. The couple must 
decide if their marriage will be subject to the prevailing economic winds of ever-
increasing consumption. Mentors and priests should encourage couples to contribute 
together to a charitable cause, as well as to discuss whether and to what degree they will 
tithe. They ought to work of lists of ―things‖ that are necessities and wants. Together they 
should anticipate expenses and hold each other accountable to their spending while still 
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unmarried. They should talk about how they will put into action the notion of common 
possession. They should also talk about how money will affect their willingness to be 
open to God‘s gift of fertility, that is, whether their poverty or lack thereof constitutes a 
serious reason to avoid pregnancy temporarily. They should ask how they see themselves 
entering relationships of interdependence with neighbors and church. Co-ownership, 
especially a future place-of-residence, before marriage is risky, but under the right 
circumstances could be an opportunity for developing habits of fidelity to common goals 
and practice in working together. Rather than a practice in sharing and work for a 
common good, co-ownership could easily amount to a serious occasion for sin. Couples 
should be prepared for a distinct change upon beginning their marriage, and holding off 
on co-ownership helps reinforce the difference in state from single to married. The life 
they prepare to enter is a paradox that requires all they have and reminds them that they 
have nothing to give but themselves. 
Second, if chastity is as important and as difficult in entering the conjugal state 
and reaching its goals as it is in the religious state, then we as the church must identify 
and effect bold practices to form marrying couples in this virtue. Remote preparation for 
marriage in childhood and adolescence should provide a formation in the virtue of 
chastity, but the fact is that many couples will approach their parish priest with little or no 
training in the capacity to regulate and integrate their sexuality into the Christian conjugal 
life. Formation in chastity must begin from the very moment they approach a pastor for 
marriage. I suggest the following practice: require couples to make a verbal commitment 
to a chaste period of engagement as a condition for their celebrating matrimony in the 
Catholic Church. This requirement would hold for any couple, whether cohabiting or not. 
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The couple would not have to succeed to perfection, but their most earnest attempt should 
be expected. There would be no documentary record of the couple‘s success or failure to 
keep the commitment, but the couple would be encouraged to avail themselves of the 
sacrament of penance if necessary. Regular conversations with mentor couples and/or a 
pastor should not hesitate to broach the topic. With respect to the wide variety of moral 
development and the uniqueness of each couple‘s situation, the definition of ―chaste‖ 
should be discussed and defined along a spectrum with at least the pastor, but hopefully 
also with a mentor couple. The definitions will include clarity on chaste ways for the 
couple to express affection. For example, some couples may choose to refrain from any 
kind of touch or kiss that can typically cause sexual arousal. The definition will include 
clarity on the kinds of situations, media, language, and clothing to avoid (again, 
determined uniquely for each couple). The definition will also institute positive practices 
to advance in chastity. For example, conversations on sexual expectations and experience, 
on struggles relating to body image, and on struggles relating to current sexual sin.  
Chastity training should also include a course in human sexuality, including 
sessions on natural family planning. The priest and mentor couple should be sure to talk 
about prayerfully discerning what is meant by ―responsible parenthood,‖ and what might 
constitute ―serious reasons‖ for the couple to avoid a pregnancy. These pastoral actions of 
formation may lead to a decline in the number of marriages in the Church, at least 
initially. Some way must be found, though, to avoid any decline on account of the hurdles 
of material poverty and a lack of education. Extra resources must find their way to aid 
parishes that marry Catholics for whom the leisure time necessary for this kind of 
preparation in chastity is greatly difficult to come by. Baptized Christians have a right to 
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marriage in the Church, but their right is to a valid marriage. Without adequate 
preparation they are not free to exercise that right, and a pastor may be compelled by 
canon law to delay the wedding. Couples seriously lacking in, or unwilling to commit to 
chastity demonstrate their incapacity to make the marriage vows. As the body of Christ, 
we must insist on the public nature of married sexuality, that joining Christians ill-
prepared does the spouses as well as Christ‘s body a dis-service and a great irreverence. 
Finally, couples should prepare for obedience by common prayer, spiritual 
reading, and common works of mercy (soup kitchens, habitats for humanity, etc.). These 
kinds of activities will help engaged couples discern God‘s initial calling for them in their 
marriage. Through this discussion, reading, prayer, and action, the couple should develop 
at least an initial regula matrimonii with the help of a mentor couple, a priest or religious 
person. They should consider the virtues and goods they want to privilege, the roles they 
want to inhabit, and the form of life they hope to live. The engagement would be an 
opportunity for couples to visit a religious order and married friends‘ homes to see how 
others living according to a rule order their lives as a Common Way in Christ. They 
might even consider different forms or creative forms of Christian householding at this 
point with vowed religious or with single non-vowed persons in community. By the time 
the couple reaches their wedding day, they should be ready to hit the ground running with 
a well-ordered rough draft of their regula matrimonii, one that will certainly change, but 
will guide them in the early days as they discover God‘s will for their Christian 
householding together. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter has sought to creatively integrate the insights of those before it into a 
constructive proposal for Christian marriage understood under the paradigm of Common 
Way in Christ. The chapter has sketched a framework for what Christian marriage, as a 
form of Christian householding participating in the ecclesial states and virtues of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience, might look like in the contemporary context. To that end I have 
introduced practical consequences for the theoretical consonance between marriage and 
religious life developed in the first five chapters.  
The first section recalled the way that MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice,‖ the 
Augustinian notion of ecclesial-nuptials good, and the principles of Christian 
householding contribute to understanding marriage as a Common Way in Christ. 
MacIntyre‘s social-historical aspect of ―practice‖ went along with the householding 
principles of permeability and supravoluntarity. Fidelity to the standards of excellence in 
a practice occasionally calls practitioners to sacrifice external goods for the sake of 
internal goods; this fact is expressed by aspects of the familiarity and formality of 
Christian householding. Finally, the internal good of ―living as married people live‖ was 
understood according to the householding principles of ora et labora.  
The second section explored the place of poverty, chastity, and obedience as 
virtues and states in marriage as a Common Way in Christ. This task also incorporated 
common ground in Christ, as well as the principles of Christian householding and 
MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice.‖ In poverty, households resist the economy of 
consumption as the ordering principle for their practice of householding. Instead they 
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choose solidarity with the poor and conditions of real interdependence, reliance, and 
reliability. The notion of poverty as a virtue and state in marriage must avoid remaining 
at a merely metaphorical level. If it does, then the Christian household will remain under 
the power of the same economy of desire and consumption that has in part led to its 
current crisis. In conjugal chastity, couples integrate their entire being as sexed and 
gendered into their spousal love by realizing that love in the daily, bodily actions of their 
Christian householding. Far from being reducible to natural family planning, the practice 
of chaste married sexuality may incorporate this skill in service to marriage‘s internal 
good of the child (or responsible parenthood). In obedience, members of a conjugal 
household submit themselves to the common will for their marriage, a will they hope 
mediates the Father‘s will. In doing so the couple act together to live in Christ obeying 
his Father.  
Part three considered how a regula matrimonii integrates poverty, chastity, and 
obedience into one common way. The rule contains a statement of charism, a description 
of principles and roles, and a daily order for each kind of day. Among the benefits of a 
rule is its ability to order forms of Christian householding that might include spouses with 
children along with vowed religious or single-non-vowed, or multi-generational domestic 
arrangements. Finally, I suggested some hypotheses and sources for further research on 
how Christians might prepare for their common way of poverty, chastity, and obedience 
in Christ along the lines of a novitiate. 
 Admittedly, since I have provided merely a constructive framework and not a 
definitive account, this chapter gives only a few examples and indications enfleshing this 
framework‘s practical workings. A more detailed, complete account of marriage as 
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Common Way in Christ will have to be fleshed out in a subsequent study. Among aspects 
requiring further development is the way Augustinian ecclesio-nuptial goods of proles, 
fides, and sacramentum figure as internal goods of marriage as a Common Way in Christ. 
Second, the practice of chaste married sexuality, a sub practice of Christian marriage 
itself. Third, the possibilities for Christian householding among spouses, children, parents, 
vowed religious, or single non-vowed persons need more attention. Fourth, the notion of 
parenthood as a practice shared by the whole church, especially under the lost rubric of 
―spiritual parenthood‖ deserves renewed focus. Finally, this study focused on the 
conjugal side of the conjugal-consecrated consonance. A complementary study on the 
consecrated life and its participation in a Common Way with the goods of proles, fides, 
and sacramentum could prove a worthwhile project.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENTS 
 
 This dissertation began by invoking the Second Vatican Council‘s declaration that 
―Christ summons the Church to continual reformation as she sojourns here on earth.‖1 
The council‘s language of ―reformation‖ is especially apt for conjugal life and 
consecrated life in the way this dissertation seeks to envision them—as domestic 
practices situated within the greater household of God that conform people ever-more to 
the likeness of Christ. Practices, after all, are complex cooperative human activities in 
which virtues are formed and vices are reformed. Marriage and religious consecration, as 
christomorphic practices, form and reform people in Christ‘s virtues of poverty, chastity, 
and obedience. Furthermore, as ecclesial practices, the Church is the authoritative social 
milieu in which the internal goods, virtues, and standards of excellence exist. Likewise, 
as domestic practices of explicitly Christian householding, marriage and consecrated life 
are eschatologically ordered, conscious that the church ―sojourns here on earth‖ in 
anticipation of and in training for eternal life in the heavenly household of God, where 
Christ prepares a room for those who do now and always will abide with him and his 
Father.  
The goal of the dissertation has never been to fix marriage, but rather to reform 
our understanding and practice of what Christian marriage has always been by finding a 
suitable, paradigmatic approach. To this end I introduced the project with a sociological 
snapshot of the problems affecting contemporary marriage and family in America, as 
well as with theological, sociological, economic, political, and philosophical narratives 
for where marriage is, how it got there, and where it must go. Each narrative forwards its 
                                                          
1
 Unitatis redintegratio, 6. 
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own diagnosis of the disease and a related cure. The diagnoses and treatments for the 
illness plaguing marriage relate to the paradigms used to understand marriage itself. In 
demonstrating this claim, chapter one described two existing paradigms for thinking 
about the purpose, goods, and virtues involved with marriage: thinking of marriage as 
―relationship‖ and marriage as ―practice.‖ Each of these paradigms contributes to solving 
some of the difficulties in marriage, but each leaves challenges unaddressed or even 
creates additional challenges. The relational paradigm is overly anthropological—with 
little connection to Trinity and without the church as the primary context for the 
relationship. The relational paradigm can be christological and even ecclesial (e.g., the 
relationship between the spouses is the sacrament of Christ‘s bond to the Church), but in 
a way that tends to reify one spouse as Christ and the other as the church. Authors using 
the relational paradigm also tended to see marriage as a relationship between two persons 
alongside of the church rather than within it. At the same time, practice language lacked a 
rich theological grounding, but had made a strong move to situate marriage principally 
within the Church. Some third paradigm that involves aspects of both ―relationship‖ and 
―practice‖ was required, with a theological foundation to anchor it.  
The language for this paradigm, I argued, must come from the life of the Church 
rather than the grammar of the state or civil society, because Christian marriage‘s primary 
context is ecclesial and its primary end (as determined by that context) is the 
sanctification of the spouses. Thus I sought an aspect of ecclesial life with an already rich 
tradition and theological grounding in Christ and the Trinity as a practice for moving 
toward the universal vocation of Christian perfection: vowed religious life in community. 
Hoping to find a common ground and a higher viewpoint, I hypothesized a consonance 
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between vowed religious life and matrimonial life. In developing that consonance, a new 
paradigm for understanding marriage was conceived and came to birth: Christian 
marriage as Common Way in Christ. 
Chapter two continued by turning to contemporary attempts to relate and 
distinguish conjugal and consecrated life. These authors produced helpful insights into 
the relationship between the two states of life, but they ultimately maintain a version of 
the oppositional, competitive account that necessarily dichotomizes the two states and 
fails to see their common ground in Christ the Second Person of the Trinity. The risk of 
relating the two states is that essential aspects of one will be borrowed or interpolated 
into the other, thereby adulterating its authentic practice. The result is ―monasticized‖ 
marriage or ―domesticated‖ religious life. My paradigm avoids this pitfall by identifying 
aspects essential to both ways of life, since they are both manifestations of a larger 
practice—householding with God. Furthermore, I intended to overcome the adversarial 
narrative of the consecrated-conjugal relationship with a counter-narrative that 
demonstrates complex relationship between these states, and the bi-directional sharing of 
images and concepts that has existed between the states throughout Christian history. The 
counter-narrative sees the two states as composing together the one bride of Christ who is 
united to and abides with the bridegroom. 
Chapter three took on the challenge of showing the complex relationship between 
consecrated and conjugal life had already existed in the patristic era, and that, in the 
patristic tradition accounts of that relationship, we could find a non-adversarial and 
cooperative perspective. Augustine‘s position within the Donatist, Manichean, and 
Pelagian controversies provided ample opportunity for him to answer the same level 
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playing field and hierarchical approaches to marriage and monasticism that exist in 
modern scholarship from chapter two. Augustine‘s creative renarration of this 
relationship shows a dialogical relationship between the two states and their sacramental 
(signifying) value throughout salvation history. Ultimately, both married and virgins 
share in the ecclesio-nuptial goods of proles, fides, and sacramentum whether literally, 
allegorically, analogically, or anagogically. The Augustinian vision of these states‘ 
common participation provides us with an authoritative source in the tradition that 
suggests a refocusing of our attention away from antagonistic distinction between the 
states of Christian life and toward the common share these states have in the life of Christ, 
in the life of the church. 
In the fourth chapter, contemporary scholars who envision Christian life in terms 
of Christian-householding principles take center stage. Four pairs of principles in tension 
were identified: intentionality and supravoluntarity; familiarity and formality; exclusivity 
and permeability; and ora et labora. These Christian-householding principles offer for 
matrimony and religious life a good start, and they help alleviate the confusion regarding 
the connection between family and church in theologies of the family. These principles of 
unity reminded us that both vowed religious life and conjugal life are shaped by the 
larger identity and purposes of the Body of Christ. While these principles are helpful, 
chapter four noted significant lacks, among them the understanding of life according to a 
regula, the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, and Christ and the 
Trinity as foundation for these principles and practices. 
In chapter five, therefore, I grounded both married and religious life three 
theological loci not attended to by the principles of Christian householding. Marriage and 
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religious life are grounded in vows, specifically the vows of poverty, chastity, and 
obedience. Poverty, chastity, and obedience, though, are not only vows, but states and 
virtues as well. As virtues and states they are present in the nexus of Christian life: Christ, 
the second Adam and the Second Person of the Trinity. Married and religious share in 
these virtues ecclesially, that is, by virtue of the sacraments of initiation all Christians are 
incorporated into Christ‘s body. They share, therefore, what pertains to Christ. They are 
one with Christ the poor, chaste, and obedient bridegroom. They also share in Christ‘s 
life as Second Person of the Trinity. Both matrimonial and vowed religious life are 
confessions of the Trinity in the practices and relationships they hold as communiones 
personarum. 
 Having argued for the fundamental character of poverty, chastity, and obedience 
as vows, virtues and states in the nexus of Christ as new Adam and Second Person of the 
Trinity, chapter six could proceed to integrate the insights from all previous chapters into 
a framework for marriage as Common Way in Christ. This paradigm makes advances 
over the two that I offered in chapter one. By grounding the married life in Christ, what 
the human person is called to be, this paradigm succeeds where the relational paradigm 
did not; the relational paradigm was grounded in anthropology not closely linked to 
Christology. While the practice paradigm attempted to situate marriage within the church, 
the Common Way in Christ paradigm develops the specifically Christian householding 
principles to fill out that situation. Furthermore, the Common Way I Christ paradigm 
offers theological grounding in Christ and the Trinity to strongly affirm the legitimacy 
and consequences of that ecclesial location. Marriage as Common Way in Christ, by 
relying on Augustine‘s accomplishments in his own time, as well as the principles of 
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Christian householding in contemporary though, has overcome the adversarial difficulties 
and the problem of dichotomizing the states of life that plagued modern attempts to put 
the marriage and consecrated life in dialogue (which we saw in chapter two).  
A key distinguishing factor of my own attempt at this kind of exploration is that it 
does not interpolate poverty, chastity, and obedience or the principles of Christian 
householding as essentially monastic wisdom that can be lived in some partial way by 
married folk. In other words, the effort to understand poverty, chastity, and obedience in 
the married state is not a monasticization of marriage. I based the exploration, instead, on 
the stronger claim that these virtues, states, and vows, lie behind both religious and 
married life as principally ecclesial goods. These virtues and states—poverty, chastity, 
and obedience—are primarily evangelical counsels or imperatives of the church, 
instantiated in slightly different ways in the lives of the consecrated (as we saw in chapter 
five), the married (as discussed in chapter six), and even single, non-vowed members of 
the church (who are not considered here). Chapter six, then, hypothesized householding 
practices for poverty, chastity, and obedience within the larger ecclesial practice of 
Christian marriage. 
 The first section of chapter six recalled MacIntyre‘s definition of ―practice‖ as 
applied to marriage in light the goods internal to participation in the marriage of the one 
Church to Christ. These goods come from the insights of Augustine and the scholars 
studied in chapter four. The second section sketched examples and possibilities for 
poverty, chastity, and obedience in marriage as they relate to the principles of Christian 
householding from chapter four. From here, the chapter moved to a consideration of a 
regula matrimonii, which integrates the practice of Christian marriage around its internal 
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goods, principles, and virtues. The chapter closed with suggestions for further research 
into how couples might prepare for this kind of Common Way in Christ in terms of a 
marriage novitiate. 
 The paradigmatic framework for marriage as a Common Way in Christ is 
admittedly skeletal, heuristic, and not definitively fleshed out. Since it offers only a 
theological grounding and constructive framework and not a definitive account, this 
dissertation produced but a few examples and indications for this framework‘s practical 
working. A more detailed, complete account of marriage as Common Way in Christ will 
have to be fleshed out in a subsequent study. Among aspects requiring further 
development is the way Augustinian ecclesio-nuptial goods of proles, fides, and 
sacramentum figure as internal goods of marriage as a Common Way in Christ. Second, 
the practice of chaste married sexuality, a sub practice of Christian marriage itself needs 
additional development. Third the notion of parenthood as a practice shared by the whole 
church, especially under the lost rubric of ―spiritual parenthood‖ deserves renewed focus. 
Finally, while this study focused on the conjugal side of the conjugal-consecrated 
consonance, a complementary study on the consecrated life and its participation in a 
Common Way with the goods of proles, fides, and sacramentum could prove a 
worthwhile project. 
Without question, much remains to be done in the effort to understand what 
conjugal life is and how spouses can live it as part of the larger practice of inhabiting 
God‘s household. Rather than answering all the questions, this dissertation has set down a 
foundation for future studies and constructive efforts. Specifically, fruitful study should 
continue on how fiancés prepare for this Common Way and how spouses are continually 
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formed in this Common Way. As an example of the latter, in chapter four I briefly 
considered the possibility of thinking ecclesially about breakdown in conjugal, 
consecrated, or mixed communities with the language of cessation, repentance, 
reconciliation, and return to communion. This avenue of study ought to bear fruit for 
practices of preparation, formation, and reformation in both states of life. The possibility 
of ―novitiate‖ language in preparation is promising, as it is practical, liturgical, long-term, 
and forms persons in the virtues they will need to successfully live their marriage. 
Additionally, greater focus deserves to be placed on forming fiancés in poverty, chastity, 
and obedience. The possibilities for conjugal formation in these same areas is exciting, 
especially because it could incorporate the activities of religious orders.  
Hopefully, more scholars will pursue creative ways to organize and structure 
Christian householding intergenerationally, with a mix of consecrated and married 
persons, perhaps with a renewal of an order of widows. Historical resources and 
contemporary practices of religious institutes and associations of lay faithful will prove 
helpful to this endeavor. Finally, with the riches of the Christian tradition‘s reflection on 
poverty, chastity, and obedience (and other virtues of Christian householding) opened 
onto new light by seeing marriage as Common Way in Christ, the possibilities for future 
articulation of marital practice as participation in God‘s household will hopefully bear 
fruit for generations to come. 
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